Archivi tag: Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Memories of Budennovsk: Francesco Benedetti interviews Ikhvan Gerikhanov

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Mr. Gerikhanov , your intervention in the Budennovsk hostage crisis begins on the evening of June 15, 1995, when you reach the city hospital, occupied by Basayev’s men, with the intention of starting negotiations. The task had been assigned to her by the Minister for Nationalities of the Russian Federation, Mikhailov. Do you remember how you responded to his request? Were you able to communicate with ChRI authorities from the time you were called to the hospital until you entered the hospital?

That’s essentially how it went. As chairman of the Constitutional Court , I had no contact with the leadership of the Chechen Republic, and was busy reporting on the war crimes that were taking place on the territory of our republic. I have personally held dozens of international conferences and roundtables, in which I have called for the intervention of the world community to stop the destruction of the Chechen people as an ethnic group!

At the time I was in Moscow, as an expert in the session of the International Tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Chechen Republic, headed by State Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova, later killed due to her civil engagement on the events in Chechnya. While I was at work, I was approached by one of my compatriots who held a responsible position in the presidential administration of the Russian Federation. He was looking for me at the request of the Minister for Nationalities, Mikhailov, who asked for my assistance in freeing the hostages held in Budennovsk. Naturally, I accepted the assignment, aware of the moral responsibility I had for these facts, as a senior official of the republic.

First of all, I interpreted my mission as that of allowing the hostages to understand the reason for this armed incursion, and to explain to them that they were not “militants”, as reported by all the world’s media, but defenders of their homeland.

Two or three days after I received the request, I was on a plane bound for Grozny, on which was also a delegation from the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Zhirinovsky. We had no contact with them, but the departure of the plane from Moscow was delayed for several hours.

Ikhvan Gerikhanov waits in front of an entrance to the Budennovsk hospital manned by one of Basayev’s men

Together with her were other Chechen officials. Who were they? And why did you choose them?

With me . were Paskushev and D. Khangoshvili . The second is a Georgian Chechen. Neither was an official of the state structure of the republic. I didn’t choose them, we just happened to be together. In fact I was not the head of the delegation. The other two simply knew my position among the authorities of the republic, and they recognized me as a sort of “primacy” in relation to the responsibility of my work. Unfortunately Khangoshvili passed away a week ago. Paskushev remained at headquarters in the Ministry of Internal Affairs building to ensure our safety.

I take this opportunity to express my special gratitude to my comrades for their courage and perseverance in these events. We were exposed to mortal danger of being shot in the rear by the Russian army, or by a sniper, or of being shot by our own if the military’s provocations ended with the assault on the hospital.

Did you personally know Basayev before Budennovsk? What opinion did you have of him? And how has it changed after the seizure of the hospital?

Before these events I had never had personal contact with him, as a Member of Parliament on first call and President of the Constitutional Court I was busy with my duties.

My opinion on this raid is still ambiguous today, I am against violence against civilians, although dozens of times we Chechens have seen how Russian troops put groups of civilians in front of them and went on the attack. But war is war , there are no rules of engagement and no one chooses the methods. This was mutually evident when civilians were killed by carpet bombing on the territory of the republic and filter camps were set up, where ordinary civilians, both women and men, were tortured, raped and killed.

The indifference of the absolute majority of Russian citizens and the world community gave the following result: our soldiers were forced to attract everyone’s attention in this way, to stop the destruction of the Chechens on a national basis. By the way, to this day the participants of Basayev’s raid are “found guilty” and sentenced to the maximum sentence, while not a single officer or soldier of the Russian army, except for the freak and rapist Budanov, has been held responsible for the criminal acts made on the territory of our republic.

This raid, with its pitiable innocent victims, produced results: the war was stopped and the Khasavyurt Accords on the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of peace negotiations were signed.

After landing in Budennovsk and reaching the hospital, you made contact with the Chechen units barricaded in the facility. Your first request to talk to Basayev, however, was turned down. Aslambek Ismailov, clarified that there would be no negotiations. Why do you think Basayev reacted so harshly? Didn’t he recognize you as a senior ChRI official? And speaking of Ismailov, did you know him before the Budennovsk events?

Before our arrival in Budennovsk, Basayev made it clear to everyone that there would be no negotiations before the withdrawal of the Russian army from the territory of our republic and that negotiations with Dudayev for the recognition of independence should begin. To all delegations, including one composed of Basayev’s relatives, he made it clear that he would not speak to anyone, and that any attempt to force the situation would lead to the death of the hostages.

After arriving at the Headquarters, headed by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Egorov, I informed everyone about the purpose of my visit and after long discussions I called the hospital directly to explain that my intention was to visit the building where the hostages were being held. Since it was night, I resolved to enter the building the next morning. Ismailov, Basayev’s deputy, answered me. I had never met him before. He knew me, he knew I was a high official of the republic. He promised to tell Basayev what I was proposing, and to give me an answer within a few hours.

To get an affirmative answer, I had to declare that I was willing to remain inside the hospital together with the hostages and Basayev’s men if my efforts to resolve the crisis were unsuccessful.

June 18 , you finally managed to enter the hospital, leading two different groups inside the facility and starting negotiations to open an exit corridor for Basayev’s men, in exchange for the release of a certain number of hostages. How did these negotiations take place? Why do you think Basayev changed his attitude towards you?

My first contact was on June 16 , when Khangoshvili and Ismailov met at the hospital entrance. Before our arrival a sniper had shot one of Basayev’s men, and his corpse was still lying in plain sight, covered in blood, at a distance of 1.5 – 2 meters. To avoid risking the same end, we met on the entrance stairway, sheltered from snipers. After a short conversation with Ismailov, we parted. On the same day he contacted the General Headquarters informing those present that Basayev was available to meet the President of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic.

Women and children hostages are freed during the negotiations.

What situation did you find in the hospital? Do you remember the conditions of the hostages and militants during your stay in the facility?

The situation was very tense, there were many women and children, some wounded, mothers who had just given birth. With respect to this, the Russian media presented a distorted version of reality: with the exception of military pilots and police officers, the hostages were shown respect and care, relative to the conditions in which they found themselves. The hostages themselves had spread white scarves and sheets outside the windows to prevent an assault by the Russian army. I saw a woman, a doctor from the hospital, slap a police lieutenant general who was saying that Basayev’s team was putting women and children against the windows!

Khangoshvili and I have been to the hospital 5-6 times until June 18th , and each time we came back with several children, who we returned to their mothers. They persuaded me to take the children with me, referring to the fact that Basayev would not object and that the children would be saved. On our next visit, we heard the voices of the women talking to each other saying that there was a “mustachioed prosecutor” and that another group of children needed to be rounded up.

According to press reports, it was you who developed the text of the agreement that led to the resolution of the crisis. Do you remember the genesis of this document? Were there discussions about what should be written on it? Do you keep a copy of this document?

Yes, I wrote that text. At the first meeting with Basayev he recognized my rank as an official, but said that he was accountable to his command, and that without the approval of his bosses he would not take any decision. Basayev insisted that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the republic’s independence could not be negotiated. His detachment would not have left if these two conditions were not met. If necessary they would all have sacrificed their lives for this. I had to talk to all the members of Basayev’s team to explain to them that at this stage of the conflict, fulfilling both conditions would be impossible, even with the sacrifice of all Chechens on earth.

In the end, thanks to the help of the witnesses I brought, and the arguments of my reasoning, I managed to persuade Basayev that the withdrawal of troops and the opening of negotiations would be real steps towards ending the war and recognizing Chechen sovereignty . After another visit to the hospital on June 17 , Basayev finally declared that he was ready to open a dialogue on this basis, and asked me to draft a document. To the above conditions he added the request for a guarantee of safety for his men, so that they could return to Chechnya without incident. Finally, he reminded me that, as a Chechen, I would answer to the people and to Allah if the Russian military and political leadership did not abide by the agreements.

The text was signed by responsible persons. I was asked to sign as head of the Chechen delegation, but I refused because I was a state official. However, having to identify a guarantor among the Chechens, I asked Kanghoshvili to sign, since the Russian government would not accept my signature as an official of the Chechen Republic.

The main concern for me and for Basayev was: who would guarantee the free passage of the buses on which the Chechen fighters and their escorts would leave? Knowing the insidious behavior of the Russian military and leadership, when I returned to the HQ I asked on my own initiative that this guarantee be given by the Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin: without his direct intervention, Basayev’s men would not have left the building, and they would have agreed to fight to the death. All those present reacted with anger: Deputy Prime Minister Yegorov , FSB director Stephasin and other military commanders invited me to leave. To which, brusquely, I told them that if they stormed the hospital, the whole world would immediately know about it from me, and the death of the hostages would remain on their conscience!

While returning to Moscow with the Chechen delegation, the human rights activist, S. Kovalev, approached us, and told us that Chernomyrdin was willing to talk with us about the guarantees to be given to Basayev’s men. I replied that this shouldn’t have been behind the scenes, but that it should have been an official statement. I then demanded that the Prime Minister speak to Basayev directly on the phone, and threatened to abandon the negotiations, and to return to my job if the conversation did not take place.

When you left the hospital, you took about a hundred hostages with you. Do you remember any of them? Were you able to exchange a few words between you? What did the hostages think about what was happening?

As I said, after I learned that Chernomyrdin would call Basayev, I returned to the hospital on June 18th . Arriving from Basayev I asked him: if the Prime Minister provides a guarantee of safe passage to Chechnya, will this be a sufficient basis for the release of the hostages? Basayev and his men laughed: they didn’t believe such a guarantee would be possible. However Kovalev and the accompanying State Duma deputies confirmed my words, so we added this clause to the agreement, and signed it. I asked Basayev to give a sign of good will by handing over, together with the request for agreement, at least 100 hostages, including women and children, to be released. Basayev agreed to the request the next day.

Upon your departure, Basayev reportedly warned you: “Remember that you are a Chechen. If even a single hair falls from my fighters’ heads along the way, your whole family will answer for it!” Does this mean you got involved in a family feud to save the Budennovsk hostages?

Naturally this was a provocation on Basayev’s part. After all, I could not vouch for their free passage through Russian territory. Knowing about Yeltsin’s intention to show himself to the world community as a fighter against “terrorists”, I nipped in the bud another provocation thought up by the head of the operation to free the hostages, General Yerin . As soon as I arrived in Moscow, I gave several interviews to Russian and foreign journalists in which I feared a possible military provocation against Basayev’s detachment on the way back.

After signing the agreement, on your way home, you were abruptly called back at Aslambek ‘s explicit request Abdulkhadzhiev . The feds had asked all those who had joined Basayev on the return journey to sign a document that effectively exempted the Russian authorities from any responsibility in the event of accidents on the way back. It was a tacit admission of a willingness to raid Basayev’s convoy as soon as it entered Chechnya. Abdulkhadzhiev stated that without your intervention the negotiations would not have resumed. Did you know him? Why was your presence deemed necessary?

I have already mentioned General Yerin , the author of this receipt stating that such and such a person “voluntarily joins Shamil Basayev’s group…”. Abdulkhadzhiev reacted urgently to this provocation and declared that without a conversation with the President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic, the agreement would not proceed.

A car caught up with us on the way to the airport, and we were asked to come back. Upon arrival in Budennovsk, after reading the text proposed by General Yerin , I asked to speak urgently with Chernomyrdin and, after my explanations, Chernomyrdin slipped through Yerin , scolded him about the receipt and ordered him to cancel it. It later became known that the General was preparing an assault on Basayev’s convoy on orders from President Yeltsin, who was outside Russia at the time. Indeed, an attempted assault took place near the Chechen border, at the height of Kurskaya , when military helicopters began flying over the buses. However, due to the great attention these events caused and the presence of many foreign journalists, the attack did not take place.

Hostages leave the hospital

After resolving this second crisis, you were faced with the frustrated reaction of the Russian military and civilians who had witnessed the kidnapping. Why were they mad at you? What made them so nervous?

The answer in this case is unequivocal. Many soldiers wanted to destroy Basayev’s detachment and gain prestige. They didn’t care about the hostages and their punishments at the time. On our next visit to the hospital we realized that the army’s special units clearly wanted to take advantage of the stalemate in operations due to the negotiation process to storm the hospital. And the police major’s snide comment: You can’t come here, you’re no better than the terrorists you sent home I assumed I never expected the most basic humanity or gratitude from these people.

After Basayev’s return to Chechnya, your mission was over. Were you able to contact Dudayev, or another official of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria?

Unfortunately no, I was very busy with the international tribunal, and until 1996 I was unable to return to the republic. According to Abdulkhadzhiev , in the presence of Ismailov and Basayev, my actions in this mission were highly appreciated by the President, who said that at the first meeting with me he would present me with the Republic’s highest award, the “Honor of the Nation ”. Unfortunately, the infamous assassination of the President of the Chechen Republic prevented us from meeting on this earth.

Did the Russian authorities give you any credit for ending the Budennovsk hostage crisis?

First of all, I didn’t expect anything from gold and I didn’t work for them. I only accepted the offer to participate in this matter, in good faith, because I was one of the highest officials of the Republic. Secondly, I did what I did out of civic duty, and I am grateful to the Almighty for giving me the opportunity to be of service to my people and to free more than 1200 hostages who were not involved in hostilities, like dozens of thousands of civilians in Chechnya, who suffered the most from the presence of the Russian army.

It was said a long time ago that I was offered an apartment in Moscow. Speculation around this topic was a useless farce of the Russian leadership, just as some newly emerged “patriots” among the Chechens could be accused of treason, who even today cannot understand and evaluate my actions as Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic Chechen. But that’s another topic!

The Budennovsk crisis allowed the Chechen government to conclude a truce which proved useful in winning the war. However, it has cast a shadow of terror on the resistance. How do you think Budennovsk changed the history of independent Chechnya?

Today the whole world has known the face of the Russian Empire and has finally understood that the war of the aggressor, launched against our republic, was the beginning of perfidy and contempt for all norms and principles of international law, so as well as its obligations to the world community. The Budennovsk events forced the Russian leadership to sit down at the negotiating table, and this saved tens of thousands of lives, both on the territory of our republic and in Russia itself.

As for the “shadow of terror”, state terror was declared against the Chechen people by Russia, exclusively on a national basis, and has not stopped to this day, even though the peace treaty with the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was signed a long time ago! So who is guilty of terrorism? Who is the terrorist?

Thank God the European community has already declared Russia a sponsor of terrorism. This is mine answer at the your last question !

Text of the agreement drawn up by Gerikhanov.


The document, translated for us by Inna Kurochkina, says:

Agreed text for the time 10 hours 40 minutes 18.06.95.

On the release of the hostages, the city of Budyonnovsk.

Commitment:

-On the part of the Government of the Russian Federation represented by the Prime Minister

V.S. Chernomyrdin:

Immediately stop hostilities and bombardments of the territory of Chechnya.

All other issues, including the disengagement of troops, should be resolved exclusively by personal means on the basis of the negotiation process.

The person authorized to negotiate with the Chechen side is Usman Imaev.

-From Shamil Basayev:

Release of hostages, with the exception of the security assurance team.

Time of completion:

Statement by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Chernomyrdin.

The release of the hostages in the amount of one hundred people Sh. Basaev immediately after the speech of Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The rest, with the exception of the security guarantee group, are released during the time for the security of the departure of Sh. Basayev’s group.

18.06.95

10 hours 03 minutes

Signatures:

Viktor Stepanivich Chernomyrdin

Shamil Basaev

From the Government of the Russian Federation on behalf of Viktor Chernomyrdin: Head of

the Delegation Sergey Kovalev

From the Administration of the Stavropol Kraj Member of the delegation Sergey Popov

Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Yuliy Rybakov

From the side of the Chechen diaspora Khangoshvili Dzhabrail

Federation Council Deputy Viktor Kurochkin

Assistant to Kovalev Oleg Orlov “Memorial”

Amendments to the first document

The document, translated for us by Inna Kurochkina, says:

Additional agreements to the text of the Agreement dated June 18, 1995.

The delegation of the Russian Federation and Shamil Basayev’s group agreed on the following:

All questions of a political settlement, including the question of the status of the Republic of Chechnya, its relations with the federal authorities of the Russian Federation, and the republics of the Russian Federation, and other issues, should be resolved exclusively by peaceful means, on the basis of international legal acts, legislation and agreements reached in the negotiations.

This procedure should be the subject of consideration by authorized officials of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and representatives of the Government and the Federal Assembly of

the Russian Federation.

18.06.95

11 hours 03 minutes

Signatures

Shamil Basaev

From the side of the Chechen diaspora Khangoshvili Dzhabrail

From the delegation of the Russian Federation:

Sergey Kovalev

Juliy Rybakov (Deputy of the State Duma)

Viktor Kurochkin (Member of the Federal Assembly)

Oleg Orlov (“Memorial”)

From the Administration of the Stavropol Kraj Sergey Popov

Back to the Constitution: Francesco Benedetti interviews Ikhvan Gerikhanov (Part 2)

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In April 21, 1996, President Dudayev was killed, and Vice-President Yandarbiev assumed his interim powers. How did your relationship with him develop?

After the treasonous assassination of the President, I returned to Grozny and actively participated in the preparation of the new elections. I returned to my duties when President Yandarbiev accepted my condition that the Constitutional Court could begin its work only after the annulment of the unconstitutional decree concerning its dissolution in April 1993. This happened with the Decree from these promulgated on November 12, 1996, in which it was clarified that the dissolution order issued by Dudaev was to be considered devoid of any legal effect. At that point I started forming a new team of judges for the court, having to make up for the expressed refusal of some of the old members to collaborate with the new government, as well as the defections of others, who had left the territory of the Republic.

During his mandate, Yandarbiev initiated a series of legislative interventions aimed at establishing an Islamic republic, such as, for example, the creation of Sharia courts. Were these measures constitutionally correct? Has the Constitutional Court sanctioned them?


To take a specific decision on the introduction of Sharia courts, the Constitutional Court did not yet have the necessary quorum for a vote and the approval of the judges was and is the prerogative of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, which during this period had not yet been renewed. Actions aimed at introducing Sharia courts directly contradict the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, which I have repeatedly expressed in the media and personally to Yandarbiev.

Zelimkhan Yandarbiev


Following the January 1997 presidential elections, Aslan Maskhadov became president. How was your work under his tenure?


After the election of President and of the Parliament, I have actively collaborated with the institutions and have looked for candidates to complete the ranks of the Constitutional Court , and obtain their nomination by the Parliament. However I failed to complete this task, due to the situation in the Republic and the introduction of Sharia courts. However, as head of the highest judicial authority, I have actively participated in all legal activities of national importance.

By Presidential Decree of May 6 , 1996, I was appointed an expert in the process of negotiating and drafting documents on relations between the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation, and also headed the office of the State Legal Commission to develop and improve the constitutional principles , with the creation of a code of Islamic law CHRI. This order was presented to the President on May 20, 1997. This code of laws was personally prepared by me and delivered to President Maskhadov under the name ” Korta Nizam “, meaning “main consensus”: this project included the combination of Muslim and secular law, without radical deviations from the mentality and customs ( adat ) of the Chechen people, but taking into account the rules of conduct for a Muslim according to the Koran and the Sunnah of our Prophet (SAS). This law should have been voted on in a referendum and subsequently should have been adopted by the Parliament. If the Chechen people had approved this bill, after it was adopted by its legislative body, it would have acquired the status of Constitution as Basic Law of the country.However, once again, the crisis of the institutions has not allowed this to be discussed, and possibly integrated into the Fundamental Law of the State.

In addition to this, I was involved in the work as a member of the State Commission for the Development of the National Security Doctrine of the CRI, according to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of July 31, 1997. Basically, we worked on guarantees for the country’s national security and so that the invasion of our country would not be repeated over the decades. We have tried to establish ChRI in the world community as a subject of international law and find protection through international institutions. In addition, we have worked on consolidating our statehood through the Charter of the United Nations, which should be the document guaranteeing our security, both as a state and as a whole and as an ethnic group in communion with the whole civilized world. Constitutional Court member Seda Khalidova worked actively with me. In 1997 we met with the new Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation M. Baglai and even prepared an agreement on the interaction of the two highest state judicial bodies. This draft agreement was not approved by the parties, for the well-known reasons we have already mentioned.

As the radical forces consolidated in the country, the possibility of creating an Islamic state was increasingly discussed. How could this idea fit into the 1992 Constitution?


In no way. The Constitution of the CRI and its norms are mandatory, i.e. mandatory, regardless of the situation, if changes to individual articles of the Constitution have not been made in accordance with the requirements of this Basic Law.

At the end of 1998, Maskhadov was tried by the Sharia court. Was this court constitutionally legal? Do you remember this process?

By that time I had left the republic and worked at the International Arbitration Tribunal, but as one of the authors of the 1992 Constitution of the Chechen Republic, I can state that such a decision grossly violates the requirements of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic!

How did your experience as President of the Constitutional Court ended?

I resigned in March 1998, after an unconstitutional vote of no confidence in the President of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic, ie in me, for my position against the introduction of Sharia courts and the use of public executions. In the Parliament of the CRI on the second convocation there were deputies who had their own candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal and, frankly, had their own mercantile interests, which under my leadership they could not have realized. Moreover, the very discussion regarding the issue of mistrust of me is an unconstitutional process, if I have not committed a crime or if, for health reasons, I cannot fulfill my duties, or I have committed other actions contrary to the ideas of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, prescribed by the law “On the activities of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic”, adopted in 1992.

This question was initiated by two deputies, one of whom, as it was later established, worked for the FSB of Russia. The second deputy brought his name into disrepute during the proceedings of the first convocation Parliament. Their names are known and they, being refugees in Europe, continue to harm the legitimate authorities of the CRI.

Chechnya, 1997: Religious police impose corporal punishment for drunkenness

After the start of the Second Russo-Chechen War and Russia’s second invasion of the country, martial law was introduced in the CRI. Aslan Maskhadov’s mandate would have expired in February 2002, but he remained in office until his assassination in 2005. If you recall, what measure extended his mandate up to this point?

First of all, we must proceed from the fact that the President of the CRI, in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI, declared martial law in connection with the invasion of the aggressor into the sovereign territory of the country.

Secondly, in connection with martial law and the purpose of centralized government, the chairman of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, issued a decree on October 5, 1999 on the introduction of martial law on the territory of the republic and the adoption of Annex No . 1 to it, according to which all state structures were subordinated to the established State Defense Committee (GKO), with the wording that ” all authorities stop their work of norm-setting “. Furthermore, the State Defense Committee, since martial law was declared, has been approved as ” the highest collegial body of state power…”. And with resolution no. 217, adopted at the same time, by decision of the GKO, the President of the CRI was endowed with additional powers corresponding to the highest legislative and executive power!

Thus, the chairman of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the CRI and the head of the country’s State Defense Committee, during this wartime period could not and had no legal right to leave this post and remained in place until his treasonous assassination by Russian punishers.

After Maskhadov’s assassination, power passed to Vice President Abdul Khalim Sadulayev. Was such a transfer of power constitutionally acceptable?

Of course, and this right is enshrined in art. 75 of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, which provides that in case of removal from office of the President or in other cases in which the President cannot perform his duties, the Vice-President is required to assume full powers.

After the assassination of Sadulaev , power passed to Dokku Umarov , who proclaimed himself President. There appear to be differences between the Maskhadov-Sadulayev succession and the Sadulayev- Umarov power . What do you think is the difference between these two phenomena?

I don’t see much difference, since CRI president Abdul- Khalim Sadulaev , by decree dated June 2, 2005, appointed Umarov Doku as Vice President of the CRI. As it was indicated above, the State Defense Committee is the only state authority for the period of martial law in the country, and such actions to transfer powers do not go beyond the legislation of the CRI, although they are of a temporary nature, until the end of war and the lifting of the state of emergency.

In October 2007, Umarov announced the dissolution of the CRI as part of the Caucasus Emirate. Is this process unconstitutional?

These actions grossly violate the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI and are criminally punishable as liquidation of the state system and its power structures!

Dokku Umarov (center) last President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and founder of the Caucasus Emirate


A few months after the birth of the Caucasus Emirate, the current Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Akhmed Zakayev, was elected to his current position by still capable deputies. How did this nomination come about? Was it constitutionally correct?

This process can be explained at length and it is impossible to complete it in this interview due to its large volume in the description. There is my October 10, 2020 Expert Opinion [attached at the bottom of this interview, NDR], made at the request of the Council of Elders of Europe, which has done a great job of consolidating disparate structures, as each of them it is declared a legitimate authority in accordance with the Constitution of the CRI. During this period, I was not a member of any diaspora or power group, so I conducted a thorough analysis and evaluation of the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI, as one of its authors and a scientist in the field of jurisprudence, and concluded that the CRI government in exile is a legitimate state authority of the CRI.

Is it true that in 2002 all powers were transferred to the GKO and that so far the institutional power of the CRI derives from the decisions of this committee, now renamed the State Deoccupation Commitee?

Yes, it is this structure that continues to have the status of the only state authority of the CRI, as the successor to the State Defense Committee, represented by the State Deoccupation Commitee of the annexed territory by the Russian Armed Forces and their protégés.

From the point of view of constitutional law, can the current CRI authorities represented by the Cabinet of Ministers, chaired by Akhmed Zakaev , recognize themselves as legitimate?

Yes, and this does not contradict the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI, and proof of this is the fact that it was approved by the legal successor of the state power of the CRI – the State Deoccupation Commitee. A detailed analysis of the legitimacy of the Cabinet of Ministers of the CRI is contained in the opinion of 10.10.2020.

FREEDOM SOLD OR WAR BOUGHT? – REFLECTIONS BY APTI BATALOV (part 2)

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The sharp deterioration of Russian-Chechen relations and the intensification of activities by the Russian special services in Ichkeria and neighboring territories began with Putin’s appointment as Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Armed provocations were staged on the Russian-Chechen border. In April 1999, for example, Russian forces attacked a Chechen border post along the Kizlyar section of the border at night, killing one guard and wounding several others. This was evidently an attempt to draw the Chechens into an armed conflict in Dagestan. However Maskhadov, realizing what the Russians wanted to achieve, forbade any retaliatory action across the border. The Russian provocation, therefore, was not followed up. The next action was staged in the Herzel section of the border in May 1999. Fierce fighting took place here for several days, during which even field artillery was used. The Russians’ plan was the same – to lure the Dagestanis to their side. Once again, however, the President of Ichkeria managed to preserve the peace between the Chechen and Dagestani peoples. Even this cowardly enterprise failed, the Russians began to threaten the country with all kinds of ultimatums.

Aslan Maskhadov (left) and Alexander Lebed (right) sign the Khasavyurt’s Accords, August 1996

President Yeltsin’s second term was coming to an end, and to save themselves from prison this drunkard’s entourage began frantically looking for a replacement. However, this group did not have a candidate who could validly oppose Primakov, and with the latter’s coming to power, all this mess would end: everything they plundered would be confiscated from them. In an attempt to find a good man they first turned to Stephasin, who refused. After these appeared Putin, like a devil from a snuffbox. He was ready to accept all the conditions stipulated by the Yeltsin clique. However , he was not yet popular enough to oppose Primakov. Thus it was that the public relations specialists, led by Berezovsky, Voloshin and Pavlovsky played the “Chechen card” in favor of Putin.

Every presidential campaign in modern “democratic” Russia is shrouded in tragedy and blood. At that time the GRU and the FSB flooded Chechnya with their agents. The services were infiltrated into the restricted circle of Chechen political-military leaders, taking advantage of the latter’s indifference in the selection of their entourage, soon becoming confidants of their godfathers. As the struggle for the presidency intensified in Moscow, Russian agents accelerated their provocative and subversive activities, as was evident from the events that began to occur in Ichkeria. I recall that in the spring of 1997 rumors began to circulate about the imminent unification of Chechnya and Dagestan into a single Islamic state, and that a “cleansing” of Russians would soon begin in preparation for this unification. Various kinds of figures and emissaries began to appear in Chechnya, coming from Dagestan. These men found great hospitality, and the support of those who supported them. Without encountering any significant opposition from the authorities, supporters of the Imamate began to promote the idea of creating a Chechen-Dagestan state “to marry Dagestan to Ichkeria” as one of them put it.

Some time later, a congress of the Chechen and Dagestani peoples was held in Dzhokhar, in the presence of the same leadership of Ichkeria. Shamil Basayev was elected Imam of Chechnya and Dagestan, with the aim of establishing an Imamate. Analyzing everything that was happening, it was obvious that this was being done under the direction of the Lubyanka , but any sober remarks regarding this adventure met with strong opposition from the “advocates of pure Islam”, anyone who dared to say something objective in this matter he would have been branded as an “apostate”, an agent of the Russians, a Jew or belonging to other categories considered hostile to the Chechens.

Shamil Basayev and Al Khattab, the two main animators of the Congress of Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan

After using all sorts of provocations against Ichkeria, starting with the financing of slave traders and ending with battles on the Russian-Chechen border, without results, the Russian revanchists used the risk of an Islamic insurrection in the Caucasus as a strong argument for the 1999 presidential campaign. In the summer of 1999, Basayev and his supporters accelerated preparations for the invasion of Dagestan, making no secret of their plans. The leadership of Ichkeria, being in a serious internal crisis, did not have the opportunity to intervene.

At the end of August , more precisely on August 28, 1999, a meeting of the State Defense Committee (GKO) was held in the building of the Presidential Administration. Almost all of the country’s military-political leadership attended this meeting, as well as religious figures and some members of Parliament. The main argument was evidently the invasion of Dagestan. Basayev had shown himself to the whole world in the territory of Dagestan, with a watermelon in his hand. The GKO was expected to make a decision on this issue , and a proposal was made to ask Basayev to immediately leave Dagestan, and return to Chechnya.

The meeting took place in a tense atmosphere: the president assessed the situation as very difficult, and harshly accused Basayev of having exposed the Chechen people to serious consequences. Finally, he urged those present to prepare to repel the invasion of the Russians, as, according to him, another war was inevitable at this point. At the end of his speech, the President asked the members of the State Defense Committee to express their opinion on this issue. On the eve of the GKO meeting, I hoped that a collective statement condemning the actions of Shamil Basayev would be presented: I am sure that Shamil would not have remained indifferent to the GKO’s pronouncement. Yet this did not happen. Without boring the reader with a list of the names of those present, I will say that there were 35/40 people there. For the most part the speakers expressed little, and not very clearly. A clear and unequivocal position on the matter was expressed by no more than 3 – 4 people. Among them was Akhmed Zakayev. In his speech the Minister of Culture supported and approved Basayev’s actions without hesitation. I, in turn, called Basayev’s actions a crime against the Chechen people. Many of those who condemn Basayev’s action today remained silent then. The lack of a unanimous decision on this issue was a mistake on the part of the GKO. The leadership of Ichkeria, with its fragmentation, showed the side of Russian anti-Chechen propaganda. Our short-sightedness was very useful to the Russian revanchists.

Zakatev scrive ai Radicali Italiani: sarete benvenuti come fratelli nella Cecenia libera!

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A seguito del riconoscimento della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria da parte del Parlamento ucraino, il Primo Ministro Akhmed Zakayev si è rivolto ai Radicali Italiani per ringraziarli del loro sostegno. Nel Giugno scorso i Radicali avevano organizzato una visita a Roma per il Primo Ministro ceceno, durante la quale era stato ricevuto in via ufficiale dal Sottosegretario di Stato agli Esteri Benedetto della Vedova.

Ai nostri amici italiani di Radicali Italiani

A Silvja Manzi e Igor Boni

A Benedetto della Vedova e Riccardo Magi

18 ottobre 2022

Oggi il Parlamento ucraino ha riconosciuto la Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria. Si tratta di un gesto molto più che formale: il popolo ucraino ha riconosciuto nella nostra battaglia la sua stessa battaglia, nelle nostre sofferenze le sue stesse sofferenze, nel nostro destino il suo stesso destino. Non potrà mai esserci libertà per nessuno, finché un solo popolo, e addirittura un solo uomo, dovrà subire la schiavitù.

Oggi gli Ucraini combattono per la loro indipendenza, così come i ceceni fanno ormai da ventidue lunghi anni. L’Europa, che prima non aveva capito l’importanza della nostra battaglia, oggi comincia a riconoscere che la guerra che oggi si combatte sulle sponde del Dnepr e nel Donbass è iniziato molti anni prima, quando la Russia ha preteso di piegare il nostro spirito spezzando i corpi dei nostri fratelli, dei nostri bambini, con i cingoli dei suoi carri armati.

In questo giorno così importante per la nostra nazione, che segna il primo, concreto passo verso la riconquista della nostra libertà dall’oppressione, rivolgo a voi, che in tutto questo avete creduto fin dall’inizio, il mio sentito ringraziamento per il sostegno che avete dato, e che continuate dare, alla nostra lotta. Spero che la purezza dei vostri ideali possa illuminare le coscienze di tutti gli uomini liberi.

Sarete benvenuti come fratelli nella Cecenia libera.

Akhmed Zakaev,

Primo Ministro della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria

ENGLISH VERSION

Following the recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by the Ukrainian Parliament, Prime Minister Akhmed Zakayev addressed the Italian Radicals to thank them for their support. Last June the Radicals had organized a visit to Rome for the Chechen Prime Minister, during which he was officially received by the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Benedetto della Vedova.

To our Italian friends of Radicali Italiani

To Silvja Manzi and Igor Boni

To Benedetto della Vedova and Riccardo Magi

October 18, 2022

Today the Ukrainian Parliament recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. It is a much more than formal gesture: the Ukrainian people recognized their own battle in our battle, their own sufferings in our sufferings, their own destiny in our destiny. There can never be freedom for anyone, as long as a single people, and even a single man, has to suffer slavery.

Today the Ukrainians are fighting for their independence, just as the Chechens have been fighting for twenty-two long years now. Europe, which previously did not understand the importance of our battle, is now beginning to recognize that the war being fought today on the banks of the Dnieper and in the Donbass began many years earlier, when Russia tried to bend our spirit. breaking the bodies of our brothers, of our children, with the tracks of his tanks.

On this very important day for our nation, which marks the first concrete step towards regaining our freedom from oppression, I extend to you, who have believed in all this from the beginning, my heartfelt thanks for the support that you have given, and continue to dare, to our struggle. I hope that the purity of your ideals can enlighten the consciences of all free men.

You will be welcome as brothers in free Chechnya.

Akhmed Zakaev,

Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

THE GENERAL OF NAUR – MEMORIES OF APTI BATALOV (Part II)

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The first meeting with Maskhadov

My first meeting with Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic took place a few days after my appointment. That day I was summoned to Grozny for a meeting of the commanders of the military units. When I arrived in Grozny, I introduced myself to his office, which if I remember correctly was on the second floor of the building that housed the Headquarters. After a short wait I was called by one of his guards and invited to enter. Maskhadov’s office, then still a Colonel, was not large. He was sitting on his desk and writing. I greeted him with the usual Chechen greeting, he got up from his chair and replied with a counter greeting. When he had finished, he looked at me and asked me what the purpose of my visit was.

I introduced myself, and Merzhuyev ‘s order regarding my appointment as Commander of the districts of Naursk and Nadterechny was placed on the table. Maskhadov took the document, read it, crossed out a sentence with his pen and said to me: Have it wright again, I don’t have enough cops. And he gave me back my order. I took the paper and looked at what he had erased. After seeing his correction the blood went to my head, my face started to burn with anger. Maskhadov had ticked “Police Captain”. Holding back the indignation with difficulty, I replied: I did not ask for this position, I will not go to anyone and I will not write anything! To be honest, in a way, I was satisfied with this “entry” into the ChRI authorities. Now I could legitimately refuse my appointment and go home in peace. But as I reached the door Maskhadov called me back: The meeting will start in an hour, please go to the Central Control Center. I didn’t know what he was talking about and so, after taking my leave, I asked a guard what the Central Control Center ( TsKP ) was, and where it was. The guard told me that it was the Central Command Post, and that I could reach it on the first floor of the Presidential Palace, in the right wing. I headed for my destination, keeping the order in my pocket. I still keep it in my personal archive. As I walked, I thought to myself: Something is rotten in the state of Denmark. The subsequent history of the Republic confirmed the validity of my hypothesis.

False alarms. Luckly!

Between 29 and 30 August , at the Ishcherskaya checkpoint , we arrested a boy of about 25 from the Stavropol District. Subjected to inspection, in his backpack we found a T-shirt, underwear, a black mask and a full-face balaclava, as well as a silk rope of about one meter in length. In his pocket we found a letter which, we discovered, was addressed to his sister. We questioned him about the purpose of his trip to Chechnya, and he replied without hesitation that he had come to join the opposition and protect the Russians from the oppression and violence of the Dudaevites. He said that he had already fought in Yugoslavia, on the side of the Serbs, and that the mask and the rope he had already used there. He said that once he reached his destination he would send the letter to his sister, the only one who loved him, to inform her of his arrival. After detaining him, I called for ad AN – 2 from Khankala delivered him to Grozny. A few days later the “volunteer” was shown on TV and President Dudaev, in front of the reporters, after showing the mask and the cordon, read aloud the “letter from a volunteer”.

As I wrote earlier, all settlements in the region were equipped with radio stations, there was a consolidated link between the district and the village commander’s offices, at any time of day I could contact the commander of each village and know the situation in this settlement. In addition to ensuring the safety of the Naur region from the Avturkhanov opposition, we, through our local supporters in the village of Znamenskoye , who were not few, monitored what was happening in the opposition camp, and relayed reports to Grozny. We had a signalman who knew radio stations well once he served in Afghanistan as radio operator in a GRU sabotage detachment.

One day, the operator tuned in to the opposition radio station in Znamenskoye , and listened to a radio conversation of our opponents that was endlessly repeated: Tonight , at zero – zero, the time X arrives. Fearing to be heard, I decided to deliver the report personally, and went to Grozny myself. Arriving at the Presidential Palace, I went to the Central Command Post, but found no one. It was late at night, but the news was too important, so I went to the sixth (or possibly seventh) floor, where Colonel Merzhuyev ‘s office was located . After listening to me, he confirmed my fears: Apparently tonight, or early in the morning, something will happen. The Ingush [I don’t know who he was referring to] received orders from Moscow to block the Rostov – Baku highway and to keep it ready for the mass advance of military vehicles.

Merzhuyev was visibly agitated by my message. Before leaving, he asked me to warn Abu Arsanukaev , commander of the Presidential Guard, to strengthen security around the Palace. Having found Arsanukaev , I sent him Mershuyev ‘s order , and he began to tinker with the armored vehicle parked at the entrance, a BRDM armed with a machine gun. After a brief check, it became clear that the vehicle’s machine gun was unable to fire. The guards present began to look for an alternative: it seems that a tank was available, stationed around a nearby corner, but that it was unable to move and that they should have towed it.

I thought, disconsolately, about the conversation with Merzhuyev , while observing the readiness or rather, the non-readiness of the defense of the Presidential Palace in the event of an attack. I returned to Ishcherskaya , waiting for the impending attack. Fortunately, neither that day nor the next day did anything happen. A week or two later Mershuyev apparently quit for health reasons.

Musa Merzhuyev (left) attends the Independence Day military parade, September 6, 1993

The hardest two hours of my life

On 23 August 1994 an opposition unit, mounted on trucks and escorted by two T – 64s, appeared near Chernokozovo, a few kilometers from Naurskaya. Waiting for him was a crowd of local residents, led by the Prefect, Aindi Akhaev , who literally seized the tanks, disarmed the avturkhanovites and sent them back, with a promise never to come back armed. Shortly thereafter, I received an ultimatum from Avturkhanov: either we would return the wagons to him and remove the roadblocks, or, in his words, he would march into the district in bloody boots . Receiving no response from us, he sent a messenger and asked me for a meeting on the bridge between Ishcherskaya and Znamenskoye . I accepted, and went to the birdge. Halfway there was a Volga, from which first a tall man with blond hair got out, then Avturkhanov.

We shook hands. His was sweaty, and visibly trembling. I mocked him, asking: What is it, Umar, don’t you have reliable Chechens to use as bodyguards? He muttered back to me, then moved on to threats. He asked me to return the tanks to him, and to my refusal he replied: I’ll give you two hours, otherwise I’ll reduce you to dust! He did not insist again on the dismantling of the roadblock, perhaps he had forgotten. I replied aloud, in Russian: we’ll see who cancels whom. We are waiting for you. I went back to my companions and told them about our conversation. We prepared to repel the attack. Fifteen minutes later, on the other side of the river we noticed a great commotion: civilian cars were massing at the checkpoint, a ZPU-2 anti-aircraft gun had appeared out of nowhere, and its turret rotated left and right, aimed at ours. locations.

The moment was very tense, and some of us started running away. A police officer who was with me along with four of his fellow soldiers stated that he had been urgently recalled to the District Police Department, and that they should leave us. I couldn’t resist, and I let them go. Other militiamen also left. I had to do something, so I ordered one of the tanks we had seized to be placed at the entrance to the Checkpoint, and aimed the gun at our opponents. At the sight of the tank, the opposition militants on the other side began to fidget, running back and forth. Two painful hours passed while we awaited the attack. If there had been a well-organized attack, we would never have been able to keep the bridge. They would have taken the tank back from us, and no one could have helped us. The difference between our forces and theirs was too great, we barely had two magazines each, and neither of us had military experience. If Avturkhanov had persisted, the bridge would have fallen. At the time I did not understand why he considered it so important to enter the Naursk District, being able to use the road from Lomaz – Yurt to Znamenskoye , along the right side of the Terek, to get to Grozny. Only some time ago, in a conversation with a guy who was an opposition militant at the time, I learned that the anti – Dudaevites had trouble getting the equipment through that street, because the inhabitants of Lomaz – Yurt (now Bratskoye ) they were for the most part supporters of Dudaev, and opposed arms in hand to the passing of arms against the government. Avturkhanov wanted to check the bridge in order to use the road on the left bank of the Terek. But these things I learned only later. I was not aware of this at the time, and I did not understand what this opposition showdown was for.

Eventually Avturkhanov gave up. There was no attack. The Avturkhanovites limited themselves to undermining their side of the bridge and damaging it, leaving only a narrow pedestrian passage. That day I learned about who was with me: I was very proud of the companions who remained. To be honest, these two hours were perhaps the hardest hours of my life for me. The most difficult because for the first time, I had to make a decision that could have had serious consequences. In those days the Chechens were not so indifferent to the bloodshed of their compatriots, they were not yet hardened by the hatred due to political differences!

After the war, when I was director of the National Security Service, I learned from an inmate that the Provisional Council had organized the August 23 Raid to try to take over the entire district. The raid on Naurskaya, stopped by Akhaev in Chernokozovo , was supposed to induce the population of the district to surrender, taking the militia behind while they were busy defending the checkpoints. What Avturkhanov’s strategists had not considered was the courage of the people of Naursk and Mekenskaya . They were simple people, but very determined, who with their courage made the plan of our adversaries fail.

Dudaev (left) Maskhadov (centre) Edilov (Right)

VERSIONE ITALIANA

PARTE II

Il primo incontro con Maskhadov

Il mio primo incontro con Aslan Maskhadov, Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale delle Forze Armate della Repubblica Cecena è avvenuto pochi giorni dopo la mia nomina. Quel giorno fui convocato a Grozny per una riunione dei comandanti delle unità militari. Arrivato a Grozny, mi presentai nel suo ufficio, che se non ricordo male si trovava al secondo piano dell’edificio che ospitava il Quartier Generale. Dopo una breve anticamera fui chiamato da una delle sue guardie ed invitato ad entrare. L’ufficio di Maskhadov, allora ancora Colonnello, non era grande. Egli era seduto sulla sua scrivania e scriveva. Lo salutai con il consueto saluto ceceno, lui si alzò dalla sedia e rispose con un contro saluto. Quando ebbe finito di scrivere, mi guardò e mi chiese quale fosse lo scopo della mia visita.

Mi presentai, e l’ordine di Merzhuyev riguardo la mia nomina a Comandante dei distretti di Naursk e Nadterechny gli fu posto sul tavolo. Maskhadov prese il documento, lo lesse, barrò una frase con la penna e mi disse: Fallo rifare, non ho abbastanza poliziotti. E mi restituì l’ordine. Io presi il foglio e guardai che cosa avesse cancellato. Dopo aver visto la sua correzione il sangue mi andò alla testa, il mio viso iniziò a bruciare di eccitazione. Maskhadov aveva barrato “Capitano della Polizia”. Trattenendo a fatica l’indignazione, risposi: Non ho chiesto io questa posizione, non andrò da nessuno e non scriverò nulla! Ad essere onesti, in un certo modo, ero soddisfatto di questo “ingresso” nelle autorità della ChRI. Ora potevo legittimamente rifiutare la mia nomina e tornare a casa in pace. Ma come raggiunsi la porta Maskhadov mi richiamò: La riunione comincerà tra un’ora, fatti trovare al Centro di Controllo Centrale. Io non sapevo di cosa stesse parlando e così, dopo essermi congedato, chiesi ad una guardia che cosa fosse il Centro di Controllo Centrale (TsKP), e dove si trovasse. La guardia mi precisò che si trattava del Posto di Comando Centrale, e che avrei potuto raggiungerlo al primo piano del Palazzo Presidenziale, nell’ala destra.

Dopo aver salutato, mi avviai verso la mia destinazione, tenendo l’ordine in tasca. Lo conservo ancora, nel mio archivio personale. Mentre camminavo, pensai tra me e me: “C’è del marcio in Danimarca”. La successiva storia della Repubblica confermò la validità di questa mia ipotesi.

Falsi allarmi. Per fortuna!

Tra il 29 ed il 30 Agosto, al posto di blocco di Ishcherskaya, fermammo un ragazzo di circa 25 anni proveniente dal Distretto di Stavropol. Sottoposto ad ispezione, nel suo zaino trovammo una maglietta, della biancheria, una maschera nera ed un passamontagna integrale, oltre ad una corda di seta di circa un metro di lunghezza. In tasca gli trovammo una lettera che, scoprimmo, era indirizzata alla sorella. Lo interrogammo riguardo lo scopo del suo viaggio in Cecenia, e lui rispose senza esitazione che era venuto per unirsi all’opposizione e proteggere i russi dall’oppressione e dalla violenza dei dudaeviti. Disse che aveva già combattuto in Jugoslavia, dalla parte dei serbi, e che la maschera e la corda li aveva già usati lì. Disse che una volta giunto a destinazione avrebbe inviato la lettera alla sorella, l’unica che gli volesse bene, per comunicarle il suo arrivo. Dopo averlo trattenuto, feci arrivare un AN – 2 da Khankala e lo feci consegnare a Grozny. Pochi giorni dopo il “volontario” fu mostrato alla TV ed il Presidente Dudaev, davanti ai giornalisti,  dopo aver mostrato la maschera ed il cordone, lesse ad alta voce la “lettera di un volontario”.

Come ho scritto in precedenza, tutti gli insediamenti della regione erano dotati di stazioni radio, c’era un collegamento consolidato tra il distretto e gli uffici del comandante del villaggio, a qualsiasi ora del giorno potevo contattare il comandante Di ogni villaggio e conoscere la situazione in questo insediamento. Oltre a garantire la sicurezza della regione di Naur da parte dell’opposizione di Avturkhanov, noi, attraverso i nostri sostenitori locali nel villaggio di Znamenskoye, che non erano pochi, monitoravamo quanto stava accadendo nel campo dell’opposizione, e trasmettevamo rapporti a Grozny. Avevamo un segnalatore che conosceva bene le stazioni radio, una volta ha attraversato l’Afghanistan dove era un operatore radio in un distaccamento di sabotaggio del GRU.

Un giorno, l’operatore si sintonizzò sulla stazione radio dell’opposizione a Znamenskoye, ed ascoltò una conversazione radio dei nostri avversari che si ripeteva incessantemente: Questa notte, a zero – zero, arriva l’ora X. Temendo che anche le nostre conversazioni fossero ascoltate, decisi di recapitare il rapporto personalmente, e mi recai di persona a Grozny. Giunto al Palazzo Presidenziale, mi recai al Posto di Comando Centrale, ma non trovai nessuno. Era notte fonda, ma la notizia era troppo importante, così mi recai al sesto (o forse al settimo) piano, dove si trovava l’ufficio del Colonnello Merzhuyev. Dopo avermi ascoltato, questi confermò i miei timori: A quanto pare questa notte, o al mattino presto, succederà qualcosa. L’Inguscio [non so a chi si riferisse] ha ricevuto ordini da Mosca di bloccare l’autostrata Rostov – Baku e di tenerla pronta per l’avanzata in massa di mezzi militari.

Merzhuyev era visibilmente agitato dal mio messaggio. Prima di prendere commiato, mi chiese di avvisare Abu Arsanukaev, comandante della Guardia Presidenziale, di rafforzare la sicurezza intorno al Palazzo. Trovato Arsanukaev, gli trasmisi l’ordine di Mershuyev, e questi si mise ad armeggiare con il mezzo blindato parcheggiato all’ingresso, un BRDM armato di mitragliatrice. Dopo un breve controllo, fu chiaro che la mitragliatrice del veicolo non era in grado di sparare. Le guardie presenti si misero a cercare un’alternativa: pare che fosse disponibile un carro armato, appostato dietro ad un angolo lì vicino, ma che non fosse in grado di muoversi e che avrebbero dovuto rimorchiarlo.

Ripensai, sconsolato, alla conversazione con Merzhuyev, mentre osservavo la prontezza o meglio, la non prontezza della difesa del Palazzo Presidenziale in caso di attacco. Tornai ad Ishcherskaya, aspettando l’attacco imminente. Fortunatamente, né quel giorno, né il giorno successivo accadde nulla. Una o due settimane dopo Mershuyev si licenziò a quanto pare per motivi di salute. Non l’ho più visto

Le due ore più difficili della mia vita

Il 23 Agosto 1994 un reparto dell’opposizione, montato su camion e scortato da due T – 64 comparve nei pressi di Chernokozovo, a pochi chilometri da Naur. Ad attenderlo c’era una folla di residenti locali, guidati dal Prefetto, Aindi Akhaev, i quali letteralmente sequestrarono i carri armati, disarmarono gli avturkhanoviti e li rispedirono indietro, con la promessa di non tornare mai più armati. Poco dopo ricevetti un ultimatum da Avturkhanov: o gli restituivamo i carri e rimuovevamo i posti di blocco, oppure, citando le sue parole, egli avrebbe marciato sul distretto con gli stivali insenguinati. Non ricevendo da noi alcuna risposta, inviò un messaggero e mi chiese un incontro sul ponte tra Ishcherskaya e Znamenskoye. Io accettai, e mi recai sul ponte. A metà strada c’era una Volga, dalla quale scese dapprima un uomo alto, coi capelli biondi, poi Avturkhanov.

Ci stringemmo la mano. La sua era sudata, e visibilmente tremante. Lo irrisi, chiedendogli: Che c’è, Umar, non hai ceceni affidabili da usare come guardie del corpo? Quello mi rispose bofonchiando, poi passò alle minacce. Mi chiese di restituirgli i carri armati, e al mio rifiuto rispose: ti do due ore, altrimenti vi riduco in polvere! Non insistette nuovamente sullo smantellamento del posto di blocco, forse se n’era dimenticato. Io gli risposi ad alta voce, in russo: vedremo chi cancellerà chi. Vi aspettiamo. Tornai dai miei compagni e raccontai loro della nostra conversazione. Ci preparammo a respingere l’attacco. Quindici minuti dopo, dall’altra parte del fiume notammo un gran trambusto: auto civili si stavano ammassando al posto di blocco, un cannone antiaereo ZPU – 2 era apparso dal nulla, e la sua torretta ruotava a destra e a sinistra, diretta contro le nostre posizioni.

Il momento era molto teso, ed alcuni di noi iniziarono a darsela a gambe. Un ufficiale di polizia che era con me insieme a quattro suoi commilitoni dichiarò che era stato richiamato urgentemente al Dipartimento di Polizia Distrettuale, e che avrebbero dovuto lasciarci. Non potevo oppormi, e li lasciai partire. Anche altri miliziani se ne andarono. Dovevo fare qualcosa, e allora ordinai che uno dei carri che avevamo sequestrato fosse posizionato all’ingresso del Checkpoint, e che puntasse il cannone contro i nostri avversari.  Alla vista del carro, dall’altra parte i militanti dell’opposizione iniziarono ad agitarsi, correndo avanti e indietro. Passarono due ore dolorose, mentre attendevamo l’attacco. Se ci fosse stato un attacco ben organizzato, non avremmo mai potuto tenere il ponte. Loro ci avrebbero ripreso il carro armato, e nessuno avrebbe potuto aiutarci. La differenza tra le nostre forze e le loro era troppo grande, noi avevamo appena due caricatori a testa, e nessuno di noi aveva esperienza militare. Se Avturkhanov avesse insistito, il ponte sarebbe caduto. Sul momento non capivo perché ritenesse così importante penetrare nel Distretto di Naursk, potendo utilizzare la strada che da Lomaz – Yurt procede pe Znamenskoye, costeggiando il lato destro del Terek, per arrivare a Grozny. Soltanto qualche tempo da, conversando con un tizio che a quel tempo era un militante dell’opposizione, ho saputo che gli anti – dudaeviti avevano problemi a far passare l’equipaggiamento da quella strada, perché gli abitanti di Lomaz – Yurt (oggi Bratskoye) erano per la maggior parte sostenitori di Dudaev, e si opponevano armi in pugno al passaggio di armi contro il governo. Avturkhanov voleva controllare il ponte per poter usare la strada sulla sponda sinistra del Terek. Ma queste cose le ho sapute soltanto dopo. All’epoca non ne ero informato, e non capivo a cosa servisse questa prova di forza da parte dell’opposizione. 

Alla fine Avturkhanov desistette. Non ci fu alcun attacco. Gli avturkhanoviti si limitarono a minare il loro versante del ponte e a danneggiarlo, lasciando soltanto uno stretto passaggio pedonale. Quel giorno imparai a conoscere chi era con me: fui molto orgoglioso dei compagni che erano rimasti. Ad essere sincero, per me  queste due ore sono state forse le ore più difficili della mia vita. Le più difficili perché per la prima volta, dovetti prendere una decisione che avrebbe potuto produrre gravi conseguenze. A quei tempi i ceceni non erano così indifferenti allo spargimento di sangue dei loro compatrioti, non erano ancora induriti dall’odio dovuto alle differenze politiche!

Dopo la guerra, quando ero direttore del Servizio di Sicurezza Nazionale, seppi da un detenuto che il Consiglio Provvisorio aveva organizzato il Raid del 23 Agosto per tentare di impossessarsi dell’intero distretto. Il raid su Naur, fermato da Akhaev a Chernokozovo, avrebbe dovuto indurre la popolazione del distretto ad arrendersi, prendendo la milizia alle spalle mentre era impegnata a difendere i posti di blocco. Quello che gli strateghi di Avturkhanov non avevano considerato era il coraggio delle popolazioni di Naursk e di Mekenskaya. Si trattava di persone semplici, ma molto determinate, che con il loro coraggio fecero fallire il piano dei nostri avversari.

THE GENERAL OF NAUR – MEMORIES OF APTI BATALOV (PART I)

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Introduction

Apti Batalov was born in Ilic, in the Kamensky District of Kazakhistan, on October 19, 1956. Police officer, in September 1994 he was appointed military commander of the districts of Naur and Nadterechny, and in this role he organized the armed militias destined to become one of the most well-known military units of the Chechen army, the Naursk Battalion. The unit would have distinguished itself in many battles, and Batalov himself would have become, at the end of the conflict, one of the main officials of the Chechen army, coming to lead the General Staff of the Armed Forces with the rank of Brigadier General and the National Security Service.

Batalov agreed to share his war memories with me.

Winds of war

On June 20, 1994, I was appointed head of the Ishcherskaya Village Police Department in the Naursk District. The village is located on the left bank of the Terek, the north-eastern part of the village borders the Stavropol Territory while to the south, on the other side of the river, about a kilometer and a half, is the village of Znamenskoye, which at the time was the headquarters of the opposition. The city is crossed by a railway that leads from Russia to Dagestan. The western part of the village hosted a terminal for the loading of oil and a pumping station, through which the crude was shipped to Russia. The road that entered Chechnya from the Stavropol Territory forked in two: one route continued eastwards, reaching Chervlennaya and from there continuing to Dagestan, in the north, and another one run up to Grozny, in the south. The other crossed the Terek by a bridge, crossed the Nadterechny District and then penetrated deep into the country. Being a border settlement and a crossroads of roads to and from Russia, Ishcherskaya was one of the busiest places for criminals in all of Chechnya – a sort of criminal transit point.

At the end of June 1994 the chief of the district police, Zaindi Pashaev, called me and introduced me to the district military commander sent from Grozny. I was told to make myself available to the Commander and to assist him in organizing checkpoints around Ishcherskaya. He did not present any documents confirming his position, neither then nor subsequently. He was a man of about 25, 28 years, about five feet tall, very dynamic, fast in his movements and physically strong. A young man, who I later learned was President Dudaev’s son-in-law, having married the daughter of a brother of the President. His name was Duta Muzaev. He actively went to work, and I followed his directions, helping in all that needed to be done. We set up two checkpoints, one on the Russian-Chechen border, in front of the village of Galyugaevskaya, the other on the left access of the bridge over the Terek, in front of Znamenskoye.

In those days, while we were building the checkpoints, mass anti-Chechen pogroms began in the territories adjacent to Chechnya, a boy named Pashaev was killed, self-styled “Cossacks of Kursk” (actually agents of the GRU and FSK) began to damaging the houses where the Chechens lived, they burned the farms where cows and sheep were kept. It was not difficult to understand that behind these pogroms and murders there were forces interested in creating chaos and inter-ethnic massacres between the Cossack and Chechen populations. Refugees began pouring into Chechnya. Meanwhile , Russian armed units began to carry out all kinds of provocations. Armed units entered their armored vehicles in the Naur District and, under armed threat, carried out “passport control” operations declaring: “You are in our territory, and you are Russian citizens”.

In the first days of August Muzaev told me that he had had a physical problem with the muscles of his spine, and that he would have to return to Grozny for treatment. He left, and never came back. Shortly after Muzaev’s departure, I was summoned to Grozny by Colonel Merzhuyev. On 16 September I joined him in the capital and he informed me that due to the worsening of the situation on the borders of Ichkeria, since the Naursk District is located at the northern limit of the Republic, I had been recommended to the President to take the place of Military Commander in that district, and in the neighboring district of Nadterechny. To be honest this news surprised me, and shocked me, because it was clear that a war was about to break out between Russia and Chechnya. The Naur region was the most vulnerable, being on the border. After listening to Merzhuyev, I asked him: Don’t you really have a person more experienced than me for this position? I told him that I was absolutely not trained in military affairs, and that I had no idea how to play the role of military commander in these regions, especially in the Nadterechny District, which is almost entirely under the control of the opposition. Merzhuyev replied: Tell the President all this.

We went to meet the President, who received us after a short anteroom. It was my first meeting with Dudaev. He was dressed in civilian clothes, and he looked intelligent and serious. He asked me some not very important questions, after which he asked me: You have been recommended to me for the position of District Commander. Well, are you able to hold it? I was hoping that Merzhuyev would join the conversation, but looking at him I realized that he would remain silent. I’ll do whatever it takes, I replied. Dudaev did not detain us any longer, and dismissed us. Before leaving, Merzhuyev wrote an appointment order by hand, said he would send it to the Naur District Prefect, Aindi Akhaev, so that he would learn of the appointment and order his officials to carry out my orders. I had just become the first regional military commander in the history of Ichkeria. From that day on, my path was the struggle for Chechnya’s independence, which eventually led me to England.

Aindi Akhaev

Military Commander

Back in Naur, I started mobilizing volunteers for checkpoint service. People answered my call: they were ordinary Chechen boys, simple agricultural workers, yet they were people of great dignity, and with a deep sense of honor. Most of them were unarmed, some carrying shotguns, knives or daggers with them. My frequent appeals to Headquarters were eventually crowned with success, and they promised me from Grozny that they would send 10 AK-74 firearms. I thought I would get the guns from the State Security Department, but Geliskhanov, who at the time he led the department, found a different reason each time not to send the guns, and went on for about a month. When the weapons were finally delivered, I saw that they were old, worn, firearms, some even missing some parts. I had to sort it out differently, so I requisitioned the armory of the Naur Police Department. We managed to collect more than twenty AK 5.45 assault rifles, an RPK 5.45 machine gun, two PK – 7.62, two RPG grenade launchers, an automatic grenade launcher and a sniper rifle. I distributed all these weapons among the militia men on duty at the Checkpoints, and so we put on a well-armed force, able to counter the armed opposition deployed in Znamenskoye and the bandits who tried to penetrate taking advantage of the chaos. In addition to this, I formed local teams recruited from the residents of each village. We began holding gatherings in all the settlements in the region, leaving the residents to appoint their own commanders. These makeshift officers were the directors of state agricultural farms and other local businesses. In particular, they provided us with radio stations with which they were used to communicating with the district authorities. A person who specialized in these things helped us to establish communications, so that all units were coordinated with each other.

The summer and autumn of 1994 in Chechnya saw many social and political events. The Opposition has become more active in the districts of Urus – Martan, Gudermes and Grozny. In the village of Znamenskoye the armed groups of Labazanov and Gantemirov gathered, while the Cossacks of the Naur and Shelkov districts took action, sending delegations to Stavropol asking to annex the entire left bank of the Terek to Russia. Realizing that any public demonstration in support of this proposal would give courage and determination to the local opponents and the Cossacks, to prevent this from happening, I began to seek contacts to organize secret meetings with the leaders of the Chechen and Cossack opposition. I used to go to their house and there, over a cup of tea or vodka, I would say to them: If you want to gather, go to Znamenskoye, I promise you that none of your family will be punished for this. But if you start moving from that area, no one will be safe, not even you. They replied that they would not give in to my threats, but in the end no one in the Naur District spoke out against Dudaev in a public demonstration. A big help came from the district prefect, Aindi Akhaev, who was a very brave man and a devoted supporter of President Dudaev. The fortunate coexistence of these factors, in the end, determined the fact that the District of Naur remained loyal to Ichkeria until the end!

Umar Avturkhanov, leader dell’opposizione antidudaevita

Adding fuel to the fire

In the fall of 1994, enemy special services intensified their subversive activities throughout Ichkeria. In Grozny, terrorist attacks and all kinds of provocations began to occur frequently: the Russians actively sought to create an atmosphere of fear, panic and chaos throughout the Republic, while in several areas the so-called “opposition” declared with increasing certainty that they would not recognize the central government. Of course, the Naur District was also under attack from the special services. Several high-profile murders took place in the area, such as two Naurskaya residents, both of Cossack ethnicity, killed on the Tersky state farm. I, together with the district police chief, went to the scene of the crime: the murder had been committed with demonstrative cruelty, the victims’ stomachs had been slashed, and the bowels had been made out of the corpses. At the crime scene a trace was perfectly visible, as if it had been left on purpose, leading to a boy’s home: clothes smeared with blood, rubber boots with blood on the soles and other evidence clearly framing the young man.

However, something was not clear: the alleged perpetrator was a physically very weak, mentally unstable 17-18 year old boy. Furthermore, if the traces leading from the place where the bodies were found to his home were evident, there was no trace that led to the place where these people had been killed. It was obvious that this boy had been brought onto the scene by someone else, in order to be used as a scapegoat. When I asked the chief of the district police a few days later how the investigation was proceeding, he replied that because the district attorney had refused to arrest the suspect, the detainee had been released from custody. I was sure that the Russian special services were behind this crime, who were interested in creating a rift between Cossacks and Chechens, using the pretext of “genocide” to incite the former against the latter and provoke the secession of the northern districts from Chechnya.

Later, these suspicions of ours were proved by facts. The news of the brutal murder spread throughout the region with incredible speed, the Cossacks gathered in Naurskaya and demanded that the guilty be found, tried and sentenced. Aindi Akhaev met many of them, explained to them who the instigators of these murders were, and the Cossacks realized that the Russian government didn’t care about them at all, but was interested in using them as tools to provoke an inter-ethnic massacre. I too, present at this meeting, spoke in support of the Prefect’s version. Finally, thanks to him, the Naur region was spared from violence.

автоматический перевод на русский

ГЕНЕРАЛ НАУРА – ВОСПОМИНАНИЯ АПТИ БАТАЛОВА (ЧАСТЬ I)

Введение

Апти Баталов родился 19 октября 1956 года в селе Илыч Каменского района Казахстана. Офицер полиции, в сентябре 1994 года назначен военным комендантом Наурского и Надтеречного районов, и в этой роли организовывал вооруженные формирования, предназначенные для стать одной из самых известных воинских частей чеченской армии, Наурским батальоном. Подразделение отличилось бы во многих боях, а сам Баталов стал бы по окончании конфликта одним из главных чинов чеченской армии, придя возглавить Генеральный штаб Вооруженных Сил в звании бригадного генерала. и Служба национальной безопасности.

Баталов согласился поделиться со мной своими военными воспоминаниями.

Ветры войны

20 июня 1994 года я был назначен начальником Ищерского РОВД Наурского района. Село расположено на левом берегу Терека, северо-восточная часть села граничит со Ставропольским краем, а южнее, по другую сторону реки, примерно в полутора километрах, находится село Знаменское, который в то время был штабом оппозиции. Город пересекает железная дорога, ведущая из России в Дагестан. В западной части поселка находился терминал по отгрузке нефти и насосная станция, через которую нефть отгружалась в Россию. Дорога, въезжавшая в Чечню со стороны Ставропольского края, разветвлялась на две части: одна шла на восток до Червленной и оттуда в Дагестан на севере, а другая доходила до Грозного на юге. Другая по мосту пересекла Терек, пересекла Надтеречный район и затем проникла в глубь страны. Будучи пограничным поселком и перекрестком дорог в Россию и из России, Ищерская была одним из самых оживленных мест криминала во всей Чечне — этаким криминальным перевалочным пунктом.

В конце июня 1994 г. мне позвонил начальник районной милиции Заинди Пашаев и представил присланному из Грозного окружному военачальнику. Мне сказали явиться к командиру и помочь ему в организации блокпостов вокруг Ищерской. Никаких документов, подтверждающих его позицию, он не предъявлял ни тогда, ни впоследствии. Это был мужчина лет 25-28, ростом около пяти футов, очень динамичный, быстрый в движениях и крепкий физически. Молодой человек, как я потом узнал, был зятем президента Дудаева, женившимся на дочери брата президента. Звали его Дута Музаев. Он активно брался за работу, а я следовала его указаниям, помогая во всем, что нужно было делать. Поставили два блокпоста, один на российско-чеченской границе, перед станицей Галюгаевской, другой на левом подъезде к мосту через Терек, перед Знаменским.

В те дни, пока мы строили блокпосты, на прилегающих к Чечне территориях начались массовые античеченские погромы, был убит мальчик по имени Пашаев, самозваные «казаки Курска» (на самом деле агенты ГРУ и ФСК) начали повредив дома, в которых жили чеченцы, они сожгли фермы, где содержались коровы и овцы. Нетрудно было понять, что за этими погромами и убийствами стояли силы, заинтересованные в создании хаоса и межнациональных погромов между казачьим и чеченским населением. Беженцы начали прибывать в Чечню. Тем временем российские вооруженные формирования начали проводить всевозможные провокации. Вооруженные формирования въехали на своей бронетехнике в Наурский район и под угрозой оружия провели операцию «паспортный контроль», заявив: «Вы находитесь на нашей территории, и вы – граждане России».

В первых числах августа Музаев сказал мне, что у него физически возникли проблемы с мышцами позвоночника, и что ему придется вернуться в Грозный для лечения. Он ушел и больше не вернулся. Вскоре после отъезда Музаева меня вызвал в Грозный полковник Мержуев. 16 сентября я присоединился к нему в столице, и он сообщил мне, что в связи с ухудшением обстановки на границах Ичкерии, поскольку Наурский район находится на северной окраине республики, я рекомендован Президенту принять место Военкомата в этом районе и в соседнем Надтеречном районе. Честно говоря, эта новость меня удивила и шокировала, потому что было ясно, что вот-вот разразится война между Россией и Чечней. Наурский район был самым уязвимым, находясь на границе. Выслушав Мержуева, я спросил его: неужели у вас нет на эту должность человека более опытного, чем я? Я сказал ему, что я совершенно не обучен военному делу и понятия не имею, как играть роль военного коменданта в этих районах, особенно в Надтеречном районе, который почти полностью находится под контролем оппозиции. Мержуев ответил: Расскажите обо всем этом Президенту.

Мы пошли встречать президента, который принял нас после короткой приемной. Это была моя первая встреча с Дудаевым. Он был одет в штатское, выглядел интеллигентным и серьезным. Он задал мне несколько не очень важных вопросов, после чего спросил: Вы мне рекомендованы на должность командующего округом. Ну, ты в состоянии держать его? Я надеялся, что Мержуев присоединится к разговору, но, глядя на него, понял, что он будет молчать. Я сделаю все, что потребуется, — ответил я. Дудаев больше нас не задерживал и отпустил. Перед отъездом Мержуев написал от руки приказ о назначении, сказал, что направит его префекту Наурского района Айнди Ахаеву, чтобы тот узнал о назначении и приказал своим чиновникам выполнить мои распоряжения. Я только что стал первым в истории Ичкерии областным военачальником. С этого дня моим путем стала борьба за независимость Чечни, которая в конце концов привела меня в Англию.

Военный командующий

Вернувшись в Наур, я начал мобилизовывать добровольцев для обслуживания блокпостов. На мой зов откликнулись люди: это были обычные чеченские мальчишки, простые сельскохозяйственные рабочие, но люди большого достоинства, с глубоким чувством чести. Большинство из них были безоружны, некоторые несли с собой дробовики, ножи или кинжалы. Мои частые обращения в Ставку в итоге увенчались успехом, и из Грозного мне пообещали прислать 10 автоматов АК-74. Я думал, что получу оружие из ОГБ, но Гелисханов, который в то время руководил управлением, каждый раз находил разные причины не присылать ружья, и ездил около месяца. Когда оружие, наконец, доставили, я увидел, что оно старое, изношенное, огнестрельное, у некоторых даже не хватает некоторых частей. Пришлось разбираться по-другому, поэтому я реквизировал арсенал Наурского полицейского управления. Нам удалось собрать более двадцати автоматов АК 5,45, пулемет РПК 5,45, два ПК-7,62, два гранатомета РПГ, автоматический гранатомет и снайперскую винтовку. Все это оружие я раздал милиционерам, дежурившим на блокпостах, и таким образом мы сформировали хорошо вооруженный отряд, способный противостоять вооруженной оппозиции, дислоцированной в Знаменском, и бандитам, пытавшимся проникнуть, воспользовавшись хаосом. Кроме того, я сформировал местные команды, набранные из жителей каждой деревни. Мы начали проводить сходы во всех населенных пунктах района, предоставив жителям самим назначать себе командиров. Эти импровизированные офицеры были директорами совхозов и других местных предприятий. В частности, они предоставили нам радиостанции, с помощью которых они привыкли общаться с районными властями. Человек, который специализировался на этих вещах, помог нам наладить связь, чтобы все подразделения были согласованы друг с другом.

Летом и осенью 1994 года в Чечне произошло много общественно-политических событий. Оппозиция активизировалась в районах Уруса – Мартановском, Гудермесском и Грозненском. В селе Знаменском собрались вооруженные отряды Лабазанова и Гантемирова, а казаки Наурского и Шелковского уездов выступили, направив в Ставрополь делегации с просьбой присоединить к России весь левый берег Терека. Понимая, что любая публичная демонстрация в поддержку этого предложения придаст мужества и решимости местным противникам и казакам, чтобы этого не произошло, я стал искать контакты для организации тайных встреч с лидерами чеченской и казачьей оппозиции. Бывало, я прихожу к ним домой и там за чашкой чая или водки говорю им: если хотите собраться, езжайте в Знаменское, обещаю вам, что никто из вашей семьи не будет за это наказан. Но если вы начнете двигаться из этой области, никто не будет в безопасности, даже вы. Они ответили, что не поддадутся на мои угрозы, но в итоге никто в Наурском районе не выступил против Дудаева на публичной демонстрации. Большую помощь оказал префект района Айнди Ахаев, очень храбрый человек и преданный сторонник президента Дудаева. Удачное сосуществование этих факторов, в конечном итоге, определило тот факт, что Наурский округ до конца остался верен Ичкерии!

Добавление масла в огонь

Осенью 1994 года спецслужбы противника активизировали диверсионную деятельность по всей Ичкерии. В Грозном участились теракты и разного рода провокации: русские активно стремились создать атмосферу страха, паники и хаоса по всей республике, а в ряде районов так называемая «оппозиция» со все большей уверенностью заявляла, что они не признавал центральную власть. Конечно, Наурский район также подвергся обстрелу со стороны спецслужб. В этом районе произошло несколько громких убийств, например, двое жителей Наурской, оба казачьей национальности, убиты в совхозе «Терский». Я вместе с участковым полицмейстером выехал на место преступления: убийство совершено с демонстративной жестокостью, животы жертв вскрыты, из трупов сделаны кишки. На месте преступления был прекрасно виден след, как будто специально оставленный, ведущий к дому мальчика: одежда, перепачканная кровью, резиновые сапоги с кровью на подошвах и другие улики, явно подставлявшие молодого человека .

Однако что-то было непонятно: предполагаемый преступник был физически очень слабым, психически неуравновешенным парнем 17-18 лет. Кроме того, если следы, ведущие от места, где были обнаружены тела, к его дому, были очевидны, то не было никаких следов, ведущих к месту, где были убиты эти люди. Было очевидно, что этого мальчика привел на сцену кто-то другой, чтобы использовать его в качестве козла отпущения. Когда через несколько дней я спросил начальника районной полиции, как продвигается следствие, он ответил, что из-за отказа окружного прокурора задержать подозреваемого задержанный был освобожден из-под стражи. Я был уверен, что за этим преступлением стоят российские спецслужбы, заинтересованные в том, чтобы создать раскол между казаками и чеченцами, под предлогом «геноцида» настроить первых против вторых и спровоцировать отделение северных районов от Чечни.

Позднее эти наши подозрения подтвердились фактами. Весть о зверском убийстве с невероятной скоростью разнеслась по округе, казаки собрались в Наурской и потребовали найти виновного, судить и осудить. Айни Ахаев познакомился со многими лотосами, объяснил им, кто был зачинщиком этих убийств, и казаки поняли, что российское правительство вообще не заботится о них, а заинтересовано в том, чтобы использовать их как инструменты для провоцирования межнациональной бойни. Я тоже, присутствовавший на этом собрании, высказался в поддержку версии префекта. Наконец, благодаря ему Наурский край был избавлен от насилия.

TRADUZIONE IN ITALIANO

IL GENERALE DI NAUR – MEMORIE DI APTI BATALOV (PARTE I)

Introduzione

Apti Batalov è nato ad Ilic, nel Distretto di Kamensky, il 19 Ottobre 1956. Funzionario di polizia, nel Settembre del 1994 fu nominato comandante militare dei distretti di Naur e di Nadterechny, ed in questa veste organizzò le milizie armate destinate a diventare una delle più note unità militari dell’esercito ceceno, il Battaglione Naursk. L’unità si sarebbe distinta in molte battaglie, dalla difesa di Grozny, nel 1995, alla sua riconquista, l’anno successivo, lo stesso Batalov sarebbe diventato, alla fine del conflitto, uno dei principali funzionari dell’esercito ceceno, giungendo a guidare lo Stato Maggiore delle Forze Armate col grado di Generale di Brigata.

Ho contattato Batalov di mia iniziativa, per raccogliere i suoi ricordi di guerra, e lui ha accettato di condividerle con me.

Venti di guerra

Il 20 Giugno 1994 fui nominato capo del dipartimento di polizia del villaggio di Ishcherskaya, nel Distretto di Naursk. Il villaggio è situato sulla riva sinistra del Terek, la parte nordorientale del villaggio confina con il Territorio di Stavropol mentre a Sud, dall’altra parte del fiume, a circa un chilometro e mezzo, è situato il villaggio di Znamenskoye, che all’epoca era il quartier generale dell’opposizione. Una volta Ishcherskaya era un grande insediamento cosacco, ma a quel tempo non c’erano più di dieci famiglie di cosacchi del Terek. Ishcherskaya è attraversata da una ferrovia che porta dalla Russia al Daghestan. Infine, la parte occidentale del villaggio ospitava un terminal per il carico  del petrolio ed una stazione di pompaggio, tramite la quale il greggio veniva spedito in Russia. All’altezza della cittadina, la strada che dal Territorio di Stavropol entrava in Cecenia si biforcava in due: una rotta proseguiva verso est, raggiungendo Chervlennaya e da qui proseguendo fino in Daghestan, a nord, e fino a Grozny, a sud. L’altra attraversava il Terek tramite un ponte, attraversava il Distretto di Nadterechny per poi penetrare in profondità nel Paese. Trattandosi di un insediamento di frontiera e di un crocevia di strade da e per la Russia, Ishcherskaya era uno dei posti più affollati da criminali in tutta la Cecenia: una sorta di punto di transito criminale.

Alla fine di Giugno del 1994 il capo della polizia distrettuale, Zaindi Pashaev, mi chiamò e mi presentò al comandante militare del distretto inviato da Grozny. Mi fu detto di mettermi a disposizione del Comandante e di affiancarlo nell’organizzazione di posti di blocco nei dintorni di Ishcherskaya. Egli non presentò nessun documento che confermasse la sua posizione, né allora né successivamente. Era un uomo di circa 25, 28 anni, alto circa un metro e settanta, molto dinamico, veloce nei movimenti e fisicamente forte. Un uomo giovane, che più tardi capii essere il genero del Presidente Dudaev, avendo sposato la figlia di un fratello del Presidente. Si chiamava Duta Muzaev. Egli si mise attivamente al lavoro, ed io eseguii le sue indicazioni, aiutando in tutto ciò che doveva essere fatto. Mettemmo su due posti di blocco, uno sul confine russo – ceceno, di fronte al villaggio di Galyugaevskaya, l’altro sull’accesso sinistro del ponte sul Terek, di fronte a Znamenskoye.

In quei giorni, mentre stavamo realizzando i checkpoint, nei territori limitrofi alla Cecenia iniziarono pogrom anti – ceceni di massa, un  ragazzo di nome Pashaev fu ucciso, sedicenti “Cosacchi di Kursk” (in realtà agenti del GRU e dell’FSK) iniziarono a danneggiare le case dove vivevano i ceceni, bruciarono le fattorie dove venivano tenute mucche e pecore. Non era difficile capire che dietro a questi pogrom e omicidi c’erano forze interessate a creare caos e massacri interetnici tra la popolazione cosacca e quella cecena. I rifugiati iniziarono ad affluire in Cecenia. Nel frattempo reparti armati russi iniziarono a compiere ogni tipo di provocazione. Unità armate penetrarono sui loro veicoli blindati nel Distretto di Naur e, sotto minaccia armata, portarono avanti operazioni di “controllo passaporti” dichiarando: “Siete nel nostro territorio, e siete cittadini russi”.

Nei primi giorni di Agosto Muzaev mi disse che aveva avuto un problema fisico ai muscoli della spina dorsale, e che avrebbe dovuto tornare a Grozny per curarsi. Se ne andò, e non tornò più. Poco dopo la partenza di Muzaev, venni convocato a Grozny dal Colonnello Merzhuyev. Il 16 Settembre lo raggiunsi nella capitale e questi mi informò che a causa dell’aggravarsi della situazione ai confini di Ichkeria, essendo il Distretto di Naursk posto al limite settentrionale della Repubblica, ero stato raccomandato al Presidente per prendere il posto di Comandante Militare in quel distretto, e nel vicino distretto di Nadterechny. Ad essere onesti questa notizia mi sorprese, e mi sconvolse, perché era chiaro che tra Russia e Cecenia stesse per scoppiare una guerra. La regione di Naur era il più vulnerabile, essendo al confine. Dopo aver ascoltato Merzhuyev, gli chiesi: Davvero non avete una persone più esperta di me per questa posizione? Gli dissi che non ero assolutamente preparato negli affari militari, e che non avevo idea di come svolgere il ruolo di comandante militare in queste regioni, specialmente nel Distretto di Nadterechny, quasi totalmente sotto il controllo dell’opposizione. Merzhuyev mi rispose: Di’ tutto questo al Presidente. Andammo a colloquio dal Presidente, il quale ci ricevette dopo una breve anticamera. Fu il mio primo incontro con Dudaev. Era vestito in abiti civili, e si mostrò intelligente e serio. Mi fece alcune domande non molto importanti, dopo di che mi chiese: Mi sei stato raccomandato per la posizione di Comandante di Distretto. Bene, sei in grado di tenerla? Speravo che Merzhuyev si unisse alla conversazione, ma guardandolo realizzai che sarebbe rimasto in silenzio. Farò tutto ciò che serve, risposi. Dudaev non ci trattenne oltre, e ci congedò. Prima di uscire, Merzhuyev scrisse a mano un ordine di nomina, disse che lo avrebbe inviato al Prefetto del Distretto di Naur, Zayndi Akhaev, in modo tale che questi venisse a conoscenza della nomina e ordinasse ai suoi funzionari di eseguire i miei ordini. Ero appena diventato il primo comandante militare regionale della Storia di Ichkeria. Da quel giorno la mia strada fu la lotta per l’indipendenza della Cecenia, la quale, alla fine, mi ha portato in Inghilterra.

Comandante Militare

Tornato a Naur, inziai a mobilitare volontari per il servizio ai checkpoint. Le persone risposero alla mia chiamata: si trattava di ragazzi ceceni ordinari, semplici lavoratori agricoli, eppure erano persone di grande dignità, e con un profondo senso dell’onore. Erano quasi tutti disarmati, qualcuno portò con sé fucili da caccia, coltellacci o pugnali. I miei frequenti appelli al Quartier Generale furono infine coronati dal successo, e da Grozny mi promisero che avrebbero inviato 10 armi da fuoco AK – 74. Pensavo che avrei avuto le armi dal Dipartimento per la Sicurezza dello Stato, ma Geliskhanov, che a quel tempo guidava il dipartimento, trovava ogni volta una ragione diversa per non inviare la armi, e tirò avanti la cosa per circa un mese. Quando poi le armi, finalmente, furono consegnate, vidi che erano vecchie, logore, armi da fuoco, alcune mancanti addirittura di alcune parti. Dovetti risolvere la cosa in altro modo, così requisii l’armeria del Dipartimento di Polizia di Naur. Riuscimmo a raccogliere così più di venti fucili d’assalto AK 5.45, una mitragliatrice RPK 5.45, due PK – 7.62, due lanciagranate RPG un lanciagranate automatico ed un fucile da cecchino. Distibuii  tutte queste armi tra gli uomini della milizia in servizio ai Checkpoint, e così mettemmo su una forza ben armata, in grado di contrastare l’opposizione armata schierata a Znamenskoye ed i banditi che tentavano di penetrare approfittandosi del caos. Oltre a questo, costituii squadre locali reclutate dai residenti di ogni villaggio. Iniziammo a tenere raduni in tutti gli insediamenti della regione, lasciando ai residenti il compito di nominare i propri comandanti. Questi ufficiali improvvisati erano i direttori delle fattorie agricole di stato e di altre imprese locali. Ci fornirono in particolare le stazioni radio con le quali erano abituati a comunicare con le autorità del distretto. Una persona specializzata in queste cose ci aiutò a stabilite le comunicazioni, in modo tale che tutte le unità fossero coordinate tra loro.

L’estate e l’autunno del 1994 in Cecenia hanno visto molti eventi sociali e politici. L’Opposizione è diventata più attiva nei distretti di Urus – Martan, Gudermes e Grozny. Nel villaggio di Znamenskoye i gruppi armati di Labazanov e di Gantemirov si radunavano, mentre i cosacchi dei distretti di Naur e di Shelkov si attivarono, inviando delegazioni a Stavropol le quali chiedevano di annettere alla Russia tutta la riva sinistra del Terek. Comprendendo che qualsiasi manifestazione pubblica a supporto di questa proposta avrebbe dato coraggio e determinazione agli oppositori locali ed ai cosacchi, per evitare che ciò avvenisse ho iniziato a cercare contatti per organizzare incontri segreti con i capi dell’opposizione cecena e cosacca. Solitamente mi recavo a casa loro e là, davanti ad una tazza di te o a una vodka, dicevo loro: Se volete radunarvi, andate a Znamenskoye, ti prometto che nessuno della tua famiglia sarà punito per questo. Ma se iniziate a muovervi da quella zona, nessuno sarà in salvo, nemmeno tu. Loro rispondevano che non avrebbero ceduto alle mie minacce, ma alla fine nessuno, nel Distretto di Naur, si pronunciò contro Dudaev in una manifestazione pubblica. Un grosso aiuto mi arrivò dal Prefetto del distretto, Aindi Akhaev, che era un uomo davvero coraggioso ed un sostenitore devoto del Presidente Dudaev. La fortunata compresenza di questi fattori, alla fine, determinò il fatto che il Distretto di Naur rimase fedele ad Ichkeria fino alla fine!

Conversazione con Hussein Iskhanov ed Aslan Artsuev

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Qualche giorno fa ho fatto una chiacchierata con i curatori della precedente intervista, ed insieme a loro con Hussein Iskhanov, Deputato al Parlamento della ChRI di Seconda Convocazione ed Aslan Artsuev, Direttore dello Human Rights Centre Ichkeria.

L’ANGELO NERO SULLE MONTAGNE: LA BATTAGLIA DELLA GOLA DI KERIGO

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DA KOMSOMOLSKOYE A PANKISI

A seguito della Battaglia di Komsomolskoye (5 – 20 Marzo 2000) Ruslan Gelayev, uno dei più audaci ed agguerriti comandanti dell’esercito della ChRI, riparò in Georgia con i resti delle sue unità, trovando riparo in una piccola gola abitata prevalentemente da Ceceni, la celebre Gola di Pankisi. Qui “L’angelo nero” installò il suo quartier generale, raccogliendo reduci e fuggiaschi ed instaurando una sorta di piccolo potentato personale, dal quale avrebbe più volte avviato campagne militari in Cecenia, in Inguscezia ed in Abkhazia.

Uomini di Gelayev si arrendono ai federali al termine della Battaglia per Komsomolskoye (2000)

Giunto a Pankisi nell’autunno del 2000, Gelayev passò tutto l’anno successivo a ricostituire le sue forze, abbandonando apparentemente il campo di battaglia e subendo, per questo, il biasimo del Presidente Maskhadov, il quale lo privò di tutti i suoi poteri e lo degradò con formale decreto. Fino alla primavera del 2002 il comandante ceceno rimase a Pankisi, studiando il modo migliore per tornare in Cecenia. Il rientro sul campo di battaglia era possibile soltanto attraverso l’Inguscezia (strada che aveva già percorso nel 2000, quando si era ritirato) o tramite la gola di Kerigo, la quale collegava direttamente Pankisi alla cittadina cecena di Baskhoy. Il primo percorso era più agevole, ma anche più pericoloso: durante la ritirata Gelayev  aveva perduto decine di uomini, trovandosi spesso in campo aperto sotto il fuoco dell’aereonautica federale ed incalzato dai mezzi blindati di Mosca. Inoltre, una volta arrivati in Cecenia, i gelayeviti avrebbero dovuto aprirsi un varco dalle pianure verso le montagne, rischiando di essere facilmente intercettati e distrutti. Il passaggio montano attraverso Kerigo appariva più sicuro, ma d’altra parte era molto più difficile da affrontare: non esistevano strade carrabili sicure (l’unica strada di una certa portanza era la Itum –  Khale / Shatili, stabilmente occupata dai russi fin dalla fine del 1999 – Per approfondire LEGGI QUI) e gli uomini di Gelayev avrebbero dovuto affrontare la traversata a piedi, trasportando in spalla, o a dorso di mulo, tutto ciò che sarebbe servito loro. D’altra parte, una volta sbucati in Cecenia, i Gelayeviti si sarebbero trovati in posizioni più favorevoli, ed avrebbero potuto facilmente ricongiungersi con gli uomini di Maskhadov che ancora combattevano nel sud montagnoso.

Militanti avanzano nella neve

LA VIA DELLE MONTAGNE

A confortare l’ipotesi di un passaggio attraverso le montagne c’era un felice precedente:  nell’estate del 2001 un altro comandante di campo, Magomed Tsagaraev, era riuscito a passare da Pankisi alla Cecenia attraverso la Gola dello Sharoargun, poco distante da Kerigo, con un gruppo di 60 uomini. La traversata non era stata facile, e le guardie di frontiera russe avevano intercettato ed ucciso alcuni dei suoi, ma Tsagaraev era comunque riuscito a passare con quasi tutti i suoi effettivi, raggiungendo con successo la zona di combattimento (salvo poi finire ucciso in una sparatoria poche settimane dopo). Gelayev era convinto di poter aprire una vera e propria rotta montana attraverso la quale far affluire alla spicciolata piccoli gruppi di 40/50 militanti per volta, eludendo la debole sorveglianza offerta dai servizi di frontiera federali (i quali avevano grosse difficoltà ad operare efficacemente in quell’area così brulla e frastagliata) e portando centinaia di uomini sulle montagne cecene entro l’inverno.

Nei mesi precedenti  il comandante ceceno inviò parecchie pattuglie in ricognizione, con lo scopo di mappare la posizione delle guardie di frontiera e seguire i loro spostamenti. Durante una di queste ricognizioni una pattuglia di Gelayev fu intercettata dai federali: i militanti si qualificarono come cacciatori, ma il fatto che fossero armati con fucili mitragliatori rese chiaro quale fosse lo scopo delle loro “battute di caccia”. I federali ebbero così piena consapevolezza che Gelayev stesse organizzando qualcosa, ed intensificarono la sorveglianza. Ciononostante l’Angelo Nero decise di procedere ugualmente, e nei primi giorni di Luglio guidò il primo distaccamento sulle montagne. La presenza dei gelayeviti non passò inosservata, ed il 21 Luglio i ceceni furono avvistati: con loro portavano armi da guerra, lanciagranate e perfino armi portatili terra – aria. Il 27 Luglio un primo reparto federale composto da una ventina di uomini, agli ordini del Maggiore Popov, intercettò una pattuglia avanzata cecena e si mosse a neutralizzarla. Il comando federale supportò l’azione inviando elicotteri da combattimento, e nel giro di poche ore combattimenti si accesero in tutta la gola. Popov aveva sottostimato l’entità delle forze nemiche, pensando di trovarsi davanti al massimo una decina di militanti, ma il rabbioso fuoco di risposta che ricevette, diretto anche contro gli elicotteri, rese presto chiaro che Gelayev aveva portato con sé svariate decine di uomini.

Ruslan Gelayev (al centro, in nero) circondato dai suoi uomini

LA BATTAGLIA

Non potendo procedere oltre per via della accanita resistenza dei militanti, Popov, optò per assumere una posizione difensiva e chiamare rinforzi: nel giro di alcune ore giunsero sul campo di battaglia alcune unità di mortaio che presero a bombardare le posizioni tenute dai gelayeviti. Il bombardamento fu efficace, e nel giro di poche ore produsse lo sbandamento della forza cecena. I russi presero ad avanzare, raggiunsero le posizioni nemiche e le assaltarono, prendendo cinque prigionieri e rinvenendo i resti di parecchi militanti. I prigionieri confermarono che la loro unità, composta da una venticinquina di uomini era l’avanguardia di un gruppo più corposo. I federali catturarono parecchie armi di ottima fattura, tra le quali 5 MANPADS.

Era chiaro che il reparto che era stato attaccato e distrutto dai russi non era né l’unico, né il più consistente, così le truppe federali continuarono ad affluire in zona, tentando di intercettare gli altri. Stavolta, tuttavia, le bande di Gelayev erano penetrate nei boschi circostanti la gola, e per stanarli sarebbe servita una lunga caccia all’uomo senza la copertura dell’artiglieria e dell’aereonautica. Reparti russi e ceceni si scontrarono nelle ore seguenti, in un complesso gioco di imboscate e sganciamenti durante il quale i reparti avversari giunsero a scontrarsi a distanza molto ravvicinata. In uno di questi scontri lo stesso Maggiore Popov rimase ucciso, probabilmente da un colpo di cecchino. Al calar del sole, Gelayev capì che anche se fosse riuscito ad aver ragione delle truppe federali (le quali, comunque continuavano ad affluire copiosamente) non avrebbe avuto alcuna possibilità di uscire dalla gola. Avendo perduto l’effetto sorpresa, e non potendo competere con i federali in campo aperto, decise quindi di far ritorno a Pankisi.

Mitragliere di Gelayev

Al termine della battaglia giacevano sul campo di battaglia almeno 25 militanti. Per parte sua l’esercito di Mosca aveva patito 8 morti e 7 feriti. Nei giorni seguenti i russi tentarono di intercettare i gelayeviti in ritirata, e secondo quanto dichiarato dal comando federale un altro contingente ceceno fu individuato, attaccato e distrutto prima che riuscisse ad attraversare il confine. Il fallimento dell’operazione convinse Gelayev a rientrare in Cecenia attraverso l’Inguscezia.

FREEDOM OR DEATH! BOOK IN ENGLISH AVAILABLE ON AMAZON

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We are pleased to announce that the English version of the book is now available on Amazon. “Freedom or Death – History of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria!” is available in both print and e-book format.

For this second edition we have decided, given the length of the work, to organize its publication in five volumes: today we present the first, “From Revolution to War (1991 – 1994)”.

The volume consist in 400 pages, and contains a complete reviewof the events that occurred in Chechnya from the birth of the Chechen National Congress to the First Chechen War.

Enjoy the reading!







	

	
	




	
	

			
	

		
DUDAEV IN AFGHANISTAN: VERITA’ O MENZOGNA?

		

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IL MITO DI DUDAEV





Una delle storie più controverse riguardo i leader della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria riguarda il suo primo (e più celebre) presidente, Dzhokhar Dudaev. La sua figura è stata oggetto di attenzioni uguali e contrarie: i suoi oppositori lo demonizzarono, disegnandolo come un piccolo tiranno corrotto, privo di scrupoli morali e lontanissimo dai valori religiosi che dichiarava di possedere. Parimenti, i suoi sostenitori e nostalgici costruirono intorno a lui un mito, esaltandone la figura di campione dell’indipendenza e di paladino della libertà. Certamente Dudaev fu un personaggio eccentrico, dai forti tratti caratteriali, capace di suscitare la più grande ammirazione come la peggior antipatia. Al pari di molti leader nazionalpopolari la sua figura assunse talvolta tratti così peculiari da risultare grottesca, eppure ancora oggi migliaia di ceceni ( e sono solo) lo considerano un punto di riferimento, e in alcuni paesi come l’Estonia (dove prestò servizio militare) e la Turchia lo celebrano intitolandogli spazi pubblici o targhe commemorative.





Tra le tante storie che circolano riguardo a Dudaev, una in particolare ha destato l’attenzione dei giornalisti di allora e degli storici di oggi. Secondo quanto dichiarato nel 1994 dall’allora Ministro della Difesa russo, Pavel Grachev, egli avrebbe operato come Generale dell’Aviazione durante la Guerra in Afghanistan, distinguendosi per lo zelo con il quale avrebbe bombardato le posizioni dei mujahideen (ed i loro villaggi) almeno in due occasioni. Per parte sua, Dudaev negò sempre la sua presenza in Afghanistan, dichiarando che a quel tempo svolgeva i suoi compiti in Turkmenistan, lavorando alla formazione morale ed alla disciplina dei reparti.





Quale fosse il motivo per il quale Grachev rispolverò questa storia è evidente: l’Afghanistan è un paese islamico, e come stava per accadere alla Cecenia, anche l’Afghanistan era stato invaso dalle truppe di Mosca. Presentare Dudaev come un “massacratore di musulmani” era funzionale a indebolire la fiducia dei separatisti nel loro campione. Ma quanto di vero c’è nelle parole di Grachev? D’altra parte, per motivi ugualmente evidenti e di opposto interesse, anche Dudaev aveva i suoi motivi per negare ogni coinvolgimento. Cercheremo, per quanto possibile, di fare luce su questa storia.





Funerali di Dzhokhar Dudaev a Grozny, 25 Aprile 1996





LE PROVE





Gli articoli inerenti questa storia citano un documento ufficiale (che la redazione non è tuttavia riuscita a reperire)  che sarebbe un estratto del fascicolo militare di Dudaev. In questo estratto, corrispondente al periodo 1988 – 1989, sarebbero iscritte tre sortite di bombardamento sulle città afghane di Jalalabad, Ghazni e Gardez, durante le quali sarebbero state sganciate 1160 bombe FAB3000 e 56 bombe FAB1500. Il documento citerebbe anche il tentativo di Dudaev di ridurre al minimo i danni collaterali, onde evitare vittime civili. Una testimonianza indiretta del coinvolgimento del presidente ceceno in Afghanistan ci giunge anche dalla motivazione di uno dei due “Ordini della Stella Rossa” che avrebbe ricevuto durante il suo servizio. Il secondo, il particolare, datato 1989, citerebbe “per l’adempimento del servizio internazionale in Afghanistan”. Precisiamo che la redazione non è riuscita a trovare neanche questa seconda prova documentale).





A supporto della presenza di Dudaev in Afghanistan (oltre alle dichiarazioni di Grachev) c’è anche un’intervista del 2013, rilasciata da un comandante di campo mujahideen operante nella gola del Panshir, Jalaladdin Mokammal, il quale dichiarò in quel frangente che uno dei principali leader della resistenza sovietica, il leggendario Massoud, teneva contatti con alcuni alti esponenti dello stato sovietico, quali Eduard Shevardnadze e Dzhokhar Dudaev, allora in servizio tra le truppe di occupazione presso la base militare di Bagram (circostanza confermata dallo stesso Grachev, il quale avrebbe dichiarato di aver conosciuto proprio là il Generale ceceno). Secondo Mokammal, Dudaev avrebbe preavvisato Massoud dell’arrivo dei bombardieri, sabotando così l’azione di bombardamento che gli era stata ordinata. Se ciò fosse vero sarebbe sì confermata la presenza di Dudaev in Afghanistan, ma il suo ruolo nella vicenda sarebbe addirittura ribaltato. La moglie del Generale, Alla Dudaeva, nella sua agiografia “Million First” parla in un passo della “fiducia” che suo marito riponeva nella leadership afghana pre – talebana, proprio nella figura di Massoud, all’epoca Ministro della Difesa nel governo Rabbani.





Dzhokhar Dudaev nel 1987





Infine ci sono le parole degli storici militari. Una fonte, seppur secondaria, è rappresentata dalle parole dello storico Alexander Suprunov, il quale in uno dei suoi lavori afferma non soltanto che Dudaev avrebbe prestato servizio in Afghanistan, ma che si sarebbe prodigato in prima persona per effettuare i bombardamenti citati dal suo stato di servizio, “sviluppando personalmente una serie di approcci, forme e tecniche per distruggere il nemico dall’aria, usando i mezzi d’attacco dell’aviazione strategica”. La fonte citata sarebbe un documento depositato presso l’archivio dell’aereonautica nel quale si certifica che il Generale (all’epoca Colonnello) avrebbe preso parte attiva alle operazioni sviluppando originali tecniche di combattimento su terreno accidentato. Lo stesso documento (anche in questo caso irreperibile per la redazione) citerebbe circa 600 sortite da parte dell’unità di bombardieri pesanti comandata a quel tempo da Dzhokhar Dudaev.





CONVERGENZE E IPOTESI





Una possibile testimonianza convergente tra le dichiarazioni di Grachev e quelle di Dudaev potrebbe essere quella rilasciata da un sedicente ex sottoposto del Generale, che ora vive in Ucraina. Nell’intervista egli afferma che effettivamente Dudaev si trovava in Turkmenistan, presso la base militare di Mary, e che da qui la sua unità partisse per effettuare le missioni di bombardamento in Afghanistan. Secondo questa fonte Dudaev avrebbe compiuto ben più di tre sortite in territorio nemico, pilotando personalmente il suo velivolo d’attacco al suolo.





Dudaev da giovane in uniforme da pilota





Alla luce delle informazioni a noi pervenute non siamo in grado di stabilire se Dudaev abbia prestato servizio in Afghanistan, se abbia bombardato i mujahideen o se abbia segretamente collaborato con Massoud. Possiamo soltanto tracciare quella che ci sembra l’ipotesi più probabile, ovvero che Dudaev abbia effettivamente operato nello scacchiere afghano, magari da una base in Turkmenistan, che abbia partecipato alle azioni militari, magari limitando al massimo il suo coinvolgimento personale e cercando di evitare vittime tra la popolazione civile, dovendosi destreggiare tra la simpatia per gli afghani, islamici come lui, ed il senso del dovere verso l’Armata Rossa.