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First Russian – Chechen War: a Preview from “Freedom or Death” Volume II

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The following is a preview of the second volume of “Freedom or Death!” just released in English. The passage deals with Russian and Chechen preparations in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war.

Zero Hour

In 1994, Russian-backed forces in Chechnya opposing Dzhokhar Dudayev led the failed November Assault, and it was a moment of realization for everyone.[1] President Yeltsin now clearly understood he needed to do more than covertly support groups inside Chechnya. He had to officially intervene to prevent the small, historically rebellious mountain republic from seceding. The Chechen opposition’s Provisional Council itself desperately appealed to him to send troops against the Dudayevites.[2] Meanwhile, General Dudayev was hopeful for peace negotiations but took seriously the threat of Russia fully invading.

For Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, victory was not an achievable objective but a ripening fact. A “small victorious war” promised to raise the administration’s ratings against the increasing popularity of nationalist parties.[3] They ignored, or pretended to ignore, the deplorable state of their military and underestimated their enemy’s determination. Meanwhile the Chechens were preparing to resist the invasion.[4] Dudayev entrusted command of the regular forces to Colonel Aslan Maskhadov,[5] who inherited ragtag units rather than an army from his former colleague Viskhan Shakhabov.[6] Throughout 1994, he attempted to structure it partly according to army reforms enacted in 1992 and based on pre-existing forces, which were comprised of veterans from wars in Afghanistan and Abkhazia. Some units were combat-ready by the beginning of December. Among such forces was the Presidential Guard commanded by Abu Arsanukaev, and its Spetnatz unit under Apti Takhaev. Next was Shamil Basayev’s Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion, which was composed mostly of veterans of Abkhazia. Then came Ruslan Gelayev’s Special Borz (“Wolf”) Regiment, which included a battalion led by Umalt Dashayev. Adding also the Shali Armored Regiment and other minor units, there was a nucleus of 1,500 troops joined by 1,000 men from the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Service (police officials, riot police and state intelligence services). Maskhadov added some volunteer territorial militia battalions, such as the so-called “Islamic Regiment” under Islam Halimov and the Naursk Battalion[7] with Major Apti Batalov.[8]  Thanks to their contribution and the many other bands of volunteers who rushed to Grozny’s defense, Chechen Headquarters relied on 5,000 men at the start of Russia’s invasion. Several more formations followed Dudayev’s general mobilization proclamation on 4 December.[9] The Chechens understood however, that regardless of how they prepared they could only temporarily hold the enemy at the gates. Chechnya lacked the numbers, arms, and organization to take on enemy armored brigades directly.[10] Russia had even preemptively destroyed the modest air force on 1 December.

Russia’s initial approach to the invasion reflected its narrow aim to eliminate the leadership rather than destroy Chechnya. The average Russian solider, struggling to pin it on a map, cared even less about Chechnya. The government narrowed its invasion partly to avoid a humanitarian crisis since the wary West was watching with a hand on the money tap keeping Russia afloat. 

Whatever way the Russians intended to attack, the Chechens were preparing to fight and die all the same. Their plan was “to last.” They wanted to resist as long as possible and hopefully expose the Kremlin to domestic public opinion, which was still struggling with trauma from the Soviet-Afghan War. Equally important was the opinion of the West, whose conditional loans kept Russia’s economy from sinking.[11] The Chechens organized their defense in three phases. They planned to first trap the Russians inside Grozny, a “concrete forest,” and ensnarl their overwhelming armor. To entice the Russians, the Chechens yielded the defensive line to the north to create the illusion they had abandoned the capital. This line along a strip of hills running north of Grozny on the so-called Terek Ridge hinged to the west by the villages Dolinskyand Pervomaisk. It ended in the east at the height of the village Petropavlovskaya on the left bank of the Sunzha. After crossing the line and penetrating the capital, the Russians would encounter Chechnya’s best forces eagerly waiting to recreate the success they had against the anti-Dudayevites back in 26 November. This was ideally going to force Yeltsin to negotiate with Dudayev, but with far more realistic expectations, the Chechens planned to retreat south to the main centers of Achkhoy-Martan, Shatoy, Vedeno, and Nozhay Yurt.

  Maskhadov divided the territory into six military districts called “Fronts” and entrusted them to his best men.[12] The loyal former police captain Vakha Arsanov held the Terek Ridge Line. Ruslan Gelayev was charged with the South-Western Front, a quadrilateral defined by the villages Assinovskaya, Novy-Sharoy, Achkhoy-Martan, and Bamut. Dudayev’s twenty-eight-year-old son-in-law Salman Raduyevcommanded the North-Eastern Front centering on the city Gudermes. CommanderRuslan Alikhadziyev[13] of the newly appointed Shali Armored Regimentled the southern front, with its main centers being Shatoyand Shali. Turpal Atgeriyev, a twenty-six-year-old veteran of the Abkhaz War and one of Raduyev’s most trusted men led the South-Eastern Front, centering on Nozhay Yurt. Finally, Shamil Basayev held Grozny. Unfortunately, the government lacked a comprehensive plan to protect the population,[14] and the situation was especially dire in Grozny. Unlike their Chechen neighbors there, the many ethnic Russian residents did not have relatives and friends in the countryside to flee to.

 The Russian Headquarters was busily gathering nineteen thousand fresh conscripts from the most diverse branches. Collectively baptized the “Joint Group of the United Forces,”[15] it also included five thousand soldiers from the Interior Ministry to comb the rear for enemies. The army was divided into the West, East, and North groups.[16] West Group started off from Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia to penetrate in three columns, taking up a position at the height of Novy-Sharoy behind the Chechen Terek RidgeLine. From Klizyar, Dagestan, East Group was to reach Tolstoy-Yurt along the Terek River. Finally, North Group in Mozdok, North Ossetia would cross the pro-Russian occupied plains of northern Chechnya to link up with East Group north of Grozny. With one hundred kilometers to the objectives, the operation had a schedule of a couple days. The high command of the Russian military prepared to issue an ultimatum to the leadership and offer amnesty to Chechen troops who surrendered.[17] Afterwards, artillery would clear the way for tanks to finally crush the rest of Dudayev’s “little rebellion”.

 However, the commander of the Russian operation Colonel General Eduard Vorobyov refused to lead the plan,[18] dismissing it as “madness”and a dishonor to send the military against citizens Russian considered its own.[19] Grachev promptly dismissed and investigated him, and instead tapped the unquestioning General Anatoly Kvashnin. Vorobyov’s forced resignation quickly led to the replacement of the Military Command of the Caucasus, further disrupting the chain of command which, on the eve of the invasion, was completely “purged.”

There were also important fringes of Parliament, including in the majority, opposed to military intervention. Yegor Gaidar, one of Yeltsin’s closest allies and chairman of the pro-government Democratic Choice of Russia Party,[20] spoke out and brought others from his faction with him.[21] Galina Starovoytova from the Democratic Russia Party was also opposed. Many moderates remained ambivalent though: the newly established center-left Yabloko Party saw heated internal debate between skeptics and those that supported the invasion “in principle” if not in execution.[22] On the right, nationalist movements beat the war drums, particularly Vadim Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party. Opponents argued that using the military was unconstitutional without the government declaring a state of emergency and imposing martial law. According to Article 102 of the Constitution, the president had to consult Parliament to issue the provision, which would likely have been rejected. Supporters of military action, on the other hand, pointed to Articles 80 and 86 as support for Yeltsin’s right to lead the military and his duty to “safeguard the sovereignty” and “integrity of the state.”[23] A public debate could perhaps have steered tanks away from the Caucasus, especially as concerned newspapers all over the world began to cover the matter.[24] But the die was cast, and Yelstin was moving his pieces towards Chechnya.

[1] For more on the November Assault and the events preceding the outbreak of the First Russo-Chechen War, see Volume I of this work.

[2] In a conversation with the author, Ilyas Akhmadov recalled a telegram from the Provisional Council explicitly requesting Yeltsin to intervene. It was signed by Umar Avturkhanov and arrived in Moscow in the first days of December 1994.

[3] One analysis of the beginning of Yeltsin’s political shift: “With the controversial decision to use force to stop the secession of a small ‘province’ of his empire, Yeltsin himself also crossed a political ‘Rubicon,’ from which it will be difficult to go back: that of the alliance with the democratic forces that had supported him from the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 to the bloody battle against the rebel parliament in ’93. . . . After the victory of nationalists and communists in the legislative elections of December ’93, Yeltsin assumed new positions in foreign policy and in the management of economic reforms, thus trying to pander to the opposition, regain popular consent, and maintain power at the next electoral appointments, the legislative ones in a year, the presidential elections in a year and a half.” (Enrico Franceschini, “A Peace Party in Moscow,” La Repubblica, December 19, 1994).

[4] Chechen Foreign Minister Shamsouddin Youssef responded to news of Russia’s likely invasion by demanding Russia to recognize Chechnya’s independence. Otherwise, the Chechens would “fight, and bring war in the Russian Federation.” On the same day, Aslan Maskhadov added that Moscow risked fighting a “new Afghanistan.” First Name Last Name, “Title,” La Repubblica, May 12, 1994. 

[5]Aslan Alievich Maskhadov, introduced in Volume I of this work, was born in Shakai, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, and returned to Chechnya with his family in 1957. He enrolled at the Artillery School of Tbilisi in 1972, then perfected himself at the High School of Kalinin Artillery in Leningrad. After his service in Hungary, he transferred to Vilnius and witnessed the Lithuanian independence uprisings. After resigning in 1992, he returned to Chechnya again and entered Dudayev’s service. In November 1993, he replaced Viskhan Sakhabov as chief of the general staff, first on an interim basis, then permanently beginning in March 1994. For a comprehensive biography written by his son Anzor, see Frihetskjemperen: Min far, Tsjetsjenias president.

[6] As Musa Temishev shared in a conversation with the author, Viskhan Shakhabov (extensively discussed in Volume I of this work) could not organize the nascent Chechen armed forces as a result of frictions with President Dudayev that arose between 1992 and 1993. Their disagreements on the methods of acquisition and use of Soviet arsenals paralyzed the Ministry of Defense, which was never officially established, leading to Shakhabov’s resignation.

[7] To be precise, Aslan Maskhadov christened the unit “Naursk Battalion” only in January 1995, during a live television broadcast on the presidential channel. The nom de guerre was a eulogy to Batalov’s units who had fought during the siege of Grozny. According to the commander, the regiment was still a “people’s militia”until the Battle for Grozny: “There were no cadres, there were no officers, there were only groups of people from different villages, commanded by people elected by them, totally on a voluntary basis. People came and went, and no one could order anything from them.”To read more about Apti Batalov and the Naursk Battalion, see the series of articles The General of Naur: Memoirs of Apti Batalov at www.ichkeria.net.

[8] Apti Batalov Aldamovich, born in Kyrgyzstan on October 19, 1956, returned to Chechnya and graduated from the Petroleum Institute of Grozny as a civil engineer. After entering the police force, he served as part of the Ishcherskaya Militia in the Naursk district, becoming its commander on June 20 1994. According to our conversations, until early August he served under District Military Commander Duta Muzaev, Dudayev’s son-in-law. After Muzaev’s return to Gronzy, Batalov became of head of the military administration of the Naursk and Nadterechny districts on September 16, 1994. He was tasked with organizing their defense against raids by the pro-Russia armed opposition.

[9] On 4 December, President Dudayev proclaimed a total mobilization of reservists. All male citizens between the ages of 15 and 60 were summoned, too many to realistically arm and train for the regular forces. Most were sent back to their villages of origin with the task of setting up self-defense militias using light weapons or resorting to hunting weapons.

Regarding the composition and nature of these militias, Ilyas Akhmadov recalled in a conversation with the author in 2022: “During the war there were many local volunteer groups consisting of five or six people, sometimes related to each other. It was very important to find a band that you knew. If you were with someone from your village, street, block, or family, you had a 90% guarantee that they wouldn’t leave your body if killed or injured. If they didn’t know you, they didn’t want you. This was mutually understandable to all: If something happened they would not be able to find the relatives, and for us it was very important to be returned to our families.”

[10] To learn more about the ChRI Air Force and its eventual destruction by Russia, see the in-depth study Green Wolf Stars: the ChRI Air Force on the website www.ichkria.net and consult Volume I of this work.

[11] United States Congress opened debates on 11 December 1994, on financially leveraging Russia to discourage war. Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberan asked for aid to be reevaluated. Their colleague Alfonse D’Amato, argued on 3 January, that this could “send the wrong signal,”although he felt it necessary to express US displeasure at the civilian losses caused by the invasion.

[12] To view the Chechen defense plan, see thematic map A.

[13] Ruslan Alikhadzhiev was born in 1961 in Shali. After completing his military service with the rank of Sergeant, he returned to Chechnya in 1992. He took command of the Shali Armored Regiment in the autumn of 1994, replacing Isa Dalkhaev. At the outbreak of hostilities he organized the recruitment of militia in the Shali district (the “Shali Regiment”).

[14] Anatol Lieven’s first-hand account: “A government plan to feed the population and evacuate the children if the Russians started a siege? I don’t know of any such thing, but if President Dudayev said so, of course it is true,” an official told me in early December 1994, sitting in his deserted office in the municipal offices of the central district of Grozny, . . . “Anyway, it doesn’t matter. We Chechens are such strong people, we will be able to feed ourselves no matter what happens. Is it my responsibility? What do you mean by this? I’m here in my office, right? Don’t you think I will fight to the death to defend my country?” With that he let out a gasp, blowing a breath of vodka in our direction, and with wet fingers lifted a piece of greyish meat from a glass jar on his knees, and fed it to his cat.” Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 34.

[15] The unpreparedness of the federal forces was well known to the military commands, and to the Minister of Defense himself. A few days before the start of the military campaign, Grachev read a top secret directive (No. D-0010) which described “unpreparedness for action of fighting.” Stazys Knezys and Romana Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).

The assessment report drawn up by the office of the North Caucasus Military Region was similar: “Most of the officers are not only unfamiliar with the required combat readiness requirements set out in the control documents, but also do not know how to recognize their personal duties, or what they should do in times of peace or war. Watch officers and units, in most formations inspected, are poorly trained to take practical actions in response to combat commands. The instructions and other control documents are prepared in gross violation of the requirements of the General Staff.” Knezys and Sedlickas,  War in Chechnya.

[16] To view the Russian invasion plan, see thematic map B.

[17] The Duma approved a resolution to this effect 13 December 1994.

[18] Grachev’s plan was entirely based on the assumption that a massive deployment of forces would disperse the separatists: “Grachev’s plan and timetable reflect expectations of limited resistance. Little intelligence used and bad planning were to blame… The planning also ignored the experience of loyalist Chechen forces [i.e. thread . Russians] who had attempted to storm Grozny in August , October and November 1994. If that experience had been studied, the Russian command would have been aware of the dangers that faced tank columns in Grozny.”Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001) 11-12.  

[19] As Eduard Vorobjev said in an interview with journalist Vitaly Moiseev: “I was shocked by the situation, the units that arrived were completely unprepared, the commanders did not know their subordinates, many of the fighters did not have the necessary professional skills. I turned to the Chief of the General Staff: ‘If you think that a change of command will change the situation for the better, then you are wrong. It’s not about the commander, it’s about the adventurous approach. . . . Approaching me, the Minister of Defense said ‘I am disappointed in you, Colonel General, and I think you should submit your letter of resignation.’ I replied ‘I have it.’… It was not easy for me, a person who served in the armed forces for 38 years, who constantly answered ‘Yes!’ I was faced with a choice: to make a deal with my conscience and deal with completely unprepared people, to conduct an operation not planned by me, or to leave the armed forces, which meant the end of my military career.… It seems to me that Grachev underestimated the moral and psychological state of the Chechens, which had reached fanaticism. The operation was designed to intimidate: they thought that Dudayev would get scared when he saw hundreds of units and thousands of soldiers, and surrender to the victor’s mercy. Indeed, the Chechen side clearly knew where our troops were, what they were doing—information was spreading in all directions.”

[20] To the press Gaidar declared: “I appeal to Yeltsin not to allow a military escalation in Chechnya. The intervention was a tragic mistake. Taking Grozny will cost huge human losses. It will worsen the internal political situation in Russia, it will be a blow to the integrity of the nation, to our democratic achievements, to everything we have achieved in recent years.” Franceschini, “A Peace Party in Moscow.” 

[21] Deputy of Democratic Choice Dimitrij Golkogonov’s response to “Why are you against the invasion?”: “Because my party, Choice of Russia, led by the ex-Prime Minister Gajdar, is against violence, against the use of force to solve political problems. In Chechnya there is a leader, Dudayev, who does not want to lose power, thanks to whom he has enriched himself and his friends with the trade of oil. Independence has nothing to do with it. But to attack Dudayev is to make a criminal a popular hero. . . . A negotiation had to be opened. If Yeltsin had invited the Chechens to Moscow, they would have come running.” Enrico Franceschini, “‘Yeltsin Made Wrong Move in Invading But Remains Leader of Russia,’” La Repubblica, December 15, 1994.

[22] Vladimir Lukin, former ambassador to the United States and prominent member of Yabloko, in his January 24, 1995 speech in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote: “The executive branch has shown itself and society that it can act independently, regardless of and in spite of political pressures . . . In an ideal world, the preposterous and dangerous idea that the military should not be used for internal conflicts should be driven out of the heads of our armed forces. . . . Using the army inside the country in extreme situations, when threats to the state appear, is the norm in democratic states. Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

[23] For careful study of this topic see Stuart Goldman and Jim Nichol, Russian Conflict in Chechnya and Implications for the United States (DC: Congressional Research Service, 1995).See also Victoria A. Malko, The Chechen Wars: Responses in Russia and the United States(Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015).  

[24]  An example from an Italian newspaper: “In the end, like a mountain annoyed by a daredevil mouse, Yeltsin ordered the direct intervention of his troops. Moscow claims that Chechnya is part of Russia, therefore it is its right to occupy it to restore order. For the moment, Western public opinion seems aligned with this position, considering yesterday’s events as an “internal matter” for Russia: for which there are no international complaints, unlike what happened with the invasion of Afghanistan. But if we look at the substance of the Russian military expedition in Chechnya, some resemblance to the Soviet invasion fifteen years ago emerges. . . . The fact remains that Yeltsin does not hesitate to use tanks when he sees that other means (negotiation, economic pressure, support for the local opposition) do not produce results. The propensity to resolve political crises militarily, as a year ago in the tug of war with the rebel Parliament, is a hallmark of his presidency. The future will tell whether Russia needed a “strongman” to become a civilized and democratic nation”. Enrico Franceschini,“Moscow Fears the Kabul Syndrome,” La Repubblica, December 12, 1994.

Past, present and future – Francesco Benedetti Interviews Inal Sharip (Part 2)

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Let’s go back to 1999. When Russia invaded Chechnya for the second time, where were you? Were you still studying?

At that time I was working in Moscow, at the Central Documentary Film Studio. I was making documentaries. When the war started, I returned to Chechnya to make a film about the war. It was my most dangerous experience, because the aggression was in full swing, they were ready to destroy the entire Chechen people. When Russian troops saw journalists, human rights activists or documentary filmmakers, they hated them and put up all sorts of obstacles, because they were telling the whole world about the atrocities that the Russians were committing in Chechnya. And when the Russian military found out that I was a Chechen, they were ready to shoot me. Several times I was a millimeter away from death. After finishing work on the film, the film was selected at a film festival in North Carolina (USA). In 2000, I left for the USA, where my film received high reviews in the professional community. After that, I began negotiations with American producers about working on a documentary series about the centuries-long struggle of the Chechen people for independence: from Sheikh Mansur to the present day.

nail Sharip collects the Award for the International Festival of Independent Cinema of Naples

What was the American public’s involvement with what was happening in Chechnya?

Ordinary people knew little about Chechnya. They heard something about the war, but knew nothing specific. Journalists and human rights activists knew well. Most Americans are not interested in what is happening outside the United States. According to statistics, only a few percent of voters care about the presidential candidate’s pre-election position on U.S. foreign policy.

In the rhetoric of the current regime of Ramzan Kadyrov I have often heard references to the fact that the independence that was regained then cost the Chechens so much, that even talking about it today is to be considered synonymous with “extremism”. In your opinion, how much did all this weigh in strengthening the Chechens’ support for Kadyrov?          

The question of how the values associated with independence and loss influence the support for Ramzan Kadyrov’s regime in Chechnya leads us to deeper reflections on human ideals and motivations. The phrase indicating that independence “cost” the Chechen people too much and that preserving this memory has become synonymous with “extremism” touches upon complex issues of identity and self-awareness. For peoples who have endured wars and trauma, collective ideals are often intertwined with historical memory, built on suffering and struggle. For many Chechens, the memory of war and independence is not merely a historical fact but a part of their identity that legitimizes their sense of community and belonging. However, this perception can become a tool of power when fear and loss are employed to validate authority.

This raises a philosophical question: Do individuals truly hold higher ideals for which they are willing to sacrifice everything, including their lives? In the past, values such as honor, dignity, and justice served as catalysts for revolutions and social changes. In the 18th and 19th centuries, such ideals inspired people to make selfless acts. Yet in the modern world, filled with logic of consumerism and individualism, these ideals may appear indifferent. Nonetheless, those ideals have not disappeared; rather, they have transformed. When facing crises or difficulties, individuals unconsciously seek not only justifications for their actions but also profound values that could support them in those moments. For some, this may be family; for others, freedom; and for some, belonging to their nation and its history. However, under an authoritarian regime like Kadyrov’s, such searches are permeated by fear. The ability to openly defend ideals born from suffering can lead to repression, making individuals more inclined towards conformity.

Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Russian province of Chechnya gestures speaking in Chechnya’s regional capital of Grozny, Russia, Tuesday, March 29, 2022. (AP Photo)

Thus, Kadyrov’s support can be viewed as a product of psychological defense, built before external threats. This does not always indicate ideological support for the ruler; rather, it is a strategic adaptation driven by the desire for survival. Society needs to protect itself from challenges, and at times, supporting an established authority becomes a means of preserving identity and collective memory. Therefore, while the era of high ideals may give way to more pragmatic considerations, the very idea of self-sacrifice and the search for meaning in life remains an inseparable part of human existence. Ultimately, the answer to the question of what drives a person regarding higher ideals largely depends on personal choice, background, and existing context. In this sense, support for Kadyrov is not merely support for a regime, but a complex and multifaceted process where fear, memory, and the search for identity converge.

A splendid reflection, which brings us to another question: can all those who collaborate with Kadyrov be considered “traitors”?

Thank you for your question. This is indeed a very complex issue that touches upon moral and ethical considerations regarding collaboration with a regime. Historical experience shows that different contexts and eras have led to various responses to such situations. During World War II, for example, those who collaborated with the occupiers were often executed immediately. In contrast, in the Baltic countries—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—after over 50 years of occupation, there were no mass executions in 1991. This was largely because a new generation had grown up without knowing life outside the Soviet Union, highlighting how sensitive the topic of survival under occupation is.

Your reflections on who exactly can be considered a “Kadyrovite” are indeed critical. It is essential to emphasize that we cannot label ordinary people, who are forced to survive in difficult conditions and have no connection to the crimes committed by Kadyrov’s gang, as “Kadyrovites.” On the contrary, they are victims of this regime, subjected to the abuses of Kadyrov and his associates. In my view, those who have committed crimes should primarily be held accountable. It is especially important to bring religious leaders who justify Kadyrov’s actions to justice, as their influence on the minds and souls of people can be far more destructive than that of the perpetrators themselves. This is a multifaceted issue, and addressing it requires careful consideration of numerous factors.

In your answer you specifically mentioned “religious leaders”. How are Islamic clergy supporting Kadyrov’s regime?

In various countries, the relationship between the state and the clergy can vary: they either work closely together or, as in the case of Russia, the state uses religious institutions to advance its interests. In Russia, government agencies deploy their agents into the religious sphere, helping them build careers within spiritual organizations. These state representatives are legitimized in religious circles, while the clergy, in turn, serves the interests of the state. This practice is widespread globally, although there may be exceptions. The first official Muslim organization in Russia was established by the decree of Catherine the Great in 1788. The position of the Mufti, the head of Russian Muslims, was created, and the candidate had to be approved by the emperor after being elected by the Muslim community. In the decree, it was explicitly stated that this organization was established in the interest of the Russian state. Since then, little has changed: just as the state controlled the religious life of its citizens in the past, it continues to do so today.

Before the 1917 revolution, Russian intelligence services infiltrated their agents into religious institutions, and after the revolution, the Soviet government created its own educational institutions—Orthodox seminaries and Islamic madrasas—where future preachers, often intelligence officers, were trained. It was impossible to receive a religious education in the Soviet Union without KGB approval. Those who believe Russia has lost its grip in this area are mistaken. In fact, Russia has expanded its influence: for example, graduates of the Islamic faculty at the University of Damascus in Syria are under the control of Russian intelligence, particularly the GRU. It’s no secret that the GRU has a base in Syria, and it’s no surprise that several dozen graduates of this university work within Ramzan Kadyrov’s circle, justifying his actions both in Chechnya and in Ukraine from a religious perspective. Undoubtedly, this situation needs to change, and the Islamic world is in dire need of reforms. However, those who benefit from the current state of affairs will fiercely defend it. A striking example is the case of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was forced to flee due to threats to his life for his political views. He was brutally murdered and dismembered at the Saudi consulate in Turkey when he came to obtain a new passport. His last tweet was deeply symbolic: “The Islamic world is in great need of democratic reforms.”

The central Mosque of Grozny

So, if the Islamic clergy is all, more or less, infiltrated or managed by the secret services, does this mean that Islam cannot be a unifying force in the movement for the independence of the North Caucasus? And if so, what force, in your opinion, can be a unifying element?

There’s no need to invent a new unifying idea for the peoples of the North Caucasus in their struggle for independence. That idea has long existed and remains clear. Just as 100 years ago, when the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus, the Mountain Republic, was created, today the peoples of the North Caucasus simply want to live freely on their own land, in accordance with their traditions and culture. It is the national liberation movement of different peoples that unites them in this struggle, just as it did a century ago. This deeply rooted desire for self-determination and the preservation of their identity continues to be the strongest unifying force. The fight for freedom and sovereignty has always been the common thread binding the diverse peoples of the region. The historical past of the struggle against occupation, repression, and genocide by the Russian Empire is indeed a key unifying factor for the peoples of the Caucasus. This past is connected to numerous tragic events and struggles for survival, creating a common platform for the recognition of themselves as oppressed peoples.

Common Experience of Oppression: All the peoples of the Caucasus have faced similar confrontations with imperial power, fostering a sense of solidarity. Memories of brutal repression, genocide, and occupation deepen the understanding of a shared fate and suffering.

Identity and Memory: Preserving the historical memory of the struggle against colonial oppression strengthens the identity of each people. In this context, shared history becomes the foundation for recognizing their rights and striving for freedom.

Culture and Language: Common cultural elements, folklore, and language also serve as connecting links. These aspects often bring a sense of unity to the fight for justice and independence.Historical memory serves as motivation for consolidating efforts to protect rights and freedoms.

Thus, the shared historical experience of fighting against oppression becomes a solid basis for forming a united front among the peoples of the Caucasus, allowing them to focus on common goals without sacrificing the interests of one people to the detriment of another.

Every project for the birth of a new state needs its own intrinsic “usefulness” for those governments that, from the outside, should give it legitimacy with their recognition. In this sense, what “usefulness” do you see for a Confederation of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus?

The answer to the question about the purpose of establishing a government in exile for the Confederation of the North Caucasus starts with recognizing the limitations of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. It is a small territory that cannot play a significant role in shaping global geopolitics. In today’s world, if you are not part of a larger force shaping the future geopolitical landscape, it is nearly impossible to change existing borders in a way that would grant independence to the Chechen people. The Chechen Republic lacks access to the Black Sea and does not occupy any strategically important transport corridors, which is why our struggle for independence did not fall within the interests of major geopolitical players. However, our struggle has been subject to political manipulation. For example, Saudi Arabia tried to leverage the Chechen issue for its own interests, offering Putin a deal to resolve the Chechen independence question in exchange for Russian withdrawal from Syria. This demonstrates how external powers can exploit national movements for their own agendas.

But when we talk about the creation of the Confederation of the North Caucasus, the geopolitical calculus changes dramatically. Such a state becomes highly attractive because it addresses several key geopolitical problems that have emerged during the war in Ukraine. If the Confederation of the North Caucasus is formed, Russia would lose access to the Black Sea, which directly aligns with Ukraine’s interests. Without its naval base in the Black Sea, Russia would no longer pose a constant maritime threat to Ukraine. Europe and the U.S. are also interested in this outcome, as they do not wish to see the total collapse of Russia, which could lead to China’s expansion into the Far East and further strengthen its influence. The West is also concerned about the potential chaos that could arise from Russia’s breakup, especially given that Russia is the largest country in the world, covering more than 10% of the world’s land area. Furthermore, there is fear over Russia’s nuclear facilities and, most critically, the risk that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of third-party states or terrorist organizations.

The creation of the Confederation of the North Caucasus would address several of these challenges at once. By losing access to the Black Sea, Russia would be reduced from a global power to a regional one, which is something the entire world is interested in. A regional Russia would be forced to focus on containing China and managing its nuclear arsenal. Without nuclear weapons, Russia would not be able to effectively counter China’s influence. Additionally, Ukraine would no longer face the threat of Russia’s naval base in the Black Sea, and Turkey would emerge as the dominant power in the region. In this way, the establishment of the Confederation of the North Caucasus aligns with the interests of multiple countries, including the U.S., Europe, Ukraine, and Turkey, all of whom share a vested interest in transforming Russia from a global to a regional power. This shift is crucial for maintaining stability and ensuring a balanced global order.

Could a confederation of the North Caucasus also be an opportunity for Russia?

The separation of the North Caucasus from Russia can indeed be seen as an opportunity for a new Russia. This scenario could facilitate the necessary transformation of the country towards a democratic state, which is urgently needed. Moreover, the separation of the Caucasus could increase the rating of those Russian politicians who manage to implement such a course. Given the growing anti-Caucasian sentiments in society, the separation of the region might be perceived as a populist step, allowing them to garner support among a segment of Russian citizens dissatisfied with the current situation.

Couldn’t an independent Caucasus easily become a client state of Türkiye?

Turkey is certainly an important player in the region with whom we will establish partnership relations, but at this stage other NATO countries are also helping us in the implementation of this project. Naturally, in the future we hope to become part of NATO, and with the partners who will help in the implementation of this project, we will have allied relations.

Past, present and future – Francesco Benedetti Interviews Inal Sharip (Part 1)

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Inal Sharip is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ichkeria. Born in 1971, he is a chess champion, a film director and producer, and between the first and second Chechen wars he was Deputy Minister of Culture and head of the Film Department.

Being born in 1971, You had the opportunity to observe the evolution of the situation in Chechnya from the independence until the outbreak of the war in 1994. What was the climate in the country in those years? And what impression did you have of Dudaev’s government?

I lived in Grozny until I graduated from university in 1993. Then I went to Moscow to take my first steps in the cinema.  I remember Grozny as an ordinary post-Soviet city no different from other cities in the former USSR or Eastern Europe. As in other cities of the post-Soviet space there was an economic difficult situation. But Dzhokhar Dudayev began to stimulate medium and small businesses and abolished taxes and duties on imported goods. Direct flights were also established from Grozny to cities in the United Arab Emirates and other cities in eastern countries from where the goods were transported. Thanks to this Grozny became in a short time the trade center of the North Caucasus.

When the war started, I was in Moscow, taking my first steps in documentary filmmaking. Many things fade from memory, but what I remember well is the anxiety of realizing that terrible events were coming. Many of my feelings were portrayed in one of my first movies, “My Grozny City”.  The piercing pain of what was done to my hometown, which remained only in my memory.

Inal Sharip, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ichkeria

How did you spend the two years of war? And what did you do after?

At the first opportunity I came to Grozny. I established a secret connection with Akhmed Zakayev. (I met Akhmed Zakayev when I was writing music for the theater, in 1992. We were introduced by our mutual friend, Hussein Guzuev, a theater director. Before the war, Dzhokhar Dudayev appointed him director of television and he was one of the first to be killed at the beginning of the First Chechen War. Akhmed was then a theater artist and became at first chairman of the Chechen Union of Theater Workers. A few months before the war started, Dzhokhar Dudayev appointed Zakayev Minister of Culture. When the war started, Akhmed led the people’s militia.) And he coordinated his activities while in Moscow and Grozny. After the first war, Akhmed returned to work as Minister of Culture and invited me to be Deputy Minister.

Akhmed appointed me head of the Department of Cinematography of the Chechen Republic with the rank of Deputy Minister of Culture. I worked there for about a year. Maskhadov then created a commission on education, science and culture (a prototype of the UNESCO commission) to work on accession and cooperation with UNESCO, and to search for and return cultural property from museums that the Russians had illegally exported to Russia in violation of all international conventions. I was appointed head of this commission. Before leaving Chechnya, I was in charge of this commission.

I was the only member of the commission. It was I who initiated the creation of this commission, because we had to enter international organizations, and UNESCO was an organization we could enter, although without the right to vote in this organization at the first stage. In addition, the Russians have taken many museum exhibits out of Chechnya. Including paintings, a collection of 17th-18th century edged weapons, etc. It was necessary to track them down and return them. The international UNESCO conventions that regulate this kind of situation were an ideal tool, given that Russia had ratified all UNESCO conventions. Maskhadov wrote a decree creating this commission and appointing me to head it. Other than that, I received nothing, no funding, no office, nothing. Few among the military at that time understood the significance of this organization. At that time, everything was focused on the military aspect. That’s why I couldn’t hire people. I could work without a salary, other people could not.

Akhmed Zakayev in 1996

Speaking of the period between 1996 and 1999, what was your impression of the situation? In your opinion, was the Maskhadov government doing a good job? What was the general opinion of the people, in your opinion?

This is one of the most difficult periods in the history of modern Chechnya. Of course, Maskhadov’s government was not ideal, but we must understand the situation it found itself in. Russia was secretly preparing for a second war. It was actively recruiting agents from among the supporters of independence. It was deliberately corrupting Chechen officials. Russian special services were in direct contact with independent commanders of military units, persuading them to commit criminal acts. Russian agents in the Middle East, who specialize in working in the Islamic world, were redirected to Chechnya to split Chechen society along religious lines. In the conditions of post-war devastation and economic crisis, Russia managed to split Chechen society. Of course, at that time few people understood what was really happening. I also did not understand and did not like many things, so in 1998 I left Chechnya and returned to film production.

Now that we have collected information, we see how many FSB agents have infiltrated Chechen society, and we can draw conclusions. Suffice it to say that the Chief Mufti of Chechnya Kadyrov was an FSB agent, but no one talked about it at the time, and the leaders of Chechnya trusted him. In addition, it should be noted that few in Maskhadov’s government understood how world politics actually worked, both in the West and in the East, since there was no international experience. There was no information, no Internet. There was great trust in the Muslim world, based on the myth of the Muslim Brotherhood, but there was no understanding that the governments and intelligence services of most Muslim countries were using religion for their own political and geopolitical interests. Perhaps historians will analyze this period of Chechen history more deeply in the future, but today we can say for sure that Maskhadov was under great pressure from all sides, primarily with the goal of splitting Chechen society.

Boris Eltsin and Vladimir Putin

In 1999, Russia invaded Chechnya for the second time. Shortly before, Vladimir Putin had appeared on the political scene. Do you remember how public opinion experienced his rise to power?

At that time, Russians were tired of crime, corruption and disorder. It seems that discrimination against democracy was deliberate and directed by someone. Of course, what happened in Russia in the nineties has nothing to do with democracy, but it was presented to the people as democratic processes. That is why the people began to miss a strong authoritarian leader, like Stalin, Andropov and others who were leaders of the USSR. A situation was created when the people wanted to get their master back, who would determine their fate for them. In exchange, the new master had to restore order and feed the people. That is why the explosions of apartment buildings, Putin’s harsh rhetoric, all this is part of the scenario of creating a new authoritarian leader of Russia. It should be noted, I say this as a director, that Putin was not the best candidate for this role. He does not have natural charisma. But the circumstances developed in such a way that he was chosen as a collective decision of several influential groups in the Kremlin.

Putin, at the beginning of his career, was a compromise figure for different Kremlin clans. Every Russian billionaire or oligarch has a KGB-FSB general as his head of security. The KGB-FSB nominated three presidential candidates: Primakov, Stepashin, Putin. All of them were from the KGB and all of them were presidential candidates. The least known person, who did not have his own team and was considered harmless for different clans, was Putin, and he was elected. In 25 years, he created his clan, dealt with other clans and now he is the undisputed master in the Kremlin. The problem is that over these 25 years, Russian propaganda has been cultivating Great Russian chauvinism in the people. Chauvinism is constantly present in the Russian people, so cultivating Great Russian chauvinism in the people was not difficult. Putin has created for himself a Putin electorate, which was created for the greatness of Russia, the successor of the tsarist empire, the Soviet empire. Therefore, having removed one tsar, the people will in any case want another tsar and demand revenge for the defeat in Ukraine. Quite recently, Putin said in an interview that the collapse of the USSR is a great geopolitical tragedy. He said this because this is the mood of the people and he expressed the opinion of the Russian people. Therefore, the matter is much more complicated than in one person.

Yes, for a period of time for several years the war may stop, but then preparations for a military revenge in Ukraine will begin. Russians will never forgive the defeat in Ukraine. Just as they could not forgive the defeat from Chechnya in 1996. When they signed a peace treaty with Chechnya, at the same moment they began to prepare for the Second Chechen War. The same will happen in Ukraine. Russia must lose and transform into another democratic state. For example, the leader of the Russian opposition Navalny, who was killed in prison, did not recognize Crimea as Ukrainian. Because in the future he planned to participate in the presidential election campaign, and he must be guided by the opinion of the people. And 90 percent of the population of Russia considers Crimea to be Russia.

So, if I understand correctly, power in Russia is organized as an alliance of clans, and the President is the one who “moderates” the relations between clans. And in this system the FSB is a “clanized” apparatus or is it in competition with these clans?

This was the case before the war in Ukraine. Each major clan had its own people in the FSB leadership. But there was also an FSB clan that included both former and current FSB officers. All this was done with Putin’s approval. Putin was interested in creating a situation where different clans opposed him, and he was at the center of this structure and was an arbiter. In this way, he ensures his own security, and the clans were interested in Putin. But the war in Ukraine changed the balance of power in Russia. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow had a particular impact on these changes. Today, the FSB controls almost everything in Russia. With Shoigu’s departure from the Ministry of Defense, the FSB began a purge of generals and thus the FSB took control of the army. The only person the FSB cannot defeat yet is Kadyrov. Putin supports Kadyrov so that at least someone inside Russia would oppose the FSB. But I assume that the FSB will achieve its goal, and sooner or later the FSB will defeat Kadyrov.

Ramzan Kadyrov hugs Vladimir Putin

Why, in your opinion, does it (the FSB) not control Kadyrov?

Because Putin is interested in this. Putin knows what the KGB and the FSB are, and he knows that they can play their game at any moment. Putin and his clan have stolen hundreds of billions of dollars. Some “patriotic” generals may not like this, and they may try to stage a coup. Therefore, he is trying to minimize the risks. To do this, he must separate the different clans and do everything so that they do not unite. There are Chechen generals in the FSB who have always served Russia and whom the FSB would like to put in charge of Chechnya. But the FSB is not succeeding, because Putin has placed his bet on Kadyrov, whom he allows to commit any crimes, which helps strengthen him. The FSB was counting on the fact that Ramzan Kadyrov and his father are temporary workers, whom they are temporarily using to transfer the Chechen people’s struggle for independence from Russia into a civil war between Chechens. Kadyrov is not a career FSB employee, he is pursuing his own independent policy in the republic, which the FSB does not like.

In this regard, clashes between the FSB and Kadyrov’s men are constantly taking place in Russia, in which Putin has to act as an arbitrator. But so far there has not been a single situation where Putin has infringed on Kadyrov’s interests. The FSB expects that Putin will have to hand over Kadyrov sooner or later. But there is no doubt that Putin will have to choose between the FSB and Kadyrov. The FSB is getting stronger because of the war in Ukraine and is a state-forming institution, so I have no doubt that they will defeat Kadyrov in the future.

ICHKERIA GENERATION – Francesco Benedetti interviews Aset Sabdulaeva (part 1)

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Aset Sabdulaeva was born in 1991 in Grozny. Her mother is the People’s Artist of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Birlyant Ramzaeva. She composed music for many famous Chechen songs « The Knight of Honour », « The time of Heros », « Don’t leave the mountains ». Her father is poet and playwright Makkal Sabdulaev. He is the author of lyrics of most of Ramzaeva’s songs. He also wrote famous theatrical play « Rejected heroes » (Махкана совбевлла к1ентий). From 1996-2000 he worked as the 1st Deputy minister of Culture of CRI. In 2000, Sabdulaev was abducted by russian soldiers in Grozny on a checkpoint. He is considered missing.

Aset lives in Canada, where she arrived when she was 13 years old, in 2004. Aset has a BA in education and she is currently completing MA in education. Aset holds the position of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

We can say that you belong to a generation that we could define as the “Ichkeria Generation”, that is, those kids who were born close to independence, and who became adults during the period of independent Chechnya. The first question I would like to ask you is: what is the first memory you associate with “being Chechen”? Do you remember how you became aware of who you were, as a member of the Chechen nation? And what feeling did you associate with this thought?

I was raised on the songs of my mother and on the poems of my father that always praised freedom, honor, dignity, good manners, our culture, our native language, our struggle for independence, our heroes and the tragic history of our people.

 The Chechen identity was constructed in me by the art of my parents. Since my childhood, I was aware of who I am. I was three years old, in 1994, when on the Eve of the First Russo-Chechen war, huge demonstrations took place on the Liberty Square. The Chechen people were asking Russians to stop the aggression and provocations against the Chechen state. People used to invite my mother to sing for them at the demonstrations on Liberty Square and she took me with her. My people have gone through horrors and injustice, two bloody wars, genocide and isolation. Chechens defended themselves although they were abandoned by the entire world and thrown in the claws of Yeltsin and Putin. But our spirit never surrendered to Russia. The history of my people taught me that no matter how big the conqueror is, we always have to resist. Today, Chechnya is under Russian occupation and my people are living under Putin’s dictatorship, yet, we continue to resist.

Thanks for your answer, Aset, which in a way anticipates my second question.  You were just a child when Russia invaded Chechnya.  What do you remember about those terrible times?  How did you experience the years of occupation as a child?

I remember a lot of things. In 1994, Yeltsin started a full land and air attack against the Independent Chechen State. During the bombing, my mother, my sister and I used to hide in the shelter (basement of our house). My mother played Pondar (chechen accordion) very loud, so that my sister and I couldn’t hear Russian military planes and irritating sounds of missiles. My father never came to the shelter. He always stayed either upstairs or outside. 

 I remember that one day a group of Chechen warriors were walking on our street, very brave and humble men. They knocked on our door and asked for water. They seemed to be exhausted because it was the moment when Grozny was surrounded by Russians. My mother invited the entire group to our yard, prepared some food and she played our national anthem. Our warriors were smiling. But they didn’t eat anything. They just drank water and left, smiling. I will never forget these beautiful faces.

I also remember ruins. The entire city was in ruins. The doors of our house were with bullet holes. I remember our dog Borzik. It was a huge white dog. Very kind and friendly dog. Everytime it heard Russian helicopters or missiles, Borzik used to run in my sister’s room and hide under the bed. When helicopters left, we always had a hard time getting Borzik out of the room because it was too big and refused to move.

Thank you, Aset. Then the war ended with the escape of the Russians in August 1996. Do you remember those days? What did they say in your family?

When the Chechen government and Russian government signed the Khasavyurt Accord in 1996 marking the end of the first Russo-Chechen war, it was a huge celebration for our people. My parents were very happy because it meant the end of a nightmare. Our nation elected in fair and democratic elections the third President Aslan Maskhadov and we truly thought that we will finally start building our prosperous state. After the victory in the unequal struggle for freedom, Chechens gained popularity in Russian public opinion and in the world. We were perceived as heroes. However, things changed when Putin got appointed as the head of the KGB in Moscow. The entire KDG machine was directed to destroy our state, our society and our reputation. The KGB’s aim was to destroy the image of Chechen heroes.

Putin opened doors for so-called middle eastern “investors” and facilitated their arrival to Chechnya through Moscow. These emissaries from the Middle East brought a lot of money and invested it in the opposition movements that were against our government. This opposition was mainly led by Movladi Udugov and his ideological comrades from Arab countries spreading fundamentalist religious beliefs that were in complete discord with the Chechen culture and adats (customs). On the other hand, Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov, who was appointed as Chechen mufti (main imam), praised traditional Islam that was in opposition to Udugov’s “pure Islam”. These two religious individuals preached their versions of Islam on TV channels. Their destructive teachings divided Chechen society that was already in a very miserable economic situation. Both Udugov and Kadyrov were working for Russian intelligence, and they aimed to destroy our state and divide our people. They were financed by Russia. I’ve read a lot of things about these events in the book of Akhmed Zakaev, “Subjugate or Exterminate” published by Washington Press. Also, it is very important to note that these Arab emissaries, under the umbrella of Russian intelligence, were directly involved in kidnappings of civilians, international aid workers, journalists and engineers. For example, the person who kidnaped British engineers Apti Abitaev, was a KGB agent, and our government arrested them. The person who initiated “fatwa” (ruling) to behead these poor British engineers was Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary. This barbaric murder of British engineers was a triumph for Russian intelligence. It succeeded in sending the message to the world that Chechens were criminals and kidnappers. Yet, the Chechen people had nothing to do with these criminal acts. Also, on 23 July 1998, an attempt was made to assassinate our President Maskhadov by blowing up the truck close to Maskhadov’s car. Two security officers of Maskhadov were killed. Later, our government found out that the “fatwa” (ruling) to kill our legitimately and democratically elected president Maskhadov was made by the same Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary that was in very close ties with Udugov.

 Indeed, I think that the period from 1996-1999, was a very difficult time for our State. But not because our government was incompetent, as some individuals claim, but because we were in complete economic/political blockade and our enemy was unproportionally powerful and malicious. Every state at the beginning of its statehood goes through difficulties. For instance, Georgia went through political turmoil at the beginning of its existence. Unlike Georgia, Chechnya was in complete blockade with no access to any political support from the West. Therefore, Russia crushed our state in the worst manner. Zakaev makes a very good point in his book about the situation in Chechnya during that period: “Crime, the gradual impoverishment of population, corruption within the government, the economic crisis, all were due mainly, of course, to Russia’s failure to honor its obligations to restore the republic’s economic infrastructure, destroyed in a war it had unleashed. Ultimately, however, in the eyes of the public the person to blame for all our troubles and economic difficulties was President Aslan Maskhadov” (2018, p.346) Russia kept us in economic blockage, infiltrated her agents from Middle East, injected Wahhabi religious ideology that was alien to us, divided our society, discredited our government, destroyed our reputation and, later, perpetrated genocide against our people.

Aset Sabdulaeva with hes mother and her father

About the end of the first war, and the feelings you felt among your family.  Was there a particular commander among those who fought for independence who was considered a hero, or a greater hero than the others?  Did little Aset have a Chechen hero who made her proud?

I remember when my mom used to take me to a demonstration, older women sang songs “zikr” (traditional style music with lyrics) praising Djokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and Ahmed Zakaev. As a child, I didn’t have a particular admiration for a specific commander. I admired all our warriors. However, when I started to grow up and to be more conscious, I understood the real value of our heroes. I love Djokhar Dudaev because he left a legacy to our nation, I deeply respect Zelimkhan Yandarbiev because he behaved in a beautiful manner in Kremlin when Yeltsin refused to sit around the table on equal terms; Zelimkhan wrote beautiful poems in Chechen language that I enjoy reading. I appreciate Aslan Maskhadov because he was a true diplomat and is the leader that signed the Peace Treaty with the Russian Federation in May 1997. I admire Abdulhalim Sadulaev because he was a very wise leader. I truly appreciate Akhmed Zakaev because he left treasure to our nation in terms of two books that he wrote. He is the witness of all historical and political processes that occurred in Chechnya. I admire them all. They dedicated their lives, so that we can be free. In the bottom of my heart, of course, my eternal hero is my father, Makkhal. He believed in freedom and justice. He wanted to build an independent and democratic state. I became who I am, because of him.

Thinking about your father, how did you feel knowing that he was participating in building the independent state that Chechens had long desired? Were your family members proud of him, or was their fear that something bad might happen to him prevail?

I felt very happy actually. After school, I used to go to the Ministry, where my father worked as 1st Deputy Minister of Culture, and run all over it. I ran and jumped so much that sometimes the workers of the Ministry complained to my father. When he brought me home, he used to talk to me for a long time explaining how important it is to behave in a good manner.  My family members were proud of my father. I remember when he came back from work, he spent hours and hours writing articles, reports and projects. Given the fact that our Republic was in complete economic blockade and Russia didn’t pay the reparations for all the damage it had done in Chechnya, Chechen government lacked funds, and it could not pay salaries to its workers. I still have my father’s certificate where it’s written that the government owes him 18 000 rubles in salary for 6 months of work. He worked for the well-being of our country because he knew that to nourish national self-conscience in young people, it’s important to elevate the culture, teach the Chechen language in schools, promote Chechen folk music, publish Chechen literature, encourage young artists and writers to write in Chechen language and share the history of our people through poems and plays.  My father opposed all radical elements infiltrated in our society by Russian intelligence. These elements retarded the development of our state.

When the second war started in Chechnya, in 1999, the Ministry of Culture stopped functioning, so my father joined Aslan Maskhadov’s media team, and he was reporting all atrocities that were perpetrated by Russians in Chechnya. He knew that it was becoming very dangerous for him to stay there. Three days before his capture, he called my mother, who was at that time in Georgia. She asked him to leave Chechnya. He refused and said: “What is happening here is a genocide. I can’t leave.” One day before his capture, his friend Dalkhan Hojaev, a chechen historian was captured by Russians and killed. The next day, they took my father when he was crossing a Russian check- point (block-post).  My father disappeared without a trace. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya in hope to find him. One of the Russian generals told her that my father was taken to Khankala, a russian military base where russian soldiers tortured and killed chechen civilians.

Makkal Sabdulaev (centre) with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev (center – left) and Akhmed Zakayev (Right)

Do you remember any activities organized by the Ministry for the Promotion of Culture during the interwar period?

I remember that on every 6th September, the Independence Day of Chechnya, the Ministry of Culture, under my father’s supervision, used to organize big concerts in Dinamo Stadium. He also initiated a plan to repair all our libraries and update the collection of books.   Under his supervision, our Ministry organized the competition of folk performers (singers and instrumentalists) in all villages and at the end of competition, the best folk performers were gathered in Grozny and they performed on a Gala Concert where they received special prices.

What happened after you heard of your father’s passing? Did your mother decide to take you to the West?

In 2000, my father insisted that we (my mother, my sister and me) go to Georgia. We were refugees in Georgia. In July, the same year, my father was kidnapped. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya and started searching for him everywhere, even in mass graves. At that time, it was possible to pay a bribe to Russian soldiers, they gave access to the mass grave. My mother appealed to every possible instance. Yet, she couldn’t find him. In 2002, she left Chechnya because Russians came to our house looking for her. She managed to escape through the backyard and hide in a neighbor’s house. Russians didn’t like that she was determined and eager to find out where my father was and she gathered too much attention. She had no choice but to leave Chechnya.

We stayed in Georgia until 2004. In 2004, Canada opened a program in Georgia for accepting chechen refugees through UNHCR. We applied for immigration, passed an interview and Canada accepted our file.  We left Georgia.

Aset Sabdulaeva ad the Jamestown Foundation

What do you remember about your time in Georgia? What was that life like, from the eyes of a little girl?

When we arrived in Georgia, we were afraid to say that we are Chechens because Russia spread horrible propaganda about Chechen people and the entire nation was demonized and presented on most Russian TV channels as terrorists and bandits.

The second problem was that I didn’t go to school for almost two years because of war. As a kid, in my learning process, I was getting behind the children of my age. My sister had to enroll me in school as soon as possible. At that time, we didn’t have official papers recognizing us as refugees in Georgia.  She approached one teacher in the school #44 in Tbilisi, on the mount Mtacminda, and talked to her about my case.  Gora Alexandrovna (teacher) agreed to take me in her class without any hesitation, although we didn’t have papers. The director of the school, Nana, approved my admission right away, and I was enrolled in 3d grade.  I remember Georgia as a country with very hospitable and kind people. Certainly, I remember all my teachers. They helped me so much to catch other kids. Gora Alexandrovna,Tamara Iradionovna, Nana Mas, Greta Stepanovna, Viola Mas, they were Georgian and Armenians, they taught me even during summer.

When we came to Georgia, President Shevardnadze was still in power. The country was poor and suffocating in corruption and bribery. Shervarnadze was a good friend of Putin. I remember 13 Chechens were deported to Moscow. It was an unjust decision made by Shevardnazde to deport our men. He knew that Putin is conducting an illegal war in Chechnya and that our people are suffering from this barbaric aggression. When Russians completed their mission in Chechnya, they came to Georgia in 2008 and annexed Georgian territories.

 I also remember that my sister and I participated at the demonstrations during the Rose Revolution to support Mikhail Saakashvili. I noticed that when Georgian people are fed up, they mobilize quite quickly and express their political will. As time passed, it was difficult to live in Georgia. My family couldn’t afford living there. We had to leave.

A post-Russian world: Francesco Benedetti interviews Oleg Magaletsky

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Oleg Magaletsky is a specialist in strategic development, organizational changes, innovations, scaling and management of organizations, teams and ideas (both in commercial and non-commercial segments)
Since childhood, he has been interested in history, economics, psychology, literature, political science, and social geography.


Oleg Magaletsky


When and how did the idea of a forum of free nations arise?

The idea to create a platform of the Free Nations Post-Russia Forum arose as a reflection on the beginning of the full-scale aggression of imperial Muscovy against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, as a result of the analysis of the situation, the confidence increased that the only real option to achieve long-term peace in Europe (and all of Northern Eurasia) is maximally controlled , non-violent and complete Decolonization of the last European empire (currently in the form of a terrorist state, the so-called “Russian Federation”)

From your point of view, Russia is a “nineteenth-century” colonial empire, comparable to the European ones dismantled after the Second World War. In what sense can the Russian Federation be defined as a “colonial empire”?

Although according to the form and declarations de jure imperial Muscovy is the (Russian) Federation (according to the “Constitution”), where the regions have subjectivity and citizens have equal rights, in fact de facto, by all outward signs Muscovy is just a classic continental empire model of the second half of the 19th century, with a clear empire, a metropolis (Moscow) and the rest of the territories (both conventionally “internal” and external) – colonies, whose resources are only exploited by the metropolis for its own “shine” and external aggressions, exercising effective control over the colonies, making it impossible there is sustainable economic development, holding back continuous progress, prohibiting linguistic, cultural and national development/identification.
In fact, the only thing that today unites Sakha and Cherkessia, Buryatia and Ingushetia ets. – this is only a repressive apparatus (“vertical”) and colonial exploitation by the Kremlin. There are no substantive horizontal connections, which is also characteristic of the imperialism of the past century, the last example of which in Europe today remains Russia.

Does supporting the reasons of the nations subjected to Russian colonial rule mean, in your opinion, denying the existence of Russia as such?

To some extent.
The concept of “Russia” is a hybrid, a simulacrum, created purely for propaganda purposes, to justify imperialism and the enslavement of inferior nations and regions.
The de-imperialization of Muscovy will also liberate it, allowing it to turn into a number of independent, compatible and free national and/or regional entities, some of which will be able to return to their own, primarily Finno-Hungarian, roots in their own identification.

the post – Russian space according to the Forum

Is there, in your opinion, a part of Russian society that would be willing to do without its empire in favor of a community of free nations in a nuclear-free “post-Russian” area?

Yes, there are such people, moreover, their number is not only growing, the very “quality” composition of supporters of the corresponding views and actions is important: these are intellectual, organizational and managerial elites (in the good sense of the word), these are people capable of analysis and understanding cause-and-effect relationships.
It is obvious to them that Putin is not the cause, but the consequence of the problems, and their very essence lies precisely in the imperial nature of the modern “Russian” statehood, which can be changed only by radical (and not cosmetic profanation) changes through de-imperialization and decolonization.

What would be, in your opinion, the advantages for the international community in dismantling the Russian Federation? Isn’t there a risk that Moscow’s enormous nuclear arsenal would end up in the hands of many smaller countries, some of which could become small “North Koreas”?

A huge number of advantages (attaching a separate file with their thesis description), with a proactive approach and controllability of the process of Decolonization of Russia, it will be the most positive geopolitical event since the collapse of the USSR 30 years ago.
As for the “spread” of nuclear weapons, this is one of the main horrors of imperial propaganda, but as the experience of the collapse of the USSR shows – all this can be easily avoided, although free countries are not interested in having nuclear weapons (it is very expensive and impractical), only empires need them.
Both the first and the second factor were devoted to our latest public events, in particular the 8th Free Nations Post-Russia Forum in London and Paris on October 12-14 (attach its summary declaration below)

The flags of some of the nations participating in the Forum

You introduced the theme of the different behavior of empires compared to nations. Based on the reflections made for Russia, do you think it is correct to say that all empires, albeit in different forms, share the same “original sin”, and that in some way also a certain “imperial mission” which is at the origin of the state of generalized war in which most of the planet finds itself? And if so, do you think it would be appropriate to apply the same “weakening” of imperial ambitions to other “empires” too?


Of course, there are certain general characteristics, but mainly – everything depends on the specific context (time, conditions, system) and is quite individual.
At a certain historical stage, the creation of colonies (in their original form and essence during the times of ancient Greece and Rome) was a progressive and relatively positive phenomenon.
But already at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the creation of colonies in the format of the policy of imperialism with all the rationalizations like “The White Man’s Burden” took on much more grotesque and negative forms (the Belgian Congo can be mentioned as an apotheosis).
Therefore, what Muscovy is doing in the 21st year on the huge expanses from Sakha in the north to Kalmykia in the south, from Keninsberg in the west and to the occupied part of Karafuto in the east – this is an absolutely unacceptable retrograde policy for the time being, which will deal with internal repression and external military expansion from the outside.
Currently, there is no other similar state in the world, but if imperial Muscovy is not stopped now, China, Iran, etc. will most likely follow its example, that is, it may be the beginning of a renaissance of the most disgusting practices of colonial exploitation, authoritarianism and imperialism.
Therefore, it is the complete and final decolonization (preferably controlled and maximally non-leadership) of the so-called “Russian Federation” that is the key to a new architecture of collective sustainable security and peace in the entire northern hemisphere (and an effective method to stop the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran-Pyongyang MBTP Axis as a de facto already existing alliance of tyrants + their satellite regimes Maduro, Lukashenko, Assad, Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban etc.)

Talking about the benefits that the divestment of the Russian Federation could bring to the world. Russia has been on the brink of collapse several times over the last century. And yet what appears to be its main enemy, the United States, has always acted to preserve its unity. Why do you think there is this strange relationship (if you believe it exists) between these two historical enemies, yet linked by an apparent relationship of mutual necessity? And how could the United States’ point of view on this issue change?

This is not so characteristic of US politics, as it is of bureaucracy and politicians in general – they are a priori extremely inert, not inclined to change and seek to preserve the status quo, even if it is negative (and changes are positive), in particular, this was the case during the collapse of the USSR, when the Bush administration (as well as Reagan before that) did everything possible and impossible to save this communist Frankenstein as a single state. But they were not the only ones who did this (the rest of the free states, from France and Britain to Japan and Canada, acted in fact in the same direction), besides, at that time the USSR was not so much an enemy as a former opponent (and in 1917- 1920 was not an enemy of the USA at all)
i.e., the situation with the desire to “leave Russia united and indivisible” is not an exception (as is the attitude of the US Department of State to this issue), but rather a geopolitical (unfortunately) “rule”: a similar attitude was applied to the division of Yugoslavia (even to Croatia and Slovenia’s “European friends” tried to prevent it from gaining independence), as we see now with regard to the enemies of the free world, China and Iran – the independence of Kurdistan is not recognized, Taiwan is in an unclear status, occupied Tiber and Eastern Turkestan are not being helped, etc.
That is, it is sad. But there is also a positive – regardless of the desire of an inert and spineless bureaucracy and blind politicians without a vision and strategy – the dynamics and logic of history determine the determinism of certain processes, such as the entropy of weak and large empires, so – they are doomed to be dismantled (regardless of the wishes of Bush, Kissinger, Sullivan, Burns, etc.)

The speakers at the seventh forum held in Japan last August

What would be the fate of the Russian communities in the new subjects that would be born following the dismantling of the Russian Federation?


Probably, it will be different. Future independent states will have different paths and structures, very different from each other, there will be significant regional integration (with current neighbors outside the perimeter)
Probably, the main trend will be integration and the creation of new political nations, where ethnic origin will not play a key role, and the main factor will be precisely citizenship and values;

Recent history presents us with numerous scenarios of civil war, or wars between states that arose following the collapse of the Soviet system throughout Eastern Europe, as well as in the former USSR. How would it be possible, from your point of view, to prevent the crumbling of the Russian empire from causing a myriad of these small conflicts, or ethnic cleansing against the old Russophile elites who governed, and partly still govern, the territory?


In fact, by the standards of history, the collapse of the USSR was virtually bloodless, violence was minimal. And where it was (as in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo during the breakup of Yugoslavia), their source and cause was precisely the revanchism of the former metropolis (Serbia and Russia, respectively).
Some conflicts in which Russia did not take an open and direct part (such as the Armenian-Azebarjan war) were deepened and artificially supported by it (divide and conquer), so as soon as there were opportunities to reduce its influence, the conflicts quickly escalated (what we actually observe there now).
There are no panaceas, but there are definitely conditions that can reduce the likelihood of conflicts (because the new states are not interested in this, they need to deal with their own state building and development, in particular:
1. Maximum integration of new states into both global and regional institutions with the participation of the leading states of the region (which can be temporary “moderators” in case of problems)
2. Eliminating the grounds for revanchism in the former metropolis through (double-parallel) both economic integration and military deterrence
3. Comprehensive involvement of the free world in the reconstruction programs of the newly independent states of the post-Russian space.



Based on the statements, the forum identifies itself as a non-violent, democratic, anti-authoritarian, as well as anti-imperialist organization. Let’s start from the first of the characteristics mentioned, non-violence as an approach to political struggle. How do you think you will be able to convince the Moscow government to recognize the reasons of the subjugated nations, through the instrument of non-violence?

Many recipes and tools demonstrate the experience of liberating both Central European states and the USSR from communism 30 years ago.
At the same time, our emphasis on nonviolent actions (which have a significant arsenal of acts of sabotage, strikes, manifestos, etc.) does not exclude some elements of violent resistance, but we are talking about the fact that the corresponding acts of direct (in particular, violent) countermeasures should be maximally limited, controlled, justified, effective and targeted.
One of the best ways to do this is the synchronization and coordination of the actions of national liberation and anti-colonial movements – alternate losses in the war against Ukraine and its own size – the empire simply cannot physically prevent simultaneous secessions.

8) The Forum defines itself, as we were saying, as an organization based on respect for democratic principles. What does it mean, from your point of view, to carry out a “democratic” fight against Russian imperialism?

We consider it unnecessary to “reinvent the wheel”, that is, we share all the main liberal and humanistic values ​​characteristic (and underlying) of NATO and the EU (with the exception, unfortunately, of Turkey and Hungary, whose authoritarian governments are increasingly in the opposite direction), in particular – freedom of will, freedom of speech, presumption of innocence, distribution of branches of power, limitation of terms of tenure in public positions, civil and civil accountability, prerogative of international law, absence of censorship, etc.

Being anti-authoritarian is certainly identified among the founding values of the Forum. This is particularly evident in your policy document, in which the forum states that “post-Russian” countries would seek cooperation from all countries, except China, which is currently under an authoritarian regime. How can the Forum ensure that some of the political realities that emerge from the fragmentation of the Russian Federation do not end up becoming bridgeheads for Chinese authoritarianism instead?

Of course, we cannot provide guarantees, as the future is uncertain and realities are dynamic.
However, we can support the existing opportunities and conditions, which is that now the leaders of the national liberation and anti-colonial movements have an anti-China position, and if the states of the free world will maintain open political, economic and cultural ties with it, their integration into global/regional markets and institutions,  they will not have no reason to drift away from cooperation with the EU, USA, NATO, Japan, etc. in the direction of the PRC.

One of the most interesting themes regarding your program is that of replacing the “territorial” element, which often inspires policies of greatness to the detriment of neighboring countries, with a system of international law based on populations and on compromise between nations, oriented towards the well-being of peoples rather than nationalist claims. Could you explain this “revolutionary” point of your program better?

In our opinion, it is important to learn from previous experience, trying to avoid repeating mistakes. A very eloquent example is the refancism and revisionism of Serbia, which affected not only Bosnia and Kosovo, but above all itself, after the breakup of Yugoslavia.
In the modern post-industrial world, the size and resources actually do not matter (and if they do, the bigger they are, the more difficult it is), because the main capital is people and their intellectual potential. At the same time, good neighborly relations and open borders create much more opportunities than an additional piece of “historic land” where people will die, military expenditures will increase, and trade will be complicated.
In addition, the very concept of “historical lands”, like “historical justice”, is very subjective and ambiguous, in contrast to international law and already existing borders (in particular, still “internal” administrative ones, as in the case of the Russian Federation), that is, if to summarize, our view is directed to the future, not the past, to collective security and cooperation (in particular with/within the EU and NATO), and not to ethnic irredentism.

Do you believe that the solution of replacing the Russian Federation with an open confederation, modeled on the European Union, for example, or directly integrated into it, could solve the problem of irredentism? And could Moskovia be part of this subject, in your opinion, without returning to hegemonise it in the long term?

Since Russia itself is a 100% artificial and unnatural entity, any attempt to change this Frankenstein will bring the same results.
Post-Russian spaces (in the plural), as well as their future independent states, are completely different and distinct, and each will have its own path – for Buryatia, Sakha, the Pacific Federation, interaction with Japan, Mongolia, Korea, etc. is much more natural, and not Moscow for Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Astrakhan – with Kazakhstan and Turkey, not Moscow, Ingria and Keningsberg are part of the Baltic region, some states (including the Federation of Zalesye, which will include Moscow as a former metropolis if it chooses Austria as a “benchmark” example) may eventually become members of the EU and NATO, – this is a very likely way)

Another cornerstone of the thought behind the Forum is the rejection of the so-called “Realpolitik”, which leads democratic and liberal regimes to enter into agreements of convenience with authoritarian, or fundamentalist, regimes for tactical purposes. Does the rejection of realpolitik therefore mean embracing a system of ethical values? If so, what could these values be?

Exactly. In the pursuit of minor tactical advantages, cooperating with dictators, murderers and tyrants, we all lose much more by legitimizing and aiding their aggressive and dangerous (especially for the free world, not only their own citizens) systems.
The ethical principles of both internal and external politics have long been formed, this is the basis of our (Western civilization), which has its roots in Athens and Rome, through the Renaissance and, above all, the political ideas of the Enlightenment (Locke, Kant, Montexieu, etc.) to the New Age with the General Declarations and human rights and the founding documents of the United Nations.
To be very general and to cut short, the categorical imperatives formed by Kant should apply to states, as well as to individuals.

WAR MEMORIES: FRANCESCO BENEDETTI INTERVIEWS AKHMED ZAKAYEV (PART 2)

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The following is the transcript of the first part of the interview between Francesco Benedetti and Akhmed Zakayev conducted by Inna Kurochkina for INEWS (we attach the link to the original video, which will soon be accompanied by English and Italian subtitles)

On 6 March 1996 the armed forces of the ChRI launched their first major offensive action of the conflict: the so-called “Operation Retribution”. According to what I was told by Huseyn Iskhanov, then Representative of the General Staff, the plan was conceived in Goiskoye and saw your participation, as well as that of the Chief of Staff, Maskhadov, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Saydaev. Do you remember how you planned this operation?

Yes, of course I remember that. This, in principle, came out of the operation that we carried out to blockade the city of Urus-Martan in order to prevent elections. After this operation, my Chief of Staff Dolkhan Khadzhaev and I met with Dzhokhar Dudayev. And we suggested the option that something like this should be done. We understood that any of our actions in order to make any attempts to change this situation, the Russians needed at least three days, theoretically.

It took them three days to recover and start doing something. And then we started talking about the possibility of blocking several districts at the same time. And then Dzhokhar Dudayev said: “You see how good it is when a team works. I, he says, was with these thoughts and thought about how best and what kind of operation we should carry out.

It was then that the idea arose to carry out this operation in the city of Grozny, in the city of Dzhokhar – in the future.

And on the same day, it was decided to invite Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the General Staff, to call him to our side, and from that time, almost two or three days after we discussed this with Dzhokhar Dudayev, we began preparations over this operation. Practically – we had our own intelligence in Grozny, we knew where each Russian unit was concentrated, and we did additional work and identified all these points where Russian units are located. Where are checkpoints, commandant’s offices, military units.

Yes, Umadi Saidaev, the late Umadi Saidaev, he was the Chief of the Operational Headquarters, and then, later, Aslan Maskhadov arrived there, and together with the Commanders of the Directions who were supposed to take part, we developed this operation.

Returning again to Operation Retribution, this was a success that the ChRI leadership chose to use more symbolically than strategically. In your memoir you recall that at the time the decision to withdraw from Grozny, despite having taken it under your control, did not please you, and that even now you maintain that what was achieved in the following August, with Operation Jihad , could have been achieved with Operation Retribution. Finally, you say: In March of 1996 we probably had the opportunity to finish the war victoriously, and then much of our recent history could have gone differently. What do you mean by this sentence? Are you alluding to the fact that Dudayev was still alive, or to the fact that the Russian presidential election had not yet been held? Or again, to something else?

I thought about the elections in Russia last, because there have never been any elections there. Yes, the very fact that Dzhokhar was alive at that time could have been of great importance, and the course of history could have been completely different if the war had ended with Dzhokhar Dudayev alive. And it is unlikely that the Russians would go for it, I also admit this, on the one hand, I admit that they would not go. They made every effort to eliminate Dzhokhar Dudayev, and subsequently to seek peace. As for this operation, I’m just sure of it. Yes, then we planned the operation for three or four days, but there was no concrete decision, such that we would leave in three days. Because Dzhokhar Dudayev arrived in Grozny, he was at my Headquarters in the city of Grozny, in my defense sector, in that part of the operation that the units under my command took part, he arrived there, and we were together last night at our headquarters. And I remember the reaction of Dzhokhar Dudayev when he learned that there was an order to leave the city, that some units had already begun to leave Grozny. He did not agree with this, because you can really assess the situation when you see the situation in the process, how it changes, and based on this you must draw conclusions and make decisions. Dzhokhar Dudayev was in Grozny for the first time after the Russian occupation, we traveled with him at night, in Grozny at night, we went to the bus station, he watched all this destruction, and when we returned to the Headquarters, some of our units had already begun to leave. He said: “Well, if there is an order, it is necessary to carry it out.”

And we retreated. And I later thought about it, because nothing more than what we did for the month of March, we did nothing in August. This operation was repeated one by one in the same way, and with the same forces and means. Even in August, we initially had and at the beginning of this operation, the funds involved were two times less than in the March operation. And therefore, I am sure that if we had stayed in Grozny … (well … history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood). What had to happen happened. But I remain of my opinion that it could have been different. But this is already from the area of \u200b\u200b”could”.

But that did not happen.

In March 1996 you faced, as commander, what was perhaps the biggest defensive battle fought by the Chechen army in 1996. I am referring to the Battle of Goiskoye. I’ve read conflicting opinions regarding the choice to face the Russians in that position. Some argue that the defense of the village was senseless, resulting in numerous unwarranted casualties for the Chechen forces. Others argue that if Goiskoye had fallen too soon into federal hands, the entire Chechen defense system could have shattered. After all these years, what do you think?

To prevent the enemy from reaching the foothills, to block him in the village of Goyskoe, this was, from a strategic point of view, militarily an absolutely correct decision. This decision was made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Yes, I also know that there is such a statement, but based on real losses, we did not suffer any serious losses during the defense of Goisky. Yes, there were dead, several people who died were injured, but there were no such losses. There is no war without loss. Well, in a strategic sense, the protection and defense of Goisky kept the front line, which moved from Bamut to Alkhazurov. Alkhazurov fell under Russian control, but Komsomolskoye also fell under Russian control. But in Goyskoe we didn’t let them go any further. We prevented the passage of the Russians up to the foothills. And thus they retained the Front and the front line. And this was of very important strategic importance, all the more so against the background of the fact that the Russians began to talk about negotiations, about a truce. If we talk about a truce and start a conversation with them about a political dialogue, naturally, the preservation of a certain territory that we controlled, this was of great political importance, and in connection with this, Dzhokhar Dudayev made the decision to protect Goiskoye. Yes, we lasted a month and a half. And later, after the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev, when Bamut had already fallen, it was decided to leave Goiskoye. But as long as Achkhoy and Bamut were on the defensive, we held the line of defense in Goyskoye as well.

But when the front had already been interrupted there, it was pointless to continue to hold the front line and lose our fighters. And so it was decided to withdraw our units already to the mountains. Subsequently, we already redeployed closer to the city and began to prepare for the August operation.

After Dudayev’s death, power was transferred to Vice-President Yandarbiev, who took office as Interim President. Was the decision to transfer power to him unanimous? Or were there discussions about it?

In principle, there were no discussions, one vote was against, the rest all spoke in favor of recognizing Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev as Vice President. It was in line with our constitution, presidency provision, and it was accepted. And Zelimkhan Yandarbiev began to act as President.

After Yandarbiev assumed presidential powers, he appointed you as Presidential Assistant at Security. What were your duties in this position?

Yes. He appointed me Assistant to the President for National Security. And at the same time, that unit, that is, the Third Sector, which I commanded, I was simultaneously appointed Commander of the Separate Special Purpose Brigade. That is, the unit that I commanded, being the Commander of the Third Sector, he was also transferred to the Brigade, to the status of the Brigade under the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Basically, this was done because Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, after we retreated and put up the Presidential Palace at the beginning of the war, he was inside the Presidential Palace until the last moment, until we left the city. Since that time, in principle, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev has not been involved in military operations, and over the past year and a half, over the past year, new units have already been created and new people have appeared in these military structures. And naturally, Zelimkhan needed a person who knew this whole system militarily, and, of course, we worked with him and in the near future Zelimkhan was introduced to the course in all Directions, Fronts and our units, and already as the Supreme Commander, he Subsequently, he began to manage these processes himself. And my task included power components. And later it was transferred, after graduation this position was transferred, retrained to the position of “Secretary of the Security Council”.

And before the elections, in principle, I performed these functions.

President of Ukraine awarded the Order of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria “Honor of the Nation” and the Order of Dzhokhar Dudayev

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President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky received the highest state awards from the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile – the Order of Honor of the Nation (Qoman Sij) and the Order named after Dzhokhar Dudayev.

The head of the Ukrainian state was honored for outstanding services and selfless deeds for the sake of freedom and democracy throughout the world and for personal services to the Chechen people.

“His political steadfastness and loyalty to his native country managed to mobilize the Ukrainian people in the face of the imminent threat of Russia’s secular enemy and bloodthirsty monsters who seized power by terrorist methods,” says the decree signed by the head of the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile, Akhmed Zakayev, on 27 November last year.

The awards were personally presented to the Head of State by the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov.

The Order of Dzhokhar Dudayev is awarded to holders of the Order of Honor of the Nation. Chechen politicians Aslan Maskhadov and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, as well as Lithuanian statesman Vytautas Landsbergis were awarded this order.

I NEWS interviews Francesco Benedetti

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A few days ago Francesco Benedetti met Inna Kurochkina in Florence. The interview that emerged takes up the speeches addressed in another chat, which took place more or less a year ago, shortly before Russia invaded Ukraine. In the course of this year many things have changed, Francis’ work has moved forward and with it his awareness of how important the history of Chechnya is for the West.

We reproduce the video of the interview, attaching the transcript in English.

ENGLISH TRANSCRIPTION

First of all I would like to congratulate you from all visitors, subscribers who have already read your first volume. From today it is possible to have this second volume. How is it possible to have it?

First of all thanks to you, and thanks to all those who appreciated the first volume, and who gave me this consideration. The book is currently available in Italian, on Amazon, but will soon be available in English, thanks to the collaboration of Orts Akhmadov, son of Ilyas Akhmadov, who is working with me on the English version, and will soon also be available in Russian and Chechen, as for the first volume.

The other time we met and talked about your book was December 2021 and perhaps we were expecting war, this tragedy. Then we met in Brussels on the first day of the war, when both we and you met Akhmed Zakayev for the first time. With your help we attended some Radicali Italiani events, these very good people who organized Akhmed Zakayev’s visit to Italy, so somehow you are involved in our activities and in Ichkeria’s. How has your life changed during this year?

I have certainly had more real experiences with respect to this theme. I was a simple student of the history of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, but my experience was purely theoretical, abstract, not concrete, material. Since that day I have had the opportunity to speak with many people, and this second book is also written thanks to the memoirs of about a hundred people with whom I have spoken. Thus, my knowledge of that historical experience and of the human experience of the Chechens has grown enormously. From February to today I have given faces, names and lives to an experience that for me until then had only been theoretical.

You and I are working on the history of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, because I am also doing a cycle of chronicles. Do you understand the expression “in your skin”? How did you feel firsthand how the war was coming to Chechnya?

One of the questions I ask myself while studying the history of Chechnya, and in particular when studying this period, was “how would I have felt if I had found myself in that situation?” And I ask myself this question almost every day, because my study is based on the memories of the people I interview, and my interviews focus precisely on this aspect of every historical event: naturally I ask for information, names, dates, etc., but the first question I asked in almost every interview was “how did you feel at that moment?” “How did you spend the period between 26 November and 11 December (the time between the storming of Grozny by the pro-Russian opposition and the invasion). Personally, I try every day to imagine what the feelings of the people waiting for the war were, what they were thinking: their children, their families, how to save their families, how to save their things, their money, their cars, their homes. An event like this can completely destroy life, change people’s lives forever. I think I’m quite an empathic person, and I assure you that writing this book I suffered a lot. Like any author, I often re-read the book I’ve read, and every time I have the same feeling of tragedy on the one hand, and admiration on the other for those people who survived the war, in this case managing to win it, against their invaders .

I would like to understand how you frame the nature of the Chechen people. I was born in Georgia, I’m Ukrainian. I would like to work for the Georgian people, or for the Chechen people, but my whole heart now belongs to the Chechen people, I don’t know why. How could you describe your feeling towards the Chechen people? Because if you fell in love with this people, you did it because you have a passion in you.

I understand what you think because, when I think about it, what happened to me is really strange. I live in Tuscany, and I have no family, economic or any other connection with Chechnya. Yet ever since I was a child, something happened the first time I heard the name “Chechnya”. I don’t know exactly what, an elective affinity that has grown inside me, and I don’t know exactly why.

What I love about the Chechen people about this story is their ability to show happiness in tragedy. In them I have seen people who don’t want to be considered victims, but people who manage to find the beauty of life in everything. They have shown the world how to laugh in the face of death, and how to preserve humanity even in a situation which, if I imagine myself in their place, would strip humanity away from me as well. If a war destroyed my life maybe I’d go crazy. I have spoken to many people who have fought a war and have not gone mad, but rather have kept their kindness, their being good people. I don’t know if I would be able to keep these qualities in myself, fighting a war. I think this character trait of the Chechens is beautiful: the fact that they have managed to keep their happiness and will to live despite going through such bitter experiences.

Knowing this special character trait of this people, let’s think about how much Russia has gone to destroy them. It’s a biblical story for me. What do you think about it?

When a bully tries to hit a victim, and the victim smiles at him, the bully will become even more angry, but will ultimately be defeated by his victim’s resilience. In this sense I loved the struggle of the Chechens who showed the Russians that their spirit would never break.

In this last year we realized that the Ukrainians didn’t understand what the war in Chechnya was, just like the Russians they didn’t care about it. Now they have understood, and the Ukrainian parliament has recognized the independence, the state of occupation and the genocide of the Chechen people. What needs to happen for even Russian liberals to understand this tragedy? In their view of life there is no Chechen war and no Chechen tragedy, and of course there is no Ichkeria. What do you think?

I think Russian liberals are also part of the Russian empire. Maybe they want a “liberal empire”? Maybe it’s nonsense. I don’t think that in this sense there is much difference between the radical parties and the moderate or liberal ones. Everyone wants the same thing: to strengthen the empire, in one form or another. Maybe Russian liberals don’t want to fight the war in Ukraine, but they also don’t want to lose the integrity of their empire. I don’t see anything strange in this. I’m more used to studying and reading the news of another empire, the American one, and the liberals of the American empire are no less angry and aggressive than the nationalists. Citizens of an empire grow up thinking the only way to preserve the country is to stick together and squash any dissonant voices.

I was very surprised by your “hobby”. I’m going to show snippets from one of your band’s videos, which is called “Inner Code”. Tell me about this song about empire. I’m so surprised because you’re from Florence, we can’t relate the concept of “empire” with the city of Rome, which is so beautiful.

Rome in this song is the archetype of the empire. When we think of the Roman Empire we think of the empire by definition. The Russian Empire itself is inspired by the Roman Empire. The word “Tsar” is the translation of the Latin “Caesar”, the Kaiser of the German Empire is the Germanic translation of “Caesar”, and so on. “He will burn Rome” speaks of the fall of Rome, but by extension it speaks of the fall of all empires. No matter how big and strong, every empire will fall sooner or later. When I listen to this song I find a connection with the story we are talking about, being a story that can work with any empire, even the Russian one. However, I recommend listening to the song at a low volume!

[…]

Basically, everything we are talking about revolves around the word “Freedom”. You are a free person in all respects, as I see. Do you see the freedom of Ichkeria under attack? Do you think the imperial forces, the FSB , want to cancel this goal of freedom? We perceive these attacks, for example those that are being carried out against Akhmed Zakayev, a person who is a symbol of freedom of Ichkeria. Do you perceive these attacks from Italy?

I guess this behavior is consistent with the situation. I have an indirect perception of this, because unfortunately Italian newspapers don’t report much on what is happening in Chechnya or in the Chechen diaspora. However, having some contact with members of the Chechen diaspora due to my studies, I imagine that these people are talking about present and future plans to achieve independence and freedom for Chechnya and sometimes they do it in heated discussions, or getting angry. I speak as an Italian, I don’t think I have the right to tell the Chechens what they have to do. Only, seeing what is happening in the Chechen diaspora from the outside, I notice that there are “unresolved issues” and it is possible that the FSB , or anyone who does not want an independent Chechnya, could emphasize these divisions on the pro-independence front to weaken it. I hope people don’t fall into this trap. I don’t know if Chechnya’s independence is far or near, but it is important that at every step we find ourselves in the best condition to gather all our strength together to win freedom.

In recent months, also thanks to you and to the Italian Radicals (I am thinking of the meeting in Rome between Zakayev and Benedetto della Vedova, the speech to the Italian parliament, the recognition of Ichkeria by the Ukrainian parliament, the just finished speech by Zakayev at the European Parliament etc.) we have seen an evolution in the proposal of the government of Ichkeria. In Brussels, Zakayev presented a project for the reconstitution of the Republic of the Mountain, established in 1918 and dissolved by the Bolsheviks, and which Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Dzhokhar Dudaev at the time wanted to reconstitute in the 1990s. Now Zakayev is carrying out this idea, this project, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inal Sharip has gone to Washington DC and is presenting it there. As a historian, do you think this project of the Mountain Republic is safer, more feasible than independent Chechnya? Do you think Chechnya alone could survive its monstrous neighbors?

I think creating a confederation is very difficult, but if it is led by a strong center, it can multiply the strength of every single member. If the confederation is a simple sum of subjects I don’t think it will last long. An example can be that of the European Union: a sum of countries, but its strength is not equivalent to the sum of the forces that compose it. Because each country defends its interests, and this is a problem because a state built like this cannot resist the forces of countries like the United States, Russia, China. The problem with our confederation is that we don’t have a center, a nation that holds all the others together. And every time one of the European nations takes supremacy, the others fight against it. So our European confederation is politically weak. If the Chechens want to lead a confederation they don’t have to do it like the Europeans did. If they are credible enough to attract other nations into a confederation of which they are the centre, not as an imperial centre, but as the place of those who believe most of all in this project, and who are ready to sacrifice themselves for it more than the others to keep everyone together, then I think this is a political project that can last. Like, for example, the United States, which is a confederacy that, after some major problems, has become the most powerful nation on earth. A confederation, therefore, can last, but you need a center that has the credibility and strength to hold all the others together, not by force but by setting an example. I think the Chechens have shown the world great examples more than once.

In 1997 Russia and Chechnya signed a peace treaty which was later betrayed. What do you think about the desire of the world community to persuade Ukraine to sign a similar treaty with Russia?

Looking at history, it is perfectly understood that the real value of documents depends on whether or not they reflect the real situation. In 1997 Russia signed a peace treaty, but while it was signing it was preparing its second invasion. In my opinion, if he now accepts a compromise with Russia, this compromise will in no case fix any situation, because I don’t think the Russians would be satisfied, and neither would the Ukrainians. I believe that a compromise now would only be a way of moving the war forward by three or four years. I believe that this is a moment in which it is necessary to solve a problem that was born in Chechnya. In a wonderful review by Adriano Sofri, an Italian who knows Chechnya well, and who wrote a wonderful article on this book, he says that what happened in Ukraine is a remake of what happened in Chechnya and Georgia, and that Ukraine is the end of a line that starts in Chechnya. It is time to break this line once and for all, otherwise we will have to add another point to this line in four or five years. As a European I reflect on the fact that this line does not go away from Europe, but from Chechnya towards Europe. The next point will be even closer to our home, not further away. I think Europe should think about this. If they don’t stop this process now, they will face it again even closer to home.

ICHKERIA ON THE STREETS OF KRIVOY ROG

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Last October, the municipality of Krivoy Rog (Krivij Rih in Ukrainian) renamed 150 streets, roads and city squares. Among these, 5 stand out, dedicated to the memory of some of the main Chechen leaders who fell during the Russo-Chechen wars (Dudaev, Gelaev, Arsanov) as well as one dedicated to Sheikh Mansour, Chechen national hero and one dedicated to the free Chechen, Free Ichkeria Street .

The street dedicated to the memory of Dzhokhar Dudaev
The street dedicated to the memory of Ruslan Gelayev
The street dedicated to the memory of Vakha Arsanov

Freedom or death! History of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria: The second volume in Italian is out today

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The war in Ukraine started in Chechnya. It may seem like a provocation. Yet, this is the reality that the pages of this second volume reveal, entirely dedicated to the First Russo-Chechen War. The genesis, development and unfolding of this bloody conflict seem to be the draft of the script that the world has been witnessing in recent months between the Donbass and the Crimea.

Even then, as now, Russia invaded a free state, disguising the war it was waging behind the label of a “special operation.”

Even then, as now, the enemy of the Russian state had been labeled and demonized: if Zelensky and his government are called “Nazis” today, Dudayev and his ministers were then called “bandits”.

Even then, as today, convinced of their superiority, the military commands marched on the capital, claiming to bend a people to their will, as they had done several times in Soviet times. But even then, as now, they were forced to withdraw, only to unleash a bloody all-out war, the most devastating European war since 1945.

The First Russo-Chechen War was the first tragic product of Russian revanchism: the “zero point” of a parable that from Grozny leads to Kiev, passing through Georgia, Crimea, Belarus and Donbass. With one substantial difference: that the Russians lost that first war against Chechnya. Their imperial ambitions, resting on the worn foundations of a crumbling empire, ended up frustrated by the stubbornness of a nation immensely inferior in number and means, to that of Ukraine, which today defends its land from the war unleashed by Putin.

This story can teach those who have the patience to read it two important lessons: what happens when you indulge the ambitions of an empire, and how do you defeat it. If it is already too late to put the first into practice, we still have time for the second.

Purchase the volume here:

https://www.amazon.it/Libert%C3%A0-Storia-Repubblica-Cecena-Ichkeria/dp/B0BMSY666Y/ref=sr_1_4?crid=379QYOJIF1LQJ&keywords=libert%C3%A0+o+morte&qid=1670606213&sprefix=%2Caps %2C76&sr=8-4