Archivi tag: History

A post-Russian world: Francesco Benedetti interviews Oleg Magaletsky

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Oleg Magaletsky is a specialist in strategic development, organizational changes, innovations, scaling and management of organizations, teams and ideas (both in commercial and non-commercial segments)
Since childhood, he has been interested in history, economics, psychology, literature, political science, and social geography.


Oleg Magaletsky


When and how did the idea of a forum of free nations arise?

The idea to create a platform of the Free Nations Post-Russia Forum arose as a reflection on the beginning of the full-scale aggression of imperial Muscovy against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, as a result of the analysis of the situation, the confidence increased that the only real option to achieve long-term peace in Europe (and all of Northern Eurasia) is maximally controlled , non-violent and complete Decolonization of the last European empire (currently in the form of a terrorist state, the so-called “Russian Federation”)

From your point of view, Russia is a “nineteenth-century” colonial empire, comparable to the European ones dismantled after the Second World War. In what sense can the Russian Federation be defined as a “colonial empire”?

Although according to the form and declarations de jure imperial Muscovy is the (Russian) Federation (according to the “Constitution”), where the regions have subjectivity and citizens have equal rights, in fact de facto, by all outward signs Muscovy is just a classic continental empire model of the second half of the 19th century, with a clear empire, a metropolis (Moscow) and the rest of the territories (both conventionally “internal” and external) – colonies, whose resources are only exploited by the metropolis for its own “shine” and external aggressions, exercising effective control over the colonies, making it impossible there is sustainable economic development, holding back continuous progress, prohibiting linguistic, cultural and national development/identification.
In fact, the only thing that today unites Sakha and Cherkessia, Buryatia and Ingushetia ets. – this is only a repressive apparatus (“vertical”) and colonial exploitation by the Kremlin. There are no substantive horizontal connections, which is also characteristic of the imperialism of the past century, the last example of which in Europe today remains Russia.

Does supporting the reasons of the nations subjected to Russian colonial rule mean, in your opinion, denying the existence of Russia as such?

To some extent.
The concept of “Russia” is a hybrid, a simulacrum, created purely for propaganda purposes, to justify imperialism and the enslavement of inferior nations and regions.
The de-imperialization of Muscovy will also liberate it, allowing it to turn into a number of independent, compatible and free national and/or regional entities, some of which will be able to return to their own, primarily Finno-Hungarian, roots in their own identification.

the post – Russian space according to the Forum

Is there, in your opinion, a part of Russian society that would be willing to do without its empire in favor of a community of free nations in a nuclear-free “post-Russian” area?

Yes, there are such people, moreover, their number is not only growing, the very “quality” composition of supporters of the corresponding views and actions is important: these are intellectual, organizational and managerial elites (in the good sense of the word), these are people capable of analysis and understanding cause-and-effect relationships.
It is obvious to them that Putin is not the cause, but the consequence of the problems, and their very essence lies precisely in the imperial nature of the modern “Russian” statehood, which can be changed only by radical (and not cosmetic profanation) changes through de-imperialization and decolonization.

What would be, in your opinion, the advantages for the international community in dismantling the Russian Federation? Isn’t there a risk that Moscow’s enormous nuclear arsenal would end up in the hands of many smaller countries, some of which could become small “North Koreas”?

A huge number of advantages (attaching a separate file with their thesis description), with a proactive approach and controllability of the process of Decolonization of Russia, it will be the most positive geopolitical event since the collapse of the USSR 30 years ago.
As for the “spread” of nuclear weapons, this is one of the main horrors of imperial propaganda, but as the experience of the collapse of the USSR shows – all this can be easily avoided, although free countries are not interested in having nuclear weapons (it is very expensive and impractical), only empires need them.
Both the first and the second factor were devoted to our latest public events, in particular the 8th Free Nations Post-Russia Forum in London and Paris on October 12-14 (attach its summary declaration below)

The flags of some of the nations participating in the Forum

You introduced the theme of the different behavior of empires compared to nations. Based on the reflections made for Russia, do you think it is correct to say that all empires, albeit in different forms, share the same “original sin”, and that in some way also a certain “imperial mission” which is at the origin of the state of generalized war in which most of the planet finds itself? And if so, do you think it would be appropriate to apply the same “weakening” of imperial ambitions to other “empires” too?


Of course, there are certain general characteristics, but mainly – everything depends on the specific context (time, conditions, system) and is quite individual.
At a certain historical stage, the creation of colonies (in their original form and essence during the times of ancient Greece and Rome) was a progressive and relatively positive phenomenon.
But already at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the creation of colonies in the format of the policy of imperialism with all the rationalizations like “The White Man’s Burden” took on much more grotesque and negative forms (the Belgian Congo can be mentioned as an apotheosis).
Therefore, what Muscovy is doing in the 21st year on the huge expanses from Sakha in the north to Kalmykia in the south, from Keninsberg in the west and to the occupied part of Karafuto in the east – this is an absolutely unacceptable retrograde policy for the time being, which will deal with internal repression and external military expansion from the outside.
Currently, there is no other similar state in the world, but if imperial Muscovy is not stopped now, China, Iran, etc. will most likely follow its example, that is, it may be the beginning of a renaissance of the most disgusting practices of colonial exploitation, authoritarianism and imperialism.
Therefore, it is the complete and final decolonization (preferably controlled and maximally non-leadership) of the so-called “Russian Federation” that is the key to a new architecture of collective sustainable security and peace in the entire northern hemisphere (and an effective method to stop the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran-Pyongyang MBTP Axis as a de facto already existing alliance of tyrants + their satellite regimes Maduro, Lukashenko, Assad, Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban etc.)

Talking about the benefits that the divestment of the Russian Federation could bring to the world. Russia has been on the brink of collapse several times over the last century. And yet what appears to be its main enemy, the United States, has always acted to preserve its unity. Why do you think there is this strange relationship (if you believe it exists) between these two historical enemies, yet linked by an apparent relationship of mutual necessity? And how could the United States’ point of view on this issue change?

This is not so characteristic of US politics, as it is of bureaucracy and politicians in general – they are a priori extremely inert, not inclined to change and seek to preserve the status quo, even if it is negative (and changes are positive), in particular, this was the case during the collapse of the USSR, when the Bush administration (as well as Reagan before that) did everything possible and impossible to save this communist Frankenstein as a single state. But they were not the only ones who did this (the rest of the free states, from France and Britain to Japan and Canada, acted in fact in the same direction), besides, at that time the USSR was not so much an enemy as a former opponent (and in 1917- 1920 was not an enemy of the USA at all)
i.e., the situation with the desire to “leave Russia united and indivisible” is not an exception (as is the attitude of the US Department of State to this issue), but rather a geopolitical (unfortunately) “rule”: a similar attitude was applied to the division of Yugoslavia (even to Croatia and Slovenia’s “European friends” tried to prevent it from gaining independence), as we see now with regard to the enemies of the free world, China and Iran – the independence of Kurdistan is not recognized, Taiwan is in an unclear status, occupied Tiber and Eastern Turkestan are not being helped, etc.
That is, it is sad. But there is also a positive – regardless of the desire of an inert and spineless bureaucracy and blind politicians without a vision and strategy – the dynamics and logic of history determine the determinism of certain processes, such as the entropy of weak and large empires, so – they are doomed to be dismantled (regardless of the wishes of Bush, Kissinger, Sullivan, Burns, etc.)

The speakers at the seventh forum held in Japan last August

What would be the fate of the Russian communities in the new subjects that would be born following the dismantling of the Russian Federation?


Probably, it will be different. Future independent states will have different paths and structures, very different from each other, there will be significant regional integration (with current neighbors outside the perimeter)
Probably, the main trend will be integration and the creation of new political nations, where ethnic origin will not play a key role, and the main factor will be precisely citizenship and values;

Recent history presents us with numerous scenarios of civil war, or wars between states that arose following the collapse of the Soviet system throughout Eastern Europe, as well as in the former USSR. How would it be possible, from your point of view, to prevent the crumbling of the Russian empire from causing a myriad of these small conflicts, or ethnic cleansing against the old Russophile elites who governed, and partly still govern, the territory?


In fact, by the standards of history, the collapse of the USSR was virtually bloodless, violence was minimal. And where it was (as in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo during the breakup of Yugoslavia), their source and cause was precisely the revanchism of the former metropolis (Serbia and Russia, respectively).
Some conflicts in which Russia did not take an open and direct part (such as the Armenian-Azebarjan war) were deepened and artificially supported by it (divide and conquer), so as soon as there were opportunities to reduce its influence, the conflicts quickly escalated (what we actually observe there now).
There are no panaceas, but there are definitely conditions that can reduce the likelihood of conflicts (because the new states are not interested in this, they need to deal with their own state building and development, in particular:
1. Maximum integration of new states into both global and regional institutions with the participation of the leading states of the region (which can be temporary “moderators” in case of problems)
2. Eliminating the grounds for revanchism in the former metropolis through (double-parallel) both economic integration and military deterrence
3. Comprehensive involvement of the free world in the reconstruction programs of the newly independent states of the post-Russian space.



Based on the statements, the forum identifies itself as a non-violent, democratic, anti-authoritarian, as well as anti-imperialist organization. Let’s start from the first of the characteristics mentioned, non-violence as an approach to political struggle. How do you think you will be able to convince the Moscow government to recognize the reasons of the subjugated nations, through the instrument of non-violence?

Many recipes and tools demonstrate the experience of liberating both Central European states and the USSR from communism 30 years ago.
At the same time, our emphasis on nonviolent actions (which have a significant arsenal of acts of sabotage, strikes, manifestos, etc.) does not exclude some elements of violent resistance, but we are talking about the fact that the corresponding acts of direct (in particular, violent) countermeasures should be maximally limited, controlled, justified, effective and targeted.
One of the best ways to do this is the synchronization and coordination of the actions of national liberation and anti-colonial movements – alternate losses in the war against Ukraine and its own size – the empire simply cannot physically prevent simultaneous secessions.

8) The Forum defines itself, as we were saying, as an organization based on respect for democratic principles. What does it mean, from your point of view, to carry out a “democratic” fight against Russian imperialism?

We consider it unnecessary to “reinvent the wheel”, that is, we share all the main liberal and humanistic values ​​characteristic (and underlying) of NATO and the EU (with the exception, unfortunately, of Turkey and Hungary, whose authoritarian governments are increasingly in the opposite direction), in particular – freedom of will, freedom of speech, presumption of innocence, distribution of branches of power, limitation of terms of tenure in public positions, civil and civil accountability, prerogative of international law, absence of censorship, etc.

Being anti-authoritarian is certainly identified among the founding values of the Forum. This is particularly evident in your policy document, in which the forum states that “post-Russian” countries would seek cooperation from all countries, except China, which is currently under an authoritarian regime. How can the Forum ensure that some of the political realities that emerge from the fragmentation of the Russian Federation do not end up becoming bridgeheads for Chinese authoritarianism instead?

Of course, we cannot provide guarantees, as the future is uncertain and realities are dynamic.
However, we can support the existing opportunities and conditions, which is that now the leaders of the national liberation and anti-colonial movements have an anti-China position, and if the states of the free world will maintain open political, economic and cultural ties with it, their integration into global/regional markets and institutions,  they will not have no reason to drift away from cooperation with the EU, USA, NATO, Japan, etc. in the direction of the PRC.

One of the most interesting themes regarding your program is that of replacing the “territorial” element, which often inspires policies of greatness to the detriment of neighboring countries, with a system of international law based on populations and on compromise between nations, oriented towards the well-being of peoples rather than nationalist claims. Could you explain this “revolutionary” point of your program better?

In our opinion, it is important to learn from previous experience, trying to avoid repeating mistakes. A very eloquent example is the refancism and revisionism of Serbia, which affected not only Bosnia and Kosovo, but above all itself, after the breakup of Yugoslavia.
In the modern post-industrial world, the size and resources actually do not matter (and if they do, the bigger they are, the more difficult it is), because the main capital is people and their intellectual potential. At the same time, good neighborly relations and open borders create much more opportunities than an additional piece of “historic land” where people will die, military expenditures will increase, and trade will be complicated.
In addition, the very concept of “historical lands”, like “historical justice”, is very subjective and ambiguous, in contrast to international law and already existing borders (in particular, still “internal” administrative ones, as in the case of the Russian Federation), that is, if to summarize, our view is directed to the future, not the past, to collective security and cooperation (in particular with/within the EU and NATO), and not to ethnic irredentism.

Do you believe that the solution of replacing the Russian Federation with an open confederation, modeled on the European Union, for example, or directly integrated into it, could solve the problem of irredentism? And could Moskovia be part of this subject, in your opinion, without returning to hegemonise it in the long term?

Since Russia itself is a 100% artificial and unnatural entity, any attempt to change this Frankenstein will bring the same results.
Post-Russian spaces (in the plural), as well as their future independent states, are completely different and distinct, and each will have its own path – for Buryatia, Sakha, the Pacific Federation, interaction with Japan, Mongolia, Korea, etc. is much more natural, and not Moscow for Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Astrakhan – with Kazakhstan and Turkey, not Moscow, Ingria and Keningsberg are part of the Baltic region, some states (including the Federation of Zalesye, which will include Moscow as a former metropolis if it chooses Austria as a “benchmark” example) may eventually become members of the EU and NATO, – this is a very likely way)

Another cornerstone of the thought behind the Forum is the rejection of the so-called “Realpolitik”, which leads democratic and liberal regimes to enter into agreements of convenience with authoritarian, or fundamentalist, regimes for tactical purposes. Does the rejection of realpolitik therefore mean embracing a system of ethical values? If so, what could these values be?

Exactly. In the pursuit of minor tactical advantages, cooperating with dictators, murderers and tyrants, we all lose much more by legitimizing and aiding their aggressive and dangerous (especially for the free world, not only their own citizens) systems.
The ethical principles of both internal and external politics have long been formed, this is the basis of our (Western civilization), which has its roots in Athens and Rome, through the Renaissance and, above all, the political ideas of the Enlightenment (Locke, Kant, Montexieu, etc.) to the New Age with the General Declarations and human rights and the founding documents of the United Nations.
To be very general and to cut short, the categorical imperatives formed by Kant should apply to states, as well as to individuals.

GAZA LIKE GROZNY: IMPERIALISM HAS ONLY ONE FACE

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Reading in the newspapers about the tragic bloody events that are taking place in Palestine is like watching the remake of a film that humanity has already seen many times, along that terrible trail of blood that is the history of imperialism. Anyone who knows the recent history of Chechnya will be able to identify the similarities between the war unleashed by Russia against Ichkeria in 1999 and the one unleashed by Israel against Palestine a few days ago. The genesis and development of both these products of imperialism seem to be almost overlapping.


Let’s start with geography. The Gaza Strip borders on two parts with the State of Israel, on another with the Mediterranean Sea and finally with Egypt, via the Rafah crossing. As we know, Israel has blocked both the land and sea borders, forcing Gaza into a de facto siege through which Tel Aviv literally maintains the right of life and death over the two and a half million Palestinians who live there. Chechnya in 1999 was also in the same situation: surrounded on three out of four sides by the Russian Federation, it could only count on a precarious mountain road, the Itum Khale – Shatili highway, to evade the economic blockade to which Moscow had subjected the country since since 1997.

Chechnya is closed on three sides by Russia, and has only one alternative border, with Georgia, via a narrow mountain pass


From a political point of view, the Gaza Strip should be part of an independent Palestinian state, recognized by Israel and the UN, but even today the government in Tel Aviv (According to the Israelis and their American protectors, Jerusalem) has not accomplished no step in this direction, preferring to consider that territory a sort of “no man’s land” to be administered with periodic military “pacification” incursions. Chechnya in 1999 also lived in a “suspended” state similar to that of Gaza. The Russian Federation, which had signed a Peace Treaty with the Chechen government, had never ratified the country’s independence, and persisted in considering it a subject of the federation, threatening any government that implemented a recognition procedure with serious retaliation. of the independence of Ichkeria.

Since 2008, the Gaza Strip has been de facto governed by Hamas. It is an extremist party, responsible for numerous terrorist actions already before October 2023, and considered a terrorist organization by most Western countries. Its power is essentially based on the desperation in which Israel artificially keeps the Palestinian population, forced to live in a state of severe overcrowding, with an income approximately 75 times lower than that of Israeli citizens, forced to ration water, food, medicines and electricity and to pray to the Israeli occupiers to be able to leave that “large ghetto” that is the Strip. A situation very similar to that experienced in Chechnya in 1999, when the weak Maskhadov government, democratically elected, operated under the blackmail of armed militias of Islamist orientation, without being able to counter the warlords’ belligerence with the social policies necessary to revive the fate of the population and distance them from the flattery of the more radicals. Also in this case the invader of the moment, Russia, did not provide war reparations to restore the economy that it had devastated with the invasion of 1994 – 1996, delaying or blocking the payment of pensions and allowances to citizens Chechens and, as in the case of Gaza, by making the country dependent on electricity supplies, it fomented a population reduced to poverty, pushing it into the arms of fundamentalism.

Gaza is closed on three sides by Israel, and has only one alternative border, with Egypt, via the Rafah crossing


Exactly as happened in October 2023 in Gaza, in August 1999 a small army of sappers, led by the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev, carried out a raid deep into Dagestan, with the intention of promoting a general uprising against Russian power and establish an Islamic emirate. In this case the objectives are slightly different (Hamas declared that the action was aimed solely at hitting the Israeli army and demonstrating the vulnerability of the State of Israel) but the dynamics are surprisingly similar: penetrated almost without encountering resistance, evidently to due to a relaxation of security measures that almost seems to have been caused intentionally, Basayev’s men, like those of Hamas, advanced for several kilometers before being blocked by a rapid (perhaps too) rapid military deployment and driven back into Chechnya. A “suicidal” action that seemed tailor-made to give Russia a casus belli and justify a new invasion. To complete the picture came a series of terrorist attacks against condominiums in various Russian cities (for which it has not yet been clarified who and why carried them out) which caused the death of three hundred people and the wounding of another 1000, causing a wave of popular indignation that the rising star of Russian politics, Vladimir Putin, was able to skilfully ride, winning the presidency of the Federation on the promise of “killing terrorists even in the toilet”.

Hamas militants

Upon closer inspection, even the terrible massacre carried out by Hamas has its “political beneficiaries”. It is surprising that, even in this case, Tel Aviv’s legendary security services failed so spectacularly to prevent the attack, they who have always been so diligent in infiltrating spies, in hunting down enemies of the state in any part of the globe, and in preventing hostile actions against Israel. While less surprising, unfortunately, is the political advantage achieved by Prime Minister Netanyahu, in the midst of a crisis of consensus until a few days earlier, and now back in the saddle with an “emergency government” that can finally have a free hand in “resolving” the problem Palestinian with the methods most similar to the narrow nationalism that the Prime Minister represents.


But the analogies do not end here: the military operation unleashed by Israel to avenge its deaths has a disproportion that is comparable only to that used by Putin against Chechnya. Today as then, after a total blockade of the borders and a terrorist campaign against the civilian population (with missiles launched on the markets, columns of refugees targeted, water and electricity services cut, humanitarian aid blocked) it is declared that the aim is not to punish a people and carry out a genocide, but “create a buffer zone”, a “cordon sanitaire” that safeguards the attacker from the response of the attacked. And in the meantime the civilian population is advised to “leave”. Where? It’s not important. For what civilian lives are worth, they can go and die of thirst in some basement. If the Israeli Defense Minister generically defined the target of the invasion as “human animals”, in the Kremlin the Chechens were seen no differently.

Basayev’s militiamen about to invade Dagestan


There is one thing that Gaza and Grozny do not have in common: the name of those who destroyed them. Yet the reason behind the martyrdom of Chechens and Palestinians is the same: the arrogance of a people that claims to crush another, implementing all the tools, legal and illicit, moral and immoral, to pursue its goal. Which is nothing other than imperialism, the political sublimation of arrogance, of cynicism, of selfishness elevated to a cult of the self, capable of bending and deforming every political, civil and moral virtue. These days, the Putin who unleashed the genocide of the Chechens is outraged by the Palestinian genocide unleashed by the Israelis, who in turn were outraged when Putin bombed refugees or tortured them in the filter camps. Each of these characters, in Moscow as in Tel Aviv, in Beijing as in Washington, accuses the others of being “the evil empire”. But the truth is that the Empire is itself “evil”, and that there are no “good empires”.

I CINQUEMILA GIORNI DI ICHKERIA – Marzo 1992

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1 Marzo

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – Allo scopo di interrompere le indebite appropriazioni di beni pubblici, soprattutto quelli afferenti ai magazzini della Protezione Civile, o la loro rivendita illegale da parte dei funzionari pubblici, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 17 il Presidente della Repubblica ordina un censimento generale delle proprietà ed un nuovo protocollo di autorizzazione per il loro utilizzo attraverso speciali permessi presidenziali.

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Con Decreto Presidenziale numero 16, recependo un’iniziativa del Parlamento della Repubblica, il Presidente Dudaev assegna un edificio precedentemente a disposizione del KGB ad un’unità medico – diagnostica a disposizione della popolazione infantile e femminile della Repubblica.

2 Marzo

POLITICA LOCALE – Su iniziativa del Sindaco di Grozny Bislan Gantamirov vengono aperti in città quattro negozi “sociali” destinati alla raccolta ed alla distribuzione di cibo e vestiario agli indigenti. Tale misura è volta a sostenere le fasce deboli della popolazione, sempre più colpita dal rialzo dei prezzi e dalla crisi economica generale.

Bislan Gantamirov (in abiti civili) presenzia ad un’ispezione insieme a Dzhokhar Dudaev (in mimetica)

3 Marzo

NEGOZIATI RUSSO/CECENI – I rappresentanti russi e ceceni si incontrano a Sochi per iniziare un ciclo di negoziati. Dal governo russo arriva la disponibilità a continuare nel limite del possibile il trasferimento dei fondi necessario al pagamento degli stipendi pubblici e dei salari.

5 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – In ordine a garantire locali adeguati alle strutture del comparto giudiziario della Repubblica, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 19 “Misure per migliorare le condizioni di lavoro dei tribunali distrettuali della Repubblica Cecena” il Presidente Dudaev ordina che gli edifici, le risorse ed il mobilio appartenute al disciolto Partito Comunista dell’Unione Sovietica siano ceduti in uso alle corti di giustizia.

6 Marzo

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – Umar Avturkhanov, Governatore dell’Alto Terek e principale leader dell’opposizione a Dudaev, pubblica un appello al popolo ceceno nel quale invita i suoi concittadini a non ubbidire al governo indipendentista.

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – A Grozny i rappresentanti dei dipendenti pubblici minacciano uno sciopero generale se il governo non assicurerà il pagamento degli stipendi.

POLITICA ESTERA – Dudaev invia una dichiarazione ai governi di Azerbaijian, Tatarstan, Baskhortostan e Turkmenistan proponendo un’unione monetaria alternativa al rublo, considerato uno strumento imperialista di destabilizzazione per le repubbliche “produttrici di petrolio”.

CRISI RUSSO/CECENA – Reagendo al blocco economico in atto da parte della Federazione Russa, Dudaev dichiara il blocco alle esportazioni dei prodotti strategici (in particolare dei lubrificanti per aerei, dei quali la Cecenia è produttore – leader con il 90% del fabbisogno di tutta la Russia) fin quando Mosca non riaprirà le frontiere.

ECONOMIA E FINANZA– La situazione economica nel paese peggiora di giorno in giorno. Il governo non ha le risorse necessarie a garantire il regolare pagamento degli stipendi. Insegnanti e forze dell’ordine non hanno ricevuto né lo stipendio di Gennaio, né lo stipendio di Marzo, e minacciano di scioperare.

10 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Al fine di garantire le risorse necessarie al suo funzionamento, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 18 il Presidente Dudaev alloca la somma di 200.000 rubli per le spese correnti della neocostituita Corte Suprema della Repubblica. Tale misura dovrà essere implementata con la costituzione di un’apposita voce nel bilancio statale.

12 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Con la Legge numero 108/1992 Il Parlamento promulga la Costituzione della Repubblica Cecena. La nuova carta fondamentale, ispirata alle costituzioni occidentali, identifica lo Stato come una repubblica democratica di tipo parlamentare, fondata sul rispetto dei diritti della persona, dei diritti civili e della tolleranza religiosa.

Con Decreto Presidenziale numero 23 il Presidente Dudaev riforma la Protezione Civile Nazionale, assumendo il potere di nomina dei suoi massimi rappresentanti e delegando al Sindaco di Grozny la gestione della protezione civile nella capitale.

POLITICA ESTERA – La delegazione cecena, guidata dal Ministro degli Esteri Shamil Beno giunge a Dagomys, in Abkhazia, dove incontra la controparte russa per iniziare i negoziati tra i governi di Grozny e di Mosca.

Le tre più alte cariche del Parlamento di prima convocazione: Il Presidente del Parlamento, Akhmadov (Al centro) ed i due Vicepresidenti, Mezhidov (a sinistra) e Gushakayev (a destra)

12 Marzo

POLITICA ESTERA – Settanta deputati provenienti dalla Georgia vengono ospitati in sessione dalle autorità cecene, alla presenza dell’ex presidente georgiano Gamsakhurdia e del Capo dello Stato ceceno, Dudaev. Con questo gesto il Presidente della Repubblica Cecena prende una chiara posizione politica in favore dell’ormai decaduto leader georgiano.

12 Marzo

NEGOZIATI RUSSO/CECENI – I negoziati tra Federazione Russa e Repubblica Cecena portano alla sottoscrizione di un documento condiviso nel quale si identificano alcune aree di integrazione politica ed economica tra i due paesi.

I negoziati proseguono mentre la Federazione Russa indice per il 31 Marzo la cerimonia di firma di un nuovo Trattato Federativo con il quale tutti i soggetti federati della Russia fisseranno i loro rapporti con il governo centrale. I moderati ceceni spingono perché la Cecenia firmi il Trattato, ma Dudaev ed i nazionalisti pretendono che prima la Federazione Russa riconosca l’indipendenza della Cecenia.

15 Marzo

NEGOZIATI RUSSO/CECENI – Di ritorno dalla sessione negoziale nella cittadina di Dagomys, la delegazione cecena comunica che il prossimo incontro si terrà a Mosca, e che la delegazione russa ha promesso di allentare il blocco finanziario della Repubblica Cecena se questa ricomincerà ad esportare i prodotti derivanti dalla lavorazione degli idrocarburi.

16 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Per favorire gli investimenti nella repubblica il Parlamento vara una moratoria sull’imposta sul reddito, e la abolisce per l’anno di imposta 1992. La misura serve anche a rottamare una enorme quantità di debiti privati nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione, cui la maggior parte dei ceceni non riesce più a far fronte, o che non intende pagare.

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – Continua lo sciopero degli insegnanti e di altri dipendenti del pubblico impiego a causa dei ritardi nel pagamento degli stipendi. In particolare gli insegnanti lamentano il fatto di non aver ancora ricevuto lo stipendio di Gennaio. Il governo assicura che presto i pagamenti riprenderanno regolari, a seguito di accordi per la vendita di prodotti petroliferi che dovrebbero portare alle casse dello Stato la liquidità necessaria a mettere il tesoro in pari con i pagamenti.

17 Marzo

CONFLITTI SOCIALI – Intere categorie di lavoratori pubblici entrano in sciopero a causa del mancato pagamento dei salari. Le scuole, colpite dall’astensione lavorativa degli insegnanti, rimangono chiuse. Il Ministro dell’Economia Taymaz Abubakarov promette che il tesoro ricomincerà a pagare regolarmente gli stipendi non appena la Russia interromperà il blocco dei trasferimenti finanziari.

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Il Parlamento della Repubblica approva una legge con la quale reintroduce l’alfabeto latino in funzione di quello cirillico, imposto dall’Unione Sovietica negli anni ’30. Secondo il parere dei deputati, questo è più aderente alla fonetica della lingua cecena.

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – l’opposizione anti – dudaevita fa circolare volantini nei quali si chiedono le dimissioni di Dudaev. Gruppi armati antidudaeviti prendono posizione nei dintorni di Grozny.

Uno dei leader dell’opposizione antidudaevita, Umar Avturkhanov

20 Marzo

POLITICA ESTERA – Con Decreto Presidenziale il Presidente Dudaev ordina al Ministero degli Esteri di stabilire regolari relazioni diplomatiche con la Repubblica di Georgia “non appena l’ordine costituzionale sarà ripristinato”. Il provvedimento è essenzialmente un gesto di amicizia politica al decaduto presidente georgiano Gamsakhurdia, il quale attualmente risiede a Grozny e lavora alla riconquista del potere sostenuto da numerosi ex esponenti del Soviet Supremo Georgiano, anch’esso disperso a seguito del colpo di stato dell’anno precedente.

20 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – Dudaev promulga il Decreto “Sulle aliquote di dazio statale da addebitarsi sulle domande e sui reclami presentati in tribunale, nonché sulle imposte degli atti notarili e dello stato civile” con il quale calmiera i prezzi degli atti pubblici, agevolando la popolazione vessata dalla crisi economica ma riducendo al minimo gli introiti a disposizione del comparto della giustizia, il quale già versa in una cronica carenza di risorse per poter funzionare.

24 Marzo

POLITICA NAZIONALE – In ordine a razionalizzare i servizi sanitari della Repubblica, con il Decreto Presidenziale numero 30 Dudaev stabilisce la conversione del centro medico del Ministero degli Interni in ospedale policlinico al servizio dei dipendenti pubblici e delle forze dell’ordine, decretando che tale struttura sarà finanziata da specifiche voci di bilancio a carico delle istituzioni statali che utilizzeranno la struttura.

25 Marzo

MOVIMENTI POLITICI – Il Congresso Nazionale del Popolo Ceceno (OKChN) dal quale sono emerse le forze che hanno scatenato la Rivoluzione Cecena, delibera una nuova sessione da tenersi in Maggio. La Costituzione appena approvata non ha riconosciuto al Congresso alcuno spazio istituzionale, ed i nuovi rappresentanti dell’organizzazione, emersi dal “travaso” di molti dei suoi leaders nelle istituzioni della Repubblica, rivendicano il ruolo centrale che a loro parere il Congresso dovrebbe avere nella Cecenia indipendente.

Yaragi Mamodaev, di ritorno da un viaggio privato in Giappone, relaziona riguardo ai suoi contatti con il Ministero degli Esteri del Sol Levante e con alcuni industriali, i quali si sono detti disponibili a saggiare le possibilità di una collaborazione economica.

A latere della sua conferenza stampa Mamodaev suggerisce che il Parlamento, dei cui 41 deputati soltanto uno (Gleb Bunin) è russo e nessuno appartiene ad alcuna delle minoranze che abitano la repubblica, dovrebbe sciogliersi e ricostituirsi secondo un criterio etnicamente più rappresentativo.

26 Marzo

TENSIONI SOCIALI – Sciopero dei vigili del fuoco, i quali lamentano ritardi di tre mesi nel pagamento degli stipendi. L’allentamento delle tensioni con la Russia ha fatto si che da Mosca siano arrivati 150 milioni di rubli per il pagamento di stipendi e pensioni, ma queste risorse sono ampiamente insufficienti a coprire gli ammanchi delle casse statali.

POLITICA NAZIONALE – In un incontro con l’Associazione dell’Intellighenzia della Repubblica Cecena, il Presidente Dudaev afferma che l’indipendenza del Paese non è in discussione, mentre lo sono tutti i suoi aspetti “collaterali”, come eventuali accordi di cooperazione economica con la Federazione Russa e con i paesi produttori di petrolio. In questo modo Dudaev ribadisce la propria totale contrarietà a qualsiasi negoziato di tipo federativo con Mosca, eventualità ventilata sia dagli stessi intellettuali, sia da correnti interne al Parlamento.

28 Marzo

TERRORISMO –  Una banda di sequestratori provenienti dal Territorio di Stavropol chiede asilo al governo ceceno, ma questo lo nega ed ordina l’arresto dei sequestratori, ed il rilascio degli ostaggi. I terroristi vengono da prima tradotti nell’edificio del Ministero degli Interni, poi in una caserma della Guardia Nazionale.

28 Marzo

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – La polizia antisommossa, dipendente dal Ministero degli Interni, è in stato di agitazione e chiede che il Ministero abbia riconosciuta una guida ufficiale, mentre adesso si trova diretto da un Ministro “de facto”, Umals Alsultanov, peraltro inattivo. Egli, già Ministro negli ultimi mesi di vita della ASSR Ceceno – Inguscia, era stato esautorato a causa della sua sospetta collaborazione con il Comitato di Emergenza responsabile del Putsch di Agosto e sostituito da Vakha Ibragimov, ma Dudaev lo ha riconfermato alla guida del dicastero nel suo “governo provvisorio”. Al momento della sua presentazione al Parlamento non ha ottenuto i voti necessari, pertanto si è posto in stato di riposo in attesa di dare le dimissioni in favore del suo successore. I funzionari del Ministero sono quindi divisi tra coloro che premono per una sua riconferma e coloro che chiedono la nomina di Ibragimov.

30 Marzo

CRISI POLITICA IN CECENIA – Milizie armate antidudaevite si radunano nei sobborghi di Grozny. In alcuni villaggi si segnala la distribuzione di armi a volontari disposti a mettere a segno un colpo di mano per estromettere il Presidente Dudaev e riportare la Cecenia nella Federazione Russa.

Vita quotidiana a Grozny nell’estate del 1992


31 Marzo

COLPO DI STATO DI MARZO –  Un gruppo di ex funzionari della RSSA Ceceno – Inguscia ed alcuni rappresentanti dell’opposizione, favorevoli alla federazione con la Russia tenta un colpo di Stato. Milizie armate e reparti inquadrati nella Guardia Nazionale occupano la TV e la Radio. Un “Comitato di Emergenza” si riunisce per costituire un governo di transizione che porti la Cecenia ad un Referendum sull’adesione alla Federazione Russa e successivamente a nuove elezioni parlamentari. Le unità del Ministero degli Interni, in questo momento prive di un Ministro e dirette dal Viceministro degli Interni, Udiev, rimangono acquartierate nelle caserme.

Dopo alcune ore di sbandamento una folla di sostenitori dell’indipendenza si raduna davanti al Palazzo Presidenziale, dove il Presidente del Parlamento Akhmadov legge la mozione dell’assemblea che condanna il colpo di stato in atto ed il Presidente Dudaev si appella al popolo affinché difenda l’indipendenza appena conquistata.

Nel corso del Pomeriggio la Guardia Nazionale riprende il controllo della città, espugna l’edificio della TV di Stato e costringe gli insorti ad abbandonare Grozny. Nelle sparatorie muoiono almeno quindici persone, ed una quarantina sono i feriti. L’opposizione moderata, critica verso il governo Dudaev, condanna parimenti le azioni del Comitato d’Emergenza, gridando ad un complotto ordito dalla leadership russa per provocare una guerra civile nel paese.

In serata il Parlamento torna a riunirsi in assemblea, mentre il Deputato e leader del VDP Zelimkhan Yandarbiev condanna i “nemici insidiosi del popolo ceceno” i quali, anziché accettare l’offerta di mediazione pubblicamente fatta dal Parlamento alcuni giorni fa, hanno deciso di prendere le armi contro lo Stato con ,’intento di rovesciarlo.

September 6, 1991 – Assault to the Supreme Soviet

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On the thirty-second anniversary of Chechen independence, we publish an excerpt from the first volume of “Freedom or Death! History of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” which retraces the events that led to the dissolution of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, and the proclamation of independence.

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In early September, the echo of the August Putsch began to fade in Moscow and the main Russian cities, and Yeltsin was able to return to rest his gaze on the turbulent peripheries of the empire. Chechnya had gone into a state of turmoil, but the Russian president did not give too much weight to the alarming reports from the local Supreme Soviet. He was convinced that all that noise was nothing more than an anti-caste regurgitation as had been seen so many at that time in the USSR. He thought that it would be enough to replace Zavgaev with someone else to be able to calm the hearts of the people and restore Chechnya – Ingushetia to social peace. So he thought of Salambek Hadjiev, a professor who had made headlines a few months earlier, when he was appointed Minister of Chemical and Oil Industry of the Soviet government. Born in Kazakhstan, Hadjiev had earned a position in academia, graduating from the Grozny Petroleum Institute and then working on it until he became its director. A prolific researcher, he was a member of the Academy of Sciences, as well as one of the leading experts in the petrochemical sector in all of Russia. Known for being a moderate anti-militarist (he was head of the Committee for Chemical Weapons and Disarmament) he represented in all respects the “mature” alter ego of the leader Dudaev. Yeltsin appreciated him because he could speak to both intellectuals and entrepreneurs, had a modern vision of the state and was a hard worker. He seemed to have all the credentials to compete with the General, who had his nice uniform, good rhetoric and little else on his side. The idea of ​​replacing Zavgaev with Hadjiev also pleased the President of the Supreme Soviet Khasbulatov, who, as we have seen, certainly did not like the current First Secretary. Hadjiev, on the other hand, was a man of high intellectual qualities like him (who was a professor) and like him he had a moderate and reformist vision. Arranging one of “his” people in power in Chechnya would also have been convenient for him in terms of elections, so he worked to ensure that the change took place as soon as possible.

Khasbulatov then headed to Chechnya to secure a painless changing of the guard. His notoriety, now that he was at the top of the Soviet state, his culture and his political ability would have allowed him to oust his hateful rival and to install a viable alternative that averted civil war and favored his position. However, there was to be reckoned with the nationalists, who grew up in the shadow of the crisis and rebelled during the coup.

To vanquish them, Khasbulatov drew up a plan. From his point of view, the nationalists were an amalgam of disillusioned, desperate and opportunists, held together by a vanguard of young idealists unable to rule the beast they were raising. Faced on the terrain of political debate, most likely they would have ended up being reduced to a residual fraction. Only the context, according to him, allowed them to occupy the scene. Despair and lack of alternatives were the ingredients of the mixture that threatened to break out the revolution. To neutralize the threat it was necessary to “change the air”: the opposition had strengthened against Zavgaev and his corrupt regime, getting him out of the way was the first step. There was to replace him with someone who had good numbers. And Hadjiev seemed the right one. The solution, however, he could not descend from above. It was necessary to establish an alternative consensus front to Dudaev and for this it took time. The nationalists had conquered the streets riding the wave of the institutional crisis. Getting them bogged down in a political diatribe by letting time pass, while the situation normalized, would have deprived the Dudaevites (as the supporters of the General began to call themselves) the ground under their feet. As socio-political conditions stabilized, the desperate would be less and less desperate, the disillusioned less and less disillusioned. People would have listened to those who called for calm and reforms rather than revolution and war, and the radicals would be marginalized. Finally, with a good democratic election, the moderates would have won and the revolutionaries would have lost.

Doku Zavgayev

A perfect plan, in theory, which, however, was based on two significant variables. The first: that Dudaev and his people were too afraid to force their hand, thus leaving the initiative to him. The second: that the situation in Moscow did not degenerate further. And Khasbulatov, unfortunately for him, could not control either the first or the second. Yet somewhere we had to start and so, from 23 August, the President of the Supreme Soviet went to Grozny, accompanied by Hadjiev, with the intention of killing Zavgaev. In a turbulent meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to the First Secretary who begged him to authorize the proclamation of a state of emergency and to disperse the opposition, Khasbulatov replied that the use of force was absolutely to be avoided, and that the solution of the crisis should be political, which meant only one thing: resignation.

Having cornered Zavgaev, he went to test his opponent. His first conversation with Dudaev seemed to be promising: the General welcomed him with affability and agreed to his proposal to dissolve the Supreme Soviet and replace it with a provisional administration to ferry the country into the elections. Satisfied, he returned to Moscow convinced that he had brought home a good point. The real goal, however, was achieved by the leader of the nationalists. Discovering Khasbulatov’s cards, he was now clear that no one would raise a finger to defend the legitimate government of Chechnya – Ingushetia: a casus belli would be enough to force the hand and take control of the institutions. Thus, while Moscow was toasting to the happy solution of the crisis, in Grozny the Dudaevites took control of the city and besieged the government, now without an army to defend it. Nevertheless, Zavgaev did not intend to give up. His abdication could only have been imposed by a vote of the Supreme Soviet, and almost none of the deputies had any intention of endorsing it, considering that a moment later the Soviet itself would be dissolved. Thus the situation remained at a standstill for a few days, with the government not resigning and the nationalists not abandoning the streets.

Between 28 and 30 August Dudaev began to test Moscow’s reactions: the National Guard broke into numerous public buildings, occupying them and displacing anyone who opposed them. Not a breath came from Moscow. Then the General ordered the establishment of armed patrols to guard the streets, and once again there was no reaction. Chaos was taking over the country and nobody seemed to care that much[1].

On September 1, Dudaev called the third session of the Congress. The National Guard presided over the assembly. Armed volunteers erected barricades all around. A group of militiamen entered in the Sovmin, occupied it and lowered the flag of the Chechen-Ingush RSSA, hoisting the green banner of Islam in its place. There was no trace of the moderates: ousted in the June session, they were now unable to influence public opinion in any way. The scene was all for the great leader, who exhorted Ispolkom to declare the Supreme Soviet lapsed. The delegates promptly agreed to the proposal and declared the Executive Committee the only legitimate authority in Chechnya. Once again, the reactions from Moscow were tepid, and mostly superficial. Khasbulatov himself, underestimating the gravity of the situation, he thought that Zavgaev’s replacement would be enough to split the nationalist front in two. Now, according to him, it would be sufficient to force Zavgaev to leave and replace him with Hadjiev, or someone else, to put the radicals in the minority. In reality, what was happening in Grozny was something much more serious than the political game that Khasbulatov thought he was playing. Dudaev had almost all public opinion on his side, he had his armed guards and was setting up a real government.

Dzhokhar Dudayev surrounded by his supporters

This was absolutely clear to the First Secretary, and it was even more so when on September 3, ignoring the directives of Moscow, he attempted to introduce a state of emergency through a resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet: no police or army department answered the call. While many of the Interior Ministry Militia men had already changed sides, those who had not taken a position simply avoided moving. Defeated again, Zavgaev remained holed up in the House of Political Education, where he had barricaded himself with his followers. Finally, on the evening of September 6, the National Guard also broke in there: a handful of men led by the Vice-President of Ispolkom Yusup Soslambekov entered the building. It is not known whether it was a premeditated action or the rise of agitation, the fact is that the crowd followed the militiamen and began to devastate everything. The deputies were beaten and silenced. Soslambekov placed in front of each of them a sheet and a pen and ordered them to write their resignations in their own hand. One by one, all the deputies signed. Under the threat of being executed on the spot, Zavgaev signed a waiver in which he “voluntarily” abandoned all public offices. Only the President of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, refused to sign. When questioned by Soslambekov, he replied: I will not sign. What you are doing is illegal, it is a coup! Moments later Kutsenko flew from the third floor, crashing to the ground. He would later be hospitalized, where he would die in excruciating suffering[2]. The moderates condemned the assault, disassociated themselves publicly and withdrew from the National Movement, constituting an alternative Round Table to Congress. Zavgaev was driven out of Grozny and took refuge in Upper Terek District, his native land. In Grozny, Ispolkom began to operate as a real government, setting up commissions, issuing decrees and occupying public buildings.

In Moscow the news of the insurrection was received almost with disinterest. It took four days before a government delegation, made up of the Secretary of State, Barbulis, and the Minister of Press and Information, Poltoranin, arrived in Chechnya to try to resolve the crisis. With Dudaev, the two tried a “Soviet” approach: in the roaring years of the USSR, when a person represented a danger to the Party and could not be sent to a gulag to clear his mind, he was promoted and kept good. Poltoranin and Barbulis thought that if they offered Dudaev a leading role, he might take the chance to get out of that mess in exchange for a good job and a hefty pension. Unfortunately for them the General wasn’t just smarter than they thought, but he was also more courageous and determined, and he really believed in an independent Chechnya. So the meeting ended in a stalemate.

Khasbulatov meanwhile had returned to Chechnya, where he hoped to resume negotiations with Dudaev where he had left them. The meeting between the two was resolved with a new draft agreement: the “fallen” Supreme Soviet would be dissolved, and in its place a “provisional” Soviet would be established to deal with ordinary administration pending new elections. Representatives of Congress would also have participated in this executive. Comforted by the apparent concession of the nationalist leader, the President of the Russian Supreme Soviet spoke to the masses thronged in Lenin Square. In front of a large crowd (who even spoke of a hundred thousand demonstrators) invited everyone to calm down, asked for the demonstrations to be stopped and put all the blame on Zavgaev, ordering him in absentia not to show up unless he wanted to be taken to Moscow in an iron cage. Finally, when an extraordinary assembly of the Supreme Soviet was convened, he induced the deputies to resign and to establish a Provisional Soviet of 32 members, some from the old assembly and some from the ranks of the Executive Committee. The last act of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet was a decree calling for new elections for the following 17 November.

The building that housed the Presidium of the Chechen – Ingush Supreme Soviet

Once again it seemed that the situation had been recovered at the last minute, and Khasbulatov set about returning to his duties in Moscow not before Dudaev had fully recommended that the agreements be respected. He did not even have time to land in the Russian capital, which was greeted by a resolution of the Executive Committee of the Congress, just made to vote by Dudaev, in which Ispolkom recognized the Provisional Soviet as an expression of the will of the Congress, and warned him to go against the will expressed by it[3]. The declaration also contained an electoral calendar different from the one agreed: fearful that normalization would weaken their position, the nationalists decreed that elections would take place on October 19 and 27, respectively for the institutions of the President of the Republic and Parliament. Nobody in Moscow knew for sure which president and which parliament they were talking about: the Constitution of the Chechen-Ingush RSSA did not provide for any of these institutions. From the tone of the declaration it was now clear that the National Congress intended to proclaim full independence.

[1]The riots that broke out following the August Putsch had led to the paralysis of government departments, which was beginning to show its first harmful effects on everyday life. On August 28, about 400 inmates from the Naursk penal colony rose up, attacking the garrison of garrison, setting fire to the watchtowers, devastating the service rooms and occupying the prison facility. Two days later fifty of them, armed with handcrafted knives and weapons, occupied a wing of the building. All the others had escaped, dispersing among the demonstrators.

[2]It is unclear whether Kutsenko threw himself from the palace in a panic attack or was deliberately ousted. According to some, it was he who threw himself downstairs, beating his head against a cast iron manhole. Other versions speak of a guard of Dudaev, or of Soslambekov himself, who would have thrown him against a window when he refused to sign his resignation. Even regarding his hospitalization, the testimonies are conflicting. According to some, the angry mob attacked him, filling him with kicks and spit. Others, like Yandarbiev himself in his memoirs, say that Kutsenko was promptly picked up and taken to hospital, but he refused to be examined by any Chechen doctor for fear of being finished. As there were no Russian doctors available, he ended up in a coma, only to expire a few days later. However, the investigation into Kutsenko’s death would not have established any responsibility. The official version reported by the Prosecutor’s Office was that the President of the Grozny City Council voluntarily threw himself downstairs, frightened by the crowd.

[3]The text of the declaration, organized in sixteen programmatic points, began by condemning the Supreme Soviet, guilty of having lost the right to exercise legislative power, of having committed a betrayal of the interests of the people and of having wanted to favor the coup d’état. Some of the main political exponents of the Congress were appointed to the Provisional Soviet (Hussein Akhmadov as President, as well as other nationalists chosen from the ranks of the VDP). The Soviet would have operated in compliance with the mandate entrusted to it by Congress: if a crisis of confidence had occurred, this would have been rejected by the Executive Committee and promptly dissolved. The solidarity of parliaments around the world and of the countries that have just left the USSR was also invoked, in opposition to the attempt by the imperial forces to continue the genocide against the Chechen people.

“Independence is not a whim or an ambition. It is the necessary condition of our survival as an ethnic group” Thomas de Waal interviews Aslan Maskhadov (April 2002)

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In an interview with IWPR, Maskhadov said that armed resistance by the rebels would continue as a means of “self-preservation” against the Russian army, but that he was seeking a political solution. Questions were sent by IWPR’s Caucasus Editor Thomas de Waal via an intermediary in March 2022, via a Chechen intermediary. The interview was recorded in late April in Chechnya, before the death was announced of the Arab warlord Khattab. Maskhadov’s answers, recorded on cassette, were returned to IWPR in London only last week.

Thomas de Waal

What is the general situation in Chechnya at the moment? What can you say about the ‘clean-up’ operations by Russian troops, about the level of resistance of Chechen fighters, about losses on both sides?

The general situation in Chechnya is dictated by the logic of a protracted war that is senseless for the men who began it. Almost three years after the beginning of the second war, the Russian side has not achieved any of its aims. At least they have not managed to break the resistance of our warriors and they will not be able to. As a result of this all the rage and cruelty of the occupiers is falling on the civilian population. And recent months have been especially hard for the inhabitants of the foothills and mountains of Chechnya. Every day Russian troops are carrying out endless ‘clean-up’ operations in these places, with robberies, murders and disappearances. General Moltenskoi devised his new tactic (ceaseless brutal clean-ups) with the idea of bringing people to the point where they would catch our warriors themselves and give them up to Russian forces. But it seems that the general is ill acquainted with the history and mentality of our people. And he also forgets that the men whom he is asking to be given up are the brothers, sons, husbands and fathers of the people his soldiers are subjecting to daily tortures and humiliations.

Russian special forces policeman patrols a street in Chechen town of Gudermes, 29 March 2001, as Chechen family looks at him, standing in front of the gates of their house, with bullet marks on them. The situation in Chechnya is set to improve significantly in the near future, the head of the pro-Moscow administration in Chechnya Akhmad Kadyrov said today, adding that Russian President Vladimir Putin as maintaining “an uncompromising line” with Chechen separatists and that there was “no question of talks” with rebel President Aslan Maskhadov. (Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV / AFP) (Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images)

Recently [at the end of March] the general, wishing to come across as a champion of human rights, issued an order requiring the search operations be carried out in the presence of a member of the prosecutor’s office and the local administration, that the armoured vehicles which took part in the operation have numbers on their hulls and the soldiers identify themselves in the houses of people they were making checks. This order was advertised by [Sergei] Yastrzhembsky [the main Russian spokesman on Chechnya] in the media pretty much as though it was the UN Declaration of Human Rights. However in reality it turned out to be just a propaganda trick. In the latest operations in Tsatsan-Yurt, Kurchaloi, Gekhi and other places the same scenes were repeated – there were armoured personnel carriers without numbers, OMON troops in masks, beatings, robberies and dozens of people disappeared without trace.

Even if General Moltenskoi wanted to, he is incapable of reining in the fighters who are out of control and long ago forgot what army regulations and order are. From the beginning they are recruited to carry out punitive operations against civilians and have turned into real bandit formations under cover of being state structures.

As I said before, the Russian side has completely turned on the civilian population. They keep away from the places where our units are deployed. Even though attacks on Russian army columns and checkpoints have not stopped for a single day. Diversionary raids are carried out on the points where enemy units are deployed. The daily losses of Russian forces vary between ten and 50 in men killed alone. There are losses on our side. That is a fact of war. But they are significantly fewer than the enemy’s because we are using partisan tactics and act in small groups and do not allow large numbers of men to be concentrated in one place.

What is your status now, as your presidential term has expired, but new elections have not yet been held? How do you see the resolution of this problem?

There cannot be some special solution for this problem in our republic. We strictly follow the dictates of international law and our constitution. Until fighting ends and there are conditions, which allow the free expression of will by the people, there can be no elections and elections are not held in these circumstances anywhere in the world. As soon as the fighting stops and the right conditions are created I will be the first with the initiative to hold elections in the republic. I assure you, it would be much more pleasant for me to be an ordinary voter in peaceful Chechnya than the president of a republic at war. So, whether the Russian authorities like me or not, to end the war they will have to hold negotiations with the legally elected authorities of Chechnya, headed by President Maskhadov. If they want to keep on repeating that the puppet regime of [Russian-appointed leader Akhmad] Kadyrov is the lawful authority in the republic, let them summon him to Moscow and sign any agreement with him on ending the fighting. We’ll see how that works out.

Do you have any contact with any Russian officials and, if so, what are you discussing?

I do not have any direct contacts with the Russian leadership. I have appointed Chechnya’s deputy prime minister Akhmed Zakayev to make these contacts. He met the president of Russia’s representative for the Southern Federal District, Vladimir Kazantsev and keeps up contact with him. But it has not got beyond general conversation. The Russian side is too afraid of its generals to have serious concrete discussions with him.

In the opinion of many people in Chechnya and outside Shamil Basayev and Khattab bear a large degree of responsibility for the second war in Chechnya. Do you believe they still enjoy support in Chechnya and it is possible to seek a way out of the situation by removing them from the game?

It would be naïve to suppose that the fifty or so volunteers who set off with Basayev to Dagestan, which was at that time totally gripped by an internal conflict (in the Tsumada and Botlikh regions and the villages of Karamakhi and Chebanmakhi), were the reason for such a wide-scale war, which has lasted for almost three years. In case the Russian public was not convinced that this was reason enough to begin a massive war (Dagestan is far away and few people understand what goes on there), they also engineered the explosions against buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities and blamed them on the Chechens. So the war against Chechnya was planned before and was not the result of a chain of accidental events.

But that does not mean that the leadership of Chechnya welcomed or encouraged Basayev’s actions in Dagestan. Quite the opposite. I called for an early meeting with the leaders of Dagestan and the other North Caucasian republics to combine our efforts and work out ways of not letting such conflicts occur. The first man to reject the idea of this meeting was the leader of Dagestan, as strong pressure was put on him from Moscow; for them the whole planned invasion of Chechnya would have been put under threat if the meeting had taken place. All these things are now well known to the public thanks to the revelations of one of the players of this game, Boris Berezovsky. The current Russian leadership is trying to present it as though only he was responsible for all this. But he is only one of the players in the game and not the main one.

As for Basayev and Khattab, they are active participants in the resistance movement and their removal from the game, as you put it, can only weaken overall resistance and not bring the end of the war any closer.

From left to right: Abu Al – Walid, Shamil Basayev, Ibn Al – Khattab and Ramzan Akhmadov

Everyone understands that this time Russian forces will not simply leave Chechnya and that in both Russia and Chechnya many people are suffering a great deal because of this. What concessions are you ready to make in order for the bloodshed to stop? Are you ready, for example, to agree to a freezing of your independence declaration in return for genuine negotiations?

As we understand it, independence means above all independence from the whim of bureaucrats, who sit in Moscow offices somewhere and decree the fates of our people without facing any punishment. Genocide has continued for several centuries now and no one has borne any responsibility for it (true, the recently formed UN Human Rights Criminal Tribunal does inspire some hope).

Armed resistance is a means of self-preservation when no other methods of defence are available. International institutions, charged with defending us and created specially for that purpose are unable to do so. Nor can the world community, which can raise its voice in defence of the Bosnians, the Timorese, the Hutus and Tutsis, the Kosovars, the Croatians and so on. In their case prominent states have the courage to send peacekeeping forces to the conflict region, impose sanctions on aggressor countries, establish international tribunals and so on. In our case, all our efforts lead only to statements by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and human-rights organizations and a handful of politicians, whose conscience and civil courage does not permit them to remain silent about the horrific crimes which are being committed in Chechnya.

So ending resistance will not guarantee for us ending the genocide. Rather the opposite. Being undefended would make us even more vulnerable in the face of the arbitrary behaviour of the Russian military machine. I want to be understood correctly. Independence is not a whim or an ambition. It is the necessary condition of our survival as an ethnic group. If Russia is prepared to undertake internationally, through the mediation of other states or international organizations, that from henceforth it will not allow itself any more armed aggression against Chechnya, if Putin is replaced by Ivanov or Ivanov by Sidorov, or in the case of any political change-over, then we are ready to discuss any questions with the Russian side, including questions of independence. Of course we well understand that we are not situated on some island, somewhere in the ocean, but next door to Russia and in some places our border runs down a country road or through a ploughed field. We are in the same economic, energy and ecological space as Russia. We share the same water resources, transport communications and many other links. So, if good will can be found, no obstacles are insuperable.

Ruslan Gelayev

What can you say about Ruslan Gelayev, his presence in the Pankisi Gorge and his raid into Abkhazia last year? In whose name was and is he acting?

In any war and especially in one so bloody and protracted as the current one in Chechnya transformations occur which are hard to understand for a person who is far away from events. Ruslan Gelayev has long been absent from Chechnya and I cannot say whether he is in the Pankisi Gorge or somewhere else. I have not given him any order to leave the territory of Chechnya and I await his explanations.

PUBLISHED ON:

https://iwpr.net/global-voices/maskhadov-seeks-negotiations

WAR MEMORIES: FRANCESCO BENEDETTI INTERVIEWS AKHMED ZAKAYEV (PART 2)

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The following is the transcript of the first part of the interview between Francesco Benedetti and Akhmed Zakayev conducted by Inna Kurochkina for INEWS (we attach the link to the original video, which will soon be accompanied by English and Italian subtitles)

On 6 March 1996 the armed forces of the ChRI launched their first major offensive action of the conflict: the so-called “Operation Retribution”. According to what I was told by Huseyn Iskhanov, then Representative of the General Staff, the plan was conceived in Goiskoye and saw your participation, as well as that of the Chief of Staff, Maskhadov, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Saydaev. Do you remember how you planned this operation?

Yes, of course I remember that. This, in principle, came out of the operation that we carried out to blockade the city of Urus-Martan in order to prevent elections. After this operation, my Chief of Staff Dolkhan Khadzhaev and I met with Dzhokhar Dudayev. And we suggested the option that something like this should be done. We understood that any of our actions in order to make any attempts to change this situation, the Russians needed at least three days, theoretically.

It took them three days to recover and start doing something. And then we started talking about the possibility of blocking several districts at the same time. And then Dzhokhar Dudayev said: “You see how good it is when a team works. I, he says, was with these thoughts and thought about how best and what kind of operation we should carry out.

It was then that the idea arose to carry out this operation in the city of Grozny, in the city of Dzhokhar – in the future.

And on the same day, it was decided to invite Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the General Staff, to call him to our side, and from that time, almost two or three days after we discussed this with Dzhokhar Dudayev, we began preparations over this operation. Practically – we had our own intelligence in Grozny, we knew where each Russian unit was concentrated, and we did additional work and identified all these points where Russian units are located. Where are checkpoints, commandant’s offices, military units.

Yes, Umadi Saidaev, the late Umadi Saidaev, he was the Chief of the Operational Headquarters, and then, later, Aslan Maskhadov arrived there, and together with the Commanders of the Directions who were supposed to take part, we developed this operation.

Returning again to Operation Retribution, this was a success that the ChRI leadership chose to use more symbolically than strategically. In your memoir you recall that at the time the decision to withdraw from Grozny, despite having taken it under your control, did not please you, and that even now you maintain that what was achieved in the following August, with Operation Jihad , could have been achieved with Operation Retribution. Finally, you say: In March of 1996 we probably had the opportunity to finish the war victoriously, and then much of our recent history could have gone differently. What do you mean by this sentence? Are you alluding to the fact that Dudayev was still alive, or to the fact that the Russian presidential election had not yet been held? Or again, to something else?

I thought about the elections in Russia last, because there have never been any elections there. Yes, the very fact that Dzhokhar was alive at that time could have been of great importance, and the course of history could have been completely different if the war had ended with Dzhokhar Dudayev alive. And it is unlikely that the Russians would go for it, I also admit this, on the one hand, I admit that they would not go. They made every effort to eliminate Dzhokhar Dudayev, and subsequently to seek peace. As for this operation, I’m just sure of it. Yes, then we planned the operation for three or four days, but there was no concrete decision, such that we would leave in three days. Because Dzhokhar Dudayev arrived in Grozny, he was at my Headquarters in the city of Grozny, in my defense sector, in that part of the operation that the units under my command took part, he arrived there, and we were together last night at our headquarters. And I remember the reaction of Dzhokhar Dudayev when he learned that there was an order to leave the city, that some units had already begun to leave Grozny. He did not agree with this, because you can really assess the situation when you see the situation in the process, how it changes, and based on this you must draw conclusions and make decisions. Dzhokhar Dudayev was in Grozny for the first time after the Russian occupation, we traveled with him at night, in Grozny at night, we went to the bus station, he watched all this destruction, and when we returned to the Headquarters, some of our units had already begun to leave. He said: “Well, if there is an order, it is necessary to carry it out.”

And we retreated. And I later thought about it, because nothing more than what we did for the month of March, we did nothing in August. This operation was repeated one by one in the same way, and with the same forces and means. Even in August, we initially had and at the beginning of this operation, the funds involved were two times less than in the March operation. And therefore, I am sure that if we had stayed in Grozny … (well … history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood). What had to happen happened. But I remain of my opinion that it could have been different. But this is already from the area of \u200b\u200b”could”.

But that did not happen.

In March 1996 you faced, as commander, what was perhaps the biggest defensive battle fought by the Chechen army in 1996. I am referring to the Battle of Goiskoye. I’ve read conflicting opinions regarding the choice to face the Russians in that position. Some argue that the defense of the village was senseless, resulting in numerous unwarranted casualties for the Chechen forces. Others argue that if Goiskoye had fallen too soon into federal hands, the entire Chechen defense system could have shattered. After all these years, what do you think?

To prevent the enemy from reaching the foothills, to block him in the village of Goyskoe, this was, from a strategic point of view, militarily an absolutely correct decision. This decision was made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Yes, I also know that there is such a statement, but based on real losses, we did not suffer any serious losses during the defense of Goisky. Yes, there were dead, several people who died were injured, but there were no such losses. There is no war without loss. Well, in a strategic sense, the protection and defense of Goisky kept the front line, which moved from Bamut to Alkhazurov. Alkhazurov fell under Russian control, but Komsomolskoye also fell under Russian control. But in Goyskoe we didn’t let them go any further. We prevented the passage of the Russians up to the foothills. And thus they retained the Front and the front line. And this was of very important strategic importance, all the more so against the background of the fact that the Russians began to talk about negotiations, about a truce. If we talk about a truce and start a conversation with them about a political dialogue, naturally, the preservation of a certain territory that we controlled, this was of great political importance, and in connection with this, Dzhokhar Dudayev made the decision to protect Goiskoye. Yes, we lasted a month and a half. And later, after the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev, when Bamut had already fallen, it was decided to leave Goiskoye. But as long as Achkhoy and Bamut were on the defensive, we held the line of defense in Goyskoye as well.

But when the front had already been interrupted there, it was pointless to continue to hold the front line and lose our fighters. And so it was decided to withdraw our units already to the mountains. Subsequently, we already redeployed closer to the city and began to prepare for the August operation.

After Dudayev’s death, power was transferred to Vice-President Yandarbiev, who took office as Interim President. Was the decision to transfer power to him unanimous? Or were there discussions about it?

In principle, there were no discussions, one vote was against, the rest all spoke in favor of recognizing Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev as Vice President. It was in line with our constitution, presidency provision, and it was accepted. And Zelimkhan Yandarbiev began to act as President.

After Yandarbiev assumed presidential powers, he appointed you as Presidential Assistant at Security. What were your duties in this position?

Yes. He appointed me Assistant to the President for National Security. And at the same time, that unit, that is, the Third Sector, which I commanded, I was simultaneously appointed Commander of the Separate Special Purpose Brigade. That is, the unit that I commanded, being the Commander of the Third Sector, he was also transferred to the Brigade, to the status of the Brigade under the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Basically, this was done because Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, after we retreated and put up the Presidential Palace at the beginning of the war, he was inside the Presidential Palace until the last moment, until we left the city. Since that time, in principle, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev has not been involved in military operations, and over the past year and a half, over the past year, new units have already been created and new people have appeared in these military structures. And naturally, Zelimkhan needed a person who knew this whole system militarily, and, of course, we worked with him and in the near future Zelimkhan was introduced to the course in all Directions, Fronts and our units, and already as the Supreme Commander, he Subsequently, he began to manage these processes himself. And my task included power components. And later it was transferred, after graduation this position was transferred, retrained to the position of “Secretary of the Security Council”.

And before the elections, in principle, I performed these functions.

War Memories: Francesco Benedetti interviews Akhmed Zakayev (Part 1)

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The following is the transcript of the first part of the interview between Francesco Benedetti and Akhmed Zakayev conducted by Inna Kurochkina for INEWS (we attach the link to the original video, which will soon be accompanied by English and Italian subtitles)

1. On December 6, 1994, a few days before the federal army invaded Chechnya, a delegation appointed by Dudayev went to Vladikavkaz to confer with the Russian Minister for Nationalities, Mikhailov. In your memoirs you say that a certain number of oil entrepreneurs joined the delegation led by the Minister of Economy Abubakarov. What do you think was the purpose of their presence? Is it possible that among the proposals that the delegation should have presented was an agreement on the exploitation of Chechen oil, or on the exploitation of Chechen refineries?

At that moment and during that period, the presence in this delegation of the Minister of Economy and Finance Abubakarov, Deputy Prime Minister Amaliyev, was not associated with any possible agreements on the operation of oil refineries. They were then our representatives and proxies of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Not only did they “join”, they were included in this delegation. And from there they went from Kizlyar to Moscow, to further study the issue of preventing military aggression from Russia, to prevent a war. Dzhokhar did everything possible to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya. And practically our delegation was in Moscow, headed by Tyushi Amaliyev, with Abubakarov, the Minister of Finance and Economy, and when Russia began to bomb Grozny. On December 11, despite everything, Yeltsin signed a decree on the introduction of troops and the start of a military campaign. Therefore, at that moment and in that period, it was not about the operation of oil wells, or rather, the use of oil refineries, or the Chechen oil that was produced at that time.

2. At the outbreak of war you placed yourself in the service of President Dudayev, and within a few months you were given the task of setting up an autonomous front. At the time you were the Minister of Culture, certainly no one expected you to take up arms and fight a war. Why did you decide to enlist?

(laughs)

The fact is that I did not go to the service of Dudayev. I was appointed Minister of Culture of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by Dudayev’s decree. No one served anyone or anyone. We worked for our state, and Dzhokhar Dudayev, as president, had the authority to appoint and dismiss. My appointment was in October, when Dzhokhar Dudayev offered me to work in his team. I accepted it despite everything that happened. I just say in my book that for me there was no difference, it was absolutely obvious that there would be a war. And I told to Dzhokhar: “Dzhokhar, it makes no difference to me in whose capacity I will defend our fatherland, my place is here, with my people. Whether a janitor, whether a minister .. ” And Dzhokhar then said, I remember his words, I just wrote about it. He said: “No, there will be no war. The world will not allow this. I won’t allow it. There will be no war, we need to do creative work. And your place is exactly in this direction. And so you must accept my offer.” I accepted this offer. I returned to the republic, and already on the first day, November 18, I officially went to work, and on November 26 the war began. In principle, this is the first invasion of Russian troops under the pretext of the “Chechen opposition” into the city of Grozny, where they were defeated.

And now for the second part of the question. The fact is that according to our legislation, I think that it is the same in Italy, the same laws, members of the Government, if a war starts, they become liable for military service, regardless of their positions. Culture, or art, it doesn’t matter, everyone becomes liable for military service. I, in principle, before I was appointed commander of the seventh front, I joined the people’s militia. I remember that day, December 28, when my office of the Ministry of Culture, in the Mayor’s Office building, was bombed, and on the same day I… There were people on the square who signed up as volunteers for the people’s militia. I signed up for this people’s militia, and only on January 11, Dzhokhar recalled me from my position as Minister of Culture, because a meeting of the Government was scheduled. And I returned from my positions to the Government meeting on January 11. And on this day Dzhokhar entrusted me with another task, I also wrote about this in my memoirs, and later, already in March, when the city was abandoned and we retreated to the foothills, at that time Dzhokhar signed the Decree on the creation of the Seventh Front and appointed me Commander. That is, we began to form this front, in general, from scratch.

3. After the fall of Grozny in Russian hands, and the withdrawal of the Chechen forces on the mountain defense line, the government was reorganized in order to make up for the defections of some senior officials, but also to function more streamlined in a context of total war. This “war government”  continued to function throughout the duration of the conflict, and overcame the death of Dudayev, placing itself at the disposal of the Interim President, Yandarbiev. How did this government operate, and how did it manage to meet, to keep in touch with the President?

The Military Government, what you call the Military Government, was the State Defense Committee, which was formed by Presidential Decree when the military aggression began. And this body was the Supreme State Organ. Parliament stopped its legislative activity. The government had already been transferred to a military footing, and the State Defense Committee was formed as the Supreme Body of State Power. It included members of the Government, members of Parliament, the Leading Military Command represented by the General Staff, and Commanders of Fronts and Directions. And this Government functioned all this period. How were the meetings? Naturally, we all knew where the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was located, in which part of the republic. And periodically he convened a meeting of the State Defense Committee, and we discussed issues related to the continuation of resistance, with defense. Questions of a military nature were discussed in connection with the preparation of military operations or attacks on enemy territory.

All these points were discussed at the meeting of the State Defense Committee, and it functioned very effectively. It was a small number of people, but they were people who were directly involved in all processes – political, military, economic issues. These questions were also not the last ones, because providing the units with the necessary provisions, this was also within the competence, the questions of the State Defense Committee. And all these issues were discussed and functioned very effectively due precisely to the fact that Dzhokhar Dudayev did not go into deep underground, into forests, into the mountains, where it would be impossible to get him, he held personal meetings with all units, not only with the State Defense Committee but also with military units. He went to the front line, to the front line, met with ordinary soldiers. And now all our defense and all our resistance fighters, they all took a very responsible attitude to which side Dzhokhar Dudayev was on. I mean, along the front line, where active hostilities are taking place, the soldiers knew that behind them, behind their shoulders, there was already the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Or they disputed, along the Argun River, when he crossed over to the other side, those parts of the resistance, the Armed Forces took it for pride, proudly announced that the Supreme Commander was now on our side of the front. There was a very friendly atmosphere. When I remember these times, this period, despite all the difficulties that we then experienced, there was a war, but the people were different. We were different. The Chechens were completely different. They were different from today’s Chechens, who live in the territory and who are outside. And all this was connected, I think, with the fact that we were under Soviet occupation for seventy years, and for the first time we had a chance to build our own state. Independent state. And now the leader of this movement and the state, and later the leader of the Defense and the leader of the national liberation movement, he inspired in many ways and not only the fighters, but the entire Chechen people to resist and repel aggression. These were simply amazing times in the history of the Chechen people, when the whole people actually accomplished a feat. It was thanks to the feat of the Chechen people that we managed then to preserve both the power structures and what we were doing. And basically win.

4. Between March and May 1995, according to what you refer in your memoirs, you were in charge of setting up, in record time and with almost non-existent resources, the so-called “Seventh Front” south of Urus – Martan, which would serve as a point of contact between the stronghold of Bamut and the rest of the Chechen deployment. In your book you tell how the Seventh Front was born. Could you explain how it developed, which units made it up, and which operations it carried out until June 1995?

This happened in March, Dzhokhar Dudayev signed a decree. By this time, all our units had moved to the foothills, when the flat part was already mainly under the control of the Russian aggressors, and the foothills remained, starting from Bamut and to Alkhazurov, in this direction, and there further up, to the Grozny region, Chishki, Dacha Borzoi. This side was not yet occupied by the Russians, and it was necessary to create a unified defense in this direction, from Bamut to Alkhazurov. And the consciousness of the Seventh Front, and the task of the Seventh Front, was precisely this. And it practically turned out basically, this is the so-called Urus – Martanovsky district, it was believed that this area was loyal to Russia, the Russian aggressors, because the occupation regime functioned there, the occupation power structures, headed by Yusup Elmurzaev, the then prefect, who was appointed occupation mode. The creation of this front and the main task was the creation of military bases in the three gorges. These are Martan Chu, Tangi Chu, Roshni Chu. It was in these three gorges that we formed three military bases in just a few months. Although at the time when the decree was signed, there were practically no military units there. There were only militias, people who were part of the people’s militia, but there was no centralized command, and we in a short time, from those units, from those people’s militias that were then in this region, we created this Seventh Front, and a centralized military unit, under the centralized command of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Dzhokhar Dudayev. Subsequently, this Seventh Front was already transformed into Sectors – the South-Western Front and Three Sectors – the First, Second, Third Sector. These sectors were under my responsibility.

Later I was in charge of the Third Sector of the Southwestern Front. Speaking by surname, these are, in principle, our young middle-level commanders, Dokka Makhaev, Dokka Umarov, Khamzat Labazanov, Isa Munaev, all these guys … Akhyad (I will not name him by his last name, because he is alive and is on the territory), Khusein Isabaev, these guys, then the middle link of commanders who headed these Sectors, and this Direction. Although it was already such a single military unit, which was part of the Armed Forces and had already been structured into the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI.

5. In the spring of 1995 you could consider yourself one of the main army officers of the ChRI, therefore you were definitely monitored by the FSB, and by the intelligence of the Russian army. How did federal forces try to stop you and other senior officers from participating in the resistance? And how did you manage to evade Russian attempts to track you down?

First of all, God protected us. And, secondly, it is the Chechens and the Chechen people. We were at home. We were in our native villages, in our native settlements. And of course, the Chechen people, in fact, were the main protection of those who were then in the Armed Forces. And President Dzhokhar Dudayev, you know, the republic is small, all this time he was among the Chechens, he was in different settlements, and every village where the fighters stopped, although there were also opposition-minded and cowardly people, but in general, our supporters, supporters and independence, and those who supported our national liberation movement, they were much stronger and were much more numerous. They managed to prevent both assassination attempts and those ambushes that set not only me, but also those who were then involved and were listed in the ranks, as you said, in the highest composition of the Command, and all of them were protected by the Chechen people. And, of course, not everything was under the control of either the FSB or the Russians. Life and death are in the hands of God. And those reasons, those actions that were taken by us in order to survive, and what the Chechens did with us, the Chechen people, protecting their commanders, people who defended their homeland, their fatherland and themselves.

“Nothing new in Ukraine” – Interview with Khavazh Serbiev

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Khavazh Serbiev served as the Prosecutor General of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria during the period between the first and second Russian invasions of the country. In June 2022 he gave an interview to Ukraina Today ( https://ukrainatoday.com.ua/ ) about the parallels between the ongoing war and those fought by the Chechens. Below is the translation of the interview.

You investigated the crimes of the Russian army. If we compare the actions of the Russian army in Chechnya and what they did in Ukraine, is there anything more similar or different?

In Ukraine, nothing new has happened, nor is it happening, compared to what has been done in the Chechen Republic. Everything is mirrored: only the scale is different, because your people (the Ukrainians, Ed ) are many times more numerous than the Chechens, and the territory is vaster. Everything else is the same. This is so familiar to us that we are even surprised: nothing changes in the policy of the Russian state and in the actions of its army!

Why did the world community react rather slowly to statements about Russian war crimes in Chechnya? Why was it considered an internal affair of Russia, or why did Russian propaganda manage to dehumanize the Chechens, saying that terrorists were fighting there?

Of course, the whole world believed that the Chechen territory and the Chechen people were subjects of the Russian Federation. And nobody wanted to change that. Although in November 1990, according to the laws of the USSR, the Chechen Republic was actually brought on an equal footing with other union republics (the republics that made up the USSR, ed. ) . But nobody wanted to change that. Also, Russia is a large nuclear state. It seems to me that this factor played a leading role.

In the end, everyone at that moment had their own problems. Ukraine, Belarus and other states had left the USSR. They didn’t even want to ask this question. And the rest of the world – the West and other states – for them this business was happening in a distant place, they didn’t care. The Chechen side was accused of using unacceptable methods. That is, they blamed the victim and the abuser by the same standards. There was some kind of fear or reluctance to intervene in this problem.

Is it important to involve foreign experts in war crimes investigations or is it enough to use our own forces?

It is very important to involve foreign experts. Because in a dialogue with Russia it is unrealistic to do something yourself. Naturally, the basis is created on site. It’s easier for you Ukrainians, but for us it was practically impossible. I believe the whole world should be involved in this process. It is important to have an international opinion, an international investigation. This is the only way it can work.

How did war crimes investigations unfold after the first Chechen war?

A criminal case for genocide was initiated in the Attorney General’s Office. The material, collected in every district of our territory, was conveyed to the apparatus of the General Prosecutor’s Office. Evidence of Russian military genocide and war crimes was investigated in every district. And it all came together in a common criminal case, which reached 64 volumes. Each volume is at least 400 pages. This is what we have been able to cover. Before the start of the second Russian aggression, however, we were unable to transfer a certain amount of this material to an international authority, such as the Hague Tribunal.

Why?

Because Russia has created huge problems inside Chechnya, events have overlapped one another in wave after wave. Law enforcement agencies and, of course, the Prosecutor General’s Office simply did not have time to bring at least part of this case of war crimes of the Russian army in the Chechen Republic to a conclusion. We just didn’t make it. By the time the second attack had begun, we handed over part of the materials to the Tribunal in The Hague. Approximately 12 volumes of materials have been delivered. Some were returned because they were considered irrelevant under international law. We had no experience. There are only 6 volumes left. Meanwhile, active hostilities began again and soon the whole territory was completely occupied. And any further process was suspended again.

Grozny destroyed

During the first war, which Moscow lost, Russian troops brought a lot of trouble to the Chechens. How could it be that during the Second World War Moscow found relatively many allies among the Chechens? In particular, Kadyrov supported them.

The Russian regime, the relevant authorities and services involved in the Chechen Republic have taken into account their previous mistakes. The “hat toss” dominated the minds of politicians and military during their first campaign. As a result, they took these moments into account and did a huge undercover work to attract new members to this agent network, and also launched powerful propaganda within Russia itself.

Imagine when the second campaign began: immediately on the state television of Russia sounded “Get up, the country is huge!” (popular song written during WWII to mobilize the masses against the German invasion, Ed. ) as it sounded during WWII when Hitler attacked the USSR. I’ve heard it myself. You get goosebumps when you hear this song. Imagine that against the tiny Chechen Republic, which some can’t even find on the map! And then suddenly the Chechens became a “fascist force”. The same thing that has now been done against Ukraine.

The Second Chechen War was preceded by terrorist attacks on the territory of Russia, in which the Chechens were blamed. What do you know about it?

Solid disinformation, which has been played a lot not only in Russia, but throughout the world. Many believed it. Why was it so masterfully presented using the regime controlled media. It was so obvious to us that this was a lie that we were just taken aback. There was a lot of evidence that these were provocations, that this was done by the Russian special services. But there was simply no one to listen to us. And the materials that we tried to smuggle overseas through the media in the West simply disappeared. They were broadcast, they were reported, but there was no response.

Shamil Basayev in Daghestan, 1999

There was another reason for the second war – the invasion of Shamil Basayev’s detachment in Dagestan. Why did it happen?

Yes, there was an encroachment of some groups, there were Chechens even on the territory of Dagestan. This cannot be denied. If you knew how different these groups were! There were people from all over the North Caucasus, including Dagestan. Bagautdin alone (one of the leaders of the “Islamic Shura of Dagestan” – ed. ) brought 2,000 people to our territory. And the people got the impression that it was the Chechens who were moving like an avalanche across the territory of Dagestan with the aim of occupying, assaulting, etc. It looked completely different than what eyewitnesses saw. Everyone, of course, saw what they wanted to see. But I assure you, not even half of the Chechens were there. Most of them were people from other republics, there were also volunteers from the Middle East … Naturally, President Aslan Maskhadov, from the very beginning, when information began to pour in, was categorically against it. And this was not the action of the armed units of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Under no circumstances! These were volunteers who made their choice and took part in this operation.

Did President Maskhadov have the opportunity to stop Basayev’s action?

At that time, on the borders of the Chechen Republic, throughout the North Caucasus, there was a massive concentration of Russian troops, huge. Why were they concentrated in these places? We didn’t have troops on our borders, there wasn’t even the possibility to do that. For example, there was no conscription in the army as such. And to contain the volunteers or Basayev himself, who acted alone, would have meant an intra-Chechen military confrontation. The transition to the territory of Dagestan took place in a matter of days. I believe that for Maskhadov it was, on the one hand, unexpected and that in any case there were no adequate forces to organize some kind of barrier to prevent this encroachment.

Among the Russian soldiers who died in Ukraine, there are many people from Dagestan. How to explain it?

Dagestan is mostly a mountainous area. There are many high-altitude villages that live independently. We can say that the main reason is poverty. In the Russian Federation, this is a common phenomenon in the outback. And in Dagestan there is poverty, and therefore …

Young Lithuania and New Chechnya – Francesco Benedetti interviews Stanislovas Buškevičius

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Stanislovas Buskevichius was a member of Lithuanian Seimas , the Lithuanian legislative assembly between 1996 and 2004. As a member he supported many initiatives in support of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, even presenting a legal act for its recognition by Lithuania. Francesco Benedetti interviewed him for Ichkeria.net

Biography

Born in Kaunas on September 14, 1958, since his adolescence he took part the national and democratic movement against the Soviet dictatorship, participating in demonstrations and distributing anti-Soviet literature. After graduating from Vilnius University with a degree in economics (1985), he began teaching Western politicaleconomy at the Kaunas Medical Institute. Because of his pro-Lithuanian independence ideas, his course was closed. In November 1988, he signed the Young Lithuania manifesto, which called for the restoration of an independent and democratic Lithuanian state. Between 1989 and 1990 he was one of the promoters of the boycott of the Red Army, through which thousands of military draft cards were sent back to Moscow, and promoted the demolition of Soviet monuments in Kaunas. After his visit in Paris at the invitation of the French Human Rights Association, between 1993 and 1996 he worked as a consultant to the Lithuanian Government for youth policies.

Was elected a member to Kaunas City Council (later Deputy Mayor) between 1995 and 1997, and between 2007 and 2015, in 1996 he was elected a member of the Seimas , the Lithuanian Parliament. As a member he registered 20 legal acts, regulations and drafts. Among its main activities Buskevicius indicates the promotion of physical activity, sport and a healthy lifestyle, support for Ukrainians, Chechens and other peoples who are fighting against the Russian occupation, the protection of animals.

His hobbies are culture, sport, international politics, reading. He is the father of three children.

Buskevicius calls himself a Lithuanian, a believer, a democrat.


Interview

In 1991 Chechnya proclaimed independence. How did Lithuanian public opinion experience this news? And how did you experience it? What political measures have been taken to support Chechen independence?

In 1991 Lithuanians supported the independence of Chechnya. Our common enemy was and is Russian chauvinism and imperialism. Yes, we Lithuanians demanded Chechnya’s independence to be recognized.

In 1994 the Russian Federation invaded Chechnya. How did the Lithuanian institutions express themselves towards this invasion? What was your point of view regarding this crisis?

In 1994, our newly formed Young Lithuania party and I, as well as all Lithuanian patriots, condemned the Russian invasion and the war against Chechnya. We protested. In 1995, as a member of the Kaunas city council, I demanded the assembly to recognize Chechnya's independence. The Kaunas city council, as well as many other city and district governments, recognized Chechnya’s independence.


Aminat Sayeva, representative of ChRI in Lithuania and Akhyad Idigov, President of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs of ChRI, attend the sports event organized by Buskevichius

In August 1996 the ChRI armed forces retook Grozny and forced the Russian leadership to sign the Khasavyurt Accords. What were the reactions in the Lithuanian parliament? And in general, how did public opinion react to this unexpected victory?

In 1996 I was elected member of the Lithuanian Seimas (Parliament). In 1997, I submitted to the Seimas a legal act on the recognition of the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 23 members voted in favour, 45voted against. All of Lithuania rejoiced at the Chechen victory.


As a result of the war, Chechnya found itself free, but badly destroyed. Have the Lithuanian government and civil society taken measures to support the Chechen people?

Civil society supported and sympathized with Chechnya. Lithuanian parliamentarians went to Chechnya, and the Seimas established a parliamentary group for relations with the Chechen parliament. Lithuania provided humanitarian assistance to the Chechen people. My idea was to start international recognition of Chechnya through sport. In 1997 In Kaunas, together with the athletes, I organized a unique kickboxing tournament to win the cup of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Athletes from Lithuania, Latvia and Ichkeria participated in the tournament, Ichkeria’s national anthem was played, and the flag was raised. In 1998 we invited athletes from Chechen Republic of Ichkeria   to the official European Kickboxing Championship,  therefore protesting   athletes from Russia and Belarus refused to participate in it. With this project I came to the Titanas martial arts club directed by Maries Misunas. He gladly agreed to help organize these tournaments.  On May 17, 1998 kickboxers from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria took part at our invitation at the European championship in Kaunas, as representatives of an independent state. The fights in the ring were tense, and the audience was thrilled. Many Lithuanian patriots, especially General Sergejus Madalovas , provided great assistance. Between 8 and 9 April 1997, a bill concerning the recognition of the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was presented to the Sejmas by two parties: the Young Lithuania party and the Lithuanian Labor Party. The bill was indeed scheduled, but ultimately failed to win a majority of votes.

Participants of the international championship in Kaunas, 1998

Why, in your opinion, did the Lithuanian Parliament choose not to recognize Ichkeria?


April 3, 1997, I presented in my personal capacity (not on behalf of the party) a resolution on the independence of Chechnya. The authorities, in their hearts, sympathized and supported Chechnya, but did not dare to make any actions. Vytautas Landsbergis supported me ideologically, but personally he told me that since Lithuania is not a member of NATO, there was a risk of a response from Russia. I urged him not to be afraid.

The president of the Seimas , Vytautas Landsbergis, spoke publicly on June 16, 1997. His response to Ichkeria was this: Lithuania’s decision to recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic is not the most important thing now. The chairman of the interparliamentary group for relations with Chechnya, Rytas Kupchinskas, told a Kommersant Daily correspondent that the issue of recognizing independence will be resolved very gradually. In your opinion, do these statements mean that there was actually a negotiation between the Chechen and Lithuanian delegations for the recognition of the ChRI?


I think there could have been talk of recognizing Chechnya's independence. I knew Landsbergis and I knew Kupcinska. They supported the independence of Chechnya in their hearts, but did not dare to recognize it. I personally stood up against the Russians even during the occupation, I hadn’t been a pioneer, nor a member of the Communist Youth , nor a communist. I had the KGB on my tail, so I was more determined.

As regards the inter-parliamentary group for relations with Chechnya, do you recall what activities this group has carried out to strengthen political relations with the ChRI?

The resolution of accession by the ChRI Parliament


The Chechen Liaison Group held meetings and made public statements. His work was helpful.

As a deputy of the Lithuanian Seimas , do you remember whether there were any further legislative proposals or other public initiatives in support of Chechnya during your mandate?


I don’t remember anyone else officially proposing to recognize Chechnya, other than me. Civil society and many politicians support the struggle of Chechens and Ukrainians against Russia. As a former member of Seimas , I proposed to recognize the genocide of the Chechen people, following the example of what the Ukrainian parliament did (LINK). But the chairman of the Seimas Foreign Affairs Committee , Zygimantas Pavilionis , is blocking this resolution. I suggested to Aminat Sayeva (former Foreign Minister of ChRI) to establish as soon as possible an Olympic Committee of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Brussels or Kiev, and to request participation in the Paris Olympics in 2024, instead of the Russians. I think this would be very important in Chechnya’s struggle for independence!

THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC OF ICHKERIA IS A SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

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As is known, the right of peoples to self-determination is one of the basic principles of international law, which means the right of each people to independently decide on the form of their state existence, freely determine their political status without outside interference and carry out their economic and cultural development.

He received recognition in the process of the collapse of the colonial system , and was enshrined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (adopted by Resolution No. 1514 of the XVth UN General Assembly of December 14, 1960) and subsequent international pacts and UN declarations.

This principle, along with other principles, is proclaimed in the UN Charter, which aims to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” The same goal is set in the UN Charter in connection with the development of economic and social cooperation between states.

Further, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 19, 1966 (Article 1) state: “All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development … All States Parties to the present Covenant … must, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, promote the exercise of the right to self-determination and respect this right.

The Declaration on the Principles of International Law (October 24, 1970) also states: “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, enshrined in the UN Charter, all peoples have the right to freely determine their political status without outside interference and to carry out their economic, social and cultural development and every State has an obligation to respect that right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.”

Ikhvan Gerikhanov with Vakha Arsanov

The same Declaration states that the means of exercising the right to self-determination can be “the creation of a sovereign and independent state, free accession to or association with an independent state, or the establishment of any other political status.”

Similar principles are enshrined in the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Final Document of the Vienna Meeting of 1986, the document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the OSCE Human Dimension Conference of 1990 and other international legal acts .

These international principles and the right to self-determination are directly related to the formation of the Chechen state. Without going into a historical digression about the existence of state formations among the Chechens since ancient times, we will dwell on the subject of the formation of the national statehood of the Chechens during the collapse of the USSR and after its liquidation.

According to Article 72 of the Constitution of the USSR, which was a amended by the Law of April 3, 1990, the right to secede from the Soviet Union was provided for only to the republics of the Union. It was also provided there, in the second and third parts of the said law, that “the decision to change the status and secession of an autonomous republic or an autonomous region from the USSR is possible only by a referendum. “

The first of the republics to use this right Russian Federation and on June 12, 1990, it proclaimed its sovereignty outside the USSR.

This initiative for self-determination was also supported on the territory of the Chechen Republic of China , where on November 23-25, 1990, the 1st Chechen National Congress was convened and a decision was made on behalf of the Chechen people to declare the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchicho . In fact, this was an act of a referendum, since the representatives of the congress, on behalf of the Chechen people, decided to choose a free path of development within the framework of the current legislation of the USSR and the RSFSR. It was precisely this path that the RSFSR chose when it convened its next congress of people’s deputies and proclaimed its sovereignty outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

So, the decision of the congress of the Chechen people was and legally fixed by the legally existing Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, which on November 27, 1990 issued a Resolution declaring the state sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.

Dzhokhar Dudaev at the second session of the Congress, 1991

In a word, the Chechen people (taking into account that later the people of Ingushetia also wished to live as part of the RSFSR), in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, while observing domestic law, expressed their will to self-determination at a new stage of their development. This corresponds to the legal establishment of the Declaration on the Principles of International Law (October 24, 1970 ) , which states that every people can freely determine its political status and carry out its economic, social and cultural development without outside interference.

Also, the said Declaration on State Sovereignty of the CHIR allowed to obtain an equal legal status, like the RSFSR, i.e. the status of a union republic.

This legal status did not change even after August 19, 1991 , when an attempt was made in Moscow against the president of the USSR , from which a wave of protests began throughout the entire territory of the union state.

Did not become an exception, which ultimately lost power in the republic and transferred powers again formed by the Provisional The Supreme Soviet is from among the deputies of the highest authority of the republic. The task of this Council was to prepare and conduct democratic elections to the state authorities of the republic, which it failed to cope with, and the election commission, created by the National Congress of the Chechen People, took over the preparation of the elections.

As a result, on October 27, 1991, parliamentary and presidential elections were held. Based on the will of the people, the President and the Parliament of the Republic were elected, thereby once again securing the right of the Chechen people to self-determination.

It follows from this that the inalienable right of the people to self-determination is connected with its national sovereignty and is the basis of its international legal personality. If peoples have the right to self-determination, then all other states have the duty to respect this right. This obligation also covers the recognition of those international legal relations in which the people themselves are the subject.

Hussein Akhmadov, speaker of the Parliament, with the vicepresidents, Mezhidov and Gushakayev

The will of the people, which elected the bodies of state power and administration , was once again enshrined in the Decree of the President of the Chechen Republic of November 1, 1991, proclaiming state sovereignty, thereby continuing the will of the Chechen people, expressed at the first congress on November 23-25, 1990.

Then, on March 12, 1992, the Constitution of the Chechen Republic was adopted and entered into force. And on June 12, 1992, all units of the former Soviet Army stationed on sovereign territory left the republics and, thereby de facto recognizing the sovereignty of the Chechen people.

It should be noted that since the declaration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Chechen Republic, the latter has not taken part in all the ongoing activities to create authorities in the Russian statehood. Thus, the Chechen Republic did not sign federative agreements and did not participate in the formation of the state power of Russia, as well as when voting for the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which was adopted on December 12, 1993, i.e. almost more than a year and a half after the declaration of sovereignty and the adoption of the Constitution of the Chechen state

Thus, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria , which received a change in name in 1993, in terms of compliance with domestic and international requirements for self-determination, quite legally and reasonably established its legal personality, created its own institutions of state power and administration within the country , while creating representative offices in other states of the Caucasus and the world. That is, from the point of view of international law, we are talking about the activities of sovereign states a , with its inherent features of a subject of international law.

By the way, it will be said that in this period of time, before the start of the conflict with Russia, it was precisely as a subject of international law that CRI was recognized by states such as Georgia and Afghanistan, and our countries were already ready to open official representative offices of the state with the right to present credentials by ambassadors mutually. But, as you know, these intentions were frustrated due to the change in the format of power in Georgia and the beginning of the second Russian aggression against our republic.

Direct relations between the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation also testify that there was compliance with the rules and protocol when interacting as subjects of international law.

While launching various Protocols and Agreements signed by these two states, both on the territory of Russia and in The Hague (Netherlands), when resolving the issue of resolving the military conflict, it should be recognized that the election of the President of the CRI on January 27, 1997 put a legal end to the issue on the status of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In the presence of international observers from the OSCE member states, on the basis of the Constitution of the CRI and in accordance with international law, the result of the election of state bodies of the republic was recognized: the President and the Parliament of the CRI.

RUSSIA. May 12, 1997. Russian President Boris Yeltsin (R) and the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov after signing of the Russia-Chechen Peace Treaty. Alexander Sentsov, Alexander Chumichev/TASS –—

Recognizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the CRI, the President, the Chairman of the Federation Council and the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation officially congratulated the leadership of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on democratic elections, that is, de jure recognized the CRI as a subject of international law. The latter is confirmed by such a signed interstate document as the “Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” , where it was unequivocally stated that “ bilateral relations will be considered in the light of generally accepted norms and principles of international law”.

It follows from this that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, in accordance with domestic and international law, established its authority on sovereign territory, and this fact was legally recognized by the subject of international law as the Russian Federation, from which, observing as currently in force domestic law , and the basic principles and norms of international law, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria separated as an independent state, and therefore as a subject of international law.

In relation to the current situation, the Russian armed forces occupied and even annexed the sovereign territory of the CRI, which is a violation of international legal obligations and principles of interaction between subjects of international law, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949.

It is indisputable that the very fact of occupation and annexation of foreign territory, according to the same Convention, does not acquire the right to sovereignty over this territory, regardless of the time of its occupation and retention by force. Therefore, the legal successor of the legitimate power – the Government of the CRI, located outside the country – continues legal and political work to de-occupy its territory.

The CRI government, repeating the previous statement, as a legitimate successor of a subject of international law, on the basis of the Constitution CRI conducts such diplomatic activities as the work of representative offices abroad and the opening of their own representative offices . Work is also underway to grant CRI citizenship to foreigners who wish and issue passports to citizens of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Meetings of the leadership of the CRI Governments at the highest level with representatives of the OSCE and other international organizations, as well as various diplomatic initiatives against the Russian occupation of the Chechen Republic and Ichkeria , statements to the International Criminal Court about crimes against humanity and war crimes by the political and military leadership of Russia, the existence of criminal cases and their investigations within the framework of the instructions of the Prosecutor General of the CRI and the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the CRI on political issues, this is not a complete list of the real activities of the Government of the CRI, which intends to wage a legal and political struggle until the complete de-occupation of its country from the aggressor.

History shows that similar situations were in the recent past in European countries. Thus, during the Second World War, the Polish government in exile continued its work in France and England for decades and was recognized by the world community as a legitimate representative of the Polish people.

A more striking example is the activity of the Baltic Governments, which achieved the return of the occupied territories, first by Nazi Germany, then by the Soviet Union, continuing the political struggle in exile until the final establishment of the independence of their countries.

From left to right: first – Said Khasan Abumuslimov, third – Vakha Arsanov, fourth – Ikhvan Gerikhanov

Military occupation, like annexation, as international practice shows, ends with the cessation of control by the aggressor. It makes no difference whether this will be done in a year or decades. Today, it must be recognized that the CRI is de facto under occupation by the Russian Federation, but this is not a fact of the loss of sovereignty, which was proclaimed by the legitimate power of the CRI on the basis of its Constitution and recognized by the participation of representatives of more than fifty and European states as international observers .

Summing up, we can state the following: The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, having proclaimed, at the will of the Chechen people, its independence and sovereignty, on the basis of the domestic law in force at that time, in compliance with the basic principles and norms of international law, and also defending its right to free development in the struggle with the aggressor in two bloody wars, which have no analogues in world history , continues the de-occupation of its territory through representatives of the CRI state authorities, while maintaining and protecting the status of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as a subject of international law.

Dr. IKHVAN B. GERIKHANOV,

First Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the CRI,                                President of the National Tribunal on war crimes in the CRI Doctor of Law, specialist in international law, expert on human and civil rights.