The sharp deterioration of Russian-Chechen relations and the intensification of activities by the Russian special services in Ichkeria and neighboring territories began with Putin’s appointment as Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Armed provocations were staged on the Russian-Chechen border. In April 1999, for example, Russian forces attacked a Chechen border post along the Kizlyar section of the border at night, killing one guard and wounding several others. This was evidently an attempt to draw the Chechens into an armed conflict in Dagestan. However Maskhadov, realizing what the Russians wanted to achieve, forbade any retaliatory action across the border. The Russian provocation, therefore, was not followed up. The next action was staged in the Herzel section of the border in May 1999. Fierce fighting took place here for several days, during which even field artillery was used. The Russians’ plan was the same – to lure the Dagestanis to their side. Once again, however, the President of Ichkeria managed to preserve the peace between the Chechen and Dagestani peoples. Even this cowardly enterprise failed, the Russians began to threaten the country with all kinds of ultimatums.
Aslan Maskhadov (left) and Alexander Lebed (right) sign the Khasavyurt’s Accords, August 1996
President Yeltsin’s second term was coming to an end, and to save themselves from prison this drunkard’s entourage began frantically looking for a replacement. However, this group did not have a candidate who could validly oppose Primakov, and with the latter’s coming to power, all this mess would end: everything they plundered would be confiscated from them. In an attempt to find a good man they first turned to Stephasin, who refused. After these appeared Putin, like a devil from a snuffbox. He was ready to accept all the conditions stipulated by the Yeltsin clique. However , he was not yet popular enough to oppose Primakov. Thus it was that the public relations specialists, led by Berezovsky, Voloshin and Pavlovsky played the “Chechen card” in favor of Putin.
Every presidential campaign in modern “democratic” Russia is shrouded in tragedy and blood. At that time the GRU and the FSB flooded Chechnya with their agents. The services were infiltrated into the restricted circle of Chechen political-military leaders, taking advantage of the latter’s indifference in the selection of their entourage, soon becoming confidants of their godfathers. As the struggle for the presidency intensified in Moscow, Russian agents accelerated their provocative and subversive activities, as was evident from the events that began to occur in Ichkeria. I recall that in the spring of 1997 rumors began to circulate about the imminent unification of Chechnya and Dagestan into a single Islamic state, and that a “cleansing” of Russians would soon begin in preparation for this unification. Various kinds of figures and emissaries began to appear in Chechnya, coming from Dagestan. These men found great hospitality, and the support of those who supported them. Without encountering any significant opposition from the authorities, supporters of the Imamate began to promote the idea of creating a Chechen-Dagestan state “to marry Dagestan to Ichkeria” as one of them put it.
Some time later, a congress of the Chechen and Dagestani peoples was held in Dzhokhar, in the presence of the same leadership of Ichkeria. Shamil Basayev was elected Imam of Chechnya and Dagestan, with the aim of establishing an Imamate. Analyzing everything that was happening, it was obvious that this was being done under the direction of the Lubyanka , but any sober remarks regarding this adventure met with strong opposition from the “advocates of pure Islam”, anyone who dared to say something objective in this matter he would have been branded as an “apostate”, an agent of the Russians, a Jew or belonging to other categories considered hostile to the Chechens.
Shamil Basayev and Al Khattab, the two main animators of the Congress of Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan
After using all sorts of provocations against Ichkeria, starting with the financing of slave traders and ending with battles on the Russian-Chechen border, without results, the Russian revanchists used the risk of an Islamic insurrection in the Caucasus as a strong argument for the 1999 presidential campaign. In the summer of 1999, Basayev and his supporters accelerated preparations for the invasion of Dagestan, making no secret of their plans. The leadership of Ichkeria, being in a serious internal crisis, did not have the opportunity to intervene.
At the end of August , more precisely on August 28, 1999, a meeting of the State Defense Committee (GKO) was held in the building of the Presidential Administration. Almost all of the country’s military-political leadership attended this meeting, as well as religious figures and some members of Parliament. The main argument was evidently the invasion of Dagestan. Basayev had shown himself to the whole world in the territory of Dagestan, with a watermelon in his hand. The GKO was expected to make a decision on this issue , and a proposal was made to ask Basayev to immediately leave Dagestan, and return to Chechnya.
The meeting took place in a tense atmosphere: the president assessed the situation as very difficult, and harshly accused Basayev of having exposed the Chechen people to serious consequences. Finally, he urged those present to prepare to repel the invasion of the Russians, as, according to him, another war was inevitable at this point. At the end of his speech, the President asked the members of the State Defense Committee to express their opinion on this issue. On the eve of the GKO meeting, I hoped that a collective statement condemning the actions of Shamil Basayev would be presented: I am sure that Shamil would not have remained indifferent to the GKO’s pronouncement. Yet this did not happen. Without boring the reader with a list of the names of those present, I will say that there were 35/40 people there. For the most part the speakers expressed little, and not very clearly. A clear and unequivocal position on the matter was expressed by no more than 3 – 4 people. Among them was Akhmed Zakayev. In his speech the Minister of Culture supported and approved Basayev’s actions without hesitation. I, in turn, called Basayev’s actions a crime against the Chechen people. Many of those who condemn Basayev’s action today remained silent then. The lack of a unanimous decision on this issue was a mistake on the part of the GKO. The leadership of Ichkeria, with its fragmentation, showed the side of Russian anti-Chechen propaganda. Our short-sightedness was very useful to the Russian revanchists.
I believe I am not mistaken when I say that one of the tragedies of the Chechen people originated on the day when Chechnya proclaimed itself an independent state. After choosing the first president, the Chechens naively believed that Russia would respect their choice. After all, Yeltsin said “take all the freedom you can swallow!” The Chechens did not know that “Swallowing freedom” they would regurgitate their blood.
The conquest of freedom
The Russians did not recognize the presidential elections held on October 27, 1991 in Chechnya. Rejecting any possibility of peaceful separation from Chechnya, the Kremlin has focused on the definitive solution of the Chechen “problem”. In planning actions against Chechen sovereignty, it was obvious that the Russian government would prioritize provocative and subversive activities, and this was evident from the growing activity of pro-Russian provocateurs on the territory of Chechnya. Funded and armed by Moscow, the leaders of the “anti-Dudaevites” began to form criminal groups under the cover of political slogans, calling themselves “opposition of the Dudaev regime”. In reality, the ideologues of this movement were full-time agents of the Russian special services and, following the instructions of the Lubyanka , they caused a civil war in the Chechens. Through these ” Mankurts ” [1], in the first half of the 90s of the twentieth century, Chechnya was transformed into a land of internal contrasts and social instability. Having already gained political independence from Moscow, many officials who held high positions in the state did what they could to discredit the idea of independence. With their actions they compromised the government, corrupted it, doing everything to make the Chechens repent of their choice. Every day, these people desecrated the idea of a free and sovereign state, and achieved many successes in this action, furthering the premises of the 1994/1996 Russo-Chechen War.
However, one detail had not been taken into consideration: the war imposed by the Kremlin would have ignited the genetic memory of the Chechens. All the people, with rare exceptions, took up arms and stood up to defend that choice. Evidently, after receiving the order to intensify their activities, the Russian special services agents began to increase their efforts to destabilize the political, economic and social situation throughout the Ichkeria territory. By sowing discord among the leaders of the state, creating an atmosphere of mutual distrust and enmity in the relations between yesterday’s comrades, the Russian mercenaries achieved the objectives set by Moscow. Instead of rallying around the president, in this hard and difficult time for the fate of the Chechen nation, and exercising their authority to defend and strengthen the authority of Ichkeria, the leaders of the country faced each other in the political arena with every sort of intrigue, against each other, using their credit only for speculative and populist purposes. After withdrawing troops from Ichkeria in 1996, the Russians invaded it with their agents. Terrible times came for Ichkeria, banditry assumed the proportions of a national catastrophe, kidnapping and the slave trade became the profession of a significant part of the former freedom fighters, lack of work and poverty swelled the ranks of criminals.
Heroes yesterday, enemies today
Thus there was no effective authority in Ichkeria. The comrades in arms of the President of yesterday, having had the opportunity to strengthen it, did not do so, but rather, having become politicians, they were the real antagonists of the President, doing everything to weaken his power. On every occasion, and under various pretexts, his authority was undermined: not a day passed without some “emergency” directed against the President. At that time I was convinced that these antagonists wanted to break Maskhadov psychologically. Imagine the state in which a person subjected to daily torture can be, every day more sophisticated and insidious. One fine day, the President collapsed… all this turmoil around the presidency drove the people to despair, their faith in authority and yesterday’s heroes disappeared. Social inequality, the absence of any guarantee of security, corrupt authorities at all levels, poverty and devastation: the Chechen people faced the 1999 war in these conditions … With an economic blockade, political and information isolation in place, the Chechen leadership he had no way of adequately preparing for Russian aggression.
The signs that the Russians were preparing a new war against Ichkeria appeared as early as February – March 1999. In February 1999, a demonstration of many thousands of people was held in support of the President’s policy in the city of Dzhokhar [formerly Grozny, NDR ]. The participants in the demonstration approved and supported in unison Maskhadov, the foreign and internal policy he pursued, and expressed the desire and willingness to take up arms to restore order in the country. Two or three Russian journalists were present at this gathering, being able to work without any restrictions. They assured me that the Russian media would report the demonstration, but not a single TV channel mentioned it. On the other hand, Russian public opinion began to be influenced by the idea that Maskhadov was a weak and indecisive person, that he had lost the support of the people, that power in Ichkeria was in the hands of the field commanders, that banditry and the slave trade flourished in Ichkeria. Obviously it would be wrong to deny these claims, which were partly true, but that the people did not support Maskhadov, or that he was weak, that was an absolute lie. The Chechen people had responded to the President’s appeal, and were willing to defend him. But the Russian media hid this fact from their audience. As for the field commanders, most of them obeyed without question the President and Commander the Chief of the Armed Forces.
But, as they say, no family is without monsters. On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Peace Treaty between Ichkeria and Russia on May 12 , 1997, well-organized celebrations were held in the city of Dzhokhar: events were held in the city center, horse races were held on the outskirts of the capital, with prizes in prize money, including “VAZ” 6 car models. It was a bright and festive day, during which the Ichkeria leadership showed all its desire for peace with Russia. Once again, Russian TV reporters worked on the event, as always without restrictions. And once again the media did not say a single word about the fact that similar celebrations were held in the city of Dzhokhar. All of this suggested that there would be no celebration the following year.
After leaving Argun, we moved to a wooded mountainous area in the Nozhai – Yurt district. Here we organized our base, well hidden in a gorge near the village of Shuani. On the afternoon of March 25, a messenger arrived at the base: we were ordered to go in force to the village of Novogrozny, today Oyskhara. When we arrived Maskhadov gave me a brief report on the situation: “The Russians have left Gudermes, and are moving in the direction of Novogrozny. They crushed our defenses. We have to delay them at least for a few hours, until we evacuate the hospital and the documents. I have no one else to send except your battalion. I ask you to detain the Russians as much as possible: there are many wounded in the hospital, if the Russians find them they will shoot them all. ” Then Maskhadov told me that on the eastern outskirts of Ilaskhan – Yurt a unit of militiamen from nearby was gathering and they would give us a hand.
There were few people with me, about thirty in all, because after the retreat from Argun many of the militiamen, cold and tired, had dispersed to the surrounding villages to recover their strength. We immediately set off towards Ilaskhan – Yurt and, having reached the goal, we reunited with 70 militia men. The Russians advanced on the wooded ridge overlooking the village, traveling in the direction of Novogrozny. We settled in positions previously equipped, and then later abandoned. Their conditions were not the best: due to the heavy rains of those days they were full of water, and we guarded the positions with mud up to our knees. We tried to drain them, but the water returned to fill them in a few hours, due to the damp soil.
Soon our presence was noticed by the Russians, who began bombing our trenches from their high positions. Using mortars and field artillery. In that bombing we suffered the wounding of three or four men. However , they did not proceed to an attack, allowing us to hold them back for many more hours. Having left in a hurry, we had brought neither food nor water with us: we spent the next night hungry and cold in our damp trenches, under constant enemy bombardment. We were so starved that, when we managed to get our hands on a heifer the next day, we ate its almost raw meat, but not before getting permission from a local clergyman.
March 29 , the first Russian patrol reached our trenches. We managed to repel the assault: the enemy lost two men and retreated quickly. From the uniforms and weapons found in the possession of the fallen Russians, we understood that we had a paratrooper unit in front of us. As soon as the Russians were back in their trenches the artillery began a pounding bombardment on our positions with mortars and 120 mm artillery, causing many injuries among our units. After a long preparatory bombardment, the infantry moved on to the attack, and we began the unhooking maneuvers: some of us took the wounded away, others retreated into the woods, or returned to their homes. Only five of us remained in position: Vakha from Chishka, Khavazhi from Naurskaya, Yusup from Alpatovo, Mammad from Naursk station and myself. When we finally managed to get away we were exhausted: I came out with chronic pneumonia, which would accompany me in the years to follow.
Combined Regiment Naursk
In April, if memory serves me well, on April 2, as he said, the head of the main headquarters of the armed forces of the CRI, General Maskhadov, came to my base. The Chief of Staff briefly introduced me to the latest events and changes on the lines of contact between us and the Russians: it was clear from his words that our situation was not good. Consequently he asked me to become subordinate to the commander of the Nozhai- Yurta leadership, Magomed Khambiev. The same day I went to Nozhai-Yurt, where I met the new commander. He assigned the battalion’s area of responsibility to a location not far from the village of Zamai-Yurt, southwest of this village. Once deployed, we dug trenches and equipped shooting points for the machine gun. Here at the base, we, in our Naur battalion, were joined by groups of militias from Gudermes and the Shelkovsky district, for a total of 200 people. As a result, our battalion became the “Combined Naur Regiment”. I was confirmed by Maskhadov himself as commander of this new unit.
The Regiment held the assigned position until the early days of 1995, fighting a war of position against Russian forces. These faced us mainly with artillery, throwing a hail of mortar rounds at us, and increasing the dose with incursions of combat helicopters MI – 42 and MI – 18. During this phase we mourned the death of one of us, Dzhamleila of Naurskaya , and the wounding of ten men. Finally, in the first days of June , we received the order to switch to guerrilla warfare.
VERSIONE ITALIANA
IL GENERALE DI NAUR – MEMORIE DI APTI BATALOV (PARTE 4)
Battaglia ad Ilaskhan – Yurt
Dopo aver lasciato Argun, ci trasferimmo in una zona montuosa coperta di boschi, nel distretto di Nozhai – Yurt. Qui organizzammo la nostra base, ben nascosta in una gola vicino al villaggio di Shuani. Nel pomeriggio del 25 Marzo giunse alla base un messaggero: ci era ordinato di dirigerci in forze al villaggio di Novogrozny, oggi Oyskhara. Quando arrivammo Maskhadov mi fece un breve rapporto sulla situazione: “I russi hanno lasciato Gudermes, e si stanno muovendo in direzione di Novogrozny. Hanno schiacciato le nostre difese. Dobbiamo ritardarli almeno per qualche ora, finchè non evacuiamo l’ospedale ed i documenti. Non ho nessun altro da inviare, tranne il tuo battaglione. Ti chiedo di trattenere i russi il più possibile: ci sono molti feriti nell’ospedale, se i russi li trovano li fucileranno tutti.” Poi Maskhadov mi disse che alla periferia orientale di Ilaskhan – Yurt si stava radunando un reparto di miliziani provenienti dalle vicinanze, i quali ci avrebbero dato man forte.
Insieme a me c’erano poche persone, una trentina in tutto, perché dopo la ritirata da Argun molti dei miliziani, infreddoliti e stanchi, si erano dispersi nei villaggi circostanti per recuperare le forze. Ci mettemmo subito in marcia verso Ilaskhan – Yurt e, raggiunto l’obiettivo, ci ricongiungemmo con 70 uomini della milizia. I russi avanzavano sulla cresta boscosa che dominava il villaggio, viaggiando in direzione di Novogrozny. Ci sistemammo in posizioni precedentemente attrezzate, e poi successivamente abbandonate. Le loro condizioni non erano delle migliori: a causa delle forti piogge di quei giorni erano piene d’acqua, e presidiavamo le posizioni con il fango fino alle ginocchia. Cercavamo di drenarle, ma l’acqua tornava a riempirle in poche ore, a causa del terreno umido.
Ben presto la nostra presenza fu notata dai russi, i quali iniziarono a bombardare le nostre trincee dalle loro posizioni elevate. Usando mortai ed artiglieria da campagna. In quel bombardamento patimmo il ferimento di tre o quattro uomini. Tuttavia non procedettero ad un attacco, permettendoci di trattenerli ancora per molte ore. Essendo partiti in fretta e furia, non avevamo portato con noi né cibo né acqua: trascorremmo la notte successiva affamati ed infreddoliti nelle nostre trincee umide, sotto il costante bombardamento nemico. Eravamo così provati dalla fame che, quando il giorno dopo riuscimmo a mettere le mani su una giovenca, ne mangiammo la carne quasi cruda, ma non prima di aver avuto il permesso da un religioso locale.
A mezzogiorno del 29 Marzo la prima pattuglia russa raggiunse le nostre trincee. Riuscimmo a respingere l’assalto: il nemico perse due uomini e si ritirò velocemente. Dalle divise e dalle armi trovate in possesso dei russi caduti capimmo di avere davanti un reparto di paracadutisti. Non appena i russi furono rientrati nelle loro trincee l’artiglieria iniziò un bombardamento martellante sulle nostre posizioni con mortai ed artiglieria da 120 mm, provocando molti ferimenti tra le nostre unità. Dopo un lungo bombardamento preparatorio, la fanteria passò all’attacco, e noi iniziammo le manovre di sganciamento: alcuni di noi portarono via i feriti, altri si ritirarono tra i boschi, o tornarono alle loro case. In posizione rimanemmo soltanto in cinque: Vakha da Chishka, Khavazhi da Naurskaya, Yusup da Alpatovo, Mammad dalla stazione di Naursk ed io. Quando finalmente riuscimmo ad allontanarci eravamo esausti: io ne uscii con una polmonite cronica, che mi avrebbe accompagnato negli anni a seguire.
Reggimento Combinato Naursk
Ad aprile, se la memoria mi serve bene, il due aprile, come ha detto, il capo del quartier generale principale delle forze armate della CRI, il generale Maskhadov, è venuto alla mia base. Il capo di stato maggiore mi ha brevemente presentato gli ultimi eventi e i cambiamenti sulle linee di contatto tra noi e i russi: era chiaro dalle sue parole che la nostra situazione non era buona. Di conseguenza mi chiese di diventare subordinato al comandante di la direzione Nozhai-Yurta, Magomed Khambiev. Lo stesso giorno mi recai a Nozhai-Yurt, dove incontrai il nuovo comandante. Egli assegnò l’area di responsabilità del battaglione ad una posizione non lontana dal villaggio di Zamai-Yurt, a sud-ovest di questo villaggio. Una volta schierati, abbiamo scavato trincee e attrezzato punti di tiro per la mitragliatrice. Qui alla base, noi, nel nostro battaglione Naur, siamo stati raggiunti da gruppi di milizie di Gudermes e del distretto di Shelkovsky, per un totale di 200 persone. Di conseguenza, il nostro battaglione divenne il “Reggimento Combinato Naur”. Fui confermato dallo stesso Maskhadov comandante di questa nuova unità.
Il Reggimento tenne la posizione assegnata fino ai primi di giorni del 1995, combattendo una guerra di posizione contro le forze russe. Queste ci affrontavano principalmente con l’artiglieria, lanciandoci contro una grandine di colpi di mortaio, e rincarando la dose con incursioni di elicotteri da combattimento MI – 42 e MI – 18. Durante questa fase piangemmo la morte di uno di noi, Dzhamleila di Naurskaya, ed il ferimento di dieci uomini. Nei primi giorni di Giugno, infine, ricevemmo l’ordine di passare alla guerra partigiana.
Apti Batalov was born in Ilic, in the Kamensky District of Kazakhistan, on October 19, 1956. Police officer, in September 1994 he was appointed military commander of the districts of Naur and Nadterechny, and in this role he organized the armed militias destined to become one of the most well-known military units of the Chechen army, the Naursk Battalion. The unit would have distinguished itself in many battles, and Batalov himself would have become, at the end of the conflict, one of the main officials of the Chechen army, coming to lead the General Staff of the Armed Forces with the rank of Brigadier General and the National Security Service.
Batalov agreed to share his war memories with me.
Winds of war
On June 20, 1994, I was appointed head of the Ishcherskaya Village Police Department in the Naursk District. The village is located on the left bank of the Terek, the north-eastern part of the village borders the Stavropol Territory while to the south, on the other side of the river, about a kilometer and a half, is the village of Znamenskoye, which at the time was the headquarters of the opposition. The city is crossed by a railway that leads from Russia to Dagestan. The western part of the village hosted a terminal for the loading of oil and a pumping station, through which the crude was shipped to Russia. The road that entered Chechnya from the Stavropol Territory forked in two: one route continued eastwards, reaching Chervlennaya and from there continuing to Dagestan, in the north, and another one run up to Grozny, in the south. The other crossed the Terek by a bridge, crossed the Nadterechny District and then penetrated deep into the country. Being a border settlement and a crossroads of roads to and from Russia, Ishcherskaya was one of the busiest places for criminals in all of Chechnya – a sort of criminal transit point.
At the end of June 1994 the chief of the district police, Zaindi Pashaev, called me and introduced me to the district military commander sent from Grozny. I was told to make myself available to the Commander and to assist him in organizing checkpoints around Ishcherskaya. He did not present any documents confirming his position, neither then nor subsequently. He was a man of about 25, 28 years, about five feet tall, very dynamic, fast in his movements and physically strong. A young man, who I later learned was President Dudaev’s son-in-law, having married the daughter of a brother of the President. His name was Duta Muzaev. He actively went to work, and I followed his directions, helping in all that needed to be done. We set up two checkpoints, one on the Russian-Chechen border, in front of the village of Galyugaevskaya, the other on the left access of the bridge over the Terek, in front of Znamenskoye.
In those days, while we were building the checkpoints, mass anti-Chechen pogroms began in the territories adjacent to Chechnya, a boy named Pashaev was killed, self-styled “Cossacks of Kursk” (actually agents of the GRU and FSK) began to damaging the houses where the Chechens lived, they burned the farms where cows and sheep were kept. It was not difficult to understand that behind these pogroms and murders there were forces interested in creating chaos and inter-ethnic massacres between the Cossack and Chechen populations. Refugees began pouring into Chechnya. Meanwhile , Russian armed units began to carry out all kinds of provocations. Armed units entered their armored vehicles in the Naur District and, under armed threat, carried out “passport control” operations declaring: “You are in our territory, and you are Russian citizens”.
In the first days of August Muzaev told me that he had had a physical problem with the muscles of his spine, and that he would have to return to Grozny for treatment. He left, and never came back. Shortly after Muzaev’s departure, I was summoned to Grozny by Colonel Merzhuyev. On 16 September I joined him in the capital and he informed me that due to the worsening of the situation on the borders of Ichkeria, since the Naursk District is located at the northern limit of the Republic, I had been recommended to the President to take the place of Military Commander in that district, and in the neighboring district of Nadterechny. To be honest this news surprised me, and shocked me, because it was clear that a war was about to break out between Russia and Chechnya. The Naur region was the most vulnerable, being on the border. After listening to Merzhuyev, I asked him: Don’t you really have a person more experienced than me for this position? I told him that I was absolutely not trained in military affairs, and that I had no idea how to play the role of military commander in these regions, especially in the Nadterechny District, which is almost entirely under the control of the opposition. Merzhuyev replied: Tell the President all this.
We went to meet the President, who received us after a short anteroom. It was my first meeting with Dudaev. He was dressed in civilian clothes, and he looked intelligent and serious. He asked me some not very important questions, after which he asked me: You have been recommended to me for the position of District Commander. Well, are you able to hold it? I was hoping that Merzhuyev would join the conversation, but looking at him I realized that he would remain silent. I’ll do whatever it takes, I replied. Dudaev did not detain us any longer, and dismissed us. Before leaving, Merzhuyev wrote an appointment order by hand, said he would send it to the Naur District Prefect, Aindi Akhaev, so that he would learn of the appointment and order his officials to carry out my orders. I had just become the first regional military commander in the history of Ichkeria. From that day on, my path was the struggle for Chechnya’s independence, which eventually led me to England.
Aindi Akhaev
Military Commander
Back in Naur, I started mobilizing volunteers for checkpoint service. People answered my call: they were ordinary Chechen boys, simple agricultural workers, yet they were people of great dignity, and with a deep sense of honor. Most of them were unarmed, some carrying shotguns, knives or daggers with them. My frequent appeals to Headquarters were eventually crowned with success, and they promised me from Grozny that they would send 10 AK-74 firearms. I thought I would get the guns from the State Security Department, but Geliskhanov, who at the time he led the department, found a different reason each time not to send the guns, and went on for about a month. When the weapons were finally delivered, I saw that they were old, worn, firearms, some even missing some parts. I had to sort it out differently, so I requisitioned the armory of the Naur Police Department. We managed to collect more than twenty AK 5.45 assault rifles, an RPK 5.45 machine gun, two PK – 7.62, two RPG grenade launchers, an automatic grenade launcher and a sniper rifle. I distributed all these weapons among the militia men on duty at the Checkpoints, and so we put on a well-armed force, able to counter the armed opposition deployed in Znamenskoye and the bandits who tried to penetrate taking advantage of the chaos. In addition to this, I formed local teams recruited from the residents of each village. We began holding gatherings in all the settlements in the region, leaving the residents to appoint their own commanders. These makeshift officers were the directors of state agricultural farms and other local businesses. In particular, they provided us with radio stations with which they were used to communicating with the district authorities. A person who specialized in these things helped us to establish communications, so that all units were coordinated with each other.
The summer and autumn of 1994 in Chechnya saw many social and political events. The Opposition has become more active in the districts of Urus – Martan, Gudermes and Grozny. In the village of Znamenskoye the armed groups of Labazanov and Gantemirov gathered, while the Cossacks of the Naur and Shelkov districts took action, sending delegations to Stavropol asking to annex the entire left bank of the Terek to Russia. Realizing that any public demonstration in support of this proposal would give courage and determination to the local opponents and the Cossacks, to prevent this from happening, I began to seek contacts to organize secret meetings with the leaders of the Chechen and Cossack opposition. I used to go to their house and there, over a cup of tea or vodka, I would say to them: If you want to gather, go to Znamenskoye, I promise you that none of your family will be punished for this. But if you start moving from that area, no one will be safe, not even you. They replied that they would not give in to my threats, but in the end no one in the Naur District spoke out against Dudaev in a public demonstration. A big help came from the district prefect, Aindi Akhaev, who was a very brave man and a devoted supporter of President Dudaev. The fortunate coexistence of these factors, in the end, determined the fact that the District of Naur remained loyal to Ichkeria until the end!
Umar Avturkhanov, leader dell’opposizione antidudaevita
Adding fuel to the fire
In the fall of 1994, enemy special services intensified their subversive activities throughout Ichkeria. In Grozny, terrorist attacks and all kinds of provocations began to occur frequently: the Russians actively sought to create an atmosphere of fear, panic and chaos throughout the Republic, while in several areas the so-called “opposition” declared with increasing certainty that they would not recognize the central government. Of course, the Naur District was also under attack from the special services. Several high-profile murders took place in the area, such as two Naurskaya residents, both of Cossack ethnicity, killed on the Tersky state farm. I, together with the district police chief, went to the scene of the crime: the murder had been committed with demonstrative cruelty, the victims’ stomachs had been slashed, and the bowels had been made out of the corpses. At the crime scene a trace was perfectly visible, as if it had been left on purpose, leading to a boy’s home: clothes smeared with blood, rubber boots with blood on the soles and other evidence clearly framing the young man.
However, something was not clear: the alleged perpetrator was a physically very weak, mentally unstable 17-18 year old boy. Furthermore, if the traces leading from the place where the bodies were found to his home were evident, there was no trace that led to the place where these people had been killed. It was obvious that this boy had been brought onto the scene by someone else, in order to be used as a scapegoat. When I asked the chief of the district police a few days later how the investigation was proceeding, he replied that because the district attorney had refused to arrest the suspect, the detainee had been released from custody. I was sure that the Russian special services were behind this crime, who were interested in creating a rift between Cossacks and Chechens, using the pretext of “genocide” to incite the former against the latter and provoke the secession of the northern districts from Chechnya.
Later, these suspicions of ours were proved by facts. The news of the brutal murder spread throughout the region with incredible speed, the Cossacks gathered in Naurskaya and demanded that the guilty be found, tried and sentenced. Aindi Akhaev met many of them, explained to them who the instigators of these murders were, and the Cossacks realized that the Russian government didn’t care about them at all, but was interested in using them as tools to provoke an inter-ethnic massacre. I too, present at this meeting, spoke in support of the Prefect’s version. Finally, thanks to him, the Naur region was spared from violence.
автоматический перевод на русский
ГЕНЕРАЛ НАУРА – ВОСПОМИНАНИЯ АПТИ БАТАЛОВА (ЧАСТЬ I)
Введение
Апти Баталов родился 19 октября 1956 года в селе Илыч Каменского района Казахстана. Офицер полиции, в сентябре 1994 года назначен военным комендантом Наурского и Надтеречного районов, и в этой роли организовывал вооруженные формирования, предназначенные для стать одной из самых известных воинских частей чеченской армии, Наурским батальоном. Подразделение отличилось бы во многих боях, а сам Баталов стал бы по окончании конфликта одним из главных чинов чеченской армии, придя возглавить Генеральный штаб Вооруженных Сил в звании бригадного генерала. и Служба национальной безопасности.
Баталов согласился поделиться со мной своими военными воспоминаниями.
Ветры войны
20 июня 1994 года я был назначен начальником Ищерского РОВД Наурского района. Село расположено на левом берегу Терека, северо-восточная часть села граничит со Ставропольским краем, а южнее, по другую сторону реки, примерно в полутора километрах, находится село Знаменское, который в то время был штабом оппозиции. Город пересекает железная дорога, ведущая из России в Дагестан. В западной части поселка находился терминал по отгрузке нефти и насосная станция, через которую нефть отгружалась в Россию. Дорога, въезжавшая в Чечню со стороны Ставропольского края, разветвлялась на две части: одна шла на восток до Червленной и оттуда в Дагестан на севере, а другая доходила до Грозного на юге. Другая по мосту пересекла Терек, пересекла Надтеречный район и затем проникла в глубь страны. Будучи пограничным поселком и перекрестком дорог в Россию и из России, Ищерская была одним из самых оживленных мест криминала во всей Чечне — этаким криминальным перевалочным пунктом.
В конце июня 1994 г. мне позвонил начальник районной милиции Заинди Пашаев и представил присланному из Грозного окружному военачальнику. Мне сказали явиться к командиру и помочь ему в организации блокпостов вокруг Ищерской. Никаких документов, подтверждающих его позицию, он не предъявлял ни тогда, ни впоследствии. Это был мужчина лет 25-28, ростом около пяти футов, очень динамичный, быстрый в движениях и крепкий физически. Молодой человек, как я потом узнал, был зятем президента Дудаева, женившимся на дочери брата президента. Звали его Дута Музаев. Он активно брался за работу, а я следовала его указаниям, помогая во всем, что нужно было делать. Поставили два блокпоста, один на российско-чеченской границе, перед станицей Галюгаевской, другой на левом подъезде к мосту через Терек, перед Знаменским.
В те дни, пока мы строили блокпосты, на прилегающих к Чечне территориях начались массовые античеченские погромы, был убит мальчик по имени Пашаев, самозваные «казаки Курска» (на самом деле агенты ГРУ и ФСК) начали повредив дома, в которых жили чеченцы, они сожгли фермы, где содержались коровы и овцы. Нетрудно было понять, что за этими погромами и убийствами стояли силы, заинтересованные в создании хаоса и межнациональных погромов между казачьим и чеченским населением. Беженцы начали прибывать в Чечню. Тем временем российские вооруженные формирования начали проводить всевозможные провокации. Вооруженные формирования въехали на своей бронетехнике в Наурский район и под угрозой оружия провели операцию «паспортный контроль», заявив: «Вы находитесь на нашей территории, и вы – граждане России».
В первых числах августа Музаев сказал мне, что у него физически возникли проблемы с мышцами позвоночника, и что ему придется вернуться в Грозный для лечения. Он ушел и больше не вернулся. Вскоре после отъезда Музаева меня вызвал в Грозный полковник Мержуев. 16 сентября я присоединился к нему в столице, и он сообщил мне, что в связи с ухудшением обстановки на границах Ичкерии, поскольку Наурский район находится на северной окраине республики, я рекомендован Президенту принять место Военкомата в этом районе и в соседнем Надтеречном районе. Честно говоря, эта новость меня удивила и шокировала, потому что было ясно, что вот-вот разразится война между Россией и Чечней. Наурский район был самым уязвимым, находясь на границе. Выслушав Мержуева, я спросил его: неужели у вас нет на эту должность человека более опытного, чем я? Я сказал ему, что я совершенно не обучен военному делу и понятия не имею, как играть роль военного коменданта в этих районах, особенно в Надтеречном районе, который почти полностью находится под контролем оппозиции. Мержуев ответил: Расскажите обо всем этом Президенту.
Мы пошли встречать президента, который принял нас после короткой приемной. Это была моя первая встреча с Дудаевым. Он был одет в штатское, выглядел интеллигентным и серьезным. Он задал мне несколько не очень важных вопросов, после чего спросил: Вы мне рекомендованы на должность командующего округом. Ну, ты в состоянии держать его? Я надеялся, что Мержуев присоединится к разговору, но, глядя на него, понял, что он будет молчать. Я сделаю все, что потребуется, — ответил я. Дудаев больше нас не задерживал и отпустил. Перед отъездом Мержуев написал от руки приказ о назначении, сказал, что направит его префекту Наурского района Айнди Ахаеву, чтобы тот узнал о назначении и приказал своим чиновникам выполнить мои распоряжения. Я только что стал первым в истории Ичкерии областным военачальником. С этого дня моим путем стала борьба за независимость Чечни, которая в конце концов привела меня в Англию.
Военный командующий
Вернувшись в Наур, я начал мобилизовывать добровольцев для обслуживания блокпостов. На мой зов откликнулись люди: это были обычные чеченские мальчишки, простые сельскохозяйственные рабочие, но люди большого достоинства, с глубоким чувством чести. Большинство из них были безоружны, некоторые несли с собой дробовики, ножи или кинжалы. Мои частые обращения в Ставку в итоге увенчались успехом, и из Грозного мне пообещали прислать 10 автоматов АК-74. Я думал, что получу оружие из ОГБ, но Гелисханов, который в то время руководил управлением, каждый раз находил разные причины не присылать ружья, и ездил около месяца. Когда оружие, наконец, доставили, я увидел, что оно старое, изношенное, огнестрельное, у некоторых даже не хватает некоторых частей. Пришлось разбираться по-другому, поэтому я реквизировал арсенал Наурского полицейского управления. Нам удалось собрать более двадцати автоматов АК 5,45, пулемет РПК 5,45, два ПК-7,62, два гранатомета РПГ, автоматический гранатомет и снайперскую винтовку. Все это оружие я раздал милиционерам, дежурившим на блокпостах, и таким образом мы сформировали хорошо вооруженный отряд, способный противостоять вооруженной оппозиции, дислоцированной в Знаменском, и бандитам, пытавшимся проникнуть, воспользовавшись хаосом. Кроме того, я сформировал местные команды, набранные из жителей каждой деревни. Мы начали проводить сходы во всех населенных пунктах района, предоставив жителям самим назначать себе командиров. Эти импровизированные офицеры были директорами совхозов и других местных предприятий. В частности, они предоставили нам радиостанции, с помощью которых они привыкли общаться с районными властями. Человек, который специализировался на этих вещах, помог нам наладить связь, чтобы все подразделения были согласованы друг с другом.
Летом и осенью 1994 года в Чечне произошло много общественно-политических событий. Оппозиция активизировалась в районах Уруса – Мартановском, Гудермесском и Грозненском. В селе Знаменском собрались вооруженные отряды Лабазанова и Гантемирова, а казаки Наурского и Шелковского уездов выступили, направив в Ставрополь делегации с просьбой присоединить к России весь левый берег Терека. Понимая, что любая публичная демонстрация в поддержку этого предложения придаст мужества и решимости местным противникам и казакам, чтобы этого не произошло, я стал искать контакты для организации тайных встреч с лидерами чеченской и казачьей оппозиции. Бывало, я прихожу к ним домой и там за чашкой чая или водки говорю им: если хотите собраться, езжайте в Знаменское, обещаю вам, что никто из вашей семьи не будет за это наказан. Но если вы начнете двигаться из этой области, никто не будет в безопасности, даже вы. Они ответили, что не поддадутся на мои угрозы, но в итоге никто в Наурском районе не выступил против Дудаева на публичной демонстрации. Большую помощь оказал префект района Айнди Ахаев, очень храбрый человек и преданный сторонник президента Дудаева. Удачное сосуществование этих факторов, в конечном итоге, определило тот факт, что Наурский округ до конца остался верен Ичкерии!
Добавление масла в огонь
Осенью 1994 года спецслужбы противника активизировали диверсионную деятельность по всей Ичкерии. В Грозном участились теракты и разного рода провокации: русские активно стремились создать атмосферу страха, паники и хаоса по всей республике, а в ряде районов так называемая «оппозиция» со все большей уверенностью заявляла, что они не признавал центральную власть. Конечно, Наурский район также подвергся обстрелу со стороны спецслужб. В этом районе произошло несколько громких убийств, например, двое жителей Наурской, оба казачьей национальности, убиты в совхозе «Терский». Я вместе с участковым полицмейстером выехал на место преступления: убийство совершено с демонстративной жестокостью, животы жертв вскрыты, из трупов сделаны кишки. На месте преступления был прекрасно виден след, как будто специально оставленный, ведущий к дому мальчика: одежда, перепачканная кровью, резиновые сапоги с кровью на подошвах и другие улики, явно подставлявшие молодого человека .
Однако что-то было непонятно: предполагаемый преступник был физически очень слабым, психически неуравновешенным парнем 17-18 лет. Кроме того, если следы, ведущие от места, где были обнаружены тела, к его дому, были очевидны, то не было никаких следов, ведущих к месту, где были убиты эти люди. Было очевидно, что этого мальчика привел на сцену кто-то другой, чтобы использовать его в качестве козла отпущения. Когда через несколько дней я спросил начальника районной полиции, как продвигается следствие, он ответил, что из-за отказа окружного прокурора задержать подозреваемого задержанный был освобожден из-под стражи. Я был уверен, что за этим преступлением стоят российские спецслужбы, заинтересованные в том, чтобы создать раскол между казаками и чеченцами, под предлогом «геноцида» настроить первых против вторых и спровоцировать отделение северных районов от Чечни.
Позднее эти наши подозрения подтвердились фактами. Весть о зверском убийстве с невероятной скоростью разнеслась по округе, казаки собрались в Наурской и потребовали найти виновного, судить и осудить. Айни Ахаев познакомился со многими лотосами, объяснил им, кто был зачинщиком этих убийств, и казаки поняли, что российское правительство вообще не заботится о них, а заинтересовано в том, чтобы использовать их как инструменты для провоцирования межнациональной бойни. Я тоже, присутствовавший на этом собрании, высказался в поддержку версии префекта. Наконец, благодаря ему Наурский край был избавлен от насилия.
TRADUZIONE IN ITALIANO
IL GENERALE DI NAUR – MEMORIE DI APTI BATALOV (PARTE I)
Introduzione
Apti Batalov è nato ad Ilic, nel Distretto di Kamensky, il 19 Ottobre 1956. Funzionario di polizia, nel Settembre del 1994 fu nominato comandante militare dei distretti di Naur e di Nadterechny, ed in questa veste organizzò le milizie armate destinate a diventare una delle più note unità militari dell’esercito ceceno, il Battaglione Naursk. L’unità si sarebbe distinta in molte battaglie, dalla difesa di Grozny, nel 1995, alla sua riconquista, l’anno successivo, lo stesso Batalov sarebbe diventato, alla fine del conflitto, uno dei principali funzionari dell’esercito ceceno, giungendo a guidare lo Stato Maggiore delle Forze Armate col grado di Generale di Brigata.
Ho contattato Batalov di mia iniziativa, per raccogliere i suoi ricordi di guerra, e lui ha accettato di condividerle con me.
Venti di guerra
Il 20 Giugno 1994 fui nominato capo del dipartimento di polizia del villaggio di Ishcherskaya, nel Distretto di Naursk. Il villaggio è situato sulla riva sinistra del Terek, la parte nordorientale del villaggio confina con il Territorio di Stavropol mentre a Sud, dall’altra parte del fiume, a circa un chilometro e mezzo, è situato il villaggio di Znamenskoye, che all’epoca era il quartier generale dell’opposizione. Una volta Ishcherskaya era un grande insediamento cosacco, ma a quel tempo non c’erano più di dieci famiglie di cosacchi del Terek. Ishcherskaya è attraversata da una ferrovia che porta dalla Russia al Daghestan. Infine, la parte occidentale del villaggio ospitava un terminal per il carico del petrolio ed una stazione di pompaggio, tramite la quale il greggio veniva spedito in Russia. All’altezza della cittadina, la strada che dal Territorio di Stavropol entrava in Cecenia si biforcava in due: una rotta proseguiva verso est, raggiungendo Chervlennaya e da qui proseguendo fino in Daghestan, a nord, e fino a Grozny, a sud. L’altra attraversava il Terek tramite un ponte, attraversava il Distretto di Nadterechny per poi penetrare in profondità nel Paese. Trattandosi di un insediamento di frontiera e di un crocevia di strade da e per la Russia, Ishcherskaya era uno dei posti più affollati da criminali in tutta la Cecenia: una sorta di punto di transito criminale.
Alla fine di Giugno del 1994 il capo della polizia distrettuale, Zaindi Pashaev, mi chiamò e mi presentò al comandante militare del distretto inviato da Grozny. Mi fu detto di mettermi a disposizione del Comandante e di affiancarlo nell’organizzazione di posti di blocco nei dintorni di Ishcherskaya. Egli non presentò nessun documento che confermasse la sua posizione, né allora né successivamente. Era un uomo di circa 25, 28 anni, alto circa un metro e settanta, molto dinamico, veloce nei movimenti e fisicamente forte. Un uomo giovane, che più tardi capii essere il genero del Presidente Dudaev, avendo sposato la figlia di un fratello del Presidente. Si chiamava Duta Muzaev. Egli si mise attivamente al lavoro, ed io eseguii le sue indicazioni, aiutando in tutto ciò che doveva essere fatto. Mettemmo su due posti di blocco, uno sul confine russo – ceceno, di fronte al villaggio di Galyugaevskaya, l’altro sull’accesso sinistro del ponte sul Terek, di fronte a Znamenskoye.
In quei giorni, mentre stavamo realizzando i checkpoint, nei territori limitrofi alla Cecenia iniziarono pogrom anti – ceceni di massa, un ragazzo di nome Pashaev fu ucciso, sedicenti “Cosacchi di Kursk” (in realtà agenti del GRU e dell’FSK) iniziarono a danneggiare le case dove vivevano i ceceni, bruciarono le fattorie dove venivano tenute mucche e pecore. Non era difficile capire che dietro a questi pogrom e omicidi c’erano forze interessate a creare caos e massacri interetnici tra la popolazione cosacca e quella cecena. I rifugiati iniziarono ad affluire in Cecenia. Nel frattempo reparti armati russi iniziarono a compiere ogni tipo di provocazione. Unità armate penetrarono sui loro veicoli blindati nel Distretto di Naur e, sotto minaccia armata, portarono avanti operazioni di “controllo passaporti” dichiarando: “Siete nel nostro territorio, e siete cittadini russi”.
Nei primi giorni di Agosto Muzaev mi disse che aveva avuto un problema fisico ai muscoli della spina dorsale, e che avrebbe dovuto tornare a Grozny per curarsi. Se ne andò, e non tornò più. Poco dopo la partenza di Muzaev, venni convocato a Grozny dal Colonnello Merzhuyev. Il 16 Settembre lo raggiunsi nella capitale e questi mi informò che a causa dell’aggravarsi della situazione ai confini di Ichkeria, essendo il Distretto di Naursk posto al limite settentrionale della Repubblica, ero stato raccomandato al Presidente per prendere il posto di Comandante Militare in quel distretto, e nel vicino distretto di Nadterechny. Ad essere onesti questa notizia mi sorprese, e mi sconvolse, perché era chiaro che tra Russia e Cecenia stesse per scoppiare una guerra. La regione di Naur era il più vulnerabile, essendo al confine. Dopo aver ascoltato Merzhuyev, gli chiesi: Davvero non avete una persone più esperta di me per questa posizione? Gli dissi che non ero assolutamente preparato negli affari militari, e che non avevo idea di come svolgere il ruolo di comandante militare in queste regioni, specialmente nel Distretto di Nadterechny, quasi totalmente sotto il controllo dell’opposizione. Merzhuyev mi rispose: Di’ tutto questo al Presidente. Andammo a colloquio dal Presidente, il quale ci ricevette dopo una breve anticamera. Fu il mio primo incontro con Dudaev. Era vestito in abiti civili, e si mostrò intelligente e serio. Mi fece alcune domande non molto importanti, dopo di che mi chiese: Mi sei stato raccomandato per la posizione di Comandante di Distretto. Bene, sei in grado di tenerla? Speravo che Merzhuyev si unisse alla conversazione, ma guardandolo realizzai che sarebbe rimasto in silenzio. Farò tutto ciò che serve, risposi. Dudaev non ci trattenne oltre, e ci congedò. Prima di uscire, Merzhuyev scrisse a mano un ordine di nomina, disse che lo avrebbe inviato al Prefetto del Distretto di Naur, Zayndi Akhaev, in modo tale che questi venisse a conoscenza della nomina e ordinasse ai suoi funzionari di eseguire i miei ordini. Ero appena diventato il primo comandante militare regionale della Storia di Ichkeria. Da quel giorno la mia strada fu la lotta per l’indipendenza della Cecenia, la quale, alla fine, mi ha portato in Inghilterra.
Comandante Militare
Tornato a Naur, inziai a mobilitare volontari per il servizio ai checkpoint. Le persone risposero alla mia chiamata: si trattava di ragazzi ceceni ordinari, semplici lavoratori agricoli, eppure erano persone di grande dignità, e con un profondo senso dell’onore. Erano quasi tutti disarmati, qualcuno portò con sé fucili da caccia, coltellacci o pugnali. I miei frequenti appelli al Quartier Generale furono infine coronati dal successo, e da Grozny mi promisero che avrebbero inviato 10 armi da fuoco AK – 74. Pensavo che avrei avuto le armi dal Dipartimento per la Sicurezza dello Stato, ma Geliskhanov, che a quel tempo guidava il dipartimento, trovava ogni volta una ragione diversa per non inviare la armi, e tirò avanti la cosa per circa un mese. Quando poi le armi, finalmente, furono consegnate, vidi che erano vecchie, logore, armi da fuoco, alcune mancanti addirittura di alcune parti. Dovetti risolvere la cosa in altro modo, così requisii l’armeria del Dipartimento di Polizia di Naur. Riuscimmo a raccogliere così più di venti fucili d’assalto AK 5.45, una mitragliatrice RPK 5.45, due PK – 7.62, due lanciagranate RPG un lanciagranate automatico ed un fucile da cecchino. Distibuii tutte queste armi tra gli uomini della milizia in servizio ai Checkpoint, e così mettemmo su una forza ben armata, in grado di contrastare l’opposizione armata schierata a Znamenskoye ed i banditi che tentavano di penetrare approfittandosi del caos. Oltre a questo, costituii squadre locali reclutate dai residenti di ogni villaggio. Iniziammo a tenere raduni in tutti gli insediamenti della regione, lasciando ai residenti il compito di nominare i propri comandanti. Questi ufficiali improvvisati erano i direttori delle fattorie agricole di stato e di altre imprese locali. Ci fornirono in particolare le stazioni radio con le quali erano abituati a comunicare con le autorità del distretto. Una persona specializzata in queste cose ci aiutò a stabilite le comunicazioni, in modo tale che tutte le unità fossero coordinate tra loro.
L’estate e l’autunno del 1994 in Cecenia hanno visto molti eventi sociali e politici. L’Opposizione è diventata più attiva nei distretti di Urus – Martan, Gudermes e Grozny. Nel villaggio di Znamenskoye i gruppi armati di Labazanov e di Gantemirov si radunavano, mentre i cosacchi dei distretti di Naur e di Shelkov si attivarono, inviando delegazioni a Stavropol le quali chiedevano di annettere alla Russia tutta la riva sinistra del Terek. Comprendendo che qualsiasi manifestazione pubblica a supporto di questa proposta avrebbe dato coraggio e determinazione agli oppositori locali ed ai cosacchi, per evitare che ciò avvenisse ho iniziato a cercare contatti per organizzare incontri segreti con i capi dell’opposizione cecena e cosacca. Solitamente mi recavo a casa loro e là, davanti ad una tazza di te o a una vodka, dicevo loro: Se volete radunarvi, andate a Znamenskoye, ti prometto che nessuno della tua famiglia sarà punito per questo. Ma se iniziate a muovervi da quella zona, nessuno sarà in salvo, nemmeno tu. Loro rispondevano che non avrebbero ceduto alle mie minacce, ma alla fine nessuno, nel Distretto di Naur, si pronunciò contro Dudaev in una manifestazione pubblica. Un grosso aiuto mi arrivò dal Prefetto del distretto, Aindi Akhaev, che era un uomo davvero coraggioso ed un sostenitore devoto del Presidente Dudaev. La fortunata compresenza di questi fattori, alla fine, determinò il fatto che il Distretto di Naur rimase fedele ad Ichkeria fino alla fine!
Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria (ChRI) 