Trade Unions in Chechnya, from Gorbachev to Kadyrov

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Trade Unionism in Chechnya Between the Soviet System, State Collapse, and War (1989–2001)

From socialist welfare management to institutional breakdown: the trajectory of a social actor in conditions of systemic collapse.

Introduction

Trade unionism in Chechnya during the 1990s represents one of the most anomalous cases in the post-Soviet space. Unlike other former Soviet republics, where trade unions underwent a relatively linear transformation into representative labor organizations, in Chechnya they operated under conditions of extreme state discontinuity: the dissolution of the Soviet order, the emergence of a non-recognized state, systemic economic collapse, internal political conflict, and eventually full-scale war.

In this context, trade unions ceased to function as stable social actors and instead assumed a hybrid and unstable role, oscillating between welfare administration, political mobilization, and institutional survival.

The Soviet Legacy

By the late 1980s, trade unions in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR were fully integrated into the Soviet system. They did not represent workers against power; rather, they operated within the state apparatus, performing functions such as:

-welfare management (sanatoriums, vacations, housing)

-distribution of social benefits

-administrative mediation

-organizational and disciplinary control

Their model was structurally non-confrontational.[1]

In 1990, this system was reorganized into what would become the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), which inherited the institutional structure and assets of Soviet trade unionism.[2] However, with the collapse of the USSR, the fundamental premise — the state as employer — disappeared.

The facade of the “Red Hammer” factory in Grozny

1991–1992: Suspension and Restoration

With the rise of Dzhokhar Dudayev and the proclamation of Chechen independence, trade unions were perceived as ambiguous institutions: remnants of the Soviet past, yet also potentially autonomous centers of power. According to union sources, in 1991 the Chechen Parliament formally suspended trade union activity [3]. Only on 1 September 1992, following a legal dispute, were trade unions allowed to resume operations. In July 1992, the Third Congress of Trade Unions elected Ramzan Ampukaev as chairman of the Federation. Among the emerging leaders was Magomed Mamatiev, who would later play a key role in attempts to reconstruct the union movement.

1993: From Social Conflict to Political Crisis

The economic crisis of 1993 — marked by unpaid wages, pension arrears, and financial instability — pushed trade unions into a more active role. After a three-day strike, a demonstration was organized in Grozny on 15 April 1993. According to Mamatiev: “We organized a one-day protest… then the demonstration was taken over by others.”[4] Other sources suggest that the protest quickly escalated into a political confrontation, with demands for the resignation of the president and institutional reform.[5] The consequences were decisive:

-loss of union control over social insurance

-depletion of resources

-political marginalization

Thus, 1993 marked the transition of trade unions from social actors to politically contested institutions.

Magomed Mamatiev

War and Disintegration (1994–1996)

The First Chechen War led to the near-total collapse of trade union structures.

Organizations survived only in residual form:

-reduced administrative capacity

-passive management of assets

-absence of effective representation

Nevertheless, minimal organizational continuity allowed for later reconstruction attempts.

1996–1999: Failed Reconstruction

Following the Khasavyurt Accords (1996) and the presidency of Aslan Maskhadov, efforts were made to rebuild state institutions. Magomed Mamatiev emerged as a central figure in attempts to revive trade unionism. However, these efforts faced structural constraints:

-lack of a functioning economy

-weak state institutions

-increasing militarization of society

In 1999, Mamatiev’s group promoted the creation of a non-sectoral trade union structure (bezotraslevoy sovprof), attempting to move beyond the Soviet model. This initiative, supported by figures such as Khusein Akhmadov, led to the emergence of the so-called “mamatievtsy”, representing the last organized attempt to establish autonomous trade unionism in Ichkeria.[6]

Trade Unions and Sharia

In 1998, during the institutional introduction of Sharia law, a parliamentary commission proposed the dissolution of trade unions. Their survival was ensured by the intervention of the Muftiate led by Akhmad Kadyrov, which declared trade union statutes compatible with Islamic law.[7] This episode highlights the precarious position of trade unions:

-not fully integrated into the state

-required to justify their legitimacy in a shifting normative framework

1999–2001: Forced Reintegration

With the outbreak of the Second Chechen War, trade union activity was again suspended. In November 1999, Russian military authorities ordered the abolition of Ichkerian legislation and the suspension of social organizations. In April 2000, trade unions were re-registered under Russian law, initiating reintegration into the FNPR framework[8]. However, internal divisions persisted, and activities were restricted. In 2001, congresses were banned within Chechnya.  Trade unions survived, but without political autonomy.

Ramzan Ampukaev, today “reconciled” with the Kadyrov regime

Mamatiev and Unionism Without a Base

Magomed Mamatiev’s trajectory encapsulates the contradictions of Chechen trade unionism.

Key features:

-Soviet professional background

-social orientation

-support for Maskhadov’s state-building project

-Structural limitations:

-absence of economic base

-institutional fragility

-dominance of military actors

Mamatiev represents an attempt to transform trade unionism into a socio-political actor in a context where the material conditions for such transformation did not exist.

Conclusion

Chechen trade unionism in the 1990s cannot be understood as either a continuation of the Soviet model or a transition toward Western labor representation. It constitutes a distinct phenomenon: trade unionism under conditions of state collapse. Its defining characteristics include:

-loss of economic function

-temporary politicization

-progressive marginalization

-eventual reintegration into an external system (FNPR)

This trajectory reflects the critical traits of the state-building in Chechnya: even deeply rooted institutions failed to survive the combined pressures of economic collapse, political conflict, and war.

Yet within this process, figures such as Mamatiev embody an alternative vision — one that sought to construct not only a sovereign state, but a social state.

Notes

[^1]: On the structure and function of Soviet trade unions, see general literature on Soviet labor institutions and welfare distribution mechanisms.

[^2]: Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), institutional continuity from Soviet trade unions.

[^3]: Internal Chechen trade union historical accounts (post-2000 publications).

[^4]: Interview with Magomed Mamatiev, Golos Chechenskoy Respubliki, No. 3 (20995), 24–31 January 1997.

[^5]: Accounts of the April 15, 1993 Grozny demonstration in Russian-language sources.

[^6]: Trade union historical publications (post-2000) referencing the “mamatievtsy” initiative.

[^7]: Trade union histories documenting interaction with Islamic legal institutions in late Ichkeria.

[^8]: Post-2000 accounts of trade union re-registration under Russian administration.

Il Primo ministro ceceno in esilio Zakayev ha consegnato a Europa Radicale massima onorificenza alla memoria di Antonio Russo

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Zakayev: “quanto accade in Ucraina è ennesima tappa del colonialismo russo, iniziato negli anni ’90 da Eltsin. Putin deve essere giudicato all’Aja per i suoi crimini; non per vendetta ma per giustizia”.

Si è tenuto al “Polo del ‘900” di Torino il convegno “Dalla Cecenia all’Ucraina”, in cui è intervenuto anche il primo ministro in esilio della Repubblica cecena di Ickeria, Akhmed Zakayev, per la prima volta a Torino. Insieme a lui lo storico Francesco Benedetti e il giornalista Andrea Braschayko.

Nel suo intervento Zakayev ha ripercorso in modo analitico e preciso tutte le aggressioni militari compiute già negli anni ’90 del secolo scorso dalla Federazione Russa contro gli Stati vicini (Inguscezia, Azerbaigian, Moldova, Cecenia, Georgia); le guerre coloniali russe di Eltsin furono la riproposizione dell’imperialismo sovietico, senza alcuna soluzione di continuità. Putin ha preso il testimone da Eltsin e ha continuato l’opera: seconda guerra cecena, occupazione del 20% della Georgia, occupazione del 20% dell’Ucraina (senza dimenticare il fondamentale appoggio militare al regime siriano del criminale Assad).


Zakayev ha poi ribadito che la Corte Penale Internazionale dell’Aia deve processare Vladimir Putin per i suoi crimini, “non per vendetta ma per impedire a Putin di commettere altri crimini e per impedire ad altri di imitare Putin”. E a proposito di crimini russi, al termine del suo intervento, Zakayev ha consegnato nelle mani di Igor Boni (presidente di Europa Radicale) la piu’ alta onorificenza cecena, assegnata (alla memoria) ad Antonio Russo, giornalista di Radio Radicale, ucciso barbaramente in Georgia nel 2000 mentre stava documentando i crimini russi nella vicina Cecenia.

Igor Boni e Silvja Manzi hanno dichiarato:


“Dobbiamo ringraziare Akhmed Zakayev tre volte. La prima perché, dopo oltre trent’anni di lotta incessante per il diritto alla vita del suo Paese, non ha perso una briciola della sua intelligenza politica e della sua passione civile. La seconda per i riconoscimenti reiterati all’impegno dei radicali per la difesa dei valori di libertà e democrazia dalla minaccia putiniana.

Ma soprattutto ringraziamo Zakayev per non avere dimenticato Antonio Russo, “un radicale giornalista” (come lo definì Pannella). E questo proprio nel momento in cui Radio Radicale lotta per la propria sopravvivenza, che è la sopravvivenza di un enorme patrimonio di informazione e conoscenza. Consegneremo l’onorificenza alla direzione di Radio Radicale, per arricchire tale patrimonio”.

Salman Abuev – From Independence to Collaboration

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The story of Salman Abuev – a Chechen soldier and official – embodies the contradictions of Chechnya in the 1990s. A distinguished fighter in the First Chechen War, Abuev was honored as a national hero of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, only to be branded a traitor after joining the pro-Russian side. He became a key collaborator of Akhmat Kadyrov during the Second Chechen War, and was killed in an ambush in September 2001. Below is a biographical profile that traces his career, contextualizing it within the Chechen conflict and reporting the assessments of both sides.

Background and Education

Salman Abuev was likely born in 1962, originally from the village of Alleroy in the Kurchaloy district. We lack detailed information on his early education, but his figure emerged during the First Russo-Chechen War (1994-1996). Abuev immediately joined the pro-independence camp and fought in the Ichkerian Army, reaching the rank of colonel. He distinguished himself for his military merits during the conflict, earning the respect of the state’s leaders: at the end of the war, the new president, Aslan Maskhadov, promoted him to the rank of Brigadier General and awarded him the “Honor of the Nation” decoration, one of the ChRI’s highest decorations. This decoration—conferred personally by Maskhadov—attested to Abuev’s courage and dedication in the struggle for independence.

Aslan Maskhadov (right) and Alexander Lebed (left) at the sign of Khasavyurt Accords (30 August 1996)

With the peace that followed the Khasavürt Accords and the election of Maskhadov (1997), Abuev initially became involved in the power structures of the newly independent republic. For a short time, he served as chief of the Kurchaloy district police, his home region. Subsequently, in the spring of 1997, Maskhadov promoted him to a more senior role, appointing him head of the Department for the Protection of State Property, an office primarily responsible for combating oil theft and illegal refining, endemic scourges of the postwar Chechen economy. This position, also known by its Russian acronym DOGO, was particularly prestigious, as it placed Abuev in charge of protecting the entire national oil sector. In this capacity, he also commanded an armed unit tasked with guarding extraction facilities and suppressing illicit trafficking.

Military and Political Career

Despite his prominent role in post-war Ichkeria, Abuev clashed with some of Maskhadov’s leadership. In particular, according to Russian sources, he openly criticized Maskhadov for the growing tolerance of radical Islamist groups (the “Wahhabites”) in Chechnya in the late 1990s. These political frictions strained his relationship with the president. On April 5, 1999, Abuev was dismissed from his post as head of the State Property Department by Maskhadov, because he was deemed “incapable of putting an end to oil theft.” As a result, he was demoted to lower-level positions: Maskhadov transferred him to head a district police department (according to some sources in the Gudermes district, according to others back in Kurchaloy). During this period, operating in the field far from the capital, Abuev encountered the climate of growing instability and became better acquainted with Akhmat Kadyrov, then Mufti of Chechnya. In Gudermes, Kadyrov—despite being part of Maskhadov’s government—was taking increasingly critical stances and paving the way for a possible agreement with Moscow.

In August 1999, the situation escalated: the armed incursions of commanders Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab into Dagestan drew a clear condemnation from Kadyrov. Kadyrov and Abuev, now allies, issued a political ultimatum to Maskhadov, declaring that they would cease supporting him unless he publicly condemned the actions of the guerrillas who had entered Dagestan. This was the breaking point: at the outbreak of the Second Russo-Chechen War (October 1999), Abuev made his final choice, siding with Akhmat Kadyrov on the Russian side.

Akhmat (left) and Ramzan (right) Kadyrov

In the fall of 1999, Abuev—now Brigadier General—and Sulim Yamadaev (another influential local commander) withdrew their units from Gudermes, allowing Russian troops to take control without a fight. This act amounted to a surrender of Chechen territory’s second largest city and was a key event: in response, President Maskhadov accused Kadyrov, Abuev, and the Yamadaev brothers of treason, while the Ichkeria Sharia Court sentenced them in absentia to death for high treason. Abuev switched sides in the conflict: he publicly repudiated Maskhadov in the very first days of the Russian operation and declared his support for Mufti Kadyrov, who would become the head of the pro-Russian interim administration in June 2000.

Within the nascent collaborationist government, Abuev soon became one of the few former high-ranking separatist commanders to switch sides. Moscow, however, did not place complete trust in these figures: in 2000, Abuev was even arrested by the federal military, perhaps on suspicion of double-dealing. Akhmat Kadyrov had to intervene at the highest levels—apparently with the direct support of the Kremlin—to secure his release. This demonstrates the ambiguity of Abuev’s position in those months: by now unwelcome to the separatists, he was not yet fully integrated into the new pro-Russian system. Kadyrov, however, considered him a highly valued collaborator and personal friend; he took him with him on sensitive political missions, such as a trip to Strasbourg to the Council of Europe, where Abuev and Kadyrov appeared side by side to denounce the Maskhadov government. Abuev also championed a conciliatory stance: he appeared on local TV urging Chechen guerrillas to lay down their arms and return to civilian life, following the Kremlin’s previously dictated strategy of thinning out separatist lines through calls for reconciliation and individual amnesties.

Sulim Yamadaev

Shift to the pro-Russian front

In the second half of 2000, with Russian control over lowland Chechnya consolidated, Kadyrov began appointing his own trusted personnel to local administrations. Salman Abuev, though disliked by his former comrades, had military experience and knowledge of the territory, as well as personal ties with Kadyrov. Kadyrov lobbied for a prominent role in the new apparatus: after much persuasion, in August 2001 he obtained Moscow’s approval to appoint Abuev as head of the Internal Affairs Department (OVD) for the Kurchaloy district. Paradoxically, Abuev found himself holding almost the same position he had held under Maskhadov (head of the district police), but this time within the pro-Russian administration.

According to local accounts, a dramatic event convinced Abuev to accept this assignment and become actively involved in the field: in August 2001, during a large-scale “zachistka” (anti-partisan roundup) operation conducted by federal forces in his home village of Alleroy, many civilians were subjected to abuse and violence. Shocked by what had happened to his community, Abuev decided to take over the leadership of the district police to protect the local population and restore a modicum of order. As a former commander known and feared in the area, he acted with a certain autonomy towards both Maskhadov’s men and the federal military, attempting to apply the law impartially. During the few weeks he was in charge in Kurchaloy, he took courageous initiatives: for example, he ordered the temporary detention facility (IVS) to be moved from the military komendatura base—where civilians were often mistreated—to a building under the civilian jurisdiction of his OVD, “as required by law.” He also insisted on dismantling a notorious military checkpoint between Kurchaloy and the nearby village of Mayrtup, notorious for extorting passersby. These moves earned him the favor of some residents, tired of the security forces’ excesses, but angered some elements of the federal apparatus, whose presence guaranteed Abuev a modicum of protection.

Shortly before his death, Abuev had a public clash with the local FSB chief: as witnesses in Alleroy reported, the Chechen general rebuked the FSB officer for his brutal methods against civilians and declared that he would not tolerate further abuse, threatening to turn directly to FSB director Nikolai Patrushev in Moscow if necessary. This episode highlights how Abuev was balancing two fronts: on the one hand, he sought to demonstrate loyalty to the Russians by ensuring order; on the other, he maintained a firm stance in defending the population, attracting enmity both among the separatist ranks and among some circles of the federal forces.

Kurchaloy District (in red)

Death

On the evening of September 20, 2001, about a month after taking office in Kurchaloy, Salman Abuev was ambushed. While driving home with his younger brother and several fellow police officers, his vehicle was attacked by a group of armed, masked men near the road between Kurchaloy and Mayrtup. The attackers opened fire at close range, riddling the car with bullets and killing Abuev instantly along with six people accompanying him. Among the victims were Salman’s brother, Ayub Abuev (18), and several officers originally from Alleroy (Sultan Temirbulatov, Sultan Usmanov, Yusup Darshaev), as well as two other local police officers. According to some reports, Abuev attempted to retaliate by firing several shots with his service pistol, possibly wounding one of the attackers, but was overwhelmed by the crossfire. A few minutes later, other OVD officers from Kurchaloy arrived, but they too were ambushed.

Abuev’s elimination was a severe blow to Akhmat Kadyrov: Salman was one of the very few former commanders of the ChRI army who had defected to his side. Kadyrov personally visited the village for the funeral, but the ceremony was marked by tensions – Russian soldiers at the Alleroy checkpoint blocked access to the funeral procession for a long time, leaving dozens of people who had come to pay their respects stranded. Abuev’s murder by the rebels was part of a spiral of targeted violence against pro-Moscow administration officials: just six days later, Kurchaloy’s deputy district commander, Sheikh Dugaev, was also assassinated, and in the following weeks, other local officials suffered the same fate. This campaign had a specific purpose: to intimidate and “morally” undermine Akhmat Kadyrov, systematically depriving him of his most valuable collaborators and discouraging any further defectors.

Historical Assessment

On the political and propaganda levels, Salman Abuev was viewed diametrically opposed by the two warring sides. For the Republic of Ichkeria, Abuev was now a renegade: the Maskhadov government formally removed him from all ranks and honors previously awarded to him, including revoking his title of “Honor of the Nation” and posthumously demoting him. As already mentioned, an Islamic court had sentenced him to death in 1999, and his killing was greeted by separatists as the execution of a traitor. On the pro-Russian side, however, Abuev was presented as an example of a Chechen patriot who had abandoned the extremist cause to embrace the path of peace under the Federation.

Ramzan Kadyrov on Abuev’s grave

Akhmat Kadyrov publicly mourned his passing, calling it a grave personal and political loss, and praised Abuev’s courage in fighting the “terrorists” to the point of ultimate sacrifice. Local government sources emphasized that Abuev had died “in the line of duty” while resisting an ambush by a numerically superior terrorist group. In subsequent years, Chechen officials remembered Abuev as a “hero,” and commemorations in his honor were held in Kurchaloy; Ramzan Kadyrov himself (Akhmat’s son) visited his grave.

My fate is the fate of my people – Interview with Magomed Mamatiev

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(Golos Chechenskoy Respubliki newspaper, No. 3 (20995), January 24–31, 1997)

Today we present to our readers a conversation with the hero of many articles published in our newspaper in the 1960s and 1970s, civil engineer Magomed Mamatiev, a candidate for deputy to the Parliament of the Chechen Republic in Electoral District No. 3 “Olympic” of the Leninsky District of Grozny.


Correspondent: Magomed, tell us briefly about yourself.

Magomed Mamatiev: I am 55 years old, I come from the village of Valerik, I have a higher education—a degree in construction from the Oil Institute—and I worked my way up from bricklayer to head of the construction department. I am currently vice president of the Federation of Trade Unions of the Chechen Republic. I have been awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor and two medals.


Correspondent: You belong to the generation that lived through the tragedy of 1944; did you perhaps think that all our problems were behind us?


Magomed Mamatiev: Our family ended up in the coldest region of Kazakhstan, the Kustanai region. My father was arrested in 1949 along with a learned alim for singing nazmy, and later my mother as well for cutting down three trees when the barn roof collapsed. The five of us children—the oldest was 14 and the youngest a newborn—were left on our own. We were saved from hunger and cold by the kindness of people, both Chechens and Russians.
In September 1959, I enrolled at the Grozny Oil Institute. Studying was easy. For today’s youth, most of whom pretend to study, I want to say that we didn’t know what it meant to pay money for a test or an exam. And we didn’t even have any money. Sometimes we went without food for days. We unloaded carts full of potatoes, onions, and coal at night. We constantly felt the teachers’ distrust of our knowledge. They graded our knowledge one point lower than students of other nationalities. We had to prove our worth through our diligence and hard work.
Like all my peers, my childhood was stolen from me, and we were left with a hungry and difficult youth.
After graduating from high school, I had to spend three months knocking on the doors of construction companies that, according to the ads, were looking for skilled workers. They asked me to fill out application forms and then politely turned me down. After three months, I met the kindest person, my new mentor Baskhanov Umar (Dala gechdoyla tsunna), who
hired me as a foreman and started my new working life.

Correspondent: In almost every country, trade unions are called upon to protect the interests of workers. Naturally, friction arises between them and the authorities on many issues. You and your colleagues led the union leadership in 1992. How did your relations with those in power develop?

Magomed Mamatiev: Numerous measures were adopted and efforts were made to foster cooperation between enterprises and all branches of the Republic’s government. However, none of the issues raised during meetings and by union activists were resolved. Wage arrears increased; pensions, salaries, and other benefits were not paid.

Correspondent: In the spring of 1993, a demonstration organized by the unions began in Grozny. Many are inclined to believe that this demonstration—that is, you and your comrades—is responsible for the subsequent negative events of 1993. What can you say to your opponents?

Magomed Mamatiev: Before the demonstration, the unions called a three-day strike demanding the cancellation of arrears on wages, pensions, and other social benefits, and warned the government that if these issues were not resolved, they would organize a demonstration. No response. We tried to meet with the President, but it didn’t work out. After receiving authorization for the demonstration from the mayor’s office, we organized a one-day protest and concluded the union demonstration at the scheduled time. Subsequently, the demonstration was led by local and municipal officials.
As you say, some politicians blamed union leaders for the subsequent clashes with their former associates. And our president and colleague Ampukaev Ramzan, declared an enemy by these “some,” organized massive rallies and protest marches against the entry of Russian troops into the Polish cities of Warsaw and Krakow.
And no one speaks of the military action in late December 1993, when the Presidential Palace was surrounded by tanks, armored vehicles, and troops.

Correspondent: Who do you believe is responsible for the national tragedies?

Magomed Mamatiev: There are many. Briefly, here are a few. Foremost among those responsible for our tragedy are the gray-bearded “Hajji pilgrims,” whom our President called sailors. These people did everything possible and impossible to divide our society into teips, virds, and nationalities. Having imagined themselves to be leaders of the people, they eventually began to interfere in state affairs. Some of the current candidates for the presidency have supported these pilgrims.
Usman Imaev did everything to exacerbate the confrontation between the President and Parliament; the main fault of this “man” is the complete destruction of the foundations of the Chechen state: its finances. After Russia abolished the 1991–1992 banknotes effective August 25, 1993, Imaev decided to keep this currency in circulation in the Republic until November 1, and for this worthless paper, the sale of everything that had not yet been sold began. This worthless paper was purchased in neighboring regions and republics at 102% of face value and delivered to Imaev’s bank for 30% of the cost. The remaining 70% of the cost was covered by Imaev and others like him.
According to some sources, loans totaling over 800 billion rubles were disbursed in the Republic starting in November 1993. And this is precisely where Imaev’s scheme was developed. Using forged documents from guarantor companies—whose executives received 5–10% of the loan amount—the lender paid Imaev 20% in dollars, and the National Bank transferred the loan amount to one of the commercial banks. These banks, in turn, transferred this sum to any address in the former Soviet Union for 15–20% of the loan amount.
And it is no coincidence that the National Bank and other banks were the first to be destroyed during the war. According to eyewitnesses, all the streets and squares of destroyed Grozny were littered with Imaev’s scrap paper.
In the same camp are Taymaz Abubakarov, Yeraghi Mamodayev with his team, the Albakovs, and, of course, Zavgaev’s team.
Here lies a vast field of activity for the Sharia court.

Correspondent: 16 presidential candidates. Isn’t that too many for our small republic? And in general, who do you prefer? I can’t insist on an answer to the last question…

Magomed Mamatiev: Whether many or not so many. After all, there are only five main contenders. I would vote for any of them if they were the only candidate.
But I see Aslan Maskhadov as the President of the Republic. I don’t know him personally, but I know Vakha Arsanov. Due to my professional responsibilities, I had to attend parliamentary sessions and learn the positions of all the deputies on issues related to building an independent state. I got the impression that Vakha was an honest and decent person who cares deeply about our future.
I am certain that Arsanov would never have agreed to run in the elections alongside Maskhadov if he had doubted his integrity and his intentions to build an independent Chechen state.

Correspondent: What motivated you to run in the parliamentary elections?

Magomed Mamatiev: The only thing that motivated me to run in the parliamentary elections was the hope that we would build a free and socially oriented state.
If I briefly discuss the program and the concrete legislative initiatives I intend to implement in the interest of the workers of the Chechen Republic, then, obviously, they will focus on the implementation of the principles of a social state.

Correspondent: And one last question. What is your vision for state-building and the role of trade unions?

Magomed Mamatiev: I intend to work on these priority issues if the voters of District No. 3 “Olympic” show their trust in me and elect me as their deputy to the Parliament of the Chechen Republic.
I appeal to voters to come out and vote for our future—not for me, but for our President Aslan Maskhadov. Together we will win!

Justice Denied – A Report from the North Caucaus

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The report “Justice Denied in the North Caucasus” represents one of the most comprehensive and well-documented analyses of the human rights situation in the North Caucasus region over the past decades.

Based on the work of the Natalia Estemirova Documentation Center (NEDC), the document collects and examines dozens of emblematic cases of killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, and torture that occurred in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan from the 1990s up to recent years.


The picture that emerges is deeply alarming: not only because of the systematic nature of these violations, but above all due to the near-total absence of justice. Investigations are often incomplete, suspended, or never initiated. In numerous cases, even when the European Court of Human Rights has recognized violations and responsibility, Russian authorities have failed to implement its judgments, reinforcing a climate of structural impunity.


Particularly significant is the fact that many of the victims are journalists, human rights activists, and lawyers—key figures in any free and democratic society. Through both quantitative data and detailed case analysis, the report documents thousands of violations recorded between 2010 and 2018, confirming that the problem does not belong to the past, but continues to define the region’s present.


This document therefore stands as an essential resource for understanding not only the situation in the North Caucasus, but also the structural limits of the rule of law in the Russian Federation.

The reader can find the whole document in our Bibliography section.

Inal Sharip on Kyiv Post – “Kadyrov and Chechnya: Putin’s Black Swans”

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The opinion piece published by the Kyiv Post under the title “Kadyrov and Chechnya – Putin’s Black Swans” offers a critical reading of the growing vulnerability of Vladimir Putin’s regime in light of the “Kadyrov factor” and Russia’s internal political condition.

The author, Inal Sherip — a cultural studies scholar and political figure within the Chechen diaspora — argues that Ramzan Kadyrov should no longer be seen merely as a loyal ally of the Kremlin, but increasingly as a source of fragility for Putin’s system itself. The article opens by examining the recent “surprises” (so-called black swans) confronting Putin — diplomatic failures, international pressure, and military deadlock — and explains how, in this context, Kadyrov’s role has become increasingly problematic.

Inal Sharip, Foreign Minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Sherip traces the evolution of the political project that, over the years, led to the construction of a personal power apparatus around Kadyrov — initially designed as a tool for Moscow’s control over the Caucasus — and shows how this same apparatus now risks turning into a “toxic asset.” The reasons are multiple: the growing cultural and religious autonomy of Chechnya’s leadership from Russia’s official narrative, its ties with Gulf states, and the ostentatious concentration of power and wealth.

At the core of the analysis lies the hypothesis that the potential disappearance or weakening of Kadyrov — whether due to health issues or internal conflict — could trigger a chain reaction capable of undermining Russia’s internal power balances themselves: from the redistribution of federal security forces, to an intense succession struggle within Kadyrov’s inner circle, to the opening of new spaces for intervention by Russia’s central security services, such as the FSB.

Ultimately, Sherip advances a non-conventional but compelling interpretation: Putin’s dependence on figures like Kadyrov is no longer merely a coercive advantage, but a potential breaking point for the stability of his own system of power — an internal “black swan” that could accelerate far broader dynamics of instability.

The full article is available at:

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/67997

Alkhazur Abuev – The weak men of the Maskhadov’s Army

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Background and education

A career officer in the Soviet Navy, Alkhazur Abuev (also transliterated as Olkhazur Abuev) was born in the Chechen-Ingush Socialist Republic in the first half of the 1950s.

In 1972, he graduated from the M. V. Frunze Higher Naval Academy in Leningrad, a prestigious Soviet Navy academy, obtaining the rank of Captain First Rank (капитан первого ранга). He served in the Black Sea Fleet and later in the Caspian Flotilla, where he held technical and staff positions.

He left his military career in the early 1990s, during the collapse of the USSR, and returned to Chechnya, apparently in March 1992, where he was immediately appointed by President Dzhokhar Dudaev to the organizational chart of the nascent Chechen national army, obtaining the position of deputy head of the Operational Directorate of the Armed Forces General Staff and, from June 1993, head of the same directorate. At the outbreak of the First Russian-Chechen War, however, Abuev did not take up arms but left the country.

Maskhadov’s Army

Upon his return to his homeland, he was called back by President Aslan Maskhadov to help reorganize the regular army, which, according to the plans of the new head of state, was to be called the National Guard and consist of eight specialized regiments. Maskhadov appointed Abuev Chief of Staff immediately after his election as President. According to Timur Muzaev’s reconstruction, on March 13, 1997, Maskhadov established the National Guard, and on May 15, 1997, Abuev signed the general reorganization of the army, abolishing the previous front commands and centralizing the chain of command.

The Chechen National Guard in 1997

The measures taken by the new Chief of Staff had their own abstract logic and were in line with the President’s desire to professionalize the army, but they did not take into account the important changes that had affected the armed forces during the war. Dudaev’s death had accentuated the tendency of units to rally around their field commanders, and Abuev appeared to be ‘disconnected’ from the natural hierarchies that were forming. The new General Staff’s claim to establish a professional system in an army that resembled more an advanced popular militia than a classic armed force clashed with the convictions (and interests) of many field commanders, who preferred to consider their units in ‘permanent mobilization’, both because they were convinced that war with Russia would soon resume and because they wanted to maintain the privileges and impunity that some of them had acquired.

The friction between Abuev, who was pushing for the demobilization of the armed units, and the main brigade generals, who wanted to avoid it, led to an institutional crisis that, in October 1998, resulted in Abuev’s resignation. He was replaced by Maskhadov with the “veteran” Abubakar Bantaev.

Retirement and final years

At the outbreak of the Second Chechen War (1999), Abuev retired to Baku, Azerbaijan, where he lived for almost ten years. On April 23, 2008, according to Kommersant and RBC News, he voluntarily surrendered to the Russian federal authorities, claiming that he had not participated in armed activities since 1999. The authorities confirmed that, despite having served as Chief of Staff in 1997-1998, he was not involved in war crimes. Akhmed Zakayev commented on his surrender as follows: “I don’t understand why he had to surrender. He could have returned home without announcing it, and there would have been no charges against him.” This position was confirmed by one of Abuev’s relatives, who commented: “In Chechnya, only the laziest or the illiterate are unaware that Olkhazar never fought against the federal forces […] Olkhazar was a naval officer and only arrived in Chechnya after the end of the first war, leaving before the start of the second military campaign. Why turn him into a militant commander?”

After a brief interrogation, he was released and not prosecuted.

Press sources indicated that he still lives in Chechnya under discreet surveillance, maintaining a low profile and staying out of public life.

The Chechen National Guard in 1999

Profile and assessment

Alkhazur Abuev was one of the most atypical figures in the Ichkerian military elite: a Soviet-trained technician, uninterested in religious or revolutionary rhetoric, focused on rebuilding a modern state military structure. He was the main architect of the attempt to transition from a guerrilla army to a regular force, which was thwarted by the fragmentation of the armed forces in 1998 and then by the second Russian invasion of Chechnya. His story—from his career in the USSR Navy to his command of the Ichkerian forces, to his retirement in Baku and surrender in 2008—reflects the trajectory of a generation of Chechen officers who sought to reconcile military professionalism and national identity, only to be crushed between the two logics.

The North Caucasus as a Frontier of European Security

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Russian ambition is vulnerable in what has always been the Empire’s soft underbelly: the North Caucasus. A conference in Kyiv sets a framework for opposition to Moscow’s imperialist legacy.

The following article was written by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Inal Sharip, and published in the Kyiv Post at the following link:

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/64009

The Kyiv conference “The North Caucasus as Europe’s Security Frontier” was timed to the third anniversary of Verkhovna Rada Resolution No. 2672-IX on the temporary occupation of the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI). Its core conclusion is that Europe’s stability is inseparable from the fate of the peoples of the North Caucasus; therefore, the “Caucasus track” must move from declarations to a managed policy with institutional tools and clearly defined addressees.

The lineup underscored the political weight and attention to the topic. Participants included Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk and First Deputy Speaker Oleksandr Korniyenko; Ukraine’s third President Viktor Yushchenko; Mykhailo Podolyak, advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine; Prime Minister of the ChRI Akhmed Zakayev; MEP Rasa Jukneviciene (former Lithuanian Minister of Defense, Vice-Chair of the EPP Group in the European Parliament); former Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga; as well as members of the Ukrainian parliament and international experts. Such a roster widens the frame from a national to a pan-European and transatlantic level, signaling that the North Caucasus is entering the security mainstream.

Prime Minister of ChRI Akhmed Zakayev with the third President of the Republic of Ukraine, Viktor Andrijovych Yushchenko

The normative direction of the discussion was set by the adopted Kyiv Declaration.

First, it fixes a strategic lens: the North Caucasus is a critical link in pan-European security; the threats are transnational (hybrid aggression, repression, deportations, disinformation) and require coordinated international responses. This turn implies abandoning the “all-Russia prism” in favor of viewing the North Caucasus as a distinct macro-region with its own elites and trajectory.

Second, the declaration sets an operational framework – a four-track roadmap, which makes the conversation reproducible within EU/NATO policy and at national levels:

  • Legal (universal jurisdiction, documentation of crimes, support for applications to international courts);
  • Sanctions (expansion of personal and sectoral measures for repression, mobilization, deportations, and cultural erasure);
  • Humanitarian (protection of refugees and political prisoners, access to medical and psychological care, preservation of language and culture);
  • Communications (countering disinformation, supporting independent media and expert analysis).

Third, much attention was dedicated to the Ukrainian pillar. Participants called on the Verkhovna Rada to take steps enabling “Ichkerian entities” to function within Ukraine’s legal field: recognize ChRI citizenship; provide for representation of ChRI citizens in third countries pending international recognition; grant the State Committee for the De-Occupation of the ChRI official status as an organ of national-liberation struggle; and launch a regular parliamentary dialogue. They also propose energizing cross-party caucuses and supporting draft law No. 11402 on engagement with national movements of the Russian Federation’s colonized peoples. Taken together, this moves moral-political declarations toward legally operable mechanisms.

ChRI Prime Minister Akhmed Zakayev with the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk

External addressees are divided into two groups. The first – the European Parliament, PACE/NATO PA, and national parliaments – are urged to strengthen the parliamentary dimension of de-occupation policy, initiate public hearings and evidence-gathering missions, establish systematic dialogue with national-liberation movements, and expand sanctions lists, including accountability for the use of North Caucasus natives in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The second – governments and institutions of the EU/UK/Canada/US – are encouraged to integrate North Caucasus issues into strategic reviews and deterrence plans, and to support human rights, cultural heritage, and the languages of the Caucasus peoples.

A key infrastructural outcome was the decision to build an expert network and a public monitoring panel, Caucasus Watch – a tool that links human-rights reporting, sanctions tracking, and analysis, thereby reducing information asymmetries for policymakers and regulators. A dedicated grant track is envisioned for researchers working on law, security, and culture in the North Caucasus.

The tone of the discussion was well captured by remarks from Laura Lindermann of the United States (Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and Director of Programs at the Central Asia – Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council). She noted Russia’s “strategic retrenchment” from the South Caucasus, the shift in the mediation architecture, and the vulnerability of three pillars of control in the North – hyper-securitization, budget transfers, and personal patronage networks (including the “Kadyrov model”). The weakening of these pillars increases the risks of local conflicts and terrorism, as well as the play of external actors; hence integrating the “Caucasus track” into the core of Euro-Atlantic strategies is a matter of prevention, not reaction.

From here flows the practical logic of the Kyiv Declaration: institutionalizing subjecthood, standardizing sanctions-legal work, producing verifiable data, and advancing parliamentary diplomacy. The expected outputs fall into three baskets:

  • Legal (building out universal-jurisdiction cases and treaty-based procedures);
  • Political (consolidating inter-parliamentary formats, including channels to movements and diasporas);
  • Informational (reducing reliance on fragmentary testimony through a single data window (Caucasus Watch)).

The risks are evident: sanctions fatigue and bureaucratization; limited access to sources and witness security; competing external agendas. However, the very shift to an operational framework with clear addressees and instruments is already significant. The political will of parliaments and the cohesion of expert networks will be the key variables – both for implementing the Ukrainian pillar (including decisions on ChRI citizenship and the State Committee’s status) and for embedding the “Caucasus track” in EU/NATO strategies.

Kyiv has offered new arguments as well as a policy infrastructure, from legislation to enforcement. The trajectory ahead will be measured not by the volume of statements but by the speed of institutional steps and the quality of interagency coordination.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post. 

The text of the Declaration signed in Kyiv is available in English, Russian and Ukrainian at this link

https://thechechenpress.com/news/18829-kievskaya-deklaratsiya-o-severnom-kavkaze-kak-rubezhe-bezopasnosti-evropy-na-ukrainskom-anglijskom-i-russkom-yazykakh.html

Taymaz Abubakarov – Truth and Lies

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Taymaz Taysumovich Abubakarov was born on April 16, 1948 in Kazakhstan, where his family had been deported alongside the entire Chechen nation under Stalin’s 1944 mass deportations. After the rehabilitation of the Chechen people, his family returned to Chechnya, where he grew up in Grozny.

He initially worked as a mechanic at Grozny’s TETs-2 thermal power plant before pursuing higher education in economics at Moscow State University (MGU). He completed his studies with distinction and later earned the academic degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences. Upon returning to Grozny, Abubakarov embarked on an academic career at the Chechen-Ingush State University, rising to the post of First Vice-Rector. His research specialized in the economic and demographic dynamics of the North Caucasus, earning him respect as a regional development expert.

Entry into Politics and Early Career

During the period of perestroika, Abubakarov became involved in the Chechen national movement. As early as 1985, he was an active member of the organizations “Dosh” and “Nokhchicho”, which advocated Chechen sovereignty. He briefly served in the economic administration under Doku Zavgaev during the final phase of the Soviet administration in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic.

After General Dzhokhar Dudaev led the Chechen Republic to declare independence in 1991, Abubakarov was appointed Minister of Economy and Finance on October 27, 1991. His appointment was part of Dudaev’s strategy to balance revolutionary legitimacy with the need for capable technocratic leadership.

Doku Zavgaev

Economic Policies and Challenges

As minister, Abubakarov faced the enormous challenge of establishing an independent economic system in a collapsing post-Soviet environment. He proposed a mixed economy model: allowing private ownership while maintaining state control over key strategic sectors. This approach aimed to stabilize Ichkeria’s fragile economy and shield it from Russia’s impending blockade.

However, tensions soon emerged between Abubakarov and Dudaev, particularly over economic control. Dudaev maintained tight personal oversight over sectors such as oil exports. Abubakarov also opposed Dudaev’s attempts to launch a national currency (The “Nahar”), which were instead handled by Central Bank Governor Usman Imaev. In his memoirs (The Dudaev Regime: Truth and Lies, available HERE), Abubakarov describes the severe economic crisis gripping the republic in 1992-1993, including hyperinflation, speculative black-market pricing, and the collapse of state revenues. Attempts by Dudaev to subsidize basic food items proved unsustainable, aggravating the fiscal strain.

The Chechen national currency project, the Nahar

Involvement in Pre-War Diplomacy (1994)

In December 1994, with tensions escalating towards open war, Dudaev appointed Abubakarov to lead Ichkeria’s delegation in negotiations with Russian representatives in Vladikavkaz. Despite his position as Finance Minister rather than Foreign Minister, Abubakarov was chosen based on Dudaev’s personal trust and pragmatism. The Chechen delegation offered major concessions, including dismantling irregular armed formations, provided Russia agreed to withdraw its military forces first. Meanwhile, Moscow supported both negotiations and an escalating military buildup, leading Abubakarov to accuse Russia of duplicity.

The talks were further complicated by the presence of a second, pro-Moscow Chechen delegation representing the so-called “Provisional Council.” Figures like Bektimar Baskhanov and Bislan Gantamirov appeared at the negotiations, highlighting Moscow’s attempt to foster an alternative Chechen leadership.

On December 14, 1994, as head of the Chechen Working Commission, Abubakarov signed an official statement reaffirming Chechnya’s position: disarmament would proceed only after full Russian troop withdrawal. Nevertheless, the negotiations collapsed, and Russia launched its full-scale invasion on December 11, 1994. Shortly thereafter, Abubakarov was replaced in the negotiation team by Prosecutor General Usman Imaev.

The Council of Ministers of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
(formerly “Sovmin”)

Corruption Allegations and Dismissal

As the war unfolded, accusations of corruption began to surround Abubakarov:

  • Prominent Chechen politician Musa Temishev accused him of massive misappropriation of state resources, calling him “one of Ichkeria’s most notorious looters.”
  • Russian journalist Yuri Shchekochikhin reported on a 1993 contract in which Abubakarov authorized the purchase of five metric tons of pure gold from Yakutia for 2.78 billion rubles, raising serious suspicions regarding the transaction’s legitimacy.
  • Abubakarov increasingly centralized control over export licenses, oil contracts, credit allocation, and financial institutions. 

In 1995, President Dudaev dismissed Abubakarov on charges of financial misconduct. Following his removal, Abubakarov relocated to Moscow, where he lived in quiet exile, completely withdrawing from public life.

Memoirs and Historical Testimony

In 1998, Abubakarov published his memoirs, The Dudaev Regime: Truth and Lies, offering valuable firsthand insights into Ichkeria’s early governance, internal conflicts, and economic policies. The book serves both as a crucial historical source and as his personal defense against corruption allegations.

Later Life and Current Status

Following his exile, Abubakarov disappeared from the public scene. According to public real estate records, since 1998 he has owned an apartment in Moscow. As of 2024, no official records of his death exist. He is presumed alive at age 77. He has not participated in political, media, or social activities since the late 1990s.

Extensive searches in Russian archives, media, and historical forums confirm that no verified photographs of Abubakarov are publicly available. His image remains absent from media databases, official archives, and the Ichkeria.net Name Index.

Final Remarks

Taymaz Abubakarov’s personal journey exemplifies the turbulent fate of many Ichkerian leaders. From academia to state-building under extreme conditions, from internal power struggles to exile, his career reflects the complex realities of Ichkeria’s struggle for independence. Decades later, his role remains significant for historians analyzing the republic’s internal political dynamics and its economic challenges in the face of overwhelming adversity.

Biographies: Supyan Abdullaev – from the Nation to the Emirate

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Son of Exile

Born on November 8, 1956, in Kazakhstan to a family of deportees belonging to the Teip Thadakhara tribe originally from the village of Khatuni, Supyan Minkailovich Abdullaev was just a child when, after Khrushchev’s “Pardon,” he moved to Chechnya with his parents. His family was one of many that, during the Ardakhar, had been deported by Stalin to Kazakhstan, officially as “punishment” for not fighting the Nazi invasion of the USSR with sufficient rigor, but in reality to consolidate the colonization of the Caucasus by ethnic Russians.

Exile first, then social ghettoization after their return, had produced a strong sense of disorientation in the younger Chechen generation: for a people accustomed to living in the same land for millennia, organized into clans deeply rooted in specific territories, deportation to Central Asia and the chaotic return to their homeland thirteen years later, unable to rebuild the ancient social mosaic based on the “family-territory” relationship meant the loss of every “cardinal point of identity.” In this context, the only cultural pillar remaining to the Chechens was Islam, which until the deportation had taken root in a very ‘light’ form, often syncretic with ancient cultural values, but which now represented the only foothold for Chechens to recognize themselves in a USSR that was predominantly Orthodox and Russian-speaking.

Supyan grew up cultivating traditional Chechen customs, soon became very skilled in fighting, and studied the Koran. After graduating in 1972, he earned a degree from the Chechen-Ingush State University and found work as a physical education teacher in schools in the Vedeno district, the “ancestral land” of the Chechen nation.

From madrasas to the Islamic Battalion

With the advent of Glasnost and the easing of censorship, Abdullaev was able to devote himself openly to religious propaganda, teaching in local madrasas, acquiring contacts throughout the Eastern Caucasus, and eventually participating in the creation of the Islamic Revival Party, the first explicitly confessional political movement in the Soviet Union. His social activism took the form of participation in the activities of the Ar-Risalya Islamic center in Grozny, where he began teaching Islamic doctrine and law, achieving the honorary title of Ustaz (Teacher). He eventually became director of the center and, in this capacity, supported the Chechen Revolution, the proclamation of independence, and the rise of Dzhokhar Dudaev to the presidency of the republic. He differed from most other teachers, who struggled to express themselves in Russian, in his almost complete lack of accent and a style of speech that would have been the envy of a university professor. He had a long red beard that reached down to his waist (hence the nickname “Supjan the Red”).

Supyan ran the Islamic center until 1994, when the Russian army entered Chechnya with the aim of reconquering the small republic. On November 26, 1994, a contingent of anti-Dudaev militiamen, mercenaries, and undercover Russian soldiers attempted to overthrow Dudaev by attacking Grozny. Abdulaev enlisted in a village militia and took part in the fighting that saw the attackers destroyed and put to flight. The group of volunteers to which Supyan belonged engaged the attackers at the Press House. According to some, it was in that battle that people first began to talk about the “Islamic Battalion.” Supyan’s bravery during the battle earned him the position of deputy commander of the battalion, a unit that would fight with honor throughout the First Chechen War (for more information, read “Freedom or Death! History of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” available HERE).

Supyan took part in Operation Jihad, the action with which the independence fighters recaptured the capital, putting the Russian army in check and forcing Moscow to withdraw from Chechnya. During the battle, he commanded several assault groups against the FSB headquarters, the “Government Palace,” the Dinamo Stadium, and other sensitive targets. For his role, he was apparently appointed ‘Brigadier General’ (a mainly honorary title, which would become rather inflated in the following years).

Islam and War

Maskhadov’s rise to power, democratically elected by the overwhelming majority of Chechens in 1997, saw Supyan align himself with the so-called “Radicals,” whose main exponent was Shamil Basayev. In the distribution of posts, seeking to please the radicals, Maskhadov appointed him Deputy Minister of Sharia for State Security, with the task of working on the ideological and religious training of officials. With the proclamation of full Sharia law (1999), Supyan’s role (recognized as one of the leading exponents of radical Islam in Chechnya alongside Movladi Ugudov) in the training of state officials grew significantly, as the Chechen legal system had no background in religious law. Thus, the few scholars available became ‘experts’ in Islamic law, even though they often lacked even a basic knowledge of the subject.

In any case, the formation of the ‘Islamised’ Chechen ruling class was soon brought to an end when Russia invaded Chechnya again at the end of 1999. Abdullaev quickly became a key figure, not only because he reconstituted his unit (renamed the ‘Jundullah’ Brigade) at the outbreak of the war, but also because, as a radical figure not only in politics but also in religion, he had access to the richest sources of foreign funding, coming from Wahhabi Islamic associations, which were happy to finance the jihad while ignoring any interest on the part of the moderate political and religious current of the Chechen government, of which Maskhadov was the expression.

During the Second Russian-Chechen War, Abdullaev first commanded the Jundullah Brigade as second-in-command, then as commander, earning himself a place in the political-military council of the Chechen resistance[1], the Majilis-Al-Shura (successor to the Committee for the Defense of the State at the head of the Republic). After taking command of the Eastern Front of the war theater (2003) centered in the territories of Vedeno and Shali (where he was wounded several times in combat[2]), on July 5, 2004, he was appointed Minister of Finance of the war government, with the aim of raising the necessary funds to continue operations and distribute them to units in the field. His work was appreciated, if it is true that Maskhadov’s successor, Sadulayev, confirmed him in his position. Among the fighters, Supyan gained the goodwill of his comrades, earning the respect of all. Despite his advanced age compared to the other commanders, he actively participated in operations and war councils, and was known for his austere religious discipline, moral authority, and charisma among the fighters.

The Emirate

On March 3, 2007, he was appointed Vice President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by Dokka Umarov, a position he held until the founding of the Emirate of the Caucasus on October 7, 2007. He joined the new formation, formally abandoning the state structures of the ChRI, and took on the role of “Naib” (political successor) to the former President, now “Emir,” Umarov. When, in June 2009, unconfirmed information emerged about the alleged death of Doku Umarov, Akhmed Zakayev expressed the opinion that his closest associate, Supyan Abdullayev, would most likely become his successor. Within the Caucasus Emirate, Supyan Abdullaev maintained a leading role as Dokka Umarov’s deputy, being the de facto number two in the movement. For this reason, the Russian authorities tried in every way to capture or kill him, even arresting his son, Masud, then 22, who was deported from Egypt to Russia. Nevertheless, Supyan did not give in to blackmail and did not surrender.

He was considered the most influential of the Salafi ideologues and acted as a liaison between the various Wilayat (provinces) of the new Emirate. As an educator, he oversaw the religious and ideological training of new militants in mountain training camps. He carried out this task until March 28, 2011, when, during a raid by Russian special forces in the village of Verkhny Alkun, in the Sunzha district, the Russians hunted him down and killed him. The operation was aimed at preventing a meeting between Umarov and his staff. According to some, Umarov managed to escape, while Abdullaev was killed in a heavy air strike, following which he and several others

[1] His radio call signs were “Red Supyan” and “Chitok.”

[2] In January 2006, information appeared about Abdullaev’s elimination following a special operation in the district of Shali in Chechnya. This information was later denied, as it was his youngest nephew, field commander Adam Abdullaev, who was killed. Two other field commanders were killed along with him.