Archivi tag: Dudaev

I CINQUEMILA GIORNI DI ICHKERIA – Marzo 1992

17 ottobre 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

1 Marzo

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – Allo scopo di interrompere le indebite appropriazioni di beni pubblici, soprattutto quelli afferenti ai magazzini della Protezione Civile, o la loro rivendita illegale da parte dei funzionari pubblici, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 17 il Presidente della Repubblica ordina un censimento generale delle proprietà ed un nuovo protocollo di autorizzazione per il loro utilizzo attraverso speciali permessi presidenziali.

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Con Decreto Presidenziale numero 16, recependo un’iniziativa del Parlamento della Repubblica, il Presidente Dudaev assegna un edificio precedentemente a disposizione del KGB ad un’unità medico – diagnostica a disposizione della popolazione infantile e femminile della Repubblica.

2 Marzo

POLITICA LOCALE – Su iniziativa del Sindaco di Grozny Bislan Gantamirov vengono aperti in città quattro negozi “sociali” destinati alla raccolta ed alla distribuzione di cibo e vestiario agli indigenti. Tale misura è volta a sostenere le fasce deboli della popolazione, sempre più colpita dal rialzo dei prezzi e dalla crisi economica generale.

Bislan Gantamirov (in abiti civili) presenzia ad un’ispezione insieme a Dzhokhar Dudaev (in mimetica)

3 Marzo

NEGOZIATI RUSSO/CECENI – I rappresentanti russi e ceceni si incontrano a Sochi per iniziare un ciclo di negoziati. Dal governo russo arriva la disponibilità a continuare nel limite del possibile il trasferimento dei fondi necessario al pagamento degli stipendi pubblici e dei salari.

5 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – In ordine a garantire locali adeguati alle strutture del comparto giudiziario della Repubblica, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 19 “Misure per migliorare le condizioni di lavoro dei tribunali distrettuali della Repubblica Cecena” il Presidente Dudaev ordina che gli edifici, le risorse ed il mobilio appartenute al disciolto Partito Comunista dell’Unione Sovietica siano ceduti in uso alle corti di giustizia.

6 Marzo

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – Umar Avturkhanov, Governatore dell’Alto Terek e principale leader dell’opposizione a Dudaev, pubblica un appello al popolo ceceno nel quale invita i suoi concittadini a non ubbidire al governo indipendentista.

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – A Grozny i rappresentanti dei dipendenti pubblici minacciano uno sciopero generale se il governo non assicurerà il pagamento degli stipendi.

POLITICA ESTERA – Dudaev invia una dichiarazione ai governi di Azerbaijian, Tatarstan, Baskhortostan e Turkmenistan proponendo un’unione monetaria alternativa al rublo, considerato uno strumento imperialista di destabilizzazione per le repubbliche “produttrici di petrolio”.

CRISI RUSSO/CECENA – Reagendo al blocco economico in atto da parte della Federazione Russa, Dudaev dichiara il blocco alle esportazioni dei prodotti strategici (in particolare dei lubrificanti per aerei, dei quali la Cecenia è produttore – leader con il 90% del fabbisogno di tutta la Russia) fin quando Mosca non riaprirà le frontiere.

ECONOMIA E FINANZA– La situazione economica nel paese peggiora di giorno in giorno. Il governo non ha le risorse necessarie a garantire il regolare pagamento degli stipendi. Insegnanti e forze dell’ordine non hanno ricevuto né lo stipendio di Gennaio, né lo stipendio di Marzo, e minacciano di scioperare.

10 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Al fine di garantire le risorse necessarie al suo funzionamento, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 18 il Presidente Dudaev alloca la somma di 200.000 rubli per le spese correnti della neocostituita Corte Suprema della Repubblica. Tale misura dovrà essere implementata con la costituzione di un’apposita voce nel bilancio statale.

12 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Con la Legge numero 108/1992 Il Parlamento promulga la Costituzione della Repubblica Cecena. La nuova carta fondamentale, ispirata alle costituzioni occidentali, identifica lo Stato come una repubblica democratica di tipo parlamentare, fondata sul rispetto dei diritti della persona, dei diritti civili e della tolleranza religiosa.

Con Decreto Presidenziale numero 23 il Presidente Dudaev riforma la Protezione Civile Nazionale, assumendo il potere di nomina dei suoi massimi rappresentanti e delegando al Sindaco di Grozny la gestione della protezione civile nella capitale.

POLITICA ESTERA – La delegazione cecena, guidata dal Ministro degli Esteri Shamil Beno giunge a Dagomys, in Abkhazia, dove incontra la controparte russa per iniziare i negoziati tra i governi di Grozny e di Mosca.

Le tre più alte cariche del Parlamento di prima convocazione: Il Presidente del Parlamento, Akhmadov (Al centro) ed i due Vicepresidenti, Mezhidov (a sinistra) e Gushakayev (a destra)

12 Marzo

POLITICA ESTERA – Settanta deputati provenienti dalla Georgia vengono ospitati in sessione dalle autorità cecene, alla presenza dell’ex presidente georgiano Gamsakhurdia e del Capo dello Stato ceceno, Dudaev. Con questo gesto il Presidente della Repubblica Cecena prende una chiara posizione politica in favore dell’ormai decaduto leader georgiano.

12 Marzo

NEGOZIATI RUSSO/CECENI – I negoziati tra Federazione Russa e Repubblica Cecena portano alla sottoscrizione di un documento condiviso nel quale si identificano alcune aree di integrazione politica ed economica tra i due paesi.

I negoziati proseguono mentre la Federazione Russa indice per il 31 Marzo la cerimonia di firma di un nuovo Trattato Federativo con il quale tutti i soggetti federati della Russia fisseranno i loro rapporti con il governo centrale. I moderati ceceni spingono perché la Cecenia firmi il Trattato, ma Dudaev ed i nazionalisti pretendono che prima la Federazione Russa riconosca l’indipendenza della Cecenia.

15 Marzo

NEGOZIATI RUSSO/CECENI – Di ritorno dalla sessione negoziale nella cittadina di Dagomys, la delegazione cecena comunica che il prossimo incontro si terrà a Mosca, e che la delegazione russa ha promesso di allentare il blocco finanziario della Repubblica Cecena se questa ricomincerà ad esportare i prodotti derivanti dalla lavorazione degli idrocarburi.

16 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Per favorire gli investimenti nella repubblica il Parlamento vara una moratoria sull’imposta sul reddito, e la abolisce per l’anno di imposta 1992. La misura serve anche a rottamare una enorme quantità di debiti privati nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione, cui la maggior parte dei ceceni non riesce più a far fronte, o che non intende pagare.

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – Continua lo sciopero degli insegnanti e di altri dipendenti del pubblico impiego a causa dei ritardi nel pagamento degli stipendi. In particolare gli insegnanti lamentano il fatto di non aver ancora ricevuto lo stipendio di Gennaio. Il governo assicura che presto i pagamenti riprenderanno regolari, a seguito di accordi per la vendita di prodotti petroliferi che dovrebbero portare alle casse dello Stato la liquidità necessaria a mettere il tesoro in pari con i pagamenti.

17 Marzo

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – Intere categorie di lavoratori pubblici entrano in sciopero a causa del mancato pagamento dei salari. Le scuole, colpite dall’astensione lavorativa degli insegnanti, rimangono chiuse. Il Ministro dell’Economia Taymaz Abubakarov promette che il tesoro ricomincerà a pagare regolarmente gli stipendi non appena la Russia interromperà il blocco dei trasferimenti finanziari.

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Il Parlamento della Repubblica approva una legge con la quale reintroduce l’alfabeto latino in funzione di quello cirillico, imposto dall’Unione Sovietica negli anni ’30. Secondo il parere dei deputati, questo è più aderente alla fonetica della lingua cecena.

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – l’opposizione anti – dudaevita fa circolare volantini nei quali si chiedono le dimissioni di Dudaev. Gruppi armati antidudaeviti prendono posizione nei dintorni di Grozny.

Uno dei leader dell’opposizione antidudaevita, Umar Avturkhanov

20 Marzo

POLITICA ESTERA – Con Decreto Presidenziale il Presidente Dudaev ordina al Ministero degli Esteri di stabilire regolari relazioni diplomatiche con la Repubblica di Georgia “non appena l’ordine costituzionale sarà ripristinato”. Il provvedimento è essenzialmente un gesto di amicizia politica al decaduto presidente georgiano Gamsakhurdia, il quale attualmente risiede a Grozny e lavora alla riconquista del potere sostenuto da numerosi ex esponenti del Soviet Supremo Georgiano, anch’esso disperso a seguito del colpo di stato dell’anno precedente.

20 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Dudaev promulga il Decreto “Sulle aliquote di dazio statale da addebitarsi sulle domande e sui reclami presentati in tribunale, nonché sulle imposte degli atti notarili e dello stato civile” con il quale calmiera i prezzi degli atti pubblici, agevolando la popolazione vessata dalla crisi economica ma riducendo al minimo gli introiti a disposizione del comparto della giustizia, il quale già versa in una cronica carenza di risorse per poter funzionare.

24 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – In ordine a razionalizzare i servizi sanitari della Repubblica, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 30 Dudaev stabilisce la conversione del centro medico del Ministero degli Interni in ospedale policlinico al servizio dei dipendenti pubblici e delle forze dell’ordine, decretando che tale struttura sarà finanziata da specifiche voci di bilancio a carico delle istituzioni statali che utilizzeranno la struttura.

25 Marzo

MOVIMENTI POLITICI – Il Congresso Nazionale del Popolo Ceceno (OKChN) dal quale sono emerse le forze che hanno scatenato la Rivoluzione Cecena, delibera una nuova sessione da tenersi in Maggio. La Costituzione appena approvata non ha riconosciuto al Congresso alcuno spazio istituzionale, ed i nuovi rappresentanti dell’organizzazione, emersi dal “travaso” di molti dei suoi leaders nelle istituzioni della Repubblica, rivendicano il ruolo centrale che a loro parere il Congresso dovrebbe avere nella Cecenia indipendente.

Yaragi Mamodaev, di ritorno da un viaggio privato in Giappone, relaziona riguardo ai suoi contatti con il Ministero degli Esteri del Sol Levante e con alcuni industriali, i quali si sono detti disponibili a saggiare le possibilità di una collaborazione economica.

A latere della sua conferenza stampa Mamodaev suggerisce che il Parlamento, dei cui 41 deputati soltanto uno (Gleb Bunin) è russo e nessuno appartiene ad alcuna delle minoranze che abitano la repubblica, dovrebbe sciogliersi e ricostituirsi secondo un criterio etnicamente più rappresentativo.

26 Marzo

TENSIONI SOCIALI – Sciopero dei vigili del fuoco, i quali lamentano ritardi di tre mesi nel pagamento degli stipendi. L’allentamento delle tensioni con la Russia ha fatto si che da Mosca siano arrivati 150 milioni di rubli per il pagamento di stipendi e pensioni, ma queste risorse sono ampiamente insufficienti a coprire gli ammanchi delle casse statali.

POLITICA NAZIONALE – In un incontro con l’Associazione dell’Intellighenzia della Repubblica Cecena, il Presidente Dudaev afferma che l’indipendenza del Paese non è in discussione, mentre lo sono tutti i suoi aspetti “collaterali”, come eventuali accordi di cooperazione economica con la Federazione Russa e con i paesi produttori di petrolio. In questo modo Dudaev ribadisce la propria totale contrarietà a qualsiasi negoziato di tipo federativo con Mosca, eventualità ventilata sia dagli stessi intellettuali, sia da correnti interne al Parlamento.

28 Marzo

TERRORISMO – Una banda di sequestratori provenienti dal Territorio di Stavropol chiede asilo al governo ceceno, ma questo lo nega ed ordina l’arresto dei sequestratori, ed il rilascio degli ostaggi. I terroristi vengono da prima tradotti nell’edificio del Ministero degli Interni, poi in una caserma della Guardia Nazionale.

28 Marzo

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – La polizia antisommossa, dipendente dal Ministero degli Interni, è in stato di agitazione e chiede che il Ministero abbia riconosciuta una guida ufficiale, mentre adesso si trova diretto da un Ministro “de facto”, Umals Alsultanov, peraltro inattivo. Egli, già Ministro negli ultimi mesi di vita della ASSR Ceceno – Inguscia, era stato esautorato a causa della sua sospetta collaborazione con il Comitato di Emergenza responsabile del Putsch di Agosto e sostituito da Vakha Ibragimov, ma Dudaev lo ha riconfermato alla guida del dicastero nel suo “governo provvisorio”. Al momento della sua presentazione al Parlamento non ha ottenuto i voti necessari, pertanto si è posto in stato di riposo in attesa di dare le dimissioni in favore del suo successore. I funzionari del Ministero sono quindi divisi tra coloro che premono per una sua riconferma e coloro che chiedono la nomina di Ibragimov.

30 Marzo

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – Milizie armate antidudaevite si radunano nei sobborghi di Grozny. In alcuni villaggi si segnala la distribuzione di armi a volontari disposti a mettere a segno un colpo di mano per estromettere il Presidente Dudaev e riportare la Cecenia nella Federazione Russa.

Vita quotidiana a Grozny nell’estate del 1992

31 Marzo

COLPO DI STATO DI MARZO – Un gruppo di ex funzionari della RSSA Ceceno – Inguscia ed alcuni rappresentanti dell’opposizione, favorevoli alla federazione con la Russia tenta un colpo di Stato. Milizie armate e reparti inquadrati nella Guardia Nazionale occupano la TV e la Radio. Un “Comitato di Emergenza” si riunisce per costituire un governo di transizione che porti la Cecenia ad un Referendum sull’adesione alla Federazione Russa e successivamente a nuove elezioni parlamentari. Le unità del Ministero degli Interni, in questo momento prive di un Ministro e dirette dal Viceministro degli Interni, Udiev, rimangono acquartierate nelle caserme.

Dopo alcune ore di sbandamento una folla di sostenitori dell’indipendenza si raduna davanti al Palazzo Presidenziale, dove il Presidente del Parlamento Akhmadov legge la mozione dell’assemblea che condanna il colpo di stato in atto ed il Presidente Dudaev si appella al popolo affinché difenda l’indipendenza appena conquistata.

Nel corso del Pomeriggio la Guardia Nazionale riprende il controllo della città, espugna l’edificio della TV di Stato e costringe gli insorti ad abbandonare Grozny. Nelle sparatorie muoiono almeno quindici persone, ed una quarantina sono i feriti. L’opposizione moderata, critica verso il governo Dudaev, condanna parimenti le azioni del Comitato d’Emergenza, gridando ad un complotto ordito dalla leadership russa per provocare una guerra civile nel paese.

In serata il Parlamento torna a riunirsi in assemblea, mentre il Deputato e leader del VDP Zelimkhan Yandarbiev condanna i “nemici insidiosi del popolo ceceno” i quali, anziché accettare l’offerta di mediazione pubblicamente fatta dal Parlamento alcuni giorni fa, hanno deciso di prendere le armi contro lo Stato con ,’intento di rovesciarlo.

WAR MEMORIES: FRANCESCO BENEDETTI INTERVIEWS AKHMED ZAKAYEV (PART 2)

14 agosto 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

The following is the transcript of the first part of the interview between Francesco Benedetti and Akhmed Zakayev conducted by Inna Kurochkina for INEWS (we attach the link to the original video, which will soon be accompanied by English and Italian subtitles)

On 6 March 1996 the armed forces of the ChRI launched their first major offensive action of the conflict: the so-called “Operation Retribution”. According to what I was told by Huseyn Iskhanov, then Representative of the General Staff, the plan was conceived in Goiskoye and saw your participation, as well as that of the Chief of Staff, Maskhadov, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Saydaev. Do you remember how you planned this operation?

Yes, of course I remember that. This, in principle, came out of the operation that we carried out to blockade the city of Urus-Martan in order to prevent elections. After this operation, my Chief of Staff Dolkhan Khadzhaev and I met with Dzhokhar Dudayev. And we suggested the option that something like this should be done. We understood that any of our actions in order to make any attempts to change this situation, the Russians needed at least three days, theoretically.

It took them three days to recover and start doing something. And then we started talking about the possibility of blocking several districts at the same time. And then Dzhokhar Dudayev said: “You see how good it is when a team works. I, he says, was with these thoughts and thought about how best and what kind of operation we should carry out.

It was then that the idea arose to carry out this operation in the city of Grozny, in the city of Dzhokhar – in the future.

And on the same day, it was decided to invite Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the General Staff, to call him to our side, and from that time, almost two or three days after we discussed this with Dzhokhar Dudayev, we began preparations over this operation. Practically – we had our own intelligence in Grozny, we knew where each Russian unit was concentrated, and we did additional work and identified all these points where Russian units are located. Where are checkpoints, commandant’s offices, military units.

Yes, Umadi Saidaev, the late Umadi Saidaev, he was the Chief of the Operational Headquarters, and then, later, Aslan Maskhadov arrived there, and together with the Commanders of the Directions who were supposed to take part, we developed this operation.

Returning again to Operation Retribution, this was a success that the ChRI leadership chose to use more symbolically than strategically. In your memoir you recall that at the time the decision to withdraw from Grozny, despite having taken it under your control, did not please you, and that even now you maintain that what was achieved in the following August, with Operation Jihad , could have been achieved with Operation Retribution. Finally, you say: In March of 1996 we probably had the opportunity to finish the war victoriously, and then much of our recent history could have gone differently. What do you mean by this sentence? Are you alluding to the fact that Dudayev was still alive, or to the fact that the Russian presidential election had not yet been held? Or again, to something else?

I thought about the elections in Russia last, because there have never been any elections there. Yes, the very fact that Dzhokhar was alive at that time could have been of great importance, and the course of history could have been completely different if the war had ended with Dzhokhar Dudayev alive. And it is unlikely that the Russians would go for it, I also admit this, on the one hand, I admit that they would not go. They made every effort to eliminate Dzhokhar Dudayev, and subsequently to seek peace. As for this operation, I’m just sure of it. Yes, then we planned the operation for three or four days, but there was no concrete decision, such that we would leave in three days. Because Dzhokhar Dudayev arrived in Grozny, he was at my Headquarters in the city of Grozny, in my defense sector, in that part of the operation that the units under my command took part, he arrived there, and we were together last night at our headquarters. And I remember the reaction of Dzhokhar Dudayev when he learned that there was an order to leave the city, that some units had already begun to leave Grozny. He did not agree with this, because you can really assess the situation when you see the situation in the process, how it changes, and based on this you must draw conclusions and make decisions. Dzhokhar Dudayev was in Grozny for the first time after the Russian occupation, we traveled with him at night, in Grozny at night, we went to the bus station, he watched all this destruction, and when we returned to the Headquarters, some of our units had already begun to leave. He said: “Well, if there is an order, it is necessary to carry it out.”

And we retreated. And I later thought about it, because nothing more than what we did for the month of March, we did nothing in August. This operation was repeated one by one in the same way, and with the same forces and means. Even in August, we initially had and at the beginning of this operation, the funds involved were two times less than in the March operation. And therefore, I am sure that if we had stayed in Grozny … (well … history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood). What had to happen happened. But I remain of my opinion that it could have been different. But this is already from the area of \u200b\u200b”could”.

But that did not happen.

In March 1996 you faced, as commander, what was perhaps the biggest defensive battle fought by the Chechen army in 1996. I am referring to the Battle of Goiskoye. I’ve read conflicting opinions regarding the choice to face the Russians in that position. Some argue that the defense of the village was senseless, resulting in numerous unwarranted casualties for the Chechen forces. Others argue that if Goiskoye had fallen too soon into federal hands, the entire Chechen defense system could have shattered. After all these years, what do you think?

To prevent the enemy from reaching the foothills, to block him in the village of Goyskoe, this was, from a strategic point of view, militarily an absolutely correct decision. This decision was made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Yes, I also know that there is such a statement, but based on real losses, we did not suffer any serious losses during the defense of Goisky. Yes, there were dead, several people who died were injured, but there were no such losses. There is no war without loss. Well, in a strategic sense, the protection and defense of Goisky kept the front line, which moved from Bamut to Alkhazurov. Alkhazurov fell under Russian control, but Komsomolskoye also fell under Russian control. But in Goyskoe we didn’t let them go any further. We prevented the passage of the Russians up to the foothills. And thus they retained the Front and the front line. And this was of very important strategic importance, all the more so against the background of the fact that the Russians began to talk about negotiations, about a truce. If we talk about a truce and start a conversation with them about a political dialogue, naturally, the preservation of a certain territory that we controlled, this was of great political importance, and in connection with this, Dzhokhar Dudayev made the decision to protect Goiskoye. Yes, we lasted a month and a half. And later, after the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev, when Bamut had already fallen, it was decided to leave Goiskoye. But as long as Achkhoy and Bamut were on the defensive, we held the line of defense in Goyskoye as well.

But when the front had already been interrupted there, it was pointless to continue to hold the front line and lose our fighters. And so it was decided to withdraw our units already to the mountains. Subsequently, we already redeployed closer to the city and began to prepare for the August operation.

After Dudayev’s death, power was transferred to Vice-President Yandarbiev, who took office as Interim President. Was the decision to transfer power to him unanimous? Or were there discussions about it?

In principle, there were no discussions, one vote was against, the rest all spoke in favor of recognizing Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev as Vice President. It was in line with our constitution, presidency provision, and it was accepted. And Zelimkhan Yandarbiev began to act as President.

After Yandarbiev assumed presidential powers, he appointed you as Presidential Assistant at Security. What were your duties in this position?

Yes. He appointed me Assistant to the President for National Security. And at the same time, that unit, that is, the Third Sector, which I commanded, I was simultaneously appointed Commander of the Separate Special Purpose Brigade. That is, the unit that I commanded, being the Commander of the Third Sector, he was also transferred to the Brigade, to the status of the Brigade under the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Basically, this was done because Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, after we retreated and put up the Presidential Palace at the beginning of the war, he was inside the Presidential Palace until the last moment, until we left the city. Since that time, in principle, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev has not been involved in military operations, and over the past year and a half, over the past year, new units have already been created and new people have appeared in these military structures. And naturally, Zelimkhan needed a person who knew this whole system militarily, and, of course, we worked with him and in the near future Zelimkhan was introduced to the course in all Directions, Fronts and our units, and already as the Supreme Commander, he Subsequently, he began to manage these processes himself. And my task included power components. And later it was transferred, after graduation this position was transferred, retrained to the position of “Secretary of the Security Council”.

And before the elections, in principle, I performed these functions.

Memorie di Guerra: Francesco Benedetti intervista Akhmed Zakayev (Parte 2)

14 agosto 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

Quella che segue è la trascrizione della seconda parte dell’intervista tra Francesco Benedetti ed Akhmed Zakayev realizzata da Inna Kurochkina per INEWS (alleghiamo il link al video originale, che presto sarà accompagnato da sottotitoli in inglese ed italiano)

Il 6 marzo 1996 le forze armate della ChRI hanno lanciato la loro prima grande azione offensiva del conflitto: la cosiddetta Operazione Retribution. Secondo quanto mi disse Huseyn Iskhanov, allora Rappresentante di Stato Maggiore, il piano fu concepito a Goiskoye e vide la sua partecipazione, oltre a quella del Capo di Stato Maggiore, Maskhadov, e del Vice Capo di Stato Maggiore, Saydaev. Si ricorda come fu pianificata questa operazione?

Sì, certo che me lo ricordo. Questo, in linea di principio, è venuto fuori dall’operazione che abbiamo effettuato per bloccare la città di Urus-Martan al fine di impedire le elezioni. Dopo questa operazione, io e il mio capo di stato maggiore Dolkhan Khozhaev ci siamo incontrati con Dzhokhar Dudayev. E abbiamo suggerito l’opzione di fare qualcosa del genere. Abbiamo capito che di fronte a qualsiasi nostra azione, per tentare di cambiare questa situazione, i russi avevano bisogno di almeno tre giorni, in teoria. Abbiamo iniziato a parlare della possibilità di bloccare più distretti contemporaneamente. E poi Dzhokhar Dudayev ha detto: “Vedi com’è bello quando una squadra lavora!” Io, dice, ero con questi pensieri e ho pensato al modo migliore e al tipo di operazione da eseguire. Fu allora che nacque l’idea di eseguire questa operazione nella città di Grozny, che in futuro si sarebbe chiamata Città di Dzhokhar. Lo stesso giorno, è stato deciso di invitare Aslan Maskhadov, capo di stato maggiore, a chiamarlo al nostro fianco, e da quel momento, quasi due o tre giorni dopo averne discusso con Dzhokhar Dudayev, abbiamo iniziato i preparativi su questa operazione. In pratica, avevamo la nostra intelligence a Grozny, sapevamo dove era concentrata ogni unità russa, abbiamo svolto un lavoro aggiuntivo e identificato tutti i punti in cui si trovano le unità russe. Dove sono i posti di blocco, gli uffici del comandante, le unità militari. Sì, Umadi Saidaev, il defunto Umadi Saidaev, era il capo del quartier generale operativo, e poi, in seguito, è arrivato lì Aslan Maskhadov, e insieme ai comandanti delle direzioni che avrebbero dovuto prendere parte, abbiamo sviluppato questa operazione.

Tornando di nuovo all’operazione Retribution, questo è stato un successo che la leadership ChRI ha scelto di utilizzare più simbolicamente che strategicamente. Nella sue memorie ricorda che all’epoca la decisione di ritirarsi da Grozny, nonostante fosse sotto il vostro controllo, non le piacque, e che ancora oggi lei ritiene che quanto realizzato nell’agosto successivo, con l’Operazione Jihad, avrebbe potuto essere raggiunto con Operazione Retribution. Infine, lei afferma: Nel marzo del 1996 probabilmente abbiamo avuto l’opportunità di concludere vittoriosamente la guerra, e in quel caso gran parte della nostra storia recente sarebbe potuta andare diversamente. Cosa intende con questa frase? Allude al fatto che Dudayev era ancora vivo, o al fatto che le elezioni presidenziali russe non si erano ancora svolte? O ancora, a qualcos’altro?

Ho pensato alle elezioni in Russia per ultima cosa, perché lì non ci sono mai state elezioni. Sì, il fatto stesso che Dzhokhar fosse vivo in quel momento avrebbe potuto essere di grande importanza, e il corso della storia sarebbe potuto essere completamente diverso se la guerra fosse finita con Dzhokhar Dudayev vivo. I russi hanno fatto ogni sforzo per eliminare Dzhokhar Dudayev e successivamente per cercare la pace. Per quanto riguarda questa operazione, ne sono proprio sicuro. Sì, allora abbiamo programmato l’operazione perché durasse tre o quattro giorni, ma non c’è stata una decisione concreta, secondo la quale ci saremmo dovuti ritirare in tre giorni. Quando Dzhokhar Dudayev è arrivato a Grozny, si sistemò nel mio quartier generale nella città di Grozny, nel mio settore della difesa, in quella parte della città in cui combattevano le unità sotto il mio comando, è arrivato lì, e la sera precedente eravamo insieme al Quartier Generale. Ricordo la reazione di Dzhokhar Dudayev quando ha saputo che c’era un ordine di lasciare la città, che alcune unità avevano già iniziato a lasciare Grozny. Non era d’accordo con questo, perché puoi davvero valutare la situazione quando vedi la situazione nel processo, come cambia, e sulla base di ciò devi trarre conclusioni e prendere decisioni. Dzhokhar Dudayev era a Grozny per la prima volta dall’occupazione russa, abbiamo viaggiato con lui di notte, a Grozny di notte, siamo andati alla stazione degli autobus, ha assistito a tutta questa distruzione e quando siamo tornati al quartier generale, alcuni dei nostri le unità avevano già iniziato a partire. Ha detto: “Bene, se c’è un ordine, è necessario eseguirlo”. E ci siamo ritirati. E poi ci ho ripensato, perché ad Agosto non abbiamo fatto niente di più di quello che avevamo fatto a marzo. Questa operazione è stata ripetuta nello stesso modo, e con le stesse forze e mezzi. E quindi, sono sicuro che se fossimo rimasti a Grozny … (beh … la storia non tollera il congiuntivo). Quello che doveva succedere è successo. Ma rimango della mia opinione che avrebbe potuto essere diverso. Questo è già dall’area del “potrebbe”. E non è successo.

Nel marzo 1996 lei ha affrontato, come comandante, quella che forse è stata la più grande battaglia difensiva combattuta dall’esercito ceceno nel 1996. Mi riferisco alla battaglia di Goiskoye. Ho letto pareri contrastanti sulla scelta di affrontare i russi in quella posizione. Alcuni sostengono che la difesa del villaggio fosse insensata, provocando numerose vittime ingiustificate per le forze cecene. Altri sostengono che se Goiskoye fosse caduto troppo presto mani federali, l’intero sistema di difesa ceceno avrebbe potuto andare in frantumi. Dopo tutti questi anni, cosa ne pensa?

Impedire al nemico di raggiungere le colline pedemontane, bloccarlo nel villaggio di Goyskoe, questa è stata, dal punto di vista strategico, militarmente una decisione assolutamente corretta. Questa decisione è stata presa dal Comando supremo delle forze armate della Repubblica cecena di Ichkeria. Sì, so anche che esiste una dichiarazione del genere, ma sulla base di perdite reali, non abbiamo subito perdite gravi durante la difesa di Goiskoye. Sì, c’erano morti, diverse persone che sono morte sono rimaste ferite, ma non ci sono state perdite del genere. Non c’è guerra senza perdita. Ebbene, in senso strategico, la protezione e la difesa di Goiskoye hanno permesso di mantenere la linea del fronte, che si sviluppava da Bamut ad Alkhazurovo. Alkhazurov era caduta sotto il controllo russo, ed anche Komsomolskoye era caduta sotto il controllo russo. Ma a Goyskoye non li abbiamo lasciati andare oltre. Abbiamo impedito il passaggio dei russi fino alle pendici. E così abbiamo mantenuto il fronte e la linea del fronte. E questo era di importanza strategica, tanto più sullo sfondo del fatto che i russi avevano iniziato a parlare di negoziati, di tregua. Nel caso di una tregua finalizzata ad un dialogo politico, naturalmente, la conservazione di un certo territorio che controllavamo, era di grande importanza, e in relazione a questo, Dzhokhar Dudayev ha preso la decisione di proteggere Goiskoye . Sì, siamo durati un mese e mezzo. E solo più tardi, dopo la morte di Dzhokhar Dudayev, quando Bamut era già caduta, si decise di lasciare Goiskoye. Ma finché Achkhoy e Bamut erano in mano nostra, mantenemmo la linea di difesa anche a Goyskoye. Quando lì il fronte fu interrotto, a quel punto fu inutile continuare a tenere posizione e perdere i nostri combattenti. E così si decise di ritirare le nostre unità in montagna. Successivamente, ci distribuimmo più vicino alla città e iniziammo a prepararci per l’operazione di agosto.

Dopo la morte di Dudayev, il potere è stato trasferito al vicepresidente Yandarbiev, che è entrato in carica come presidente ad interim. La decisione di trasferirgli il potere è stata unanime? O ci sono state discussioni a riguardo?

In linea di principio non ci sono state discussioni, solo un voto era contrario, il resto si espresse a favore del riconoscimento di Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev come vicepresidente. Era in linea con la nostra costituzione, con le disposizioni presidenziali, ed è stata accettata. E Zelimkhan Yandarbiev ha iniziato a fungere da presidente.

Dopo che Yandarbiev ha assunto i poteri presidenziali, l’ha nominata assistente presidenziale alla sicurezza. Quali erano i suoi doveri in questa posizione?

SÌ. Mi ha nominato Assistente del Presidente per la Sicurezza Nazionale. E allo stesso tempo, sono stato contemporaneamente nominato Comandante della Brigata Speciale Separata. Cioè, l’unità che ho comandato, che all’epoca era Terzo Settore, è stata elevata allo status di Brigata sotto il Presidente della Repubblica cecena di Ichkeria. Fondamentalmente, questo è stato necessario perché Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (dopo essere rimasto con noi all’interno del Palazzo Presidenziale fino all’ultimo momento, fino a quando non abbiamo lasciato la città) non è stato più coinvolto in operazioni militari nell’anno e mezzo successivo, e in quel periodo erano state create nuove unità e nuove persone sono apparse nella gerarchia militare. E naturalmente, Zelimkhan aveva bisogno di una persona che conoscesse militarmente l’intero sistema. Abbiamo lavorato con lui e nel periodo successivo Zelimkhan è stato introdotto in tutte le direzioni, nei fronti e nelle nostre unità, e poi come comandante supremo, ha iniziato a gestire personalmente questi processi. Il mio compito era quello di raccordo [tra lui e gli ufficiali, NDR]. Poi, terminate le operazioni militari, è diventato quello di “Segretario del Consiglio di sicurezza”. Fino a prima delle elezioni, in linea di principio, svolgevo queste funzioni.

War Memories: Francesco Benedetti interviews Akhmed Zakayev (Part 1)

4 agosto 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

1. On December 6, 1994, a few days before the federal army invaded Chechnya, a delegation appointed by Dudayev went to Vladikavkaz to confer with the Russian Minister for Nationalities, Mikhailov. In your memoirs you say that a certain number of oil entrepreneurs joined the delegation led by the Minister of Economy Abubakarov. What do you think was the purpose of their presence? Is it possible that among the proposals that the delegation should have presented was an agreement on the exploitation of Chechen oil, or on the exploitation of Chechen refineries?

At that moment and during that period, the presence in this delegation of the Minister of Economy and Finance Abubakarov, Deputy Prime Minister Amaliyev, was not associated with any possible agreements on the operation of oil refineries. They were then our representatives and proxies of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Not only did they “join”, they were included in this delegation. And from there they went from Kizlyar to Moscow, to further study the issue of preventing military aggression from Russia, to prevent a war. Dzhokhar did everything possible to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya. And practically our delegation was in Moscow, headed by Tyushi Amaliyev, with Abubakarov, the Minister of Finance and Economy, and when Russia began to bomb Grozny. On December 11, despite everything, Yeltsin signed a decree on the introduction of troops and the start of a military campaign. Therefore, at that moment and in that period, it was not about the operation of oil wells, or rather, the use of oil refineries, or the Chechen oil that was produced at that time.

2. At the outbreak of war you placed yourself in the service of President Dudayev, and within a few months you were given the task of setting up an autonomous front. At the time you were the Minister of Culture, certainly no one expected you to take up arms and fight a war. Why did you decide to enlist?

(laughs)

The fact is that I did not go to the service of Dudayev. I was appointed Minister of Culture of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by Dudayev’s decree. No one served anyone or anyone. We worked for our state, and Dzhokhar Dudayev, as president, had the authority to appoint and dismiss. My appointment was in October, when Dzhokhar Dudayev offered me to work in his team. I accepted it despite everything that happened. I just say in my book that for me there was no difference, it was absolutely obvious that there would be a war. And I told to Dzhokhar: “Dzhokhar, it makes no difference to me in whose capacity I will defend our fatherland, my place is here, with my people. Whether a janitor, whether a minister .. ” And Dzhokhar then said, I remember his words, I just wrote about it. He said: “No, there will be no war. The world will not allow this. I won’t allow it. There will be no war, we need to do creative work. And your place is exactly in this direction. And so you must accept my offer.” I accepted this offer. I returned to the republic, and already on the first day, November 18, I officially went to work, and on November 26 the war began. In principle, this is the first invasion of Russian troops under the pretext of the “Chechen opposition” into the city of Grozny, where they were defeated.

And now for the second part of the question. The fact is that according to our legislation, I think that it is the same in Italy, the same laws, members of the Government, if a war starts, they become liable for military service, regardless of their positions. Culture, or art, it doesn’t matter, everyone becomes liable for military service. I, in principle, before I was appointed commander of the seventh front, I joined the people’s militia. I remember that day, December 28, when my office of the Ministry of Culture, in the Mayor’s Office building, was bombed, and on the same day I… There were people on the square who signed up as volunteers for the people’s militia. I signed up for this people’s militia, and only on January 11, Dzhokhar recalled me from my position as Minister of Culture, because a meeting of the Government was scheduled. And I returned from my positions to the Government meeting on January 11. And on this day Dzhokhar entrusted me with another task, I also wrote about this in my memoirs, and later, already in March, when the city was abandoned and we retreated to the foothills, at that time Dzhokhar signed the Decree on the creation of the Seventh Front and appointed me Commander. That is, we began to form this front, in general, from scratch.

3. After the fall of Grozny in Russian hands, and the withdrawal of the Chechen forces on the mountain defense line, the government was reorganized in order to make up for the defections of some senior officials, but also to function more streamlined in a context of total war. This “war government” continued to function throughout the duration of the conflict, and overcame the death of Dudayev, placing itself at the disposal of the Interim President, Yandarbiev. How did this government operate, and how did it manage to meet, to keep in touch with the President?

The Military Government, what you call the Military Government, was the State Defense Committee, which was formed by Presidential Decree when the military aggression began. And this body was the Supreme State Organ. Parliament stopped its legislative activity. The government had already been transferred to a military footing, and the State Defense Committee was formed as the Supreme Body of State Power. It included members of the Government, members of Parliament, the Leading Military Command represented by the General Staff, and Commanders of Fronts and Directions. And this Government functioned all this period. How were the meetings? Naturally, we all knew where the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was located, in which part of the republic. And periodically he convened a meeting of the State Defense Committee, and we discussed issues related to the continuation of resistance, with defense. Questions of a military nature were discussed in connection with the preparation of military operations or attacks on enemy territory.

All these points were discussed at the meeting of the State Defense Committee, and it functioned very effectively. It was a small number of people, but they were people who were directly involved in all processes – political, military, economic issues. These questions were also not the last ones, because providing the units with the necessary provisions, this was also within the competence, the questions of the State Defense Committee. And all these issues were discussed and functioned very effectively due precisely to the fact that Dzhokhar Dudayev did not go into deep underground, into forests, into the mountains, where it would be impossible to get him, he held personal meetings with all units, not only with the State Defense Committee but also with military units. He went to the front line, to the front line, met with ordinary soldiers. And now all our defense and all our resistance fighters, they all took a very responsible attitude to which side Dzhokhar Dudayev was on. I mean, along the front line, where active hostilities are taking place, the soldiers knew that behind them, behind their shoulders, there was already the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Or they disputed, along the Argun River, when he crossed over to the other side, those parts of the resistance, the Armed Forces took it for pride, proudly announced that the Supreme Commander was now on our side of the front. There was a very friendly atmosphere. When I remember these times, this period, despite all the difficulties that we then experienced, there was a war, but the people were different. We were different. The Chechens were completely different. They were different from today’s Chechens, who live in the territory and who are outside. And all this was connected, I think, with the fact that we were under Soviet occupation for seventy years, and for the first time we had a chance to build our own state. Independent state. And now the leader of this movement and the state, and later the leader of the Defense and the leader of the national liberation movement, he inspired in many ways and not only the fighters, but the entire Chechen people to resist and repel aggression. These were simply amazing times in the history of the Chechen people, when the whole people actually accomplished a feat. It was thanks to the feat of the Chechen people that we managed then to preserve both the power structures and what we were doing. And basically win.

4. Between March and May 1995, according to what you refer in your memoirs, you were in charge of setting up, in record time and with almost non-existent resources, the so-called “Seventh Front” south of Urus – Martan, which would serve as a point of contact between the stronghold of Bamut and the rest of the Chechen deployment. In your book you tell how the Seventh Front was born. Could you explain how it developed, which units made it up, and which operations it carried out until June 1995?

This happened in March, Dzhokhar Dudayev signed a decree. By this time, all our units had moved to the foothills, when the flat part was already mainly under the control of the Russian aggressors, and the foothills remained, starting from Bamut and to Alkhazurov, in this direction, and there further up, to the Grozny region, Chishki, Dacha Borzoi. This side was not yet occupied by the Russians, and it was necessary to create a unified defense in this direction, from Bamut to Alkhazurov. And the consciousness of the Seventh Front, and the task of the Seventh Front, was precisely this. And it practically turned out basically, this is the so-called Urus – Martanovsky district, it was believed that this area was loyal to Russia, the Russian aggressors, because the occupation regime functioned there, the occupation power structures, headed by Yusup Elmurzaev, the then prefect, who was appointed occupation mode. The creation of this front and the main task was the creation of military bases in the three gorges. These are Martan Chu, Tangi Chu, Roshni Chu. It was in these three gorges that we formed three military bases in just a few months. Although at the time when the decree was signed, there were practically no military units there. There were only militias, people who were part of the people’s militia, but there was no centralized command, and we in a short time, from those units, from those people’s militias that were then in this region, we created this Seventh Front, and a centralized military unit, under the centralized command of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Dzhokhar Dudayev. Subsequently, this Seventh Front was already transformed into Sectors – the South-Western Front and Three Sectors – the First, Second, Third Sector. These sectors were under my responsibility.

Later I was in charge of the Third Sector of the Southwestern Front. Speaking by surname, these are, in principle, our young middle-level commanders, Dokka Makhaev, Dokka Umarov, Khamzat Labazanov, Isa Munaev, all these guys … Akhyad (I will not name him by his last name, because he is alive and is on the territory), Khusein Isabaev, these guys, then the middle link of commanders who headed these Sectors, and this Direction. Although it was already such a single military unit, which was part of the Armed Forces and had already been structured into the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI.

5. In the spring of 1995 you could consider yourself one of the main army officers of the ChRI, therefore you were definitely monitored by the FSB, and by the intelligence of the Russian army. How did federal forces try to stop you and other senior officers from participating in the resistance? And how did you manage to evade Russian attempts to track you down?

First of all, God protected us. And, secondly, it is the Chechens and the Chechen people. We were at home. We were in our native villages, in our native settlements. And of course, the Chechen people, in fact, were the main protection of those who were then in the Armed Forces. And President Dzhokhar Dudayev, you know, the republic is small, all this time he was among the Chechens, he was in different settlements, and every village where the fighters stopped, although there were also opposition-minded and cowardly people, but in general, our supporters, supporters and independence, and those who supported our national liberation movement, they were much stronger and were much more numerous. They managed to prevent both assassination attempts and those ambushes that set not only me, but also those who were then involved and were listed in the ranks, as you said, in the highest composition of the Command, and all of them were protected by the Chechen people. And, of course, not everything was under the control of either the FSB or the Russians. Life and death are in the hands of God. And those reasons, those actions that were taken by us in order to survive, and what the Chechens did with us, the Chechen people, protecting their commanders, people who defended their homeland, their fatherland and themselves.

Memorie di Guerra: Francesco Benedetti intervista Akhmed Zakayev (Parte 1)

4 agosto 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

Quella che segue è la trascrizione della prima parte dell’intervista tra Francesco Benedetti ed Akhmed Zakayev realizzata da Inna Kurochkina per INEWS (alleghiamo il link al video originale, che presto sarà accompagnato da sottotitoli in inglese ed italiano)

1. Il 6 dicembre 1994, pochi giorni prima che l’esercito federale invadesse la Cecenia, una delegazione nominata da Dudayev si recò a Vladikavkaz per conferire con il ministro russo per le Nazionalità, Mikhailov. Nelle sue memorie lei dice che un certo numero di imprenditori petroliferi si è unito alla delegazione guidata dal ministro dell’Economia Abubakarov. Quale pensa fosse lo scopo della loro presenza? È possibile che tra le proposte che la delegazione avrebbe dovuto presentare ci fosse un accordo sullo sfruttamento del petrolio ceceno o sullo sfruttamento delle raffinerie cecene?

In quel momento e durante quel periodo, la presenza in questa delegazione del Ministro dell’Economia e delle Finanze Abubakarov, e del Vice Primo Ministro Amaliyev, non era associata ad alcun possibile accordo sul funzionamento delle raffinerie di petrolio. Erano i nostri rappresentanti e delegati di Dzhokhar Dudayev. Non solo hanno “aderito”, ma sono stati inclusi in questa delegazione. E da lì sono andati da Kizlyar a Mosca, per approfondire la questione della prevenzione dell’aggressione militare dalla Russia, per prevenire una guerra. Dzhokhar ha fatto tutto il possibile per prevenire lo scoppio delle ostilità in Cecenia. E praticamente la nostra delegazione era a Mosca, guidata da Tyushi Amaliyev, con Abubakarov, il ministro delle finanze e dell’economia, quando la Russia ha iniziato a bombardare Grozny. L’11 dicembre, nonostante tutto, Eltsin ha firmato un decreto sull’introduzione delle truppe e l’inizio di una campagna militare. Quindi, in quel momento e in quel periodo, non si trattava del funzionamento dei pozzi petroliferi, o meglio, dell’utilizzo delle raffinerie di petrolio, o del petrolio ceceno che si produceva in quel momento.

2. Allo scoppio della guerra lei si è messo al servizio del presidente Dudayev e nel giro di pochi mesi le è stato affidato il compito di allestire un fronte autonomo. All’epoca lei era Ministro della Cultura, di certo nessuno si aspettava che prendesse le armi e facesse la guerra. Perché ha deciso di arruolarsi?

(ride)

Il fatto è che non sono andato al servizio di Dudayev. Sono stato nominato ministro della cultura della Repubblica cecena di Ichkeria con decreto di Dudayev. Nessuno ha servito nessuno. Abbiamo lavorato per il nostro stato e Dzhokhar Dudayev, in qualità di presidente, aveva l’autorità di nominare e revocare. La mia nomina fu in ottobre, quando Dzhokhar Dudayev mi ha offerto di lavorare nella sua squadra. L’ho accettata nonostante tutto quello che è successo. Dico solo nel mio libro che per me non c’era differenza, era assolutamente ovvio che ci sarebbe stata una guerra. E ho detto a Dzhokhar: “Dzhokhar, non fa differenza per me in quale veste difenderò la nostra patria, il mio posto è qui, con la mia gente. Come un bidello, o come un ministro .. ” Dzhokhar ha poi detto, ricordo le sue parole, ne ho appena scritto. Egli ha detto: “No, non ci sarà nessuna guerra. Il mondo non lo permetterà. Non lo permetterò. Non ci sarà la guerra, dobbiamo fare un lavoro creativo. E il tuo posto è esattamente in questa direzione. E quindi devi accettare la mia offerta. Ho accettato questa offerta. Sono tornato nella repubblica e già il primo giorno, il 18 novembre, sono andato ufficialmente a lavorare e il 26 novembre è iniziata la guerra.

In linea di principio, questa è la prima invasione delle truppe russe con il pretesto della ‘”opposizione cecena” nella città di Grozny, dove furono sconfitte. E ora per la seconda parte della domanda. Il fatto è che secondo la nostra legislazione, penso che sia lo stesso in Italia, i membri del governo, se inizia una guerra, diventano responsabili del servizio militare, indipendentemente dalla loro posizione. Cultura, o arte, non importa, tutti diventano responsabili del servizio militare. Io, in linea di principio, prima di essere nominato comandante del settimo fronte, mi sono unito alla milizia popolare. Ricordo quel giorno, il 28 dicembre, quando fu bombardato il mio ufficio del Ministero della Cultura, nel palazzo del Sindaco, e lo stesso giorno io… C’era gente in piazza che si arruolava volontaria nella milizia popolare. Mi sono iscritto alla milizia e solo l’11 gennaio Dzhokhar mi ha richiamato dalla carica di ministro della Cultura, perché era prevista una riunione del governo. E sono tornato dalle mie posizioni alla riunione del governo l’11 gennaio. E in questo giorno Dzhokhar mi ha affidato un altro compito, ne ho scritto anche nelle mie memorie, e poi, già a marzo, quando la città è stata abbandonata e ci siamo ritirati a piedi, a quel tempo Dzhokhar firmò il Decreto sulla creazione del Settimo Fronte e mi nominò Comandante. Cioè, abbiamo iniziato a formare questo fronte, in generale, da zero.

3. Dopo la caduta di Grozny in mano russa, e il ritiro delle forze cecene sulla linea di difesa della montagna, il governo è stato riorganizzato per sopperire alle defezioni di alcuni alti funzionari, ma anche per funzionare in modo più snello in un contesto di guerra totale. Questo “governo di guerra” ha continuato a funzionare per tutto il durata del conflitto, e superò la morte di Dudayev, mettendosi a disposizione del Presidente ad interim, Yandarbiev. Come ha operato questo governo, e come è riuscito a incontrarsi, a tenersi in contatto con il Presidente?

Il Governo Militare, quello che tu chiami il Governo Militare, era il Comitato di Difesa dello Stato, formatosi con Decreto Presidenziale quando iniziò l’aggressione militare. E questo corpo era l’organo supremo dello Stato. Il Parlamento ha interrotto la sua attività legislativa. Il governo era già stato trasferito su una base militare e il Comitato di difesa dello Stato era stato formato come Organo supremo del potere statale. Comprendeva membri del Governo, membri del Parlamento, il Comando Militare Principale rappresentato dallo Stato Maggiore Generale, i Comandanti di Fronti e Direzioni. E questo governo ha funzionato per tutto questo periodo. Come sono stati gli incontri? Naturalmente, sapevamo tutti dove si trovava il comandante in capo supremo, in quale parte della repubblica. E periodicamente convocava una riunione del Comitato per la difesa dello Stato, e discutevamo questioni relative alla continuazione della resistenza. Sono state discusse questioni di natura militare in relazione alla preparazione di operazioni militari o attacchi al territorio nemico. Tutti questi punti sono stati discussi durante la riunione del Comitato per la difesa dello Stato, che ha funzionato in modo molto efficace. Era un piccolo numero di persone, ma erano persone direttamente coinvolte in tutti i processi: questioni politiche, militari, economiche. Questi compiti non erano gli unici che avevamo, perché dovevamo anche fornire alle unità le disposizioni necessarie, anche questo era di competenza del Comitato per la difesa dello Stato. E tutte queste questioni sono state discusse e hanno funzionato in modo molto efficace proprio per il fatto che Dzhokhar Dudayev non è andato sottoterra, nelle foreste, nelle montagne, dove sarebbe stato impossibile rintracciarlo, ma ha tenuto incontri personali con tutte le unità, no solo con il Comitato di Difesa dello Stato ma anche con le unità militari. È andato in prima linea, al fronte, ha incontrato soldati ordinari. E tutta la nostra difesa e tutti i nostri combattenti della resistenza, hanno assunto un atteggiamento molto responsabile perché dietro di loro c’era Dzhokhar Dudayev. Voglio dire, lungo la linea del fronte, dove si svolgevano le ostilità attive, i soldati sapevano che dietro di loro, dietro le loro spalle, c’era già il quartier generale del comandante supremo.

Quando [Dudaev] attraversava l’Argun, andando dall’altra parte, le Forze Armate [che operavano lì] hanno annunciato con orgoglio che il Comandante Supremo era ora dalla loro parte del fronte. C’era un’atmosfera molto amichevole. Quando ricordo questi tempi, questo periodo, noto che nonostante tutte le difficoltà che abbiamo vissuto allora, c’era una guerra, ma le persone erano diverse. Eravamo diversi. I ceceni erano completamente diversi. Erano diversi dai ceceni di oggi, quelli che vivono nel territorio e quelli che sono fuori. E tutto ciò era collegato, credo, al fatto che siamo stati sotto l’occupazione sovietica per settant’anni e per la prima volta abbiamo avuto la possibilità di costruire il nostro stato. Stato indipendente. E il leader di questo movimento e dello stato, e in seguito il leader della Difesa e il leader del movimento di liberazione nazionale, ha ispirato in molti modi e non solo i combattenti, ma l’intero popolo ceceno a resistere e respingere l’aggressione. Erano tempi semplicemente fantastici nella storia del popolo ceceno, quando l’intero popolo ha effettivamente compiuto un’impresa. È stato grazie all’impresa del popolo ceceno che siamo riusciti a preservare le strutture di potere che ciò che stavamo costruendo. E fondamentalmente a vincere.

4. Tra marzo e maggio 1995, secondo quanto lei riferisce nelle sue memorie, lei si è occupato di allestire, a tempo di record e con mezzi pressoché inesistenti, il cosiddetto “Settimo fronte” a sud di Urus – Martan, che avrebbe dovuto essere il punto di contatto tra la roccaforte di Bamut e il resto dello schieramento ceceno. Nel suo libro racconta di come è nato il Settimo Fronte. Potrebbe spiegarci come si è sviluppato, quali unità lo componevano e quali operazioni ha svolto fino al giugno 1995?

Questo è successo a marzo, Dzhokhar Dudayev ha firmato un decreto. A questo punto tutte le nostre unità si erano spostate ai piedi delle montagne, perchè la parte pianeggiante era già principalmente sotto il controllo degli aggressori russi, e rimanevano i contrafforti, a partire da Bamut e ad Alkhazurovo, in questa direzione, e lì più in alto, verso la regione di Grozny, a Chishki, a Dacha Borzoi. Questa parte non era ancora occupata dai russi, ed era necessario creare una difesa unificata in questa direzione, da Bamut ad Alkhazurovo. E lo scopo del Settimo Fronte, il compito del Settimo Fronte, era proprio questo. Questo è il cosiddetto distretto di Urus – Martanovsky. Si credeva che quest’area fosse fedele alla Russia, agli aggressori russi, perché lì funzionava il regime di occupazione, le strutture del potere di occupazione, guidate da Yusup Elmurzaev, l’allora prefetto, che fu nominato dalle autorità di occupazione. Il compito principale di questo fronte era la creazione di basi militari in tre gole: Martan Chu, Tangi Chu, Roshni Chu. Fu in queste tre gole che in pochi mesi formammo tre basi militari. Sebbene al momento della firma del decreto, non vi fossero praticamente unità militari (c’erano solo milizie, persone che facevano parte della milizia popolare, ma non c’era un comando centralizzato) noi in breve tempo, da quelle unità, da quelle milizie popolari che erano allora in questa regione, creammo questo Settimo Fronte, e un’unità militare centralizzata, sotto il comando del Comandante in Capo Supremo Dzhokhar Dudayev. Successivamente, questo Settimo Fronte fu trasformato in Settori del Fronte Sud-Occidentale: Il Primo, il Secondo, e ilTerzo Settore. Questi settori erano sotto la mia responsabilità. Successivamente sono stato responsabile del Terzo Settore del Fronte Sudoccidentale. Citando i cognomi, questi sono, in linea di massima, i nostri giovani comandanti di medio livello, Dokka Makhaev, Dokka Umarov, Khamzat Labazanov, Isa Munaev, questi ragazzi …

Akhyad (non lo chiamerò con il suo cognome, perché è vivo ed è sul territorio), Khusein Isabaev, erano questi ragazzi l’anello intermedio dei comandanti che guidavano questi settori e questa direzione. Sebbene fosse già un’unica unità militare, che faceva parte delle Forze Armate ed era già stata strutturata nello Stato Maggiore delle Forze Armate della CRI.

5. Nella primavera del 1995 lei poteva considerarsi uno dei principali ufficiali dell’esercito della ChRI, ed era sicuramente monitorato dall’FSB e dall’intelligence dell’esercito russo. In che modo le forze federali hanno cercato di impedire a lei e ad altri alti ufficiali di partecipare alla resistenza? E come siete riusciti a eluderle?

Prima di tutto, Dio ci ha protetti. E, in secondo luogo, sono stati i ceceni e il popolo ceceno. Eravamo a casa. Eravamo nei nostri villaggi nativi, nei nostri insediamenti nativi. E, naturalmente, il popolo ceceno era la principale protezione di coloro che erano allora nelle forze armate. E il presidente Dzhokhar Dudayev, sai, la repubblica è piccola, per tutto questo tempo è stato tra i ceceni, era in diversi insediamenti, in ogni villaggio dove i combattenti si sono fermati, anche se c’erano anche persone di mentalità opposta e codarde. Ma in generale, i nostri sostenitori, sostenitori e indipendenza, e coloro che hanno sostenuto il nostro movimento di liberazione nazionale, erano molto più forti ed erano molto più numerosi. Riuscirono a sventare sia i tentativi di assassinio che quegli agguati che tesero non solo me, ma anche coloro che allora furono coinvolti ed erano inseriti nei ranghi, come hai detto, nella più alta composizione del Comando. Tutti erano protetti dal Popolo ceceno. E, naturalmente, non tutto era sotto il controllo né dell’FSB né dei russi. La vita e la morte sono nelle mani di Dio. E quelle ragioni, quelle azioni che sono state intraprese da noi per sopravvivere, e cosa hanno fatto i ceceni con noi, il popolo ceceno, proteggendo i loro comandanti, le persone che hanno difeso la loro patria, la loro patria e se stesse.

MASSACRES, SPIES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE ASSASSINATION OF FRED CUNY

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Frederick Carl Cuny (November 14, 1944, April 14, 1995) was an American citizen who throughout his life committed himself, officially for humanitarian reasons, to supporting the populations of countries in war, humanitarian and environmental crises. Active since 1969 in the consultancy and coordination of humanitarian services, he had worked in Biafra, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and dozens of other contexts, often very difficult, in which he had to deal not only with the difficult situation on the field, but also with the inefficiencies of humanitarian associations and the corruption of local governments. At the end of 1994 Cuny was contacted by George Soros’ Open Society Institute and sent to Chechnya with the aim of organizing a humanitarian plan for the safety of the inhabitants of Grozny. Returning the following March from his mission, during which he had witnessed the terrible siege of Grozny and made friends with Aslan Maskhadov, he had tried to involve the United States government in order to force Russia to stop military operations, negotiating a humanitarian truce. He held numerous conferences, public and private meetings with high-level politicians, and his article Killing Chechnya [1], in which he accused Russia of unleashing a war of aggression with genocidal purposes,went around the world. Despite his efforts and the support of some politicians in Congress, Cuny had failed to convince any of the high offices of state to intercede for him [2]. So he returned to Chechnya, to restart his mission on behalf of the Open Society. On April 1 , 1996, while on his way to Maskhadov’s headquarters in Orekhovo [3], he was captured in Starye Achkoy together with two Russian doctors and an interpreter [4], with whom he was crossing the country in an ambulance, after which he was lost traces completely. His search lasted for many months, after which his son and brother communicated that they had received reliable information according to which he would have been killed almost immediately after his arrest, presumably carried out by men of the Department of State Security, at that time directed by Abusupyan Mosvaev . His body and that of his colleagues would never be found. Charges regarding his killing fell on Colonel Rizvan Elbiev , State Defense Department officer in Achkhoy –Martan district. The latter, according to Cuny ‘s driver (the only one of the group left alive) after the ambulance had been stopped near Starye Achkhoy by a detachment of the State Department of Defense, requested that the members of the team of Cuny presented themselves to him to provide the personal details, and then accompany them to the Headquarters of Maskhadov. The volunteers sent the driver back with a note intended for Open Society in which they said they were fine, to postpone the scheduled appointments by 3 days and to alert the authorities if they did not return within the established time [5].

Days passed, then weeks, and no trace of Cuny was found. Family members involved the FBI, the US government, and even the Soros Foundation, which had financed the mission, began his research, spending up to eighty thousand dollars a month to obtain information [6]. Calls for the release of the American came from the American president Clinton, from the Russian Yeltsin and even from the Chechen one, Dudayev.

The following August, after months of unsuccessful attempts to locate Cuny and his friends, his family publicly announced that they had learned of the death of their relative, and all members of his group. Cuny ‘s son and brother publicly accused the Chechen government of responsibility for the murder, and likewise accused the Russian authorities of presenting Cuny as a spy. In the confidential report sent to the US government, the family specifically named Elbiev , whose name was given by the State Security Department soldier who had taken custody of the group. According to what they reported , Elbiev had all four shot on April 14th . This information was confirmed to the driver of the Cuny family , an ex combatant, in August 1995, on the basis of an indication given to him by a certain “A”, Bamut defense field officer [7].

In August 1996, a bloody bundle was found in the ruins of a house in Starye Achkhoy , and inside it were found the documents of all four members of Cuny ‘s team . Besides these there was a note, addressed to Maskhadov, in which was written: Esteemed Aslan, We have tried to come to you, with the medicines and the two doctors we had promised. With me is Fred Cuny , the American you already know, who came to hold the meeting that didn’t take place last time. to confirm that you are aware of us and our mission. Respectfully, Galina Oleinik . Soros Foundation. Being certain that it was Elbiev who seized the documents, it is quite probable that he was responsible for the deaths of Cuny and the others [8].

It is possible that Eldiev was only the material executor of the murder. According to what an anonymous Chechen source reported to Scott Anderson, journalist of the New York Times, and confirmed by Memorial in one of its reports, [9]the order to shoot Cuny and his friends would have come directly from the Director of the State Defense Department, Abusupyan Mosvaev who would have been deceived by a list of spies circulated by the FSB around Bamut, to push Chechen fighters into a false step [10]. The choice of Mosvaev , however, could also have been determined by another factor, a suspicion that opens up to a rather imaginative theory, based exclusively on a rumor: that in those parts, and precisely in the surroundings of Bamut, a short distance from Starye Achkhoy , the Chechen government was hiding radioactive material , or even a nuclear weapon. Let’s start again: these are theses that have no basis for proof, and we report them solely for the record.

Bamut was one of the strongholds of the Chechen defense. The village, and the missile base located nearby, withstood a long and exhausting siege, which lasted from April 18 , 1995 to May 24, 1996. The Chechens defended that position with great fury, apparently out of the way of the heart of the Chechen defense system. It so happens that the village’s main point of interest was a base for launching ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Russians had already abandoned the base in 1992, solemnly declaring that they had stolen all unconventional weapons, and that they had brought all the radioactive material back to Russia . In mid- November , following a communication sent from Chechnya, the Russian authorities found a container containing an explosive sprinkled with radioactive material in a park in Moscow . There was talk of non-military material, therefore not coming from an atomic warhead, but the case produced a search for psychosis among the federal security forces. The other element that raises doubts is the route taken by Cuny to reach Yandi . Instead of taking a main road, perhaps passing through Rostov – Baku, for you to turn towards Katar – Yurt and from there you can easily reach Maskhadov’s headquarters, Cuny decided to cross Bamut and climb up a path that is very difficult to do by car, facing voluntarily an already difficult journey in itself, complicated by the fact that the village garrison, notoriously reluctant to collaborate with journalists and foreign volunteers, was about to end up under siege [11].

The cover of the Frontline program dedicated to Fred Cuny

Neither of these two leads, in any case, appears completely convincing. It seems strange, in fact, that a man with such extensive connections and knowledge as Fred Cuny would end up shot just because he was mentioned in a fabricated FSB document. And likewise the story of the investigation into the “Dudaev atomic bomb” is totally devoid of evidence (after all, no atomic warhead, nor box containing atomic material has ever been found). What happened then? A third theory is provided by Kommersant, in his April 21, 1999 edition:

This time [on his second trip, ed .] Cuny presented a specific plan for a truce between Moscow and Grozny. And therefore, he certainly had to meet with General Dudayev . That is why the inspection by the Chechen State Security Department did not worry him at all. However, on April 7 – this is the date Galina Oleinik feared – [in the note found in 1996, ed .] the Russian army began the famous “cleansing” of Samashki, the ancestral village of the Chechen president. The shootings continued there for two days. And they couldn’t help but ruin Cuny and his mission. By then Kewney was getting in the way of everyone: Russian hawks, Chechen warlords, and even his own country’s politicians. Kewney has not overestimated the extent of his influence and authority in the American establishment. Suffice it to say that US military doctrine changed largely under his influence […] not surprisingly, the “missionary” activities of Fred Cuny and that of the US military began to go hand in hand after the Gulf War. However, if at first Cuny and American politicians successfully cooperated, trying not to interfere in each other’s sphere of competence, very soon they began to compete. […] The death of a competitor has allowed politicians to become monopolists. And they reversed his plan: Cuny , starting from the elimination of the consequences of military operations, tried to build an international mechanism to prevent humanitarian catastrophes. Politicians have transformed his doctrine into “humanitarian wars” in which a humanitarian catastrophe is caused.

Whatever the reason that led to Cuny’s death, this will presumably be buried together with his body and that of his travel companions. Precisely with regard to his remains, in November 1998 unknown criminals tried to contact Fred’s family to return the body, which they claimed to have. As evidence, they sent a photo of a metal pin that had been inserted into Cuny ‘s leg many years earlier after he had been hit by a taxi. The family replied that they would never pay a ransom for the body, following the will of the father, who stated: you don’t pay for the body, with reference to the practice of ransom of corpses. Cuny was convinced that the practice of paying ransoms for kidnapped people or getting their remains back was one of the main drivers of kidnappings for ransom, and that if the ransoms were not paid, this heinous criminal activity would soon disappear from Chechnya [12].

SOURCES

Frontline article at www.pbs.org

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/kill/

February 25, 1996 – What happened to Fred Cuny ?

Kommersant of 21 April 1999

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/217216?query=%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%8F

New York Times of July 26 , 1999

[1]https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/04/06/killing-chechnya/

[2]In particular, according to an article by Kommersant dated April 24 , 1999, the US ambassador in Moscow, Thomas Pickering, responded to Cuny ‘s requests that the United States had no strategic interest in this region and that if the Soros Foundation wanted to act in Chechnya he would have done so at his own peril.

[3]Today’s Yandi .

[4]The interpreter was Galina Oleinik , the two doctors were Sergei Makarov and Andrei Sereda .

[5]The contents of the ticket, like all the other circumstances described so far can be found in the Frontline article, Who killed Fred Cuny ? available at www.pbs.org

[6]February 25, 1996 – What happened to Fred Cuny ?

[7] Mr. “A” could be Captain Shirvani Albakov , Bamut’s Chief of Defense Staff, shot in the neck on 16 June 1995. In this sense, it could be a settlement of accounts due precisely to the cover-up of the affair in question.

[8] Frontline, Who Killed Fred Cuny ? available on the site www.pbs.org

[9]The account is quoted by Kommersant in an April 21 , 1999 article

[10]The news of the “list” presumably circulated by the FSB around Bamut to induce the Chechens to doubt foreign humanitarian agents would have been provided not only by the family of the deceased Cuny, but also by a witness interviewed by the New York Times , whose memoirs were published in the February 25, 1996 article What happened to Fred Cuny ? The circumstance is doubtful, because Cuny had arrived in Chechnya only a few days earlier, and the FSB would hardly have been able to organize such an operation in such a short time. On the other hand, it is strange that the Chechen government, always very helpful towards Western supporters at that stage of the conflict, had on its own initiative betrayed a consolidated relationship of trust with one of the most famous humanitarian workers in all of the West.

[11]New York Times of February 25 , 1996.

[12]New York Times of July 26 , 1999.

VERSIONE ITALIANA

STRAGI, SPIE ED ARMI NUCLEARI: L’ASSASSINIO DI FRED CUNY

Frederick Carl Cuny (14 Novembre 1944, 15 Aprile 1995) era un cittadino americano che per tutta la vita si impegnò, ufficialmente per motivi umanitari, nel sostegno alle popolazioni di paesi in crisi bellica, umanitaria ed ambientale. Attivo fin dal 1969 nell’attività di consulenza e coordinamento dei servizi umanitari, aveva lavorato in Biafra, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, e dozzine di altri contesti, spesso molto difficili, nei quali doveva confrontarsi non soltanto con la difficile situazione sul campo, ma anche con le inefficienze delle associazioni umanitarie e la corruzione dei governi locali. Alla fine del 1994 Cuny era stato contattato dall’Open Society Institute di George Soros ed inviato in Cecenia con lo scopo di organizzare un piano umanitario per la sicurezza degli abitanti di Grozny. Rientrato nel Marzo successivo dalla sua missione, durante la quale aveva assistito al terribile assedio di Grozny ed aveva stretto amicizia con Aslan Maskhadov, aveva cercato di coinvolgere il governo degli Stati Uniti ad entrare in campo per costringere la Russia ad interrompere le operazioni militari, negoziando una tregua umanitaria. Tenne numerose conferenze, incontri pubblici e privati con politici di alto livello, ed il suo articolo Killing Chechnya[1], nel quale accusava la Russia di aver scatenato una guerra di aggressione con scopi genocidi,fece il giro del mondo. Nonostante il suo impegno e l’appoggio di alcuni politici al Congresso, Cuny non era riuscito a convincere nessuna delle alte cariche dello stato ad intercedere per lui[2]. Così era tornato in Cecenia, per ricominciare la sua missione per conto della Open Society. Il 1 Aprile 1996, mentre si dirigeva al Quartier Generale di Maskhadov, ad Orekhovo[3], venne catturato a Starye Achkoy insieme a due medici russi ed un interprete[4], con i quali stava attraversando il paese a bordo di un’ambulanza, dopodiché di lui si persero completamente le tracce. Le sue ricerche si protrassero per molti mesi, dopodichè il figlio ed il fratello comunicarono di aver ricevuto informazioni affidabili secondo le quali egli sarebbe stato ucciso quasi subito dopo il suo arresto, operato presumibilmente da uomini del Dipartimento per la Sicurezza dello Stato, a quel tempo diretto da Abusupyan Mosvaev. Il suo corpo e quello dei suoi colleghi non sarebbero mai strati ritrovati. Le accuse riguardo la sua uccisione ricaddero sul Colonnello Rizvan Elbiev, ufficiale del Dipartimento per la Difesa dello Stato nel distretto di Achkhoy – Martan. Questi, secondo quanto riferito dall’autista di Cuny (l’unico del gruppo rimasto in vita) dopo che l’ambulanza era stata fermata nei pressi di Starye Achkhoy da un distaccamento del Dipartimento per la Difesa dello Stato, richiese che i componenti della squadra di Cuny si presentassero da lui per fornire le generalità, per poi accompagnarli al Quartier Generale di Maskhadov. I volontari rimandarono l’autista indietro con un biglietto destinato ad Open Society nel quale dicevano di stare bene, di spostare gli appuntamenti in programma di 3 giorni e di allertare le autorità qualora non fossero rientrati entro il tempo stabilito[5].

Passarono i giorni, poi le settimane, e di Cuny non si trovò traccia. I familiari coinvolsero l’FBI, il governo americano, ed anche la Fondazione Soros, che aveva finanziato la missione, iniziò le sue ricerche, spendendo fino ad ottantamila dollari al mese per ottenere informazioni[6]. Appelli alla liberazione dell’americano giunsero dal presidente americano Clinton, da quello russo Eltsin e perfino da quello ceceno, Dudaev.

Nell’Agosto successivo, dopo mesi di inutili tentativi di rintracciare Cuny ed i suoi amici, la sua famiglia annunciò pubblicamente di essere venuta a conoscenza della morte del loro congiunto, e di tutti i membri del suo gruppo. Il figlio ed il fratello di Cuny accusarono pubblicamente il governo ceceno della responsabilità dell’omicidio, e parimenti accusarono le autorità russe di aver presentato Cuny come una spia. Nel rapporto confidenziale inviato al governo degli Stati Uniti, la famiglia fece precisamente il nome di Elbiev, il cui nome era stato fatto dal militare del Dipartimento per la Sicurezza dello Stato che aveva preso in custodia il gruppo. Secondo quanto riferito da questi, Elbiev avrebbe fatto fucilare tutti e quattro il 14 Aprile. Tale informazione fu confermata all’autista della famiglia Cuny, un ex combattente, nell’Agosto del 1995, sulla base di un’indicazione a questi fornita da un certo “A”, ufficiale di campo della difesa di Bamut[7].

Nell’Agosto del 1996, tra le rovine di una casa di Starye Achkhoy fu rinvenuto un fagotto insanguinato, e all’interno di questo furono trovati i documenti di tutti e quattro i membri della squadra di Cuny. Oltre a questi c’era un biglietto, indirizzato a Maskhadov, nel quale c’era scritto: Stimato Aslan, Abbiamo cercato di passare da te, con le medicine e i due dottori che avevamo promesso. Con me c’è Fred Cuny, l’americano che già conosci, che è venuto per tenere l’incontro che l’altra volta non c’è stato. per confermare che sei a conoscenza di noi e della nostra missione. Con rispetto, Galina Oleinik. Fondazione Soros. Essendo certo che fu Elbiev a sequestrare i documenti, è piuttosto probabile che fosse lui il responsabile della morte di Cuny e degli altri[8].

E’ possibile che Eldiev fosse soltanto l’esecutore materiale dell’omicidio. Secondo quanto riferito da una fonte anonima cecena a Scott Anderson, giornalista de New York Times, e confermato da Memorial in uno dei suoi resoconti[9] l’ordine di fucilare Cuny ed i suoi amici sarebbe venuto direttamente dal Direttore del Dipartimento per la Difesa dello Stato, Abusupyan Mosvaev il quale sarebbe stato tratto in inganno da una lista di spie fatta circolare dall’FSB nei dintorni di Bamut, per spingere i combattenti ceceni ad un passo falso[10]. La scelta di Mosvaev, tuttavia, avrebbe potuto essere determinata anche da un altro fattore, un sospetto che apre ad una teoria piuttosto fantasiosa, basata esclusivamente su una diceria: che da quelle parti, e precisamente nei dintorni di Bamut, a poca distanza da Starye Achkhoy, il governo ceceno nascondesse materiale radiattivo, o addirittura un’arma nucleare. Premettiamo nuovamente: si tratta di tesi che non hanno alcun fondamento di prova, e le riportiamo unicamente per dovere di cronaca.

Bamut era uno dei capisaldi della difesa cecena. Il villaggio, e la base missilistica situata nei suoi pressi, resistettero ad un lungo ed estenuante assedio, protrattosi dal 18 Aprile 1995 al 24 Maggio 1996. I ceceni difesero con grande accanimento quella posizione, apparentemente defilata rispetto al cuore del sistema difensivo ceceno. Il caso vuole che il punto di interesse principale del villaggio fosse una base per il lancio di missili balistici capaci di trasportare testate nucleari. I russi avevano abbandonato la base già nel 1992, dichiarando solennemente di aver sottratto qualsiasi arma non convenzionale, e di aver riportato in Russia tutto il materiale radiattivo. A metà Novembre, a seguito di una comunicazione inviata dalla Cecenia, le autorità russe rinvennero in un parco di Mosca un contenitore contenente un esplosivo cosparso di materiale radiattivo. Si parlava di materiale non militare, quindi non proveniente da una testata atomica, ma il caso produsse una cerca psicosi tra le forze di sicurezza federali. L’altro elemento che solleva dei dubbi è il percorso fatto da Cuny per raggiungere Yandi. Anziché prendere una strada principale, magari passando dalla Rostov – Baku, per voi svoltare verso Katar – Yurt e da lì raggiungere agilmente il Quartier Generale di Maskhadov, Cuny decise di attraversare Bamut e di inerpicarsi su un sentiero molto difficile da fare in automobile, affrontando volontariamente un viaggio già difficile di per sé, complicato dal fatto che la guarnigione del villaggio, notoriamente poco incline a collaborare con giornalisti e volontari stranieri, stava per finire sotto assedio[11].

Nessuna tra queste due piste, in ogni caso, appare completamente convincente. Appare strano, infatti, che un uomo con agganci e conoscenze così vaste come Fred Cuny finisse fucilato soltanto perché citato in un documento artefatto dall’FSB. E parimenti la storia dell’indagine sulla “atomica di Dudaev” è totalmente priva di elementi di prova (del resto nessuna testata atomica, né scatola contenente materiale atomico è mai stata ritrovata). Che cosa successe, quindi? Una terza teoria è fornita da Kommersant, nella sua edizione del 21 Aprile 1999:

Questa volta [durante il suo secondo viaggio, ndr.] Cuny ha presentato un piano specifico per una tregua tra Mosca e Grozny. E quindi, doveva certamente incontrare il generale Dudayev. Ecco perché l’ispezione da parte del Dipartimento per la sicurezza dello Stato ceceno non lo impensieriva affatto. Tuttavia, il 7 aprile – questa è la data che temeva Galina Oleinik – [nel biglietto ritrovato nel 1996, ndr.] l’esercito russo ha iniziato la famosa “pulizia” di Samashki, il villaggio ancestrale del presidente ceceno. Le sparatorie sono continuate lì per due giorni. E non potevano fare a meno di rovinare Cuny e la sua missione. A quel punto Kewney stava intralciando tutti: falchi russi, signori della guerra ceceni e persino i politici del suo stesso paese. Kewney non ha sopravvalutato la portata della sua influenza e autorità nell’establishment americano. Basti dire che la dottrina militare degli Stati Uniti è cambiata in gran parte sotto la sua influenza […] non sorprende che l’attività “missionarie” di Fred Cuny e quella dell’esercito americano, dopo la Guerra del Golfo, abbiano cominciato ad andare di pari passo. Tuttavia, se all’inizio Cuny e i politici americani hanno collaborato con successo, cercando di non interferire nella sfera di competenza l’uno dell’altro, molto presto hanno iniziato a competere. […] La morte di un concorrente ha permesso ai politici di diventare monopolisti. E hanno ribaltato il suo piano: Cuny, partendo dall’eliminazione delle conseguenze delle operazioni militari, ha provato a costruire un meccanismo internazionale per prevenire le catastrofi umanitarie. I politici hanno trasformato la sua dottrina in “guerre umanitarie” in cui si provoca una catastrofe umanitaria.

Quale che fosse il motivo che portò Cuny alla morte, questo rimarrà presumibilmente sepolto insieme al suo cadavere ed a quello dei suoi compagni di viaggio. Proprio riguardo ai suoi resti, nel Novembre del 1998 ignoti criminali cercarono di contattare la famiglia di Fred per restituire il cadavere, che dichiaravano di detenere. Come prova inviarono una foto che ritraeva un perno di metallo che era stato inserito in una gamba di Cuny molti anni prima, dopo che era stato investito da un taxi. La famiglia rispose che non avrebbe mai pagato un riscatto per il corpo, seguendo la volontà del padre, il quale affermava: non si paga per il corpo, con riferimento alla pratica del riscatto dei cadaveri. Cuny era convinto che la prassi di pagare i riscatti per persone rapite o per riavere i loro resti era uno dei motori principali dei sequestri a scopo estorsivo, e che se i riscatti non fossero stati pagati ben presto tale odiosa attività criminale sarebbe sparita dalla Cecenia[12].

FONTI

Articolo di Frontline su www.pbs.org

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/kill/

New York Times Magazines del 25 Febbraio 1996 – What happened to Fred Cuny?

Kommersant del 21 Aprile 1999

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/217216?query=%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%8F

New York Times del 26 Luglio 1999

[1] https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/04/06/killing-chechnya/

[2] In particolare, secondo quanto riportato da un articolo di Kommersant del 24 Aprile 1999, l’ambasciatore statunitense a Mosca, Thomas Pickering, rispose alle sollecitazioni di Cuny che gli Stati Uniti non avevano interessi strategici in questa regione e che se la Soros Foundation avesse voluto agire in Cecenia lo avrebbe fatto a proprio rischio e pericolo.

[3] Odierna Yandi.

[4] L’interprete era Galina Oleinik, i due medici si chiamavano Sergei Makarov e Andrei Sereda.

[5] Il contenuto del biglietto, al pari di tutte le altre circostanze finora descritte sono reperibili sull’articolo di Frontline, Who killed Fred Cuny? disponibile sul sito www.pbs.org

[6] New York Times Magazines del 25 Febbraio 1996 – What happened to Fred Cuny?

[7] Il Signor “A” potrebbe essere il Capitano Shirvani Albakov, Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa di Bamut, ucciso con un colpo alla nuca il 16 Giugno 1995. In questo senso potrebbe trattarsi di un regolamento di conti dovuto proprio all’insabbiamento della vicenda in questione.

[8] Frontline, Who killed Fred Cuny? disponibile sul sito www.pbs.org

[9] Il resoconto è citato da Kommersant in un articolo del 21 Aprile 1999

[10] La notizia della “lista” fatta circolare presumibilmente dall’FSB nei dintorni di Bamut per indurre i ceceni a dubitare degli agenti umanitari stranieri sarebbe stata fornita, oltre che dalla famiglia del defunto Cuny, anche da un testimone intervistato dal New York Times, le cui memorie sono state pubblicate sull’articolo del 25 Febbraio 1996 What happened to Fred Cuny? La circostanza è dubbia, perché Cuny era arrivato soltanto pochi giorni prima in Cecenia, e difficilmente l’FSB sarebbe stato in grado di predisporre una simile operazione in così poco tempo. D’altra parte è strano che il governo ceceno, sempre molto disponibile verso i sostenitori occidentali in quella fase del conflitto, avesse di propria iniziativa tradito un rapporto consolidato di fiducia con uno degli operatori umanitari più celebri di tutto l’Occidente.

[11] New York Times del 25 Febbraio 1996.

[12] New York Times del 26 Luglio 1999.

Reflections and premonitions: Dudaev’s “ghost” interview

31 marzo 2023 maceriadmin 1 commento

This interview, made in April 1995 and published by Kommersant on September 1, 1998, has an unusual story. The tape with the recording of the conversation disappeared under strange circumstances, leaving only its transcript. To remove doubts about the authenticity of the interview, Kommersant questioned the journalist who carried it out, the famous ITAR – TASS reporter Sherip Asuev.

Here is what Sharip Asuev recalls: “It was three years ago, in the spring. It was very difficult for me to get to Dudayev. His base was in the mountains, near Shatoi, in an old stable. I was accompanied by his associates, especially Daud Akhmadov. We talked almost until the morning … Then for two days I could not leave. Then they took me to another road. A few months later I was persuaded to give the cassette of the journalist of Komsomolskaya Pravda Alexander Yevtushenko, I agreed, because I knew it would never go through the TASS channels. All night I deciphered the tape. The next morning Sasha left. I return in the evening. Some people in camouflage took away his car, with all its contents… ”

Yevtushenko confirmed that he had received the tape, and that his car was confiscated, which was destroyed a few weeks later at a federal troop checkpoint, hit directly by a tank shell. “Even if the tape had still been in the car” he replied “there would have been nothing left of it after the bombing…”

Daud Akhmadov also confirmed Sherip’s version, declaring that he was present while Dudayev was giving the interview, and that he worked to get people to pass by a different road than the one by which he had come, because the first one in the meantime had been bombed .

Dudaev tiene una conferenza stampa dopo lo scoppio delle ostilità

Below is the translation of the interview:

Shatoi, April 1995

Dzhokhar, on the eve of the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya, did you personally feel this danger? Did you expect this development of events? After all, there was a giant tragedy of the people.

“This is a tragedy not only of the Chechen people. There has been a tragedy for Russia and the Russian people.”

I mean Grozny destroyed, the villages executed, thousands of widows and orphans. Did you foresee something like this happening?

“I’ve always said that Russia is dying and needs victims.”

Many today (April 1995.-Kommersant) say about you that you were specially trained and sent to destroy her people.

“It’s all bullshit. Bullshit, which I despise and do not perceive. I know exactly how these lies are formed. This is propaganda.”

They also talk about the fabulous money you get from selling oil, drugs…

“Bluff and talk. I don’t even want to comment.”

How do you see the future of Chechnya today?

“Well.”

What do you think will happen to Russia next?

If the Russians knew what fate they were preparing – not only for their descendants, but also for the current generation – they would probably have incurable diarrhea. Russia has two ways of developing. And both are stupid.

So?

What is the path to Russia? Take the dollar and make it your god. They are ready for it right now. What will come of it? This is self-destruction, a destructive path. You can go another way – I know which way Russia needs. But I will never tell. Let them fall and roll! One way is to accept Islam and follow the way of Islam. This is a more realistic way for them.

Daud Akhmadov parla ad una conferenza stampa.

And could not our people with you be victims of all these global processes?

“Today it is the victim of these problems.”

Victory or defeat, how will this war end?

“Questions about the start of the war and its completion are the Almighty’s business. So far, Russia itself is not prepared either for war or for its logical conclusion. But it’s not the war that worries me now, it will end anyway . And we will sign the peace. Not in Moscow – I will never go, and not in Chechnya – I have to let Russia save face. This (the signing of the peace. – Kommersant) will take place in the Caucasian land, in Dagestan. Do you want me to tell you where? In a train carriage…”

Dzhokhar, don’t you feel guilty that everything turned out like this in Chechnya?

“I don’t feel guilty.”

Couldn’t we have avoided this nightmare of war?

“We could not. If we tried to solve (the problem of relations with Russia. – Kommersant) by peaceful means, by politics, by loyalty, by humility – I can assure you that we would be destroyed to the root. And there would never again be a Chechen nation or its state. And I can responsibly say that already in 1991, the idea arose to populate the disputed territories on the Sino-Soviet border, under the branding that the Chechen mafia, rackets will not let you live. In 1991, how many Were there locomotives in Gudermes? With the excuse of maintenance? On which the factory grease had not yet been removed!? There were 56 locomotives! And how many wagons stood at the railway junctions around and on the territory of the republic? Cattle wagons. And without any movement for more than three months?! How many covered vehicles, under the guise of collection were in 11 districts, standing motionless, with people in green jackets?! Each car has an officer. And from how many units were additionally unloaded military equipment and the military contingent arrived on the territory of the republic to those who were already here?! And the Chechen nation would be destroyed. And the Emergency Committee was supposed to implement the idea of the genocide, another deportation of the Chechen people. And only an accident thwarted these plans.”

There is an idea that if Dudayev left now, saying: “If you want elections, hold them, if you want, join Russia”! Many more lives could be saved. Why do not you do that?

“I testify before Allah that such an act would bring great harm to the people. 300,000 men – aged between 17 and 50 – now have no shelter, no food, no work. They have nowhere to go – families are being destroyed, houses are being destroyed. These people have only one goal: revenge. As long as they trust me they obey me. If the landmark is broken, they will go out of control… Terrible! An internecine war will begin. In distant Russia, who should take revenge? Here we will seek blood revenge. They will again call for help from the Russians. And the latter, not understanding where theirs is, where they are strangers, will raze everything to the ground.”

Would you like to talk to Yeltsin now?

“I always have something to say to the leadership of Russia. I have always understood perfectly well, and I understand now, that such a huge Russia has its own interests, which are difficult to give up in an hour, in an instant. At first I suggested to take into account the interests of Russia: joint defense, joint armed forces. I even called him. I said more than once: recognize the path chosen by my people, and I will leave the political arena in 3 days.”

Dudaev vota alle elezioni popolari del 27 Ottobre 1991

Dzhokhar, how do you evaluate today’s events, as a result of which you came to power in the presidential elections on October 27, 1991?

“The Supreme is my witness that I did not want to present my candidacy for president. But then my supporters were indignant because, they said I was afraid.”

Who were these people who convened the first national congress of the Chechen people (November 23-25, 1990), at which an executive committee was created (September 6, 1991, the Executive Committee of the Chechen People’s Congress seized power in the republic – Kommersant)? What do you think now, did they really support the idea or did they use the name of the first Chechen general to achieve their goals?

“That’s all! When I saw to whom the Vainakh people’s congress entrusted its sovereignty and its future, I – I give you my word of honor – got goosebumps. Already at the very first meeting of the executive committee there, they – those who organized and held this congress – started a fight for money.Literally because of the money raised for the last congress.

I didn’t need places in this republic, in that environment, spoiled to the point of lawlessness. In general, I was not only afraid of this environment but, frankly, I despised it. This environment was so far from my intellect and level with all its luxury, bravado and behind-the-scenes games. This environment was wild and far away for me… I looked and shuddered in horror. Who was given the trust of the people! It became clear that it was a collapse. That things would turn out so differently from the direction people had imagined. That they would literally pervert this idea (of sovereignty-Kommersant), they would smear it, they would spit on it. And that the people would be reduced to nothing. This is what made me take on this heavy burden. But it’s one thing to pronounce high-sounding words from the stands, quite another when it is necessary to implement a decision.”

Dudaev in abiti civili durante il periodo prebellico

They say your inner circle was corrupt.

“Everyone was corrupt. In the old days, money was brought to the first people in the highest echelons of power in the republic, and there was a certain tax. It took some time to clear the upper echelon. A cabinet of ministers was replaced , the second cabinet, the third. And we passed the upper level, we succeeded. And those who planned it, they felt the sword of Damocles upon them, which would cut off their heads. But on the lower level, the corruption continued to exist with unbridled force.

If you started all over again, what would you change about your actions in the last few years (1991-1996 – Kommersant)?

“Even if I wanted to change something, they just wouldn’t let me. Of course, I wish I had done things very differently.”

Who didn’t allow it?

The context didn’t allow it, a society that wasn’t ripe for democracy and respect for rules and laws. Do you think I wouldn’t want to have talented, intelligent, intellectual, creative, dedicated people next to me?! But there were little bastards around who had only one interest: unbridled profit. The environment turned out to be like this due to the circumstances, there was no other.”

“I am grateful to the fate that made me meet the Chechens!” Francesco Benedetti interviews Alla Dudaeva

6 marzo 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

Alla Fyodorovna Dudayeva is the widow of the first President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Dudaev’s life partner, she lived with him until his assassination, which occurred on April 21, 1996 by the Russian army. Despite being of Russian origin, Alla Dudaeva linked her personal destiny to the cause of Chechen independence, continuing after her husband’s death to plead the reasons for a free Chechnya. Among her qualities, her passion for drawing certainly stands out. For this reason, in addition to her words, we have collected and published, with her permission, her pictorial works. What follows, therefore, is a double story, in words and images: the story of a wife, a mother, an artist, a political activist, a woman united with Chechnya by love and destiny.

The death of Dzhokhar Dudayev has deprived the Chechens of both a human and a political point of reference. From your point of view, this may be even more true: has the loss of a person so important to you as a life partner, as a mother, and at the same time as a supporter of a free Chechnya, changed your existential point of view?

The entire Chechen people wept when they learned of Dzhokhar’s death, as well as the Muslim world. But not only Muslims: the whole world appreciated Dzhokhar’s life and work, the Chechen people’s resistance to Russian aggression, and dedicated dozens of streets, squares and cities in different countries to him. Dzhokhar showed how to “take cities” and in 3 days (March 7,8,9) the capital of Ichkeria was taken by Chechens. Russian military units and bases were surrounded, but the Chechens did not shoot at the Russians so that the planes could not bomb the attackers. This ingenious plan was conceived by Dzhokhar, and when journalists asked him “why did you leave Grozny?” He replied “We have shown the whole world how to take cities!” In exactly the same way, the invaders were surrounded three months after the death of Dzhokhar on August 6, 1996. It was called: “dying, embracing the enemy.” And it happened only thanks to the unparalleled courage and courage of the Chechen people. For the first time in the world, a small Chechen people defeated the huge Russian empire of evil and violence, which the whole world has been afraid of for decades!

And the people called it a miracle! This victory gave hope to all occupied peoples for their future liberation and breathed new strength into those who bowed and surrendered! A nation is invincible when it fights on its own land for its freedom, if it has such a leader! When the president and the people are one, they are invincible!

Has his death changed anything in you regarding the care of your family and regarding the idea of an independent Chechnya?

After the death of Dzhokhar, nothing has changed in me in relation to our family or in relation to the idea of the independence of Ichkeria. But my personal feeling changed, I could not imagine myself without Dzhokhar, it was as if I was unexpectedly hit in the chest. Then we were secretly taken to the second home of a brave and wise man, Dayan, and I sat by his body for three days. Dayan asked me not to mention that Dzhokhar was dead when I was at her house for dinner. He asked me to say that there was one wounded, but not that it was Dzhokhar. “My wife Leila” he said “She couldn’t bear it. He has a weak heart. No need to mourn it in front of them, there would be such a noise that everyone in the village would understand immediately. Instead we have to hide. After her words, I understood that there were still those who loved Dzhokhar, albeit weaker than me in health. And I learned to hide, even as my heart was torn apart by pain. Therefore, when it was necessary to declare Dzhokhar’s death on April 24 in front of journalists from all over the world, I learned to hide my tears and did not cry, I thought about hundreds of sick old women like Leila, what would happen to them when they heard the sad news. And about our enemies, how they would rejoice at Dzhokhar’s death … That’s why I decided to leave the doubt, to Dzhokhar’s enemies who feared him, that he might return.

That very night we snuck him out and buried him. And I witnessed such miracles, when Dzhokhar was raised and carried to the cemetery, that it seemed to me that I had new strength. We left at three in the morning. When we arrived at the cemetery it was still dark which was scary. There was a wall of fog. While the grave was being dug, I sat next to Dzhokhar’s body, behind the fence. And when they came for him and brought him, suddenly the fog cleared, pink-gold rays of the sun appeared, under which everything around shone. And in the blue sky above his grave, flocks of birds were circling, as if they had come to greet or meet him. And they sang!!! Most likely, the Almighty himself met him! I understood that Dzhokhar would not be in the grave, his soul was immediately taken to heaven!

When the Chechen people gathered all their strength and managed to defeat the huge Russian empire, many believed that Dzhokhar was alive and would certainly return. But our enemies have claimed that Dzhokhar, a symbol of independence, fled, leaving his people behind. And then I had to refute these dirty rumors and we made a documentary about the place of his death. In it, I detailed where he was, when it happened and from which side two rockets came, one after the other. The military prosecutor, Magomed Zhaniev, and our former representative in Moscow, Khamad Kurbanov, they died with him. They were immediately taken away by relatives and buried the next day. But many Chechens still didn’t believe me and so I had to write the book “Million First” which became a documentary about the birth, childhood, life and death of Dzhokhar Dudayev .

It was first published in Baku in 2002. Then in six other countries in different languages. By the way, immediately after the book was published, a video was mounted in Chechnya, someone spoke in my voice against the background of my photograph. “I apologize to the Chechen people, I am getting married. I searched for a long time and finally found someone similar to Dzhokhar, only the mustache is different.” This was done intentionally so that my book would not be believed, and some still think that I again married Dzhokhar, who in reality was allegedly wounded, secretly taken out of Chechnya, and then healed. Only many years later the Chechen people finally convinced themselves and stopped waiting for Dzhokhar.

After the liberation of Grozny in August, Chechnya found itself free, but in constant danger. From April 1996 to February 1997, Dzhokhar’s inheritance passed to Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. He was an old friend of your husband’s. What do you remember about him? What kind of person was he?

Zelimkhan Yandarbiev was a poet and leader of the Vainakh Democratic Party , one of the pioneers of Chechen People’s Freedom. He visited us in Tartu, Estonia and invited Dzhokhar to the first Congress. Dzhokhar made such a brilliant speech that he was elected chairman of the Chechen People’s Executive Committee. Zelimkhan was always next to Dzhokhar and supported him in everything. He was distinguished by great courage and loyalty to the idea of independence, and therefore Dzhokhar, after a series of unsuccessful attempts on his life, instructed him to replace him as president of the CRI in the event of his death. Zelimkhan’s courage can be judged by the famous video in which he did not surrender to President Yeltsin during peace talks in the Kremlin. And he insisted that he move to the place assigned to him, opposite Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. Because the war of 1994-1996 was with the Russian aggressor, who started the war with independent Ichkeria. This was not the “internal conflict” that the Russian media were talking about. And it was not about “restoring constitutional order on the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”, but about a full-scale war, during which the capital was burned to the ground by Russian bombs, the entire Chechen land was burned and mined ! Zelimkhan in 1997 held the election of a new president of the CRI, although he could have continued to hold office, but he wanted the Chechen people to choose their own president. Although then some blamed him for it. He has always been on the side of legality and democracy.

After the 1997 elections, the post of president of the republic passed to Aslan Maskhadov. What was your opinion of him? And how did this opinion change during your political tenure before the second Russian invasion?

Aslan Maskhadov inherited a country destroyed by the Russian-Chechen war and thousands wounded, tens of thousands of people without means of subsistence. Dzhokhar Dudayev forbade taking a ransom for captured Russians. But, immediately after his death on April 21, already in May, the oligarch Berezovsky bought out the Russian journalist Elena Masyuk from Chechen captivity for two million dollars. They returned her to the United States, and Bill Clinton, a friend of Yeltsin, solemnly awarded her a massive gold chain on her chest. All this was shown on television and marked the beginning of the hostage trade conducted by the FSK. They often took hostages from the families of wealthy businessmen to the border of the CRI and handed them over to the Chechens, and then divided the ransom through intermediaries, the main one being Berezovsky. The authorities could do nothing about the rampant crimes of the Russian special services. They killed 8 people from the International Red Cross, blaming the Chechens. And they cut off the heads of three foreigners who allegedly provided the republic with telephone communications with the whole world. They tried to show the Chechens as criminals and bandits to the whole world. In 1999, on Putin’s orders, they blew up two houses in Moscow and one in Volgodonsk, accused the Chechens of this crime and started the second Russo-Chechen war. The fate of Aslan Maskhadov was tragic, but he honorably fulfilled his duty and died as a result of a long guerrilla war. I think it was easier for him to live in a tent and fight in the forest alongside his faithful comrades than during his presidency.

The main accusation leveled against Ichkeria between 1996 and 1999 is that it became an Islamic state and abandoned the path started by the 1992 Constitution and which Dzhokhar intended to maintain. What do you think about this topic?

Ichkeria hasn’t become an Islamic state over the years because it was ruled by President Aslan Maskhadov and had a parliament, but Foreign Minister Movladi Udugov created a two-story so-called “Wahhabi” center in the city of Grozny with security and behind a wall. People from Saudi Arabia came to him, who presented themselves to the Chechen people as the most correct Muslims. They stopped cars on the street and checked people’s IDs to see if relatives or women were traveling with unfamiliar men. To then punish them with whips, as well as for drunkenness. Udugov tried to install his emirs in each village to create parallel systems of state administration. In Urus-Martan, the only village not destroyed by bombing because its inhabitants did not take part in the resistance to Russian troops in the first Russo-Chechen war, a “Wahhabi” center was organized and hijabs were brought for women. In addition, small booklets with extracts from the Koran were brought, published in Moscow. There was a Jamaat school in Baku, where our wounded were taken in, and they were taught to pray differently, but they didn’t leave to react. They were subsidized by Moscow. But, I repeat, from 1992 to 1999, Ichkeria did not become an Islamic state and retained its constitution. Much later, already during the partisan war phase, in 2002, Aslan Maskhadov made a statement and changed the constitution by introducing an Islamic one, but only the parliament has the right to make such legislative decisions if there is a quorum and the modification of the constitution by all the people during a referendum.

After Maskhadov’s death, Abdul- Khalim Sadulayev became the successor to the leadership of independent Ichkeria. He stated:

“With the beginning of the Second War, work continued on the drafting of the Constitution in full accordance with the norms of Islam, […] And now article 1 of the Constitution of the CRI accounting: “The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is a sovereign and independent Islamic state of law, created as a result of the self-determination of the Chechen people. The sources of all decisions are the Koran and the Sunnah.” Thus, we have come to the logical conclusion of the legal reforms initiated by Dzhokhar Dudayev . Do you think these arguments are correct? What do you think about Sadulaev ?

Indeed, Abdul- Khalim Saidulaev , appointed by Maskhadov in case of his death, became Aslan Maskhadov’s successor. But, like Aslan Maskhadov, he was a partisan in the forest and did not have a parliament to change the constitution. Only the parliament has the ability to engage in legislative activities, and only the people have the right to decide such important issues as changing the constitution during a referendum on this issue. The president has the right only to sign the laws passed by the parliament or the decisions of the people during a referendum.

Do you think the Chechen diaspora in Europe and the West as a whole will be able to influence governments to intervene decisively in the rebirth of an independent Chechnya? What actions, in your opinion, should be taken by its representatives?

There are now 160,000 Russian troops in Ichkeria. As soon as the changes in Russia begin, the Russian troops left in a foreign country, surrounded by a foreign people, will slowly leave by themselves. Just as Kadyrov and his accomplices will run away, fearing a feud. Our activities, like all past years, took place in the information struggle with those who want to take advantage of the seizure of power in the republic to declare Sharia and themselves at the head of Sharia without the democratic choice of the people in accordance with our constitution. We are the only legitimate authority, the Presidium and its members have never proclaimed themselves illegal “prime ministers” or cabinet presidents. We were approved in our offices by the last president and we have continued our work. And we exist to organize democratic elections for new leaders who will undoubtedly appear among the Chechen people in the course of all these events. We must ensure the continuity of democratic power of the people. Only the people have the right to elect a leader and other structures. In recent years, many educated young Chechens have grown up, who studied at the best universities in Europe. Surely the most active of them will show up and be ready, on a competitive basis, not only to lead the republic, but also the cabinet of ministers.

You, of Russian origin, could be represented, if you will allow me an analogy, as a tree with Russian roots and Chechen branches. How do you experience the relationship between these two identities, even after all that has happened?

I am very sorry that the Kremlin has started a war of annihilation with such an amazing people as the Chechens. In the first Russo-Chechen war, at the invitation of the government of Ichkeria, 250 Russian mothers came to Nazran for their captured sons, eighteen-year-old conscripts scattered throughout the republic, finding and taking their sons away from Chechen commanders. This went down in world history, for the first time such a small nation took pity on an army of conquerors and returned the captives without any ransom to their mothers. But, now, almost everyone who opposed the Russian Empire’s aggressive wars has either left Russia or been killed. The Russian people have changed and their army has turned into an army of looters and bandits. However, Russian generals are now taking criminals out of prisons and sending them to fight in Ukraine. And Russia itself evokes completely different feelings among all the peoples of our world. Therefore, everyone is waiting for this last empire of evil and violence to collapse and for its colonial peoples to free themselves and finally become masters of their own land and destiny. And I hope that with the help of Western countries, this will happen much faster than it could be with the Chechen people, who had almost no weapons to defend themselves, most of the machine guns were stolen from the Russian occupiers themselves. And yet he didn’t give up and led the resistance for decades. There were not even a million Chechens, now there are 46 million Ukrainians, and the whole world helps them with weapons and condemnation of Russia’s aggression.

During the war in Chechnya Western politicians declared non-interference in Russia’s internal affairs. Dzhokhar warned that the time might come when the West itself would become Russia’s internal affair. Lo and behold, this moment has come, his words have come true, and they finally woke up! Now Russia is recognized by the West as a terrorist state, although I would call it a terrorist state on an international scale! Because in addition to wars of conquest, it destroys all those who oppose it around the world: Alexander Litvinenko in London, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in Qatar, Turkey, Austria, Germany, France… it is difficult to list all those killed by name and name the methods of their murder. The Russian government has to answer for its crimes in the same way as Nazi Germany did when the Nuremberg trials took place. Russia is waiting for Nuremberg 2. And I really hope that we will all witness this momentous event and the Russian Empire will sink into oblivion.

How did you live, as mother and wife of the late first president, between the first and second wars? I deliberately ask this question in a very general way. Then you can talk about whatever aspect or experience is most important to you.

Between the wars I lived, like most Chechens, in the belief that there would be no more war. People have restored destroyed houses, planted trees and gardens. Life went on. My kids were there and they too thought all the bad stuff was over. After the outbreak of the second war, when the Chechen people were undeservedly accused of blowing up houses in Moscow, everyone understood that this war would become revanchist. And Moscow’s revenge for the victory of the Chechen people in 1996. I had to leave Ichkeria and move to Ingushetia, then to Georgia, to Baku and, finally, to Istanbul. Our family, like many other Chechens, was forced into exile. Throughout Ichkeria, like mushrooms, Russian filtration fields multiplied, they became more than fifty. They were even in Stavropol, Minvody , Pyatigorsk . In them, tens of thousands of Chechens were tortured and killed. Some of the dying or corpses were sold to relatives for burial. It was a terrible time! The Chechen people paid for their desire to be free with their blood! But, in his soul, he has always remained unconquered, because from time immemorial he welcomed all those who entered his house saying: “be free”! And to this day this greeting remains in effect. I am grateful to fate for giving me the opportunity to get to know this proud and humane people, their customs and traditions. A people who would be admired and taken as an example by humanity if they knew it! And I thank Allah for giving me the opportunity to witness so many miracles that I would never have believed if I hadn’t seen them myself. The Chechen people are busy now, but this is only temporary, they have a bright future ahead of them, and new names and new heroes will certainly appear, about which we still do not know anything. After all, no country in the world has as many enthusiasts as the Chechens. People ready to give their lives for the freedom of the people!

FLAG STORIES – THE WOLF OF ICHKERIA

30 gennaio 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

The flag is not just a colored rag: it is the spiritual synthesis of a people’s identity. This is more than ever true when it comes to the flag of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Every Chechen who yearns for independence carries its colors in his memory, and gets excited every time he sees them. In the green cloth marked with red and white he finds the pride of a free nation, the tragedy of the blood shed by his brothers and the promise of a future redemption.

An informant who requested to remain anonymous has brought us some fascinating stories about the tricolor of Ichkeria, which we make available to our readers.

The official flag of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

A flag at the market

September 6 , 1995. That day a major anti-war demonstration was scheduled in Grozny. At that time, a “filtration camp” was located in Neftyanka where prisoners from all over the republic were deported. Here they were tortured and if they survived, often set free for a ransom, they remained bent in body and spirit for the rest of their short lives.

In front of the camp there was a market teeming with people, organized for the military, the only ones who had money to make purchases. On the other side of the road, the armored vehicles on which the camp inmates were transported were stationed. Above them sat bored soldiers, swollen with beer bought at the market, waiting for a new “crop” of prisoners, victims of this terrible conveyor belt of death. Suddenly from a crossroads came a Zhiguli . The car parked between the market and the armored vehicle parking lot. A passenger came out of the car carrying a large ChRI flag, and began tying it to the door.

Panic immediately broke out: the sellers fled, spilling the goods, the soldiers suddenly awoke from their torpor, locking themselves inside their vehicles. The passenger of the Zhiguli , without flinching, finished arranging his flag, got into the car and slammed the door behind him. After that he set off again in complete tranquillity. It was enough for a patriot to display the flag of the Chechen Republic, with the wolf guarding it, to unleash panic among the Russian military. They had seen what miracles the Chechens had performed under this banner, defending their land from invaders.

The flag on the wall of the Council of Ministers, 1992

The flag on the crane

During the war, someone hoisted a large ChRI flag on a tall construction crane at the “new stop” in Staropromyslvsky district . The occupation authorities, noticing her, demanded that she be seized. However, they could not find anyone willing to ride the crane, not even for a reward. There were rumors that somewhere there was a sniper guarding the flag, who would electrocute anyone who approached the flag. Thus, the tricolor of Ichkeria continued to fly on the crane until August 1996, when the Chechens liberated Grozny and victoriously ended the war.

The flag of the Presidential Palace

ChRI’s most famous flag was the one that flew from the Presidential Palace. In times of peace, citizens could see this great banner waving in the sky. During the first war this was impetuously bombed and, after two anti-bunker bombs managed to penetrate up to the basement of the structure, it was necessary to evacuate it to avoid a massacre. The Palace gave shelter to hundreds of people (up to 800) and the bombings had so deeply affected the structure that its defenders, and the wounded, risked ending up buried under the rubble. So it was decided to abandon it: not before, however, having removed the flag from the mast to save it. Under a massive barrage a patrol ventured onto the roof of the palace, removed the flag and took care of it, preventing it from falling into the hands of the Russians, who would no doubt display it as a trophy. It seems that the national flag is still preserved and protected waiting to be able to wave again for a free Chechnya.

A boy waves the flag of Ichkeria in the ruins of Grozny

Bamut’s flag

One of the most legendary and iconic places of the First Russo-Chechen War is undoubtedly the Bamut fortress. Here the Chechens resisted the attacks of the Russian army for many months, enduring a terrible siege. One day, after yet another bombardment, the defenders realized that there was not a single building left intact enough to hang the flag. It was then decided to hoist it on the village water tower. The Russians, who evidently feared that that flag alone would prevent them from advancing, fired artillery at the tower until it collapsed to the ground, taking the flag with it. It was evident that the Russians were so afraid of the Chechen cloth that they were unwilling to fight under it. The defenders then decided to hang the flag from the tallest mast, so that it would continue to instill fear in the enemy.

Back to the Constitution: Francesco Benedetti interviews Ikhvan Gerikhanov (Part 2)

16 gennaio 2023 maceriadmin Lascia un commento

In April 21, 1996, President Dudayev was killed, and Vice-President Yandarbiev assumed his interim powers. How did your relationship with him develop?

After the treasonous assassination of the President, I returned to Grozny and actively participated in the preparation of the new elections. I returned to my duties when President Yandarbiev accepted my condition that the Constitutional Court could begin its work only after the annulment of the unconstitutional decree concerning its dissolution in April 1993. This happened with the Decree from these promulgated on November 12, 1996, in which it was clarified that the dissolution order issued by Dudaev was to be considered devoid of any legal effect. At that point I started forming a new team of judges for the court, having to make up for the expressed refusal of some of the old members to collaborate with the new government, as well as the defections of others, who had left the territory of the Republic.

During his mandate, Yandarbiev initiated a series of legislative interventions aimed at establishing an Islamic republic, such as, for example, the creation of Sharia courts. Were these measures constitutionally correct? Has the Constitutional Court sanctioned them?

To take a specific decision on the introduction of Sharia courts, the Constitutional Court did not yet have the necessary quorum for a vote and the approval of the judges was and is the prerogative of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, which during this period had not yet been renewed. Actions aimed at introducing Sharia courts directly contradict the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, which I have repeatedly expressed in the media and personally to Yandarbiev.

Following the January 1997 presidential elections, Aslan Maskhadov became president. How was your work under his tenure?

After the election of President and of the Parliament, I have actively collaborated with the institutions and have looked for candidates to complete the ranks of the Constitutional Court , and obtain their nomination by the Parliament. However I failed to complete this task, due to the situation in the Republic and the introduction of Sharia courts. However, as head of the highest judicial authority, I have actively participated in all legal activities of national importance.

By Presidential Decree of May 6 , 1996, I was appointed an expert in the process of negotiating and drafting documents on relations between the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation, and also headed the office of the State Legal Commission to develop and improve the constitutional principles , with the creation of a code of Islamic law CHRI. This order was presented to the President on May 20, 1997. This code of laws was personally prepared by me and delivered to President Maskhadov under the name ” Korta Nizam “, meaning “main consensus”: this project included the combination of Muslim and secular law, without radical deviations from the mentality and customs ( adat ) of the Chechen people, but taking into account the rules of conduct for a Muslim according to the Koran and the Sunnah of our Prophet (SAS). This law should have been voted on in a referendum and subsequently should have been adopted by the Parliament. If the Chechen people had approved this bill, after it was adopted by its legislative body, it would have acquired the status of Constitution as Basic Law of the country.However, once again, the crisis of the institutions has not allowed this to be discussed, and possibly integrated into the Fundamental Law of the State.

In addition to this, I was involved in the work as a member of the State Commission for the Development of the National Security Doctrine of the CRI, according to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of July 31, 1997. Basically, we worked on guarantees for the country’s national security and so that the invasion of our country would not be repeated over the decades. We have tried to establish ChRI in the world community as a subject of international law and find protection through international institutions. In addition, we have worked on consolidating our statehood through the Charter of the United Nations, which should be the document guaranteeing our security, both as a state and as a whole and as an ethnic group in communion with the whole civilized world. Constitutional Court member Seda Khalidova worked actively with me. In 1997 we met with the new Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation M. Baglai and even prepared an agreement on the interaction of the two highest state judicial bodies. This draft agreement was not approved by the parties, for the well-known reasons we have already mentioned.

As the radical forces consolidated in the country, the possibility of creating an Islamic state was increasingly discussed. How could this idea fit into the 1992 Constitution?

In no way. The Constitution of the CRI and its norms are mandatory, i.e. mandatory, regardless of the situation, if changes to individual articles of the Constitution have not been made in accordance with the requirements of this Basic Law.

At the end of 1998, Maskhadov was tried by the Sharia court. Was this court constitutionally legal? Do you remember this process?

By that time I had left the republic and worked at the International Arbitration Tribunal, but as one of the authors of the 1992 Constitution of the Chechen Republic, I can state that such a decision grossly violates the requirements of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic!

How did your experience as President of the Constitutional Court ended?

I resigned in March 1998, after an unconstitutional vote of no confidence in the President of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic, ie in me, for my position against the introduction of Sharia courts and the use of public executions. In the Parliament of the CRI on the second convocation there were deputies who had their own candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal and, frankly, had their own mercantile interests, which under my leadership they could not have realized. Moreover, the very discussion regarding the issue of mistrust of me is an unconstitutional process, if I have not committed a crime or if, for health reasons, I cannot fulfill my duties, or I have committed other actions contrary to the ideas of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, prescribed by the law “On the activities of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic”, adopted in 1992.

This question was initiated by two deputies, one of whom, as it was later established, worked for the FSB of Russia. The second deputy brought his name into disrepute during the proceedings of the first convocation Parliament. Their names are known and they, being refugees in Europe, continue to harm the legitimate authorities of the CRI.

Chechnya, 1997: Religious police impose corporal punishment for drunkenness

After the start of the Second Russo-Chechen War and Russia’s second invasion of the country, martial law was introduced in the CRI. Aslan Maskhadov’s mandate would have expired in February 2002, but he remained in office until his assassination in 2005. If you recall, what measure extended his mandate up to this point?

First of all, we must proceed from the fact that the President of the CRI, in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI, declared martial law in connection with the invasion of the aggressor into the sovereign territory of the country.

Secondly, in connection with martial law and the purpose of centralized government, the chairman of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, issued a decree on October 5, 1999 on the introduction of martial law on the territory of the republic and the adoption of Annex No . 1 to it, according to which all state structures were subordinated to the established State Defense Committee (GKO), with the wording that ” all authorities stop their work of norm-setting “. Furthermore, the State Defense Committee, since martial law was declared, has been approved as ” the highest collegial body of state power…”. And with resolution no. 217, adopted at the same time, by decision of the GKO, the President of the CRI was endowed with additional powers corresponding to the highest legislative and executive power!

Thus, the chairman of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the CRI and the head of the country’s State Defense Committee, during this wartime period could not and had no legal right to leave this post and remained in place until his treasonous assassination by Russian punishers.

After Maskhadov’s assassination, power passed to Vice President Abdul Khalim Sadulayev. Was such a transfer of power constitutionally acceptable?

Of course, and this right is enshrined in art. 75 of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, which provides that in case of removal from office of the President or in other cases in which the President cannot perform his duties, the Vice-President is required to assume full powers.

After the assassination of Sadulaev , power passed to Dokku Umarov , who proclaimed himself President. There appear to be differences between the Maskhadov-Sadulayev succession and the Sadulayev- Umarov power . What do you think is the difference between these two phenomena?

I don’t see much difference, since CRI president Abdul- Khalim Sadulaev , by decree dated June 2, 2005, appointed Umarov Doku as Vice President of the CRI. As it was indicated above, the State Defense Committee is the only state authority for the period of martial law in the country, and such actions to transfer powers do not go beyond the legislation of the CRI, although they are of a temporary nature, until the end of war and the lifting of the state of emergency.

In October 2007, Umarov announced the dissolution of the CRI as part of the Caucasus Emirate. Is this process unconstitutional?

These actions grossly violate the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI and are criminally punishable as liquidation of the state system and its power structures!

Dokku Umarov (center) last President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and founder of the Caucasus Emirate

A few months after the birth of the Caucasus Emirate, the current Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Akhmed Zakayev, was elected to his current position by still capable deputies. How did this nomination come about? Was it constitutionally correct?

This process can be explained at length and it is impossible to complete it in this interview due to its large volume in the description. There is my October 10, 2020 Expert Opinion [attached at the bottom of this interview, NDR], made at the request of the Council of Elders of Europe, which has done a great job of consolidating disparate structures, as each of them it is declared a legitimate authority in accordance with the Constitution of the CRI. During this period, I was not a member of any diaspora or power group, so I conducted a thorough analysis and evaluation of the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI, as one of its authors and a scientist in the field of jurisprudence, and concluded that the CRI government in exile is a legitimate state authority of the CRI.

Is it true that in 2002 all powers were transferred to the GKO and that so far the institutional power of the CRI derives from the decisions of this committee, now renamed the State Deoccupation Commitee?

Yes, it is this structure that continues to have the status of the only state authority of the CRI, as the successor to the State Defense Committee, represented by the State Deoccupation Commitee of the annexed territory by the Russian Armed Forces and their protégés.

From the point of view of constitutional law, can the current CRI authorities represented by the Cabinet of Ministers, chaired by Akhmed Zakaev , recognize themselves as legitimate?

Yes, and this does not contradict the requirements of the Constitution of the CRI, and proof of this is the fact that it was approved by the legal successor of the state power of the CRI – the State Deoccupation Commitee. A detailed analysis of the legitimacy of the Cabinet of Ministers of the CRI is contained in the opinion of 10.10.2020.

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