Archivi tag: Ichkeria

ICHKERIA GENERATION – Francesco Benedetti interviews Aset Sabdulaeva (part 1)

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Aset Sabdulaeva was born in 1991 in Grozny. Her mother is the People’s Artist of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Birlyant Ramzaeva. She composed music for many famous Chechen songs « The Knight of Honour », « The time of Heros », « Don’t leave the mountains ». Her father is poet and playwright Makkal Sabdulaev. He is the author of lyrics of most of Ramzaeva’s songs. He also wrote famous theatrical play « Rejected heroes » (Махкана совбевлла к1ентий). From 1996-2000 he worked as the 1st Deputy minister of Culture of CRI. In 2000, Sabdulaev was abducted by russian soldiers in Grozny on a checkpoint. He is considered missing.

Aset lives in Canada, where she arrived when she was 13 years old, in 2004. Aset has a BA in education and she is currently completing MA in education. Aset holds the position of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

We can say that you belong to a generation that we could define as the “Ichkeria Generation”, that is, those kids who were born close to independence, and who became adults during the period of independent Chechnya. The first question I would like to ask you is: what is the first memory you associate with “being Chechen”? Do you remember how you became aware of who you were, as a member of the Chechen nation? And what feeling did you associate with this thought?

I was raised on the songs of my mother and on the poems of my father that always praised freedom, honor, dignity, good manners, our culture, our native language, our struggle for independence, our heroes and the tragic history of our people.

 The Chechen identity was constructed in me by the art of my parents. Since my childhood, I was aware of who I am. I was three years old, in 1994, when on the Eve of the First Russo-Chechen war, huge demonstrations took place on the Liberty Square. The Chechen people were asking Russians to stop the aggression and provocations against the Chechen state. People used to invite my mother to sing for them at the demonstrations on Liberty Square and she took me with her. My people have gone through horrors and injustice, two bloody wars, genocide and isolation. Chechens defended themselves although they were abandoned by the entire world and thrown in the claws of Yeltsin and Putin. But our spirit never surrendered to Russia. The history of my people taught me that no matter how big the conqueror is, we always have to resist. Today, Chechnya is under Russian occupation and my people are living under Putin’s dictatorship, yet, we continue to resist.

Thanks for your answer, Aset, which in a way anticipates my second question.  You were just a child when Russia invaded Chechnya.  What do you remember about those terrible times?  How did you experience the years of occupation as a child?

I remember a lot of things. In 1994, Yeltsin started a full land and air attack against the Independent Chechen State. During the bombing, my mother, my sister and I used to hide in the shelter (basement of our house). My mother played Pondar (chechen accordion) very loud, so that my sister and I couldn’t hear Russian military planes and irritating sounds of missiles. My father never came to the shelter. He always stayed either upstairs or outside. 

 I remember that one day a group of Chechen warriors were walking on our street, very brave and humble men. They knocked on our door and asked for water. They seemed to be exhausted because it was the moment when Grozny was surrounded by Russians. My mother invited the entire group to our yard, prepared some food and she played our national anthem. Our warriors were smiling. But they didn’t eat anything. They just drank water and left, smiling. I will never forget these beautiful faces.

I also remember ruins. The entire city was in ruins. The doors of our house were with bullet holes. I remember our dog Borzik. It was a huge white dog. Very kind and friendly dog. Everytime it heard Russian helicopters or missiles, Borzik used to run in my sister’s room and hide under the bed. When helicopters left, we always had a hard time getting Borzik out of the room because it was too big and refused to move.

Thank you, Aset. Then the war ended with the escape of the Russians in August 1996. Do you remember those days? What did they say in your family?

When the Chechen government and Russian government signed the Khasavyurt Accord in 1996 marking the end of the first Russo-Chechen war, it was a huge celebration for our people. My parents were very happy because it meant the end of a nightmare. Our nation elected in fair and democratic elections the third President Aslan Maskhadov and we truly thought that we will finally start building our prosperous state. After the victory in the unequal struggle for freedom, Chechens gained popularity in Russian public opinion and in the world. We were perceived as heroes. However, things changed when Putin got appointed as the head of the KGB in Moscow. The entire KDG machine was directed to destroy our state, our society and our reputation. The KGB’s aim was to destroy the image of Chechen heroes.

Putin opened doors for so-called middle eastern “investors” and facilitated their arrival to Chechnya through Moscow. These emissaries from the Middle East brought a lot of money and invested it in the opposition movements that were against our government. This opposition was mainly led by Movladi Udugov and his ideological comrades from Arab countries spreading fundamentalist religious beliefs that were in complete discord with the Chechen culture and adats (customs). On the other hand, Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov, who was appointed as Chechen mufti (main imam), praised traditional Islam that was in opposition to Udugov’s “pure Islam”. These two religious individuals preached their versions of Islam on TV channels. Their destructive teachings divided Chechen society that was already in a very miserable economic situation. Both Udugov and Kadyrov were working for Russian intelligence, and they aimed to destroy our state and divide our people. They were financed by Russia. I’ve read a lot of things about these events in the book of Akhmed Zakaev, “Subjugate or Exterminate” published by Washington Press. Also, it is very important to note that these Arab emissaries, under the umbrella of Russian intelligence, were directly involved in kidnappings of civilians, international aid workers, journalists and engineers. For example, the person who kidnaped British engineers Apti Abitaev, was a KGB agent, and our government arrested them. The person who initiated “fatwa” (ruling) to behead these poor British engineers was Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary. This barbaric murder of British engineers was a triumph for Russian intelligence. It succeeded in sending the message to the world that Chechens were criminals and kidnappers. Yet, the Chechen people had nothing to do with these criminal acts. Also, on 23 July 1998, an attempt was made to assassinate our President Maskhadov by blowing up the truck close to Maskhadov’s car. Two security officers of Maskhadov were killed. Later, our government found out that the “fatwa” (ruling) to kill our legitimately and democratically elected president Maskhadov was made by the same Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary that was in very close ties with Udugov.

 Indeed, I think that the period from 1996-1999, was a very difficult time for our State. But not because our government was incompetent, as some individuals claim, but because we were in complete economic/political blockade and our enemy was unproportionally powerful and malicious. Every state at the beginning of its statehood goes through difficulties. For instance, Georgia went through political turmoil at the beginning of its existence. Unlike Georgia, Chechnya was in complete blockade with no access to any political support from the West. Therefore, Russia crushed our state in the worst manner. Zakaev makes a very good point in his book about the situation in Chechnya during that period: “Crime, the gradual impoverishment of population, corruption within the government, the economic crisis, all were due mainly, of course, to Russia’s failure to honor its obligations to restore the republic’s economic infrastructure, destroyed in a war it had unleashed. Ultimately, however, in the eyes of the public the person to blame for all our troubles and economic difficulties was President Aslan Maskhadov” (2018, p.346) Russia kept us in economic blockage, infiltrated her agents from Middle East, injected Wahhabi religious ideology that was alien to us, divided our society, discredited our government, destroyed our reputation and, later, perpetrated genocide against our people.

Aset Sabdulaeva with hes mother and her father

About the end of the first war, and the feelings you felt among your family.  Was there a particular commander among those who fought for independence who was considered a hero, or a greater hero than the others?  Did little Aset have a Chechen hero who made her proud?

I remember when my mom used to take me to a demonstration, older women sang songs “zikr” (traditional style music with lyrics) praising Djokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and Ahmed Zakaev. As a child, I didn’t have a particular admiration for a specific commander. I admired all our warriors. However, when I started to grow up and to be more conscious, I understood the real value of our heroes. I love Djokhar Dudaev because he left a legacy to our nation, I deeply respect Zelimkhan Yandarbiev because he behaved in a beautiful manner in Kremlin when Yeltsin refused to sit around the table on equal terms; Zelimkhan wrote beautiful poems in Chechen language that I enjoy reading. I appreciate Aslan Maskhadov because he was a true diplomat and is the leader that signed the Peace Treaty with the Russian Federation in May 1997. I admire Abdulhalim Sadulaev because he was a very wise leader. I truly appreciate Akhmed Zakaev because he left treasure to our nation in terms of two books that he wrote. He is the witness of all historical and political processes that occurred in Chechnya. I admire them all. They dedicated their lives, so that we can be free. In the bottom of my heart, of course, my eternal hero is my father, Makkhal. He believed in freedom and justice. He wanted to build an independent and democratic state. I became who I am, because of him.

Thinking about your father, how did you feel knowing that he was participating in building the independent state that Chechens had long desired? Were your family members proud of him, or was their fear that something bad might happen to him prevail?

I felt very happy actually. After school, I used to go to the Ministry, where my father worked as 1st Deputy Minister of Culture, and run all over it. I ran and jumped so much that sometimes the workers of the Ministry complained to my father. When he brought me home, he used to talk to me for a long time explaining how important it is to behave in a good manner.  My family members were proud of my father. I remember when he came back from work, he spent hours and hours writing articles, reports and projects. Given the fact that our Republic was in complete economic blockade and Russia didn’t pay the reparations for all the damage it had done in Chechnya, Chechen government lacked funds, and it could not pay salaries to its workers. I still have my father’s certificate where it’s written that the government owes him 18 000 rubles in salary for 6 months of work. He worked for the well-being of our country because he knew that to nourish national self-conscience in young people, it’s important to elevate the culture, teach the Chechen language in schools, promote Chechen folk music, publish Chechen literature, encourage young artists and writers to write in Chechen language and share the history of our people through poems and plays.  My father opposed all radical elements infiltrated in our society by Russian intelligence. These elements retarded the development of our state.

When the second war started in Chechnya, in 1999, the Ministry of Culture stopped functioning, so my father joined Aslan Maskhadov’s media team, and he was reporting all atrocities that were perpetrated by Russians in Chechnya. He knew that it was becoming very dangerous for him to stay there. Three days before his capture, he called my mother, who was at that time in Georgia. She asked him to leave Chechnya. He refused and said: “What is happening here is a genocide. I can’t leave.” One day before his capture, his friend Dalkhan Hojaev, a chechen historian was captured by Russians and killed. The next day, they took my father when he was crossing a Russian check- point (block-post).  My father disappeared without a trace. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya in hope to find him. One of the Russian generals told her that my father was taken to Khankala, a russian military base where russian soldiers tortured and killed chechen civilians.

Makkal Sabdulaev (centre) with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev (center – left) and Akhmed Zakayev (Right)

Do you remember any activities organized by the Ministry for the Promotion of Culture during the interwar period?

I remember that on every 6th September, the Independence Day of Chechnya, the Ministry of Culture, under my father’s supervision, used to organize big concerts in Dinamo Stadium. He also initiated a plan to repair all our libraries and update the collection of books.   Under his supervision, our Ministry organized the competition of folk performers (singers and instrumentalists) in all villages and at the end of competition, the best folk performers were gathered in Grozny and they performed on a Gala Concert where they received special prices.

What happened after you heard of your father’s passing? Did your mother decide to take you to the West?

In 2000, my father insisted that we (my mother, my sister and me) go to Georgia. We were refugees in Georgia. In July, the same year, my father was kidnapped. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya and started searching for him everywhere, even in mass graves. At that time, it was possible to pay a bribe to Russian soldiers, they gave access to the mass grave. My mother appealed to every possible instance. Yet, she couldn’t find him. In 2002, she left Chechnya because Russians came to our house looking for her. She managed to escape through the backyard and hide in a neighbor’s house. Russians didn’t like that she was determined and eager to find out where my father was and she gathered too much attention. She had no choice but to leave Chechnya.

We stayed in Georgia until 2004. In 2004, Canada opened a program in Georgia for accepting chechen refugees through UNHCR. We applied for immigration, passed an interview and Canada accepted our file.  We left Georgia.

Aset Sabdulaeva ad the Jamestown Foundation

What do you remember about your time in Georgia? What was that life like, from the eyes of a little girl?

When we arrived in Georgia, we were afraid to say that we are Chechens because Russia spread horrible propaganda about Chechen people and the entire nation was demonized and presented on most Russian TV channels as terrorists and bandits.

The second problem was that I didn’t go to school for almost two years because of war. As a kid, in my learning process, I was getting behind the children of my age. My sister had to enroll me in school as soon as possible. At that time, we didn’t have official papers recognizing us as refugees in Georgia.  She approached one teacher in the school #44 in Tbilisi, on the mount Mtacminda, and talked to her about my case.  Gora Alexandrovna (teacher) agreed to take me in her class without any hesitation, although we didn’t have papers. The director of the school, Nana, approved my admission right away, and I was enrolled in 3d grade.  I remember Georgia as a country with very hospitable and kind people. Certainly, I remember all my teachers. They helped me so much to catch other kids. Gora Alexandrovna,Tamara Iradionovna, Nana Mas, Greta Stepanovna, Viola Mas, they were Georgian and Armenians, they taught me even during summer.

When we came to Georgia, President Shevardnadze was still in power. The country was poor and suffocating in corruption and bribery. Shervarnadze was a good friend of Putin. I remember 13 Chechens were deported to Moscow. It was an unjust decision made by Shevardnazde to deport our men. He knew that Putin is conducting an illegal war in Chechnya and that our people are suffering from this barbaric aggression. When Russians completed their mission in Chechnya, they came to Georgia in 2008 and annexed Georgian territories.

 I also remember that my sister and I participated at the demonstrations during the Rose Revolution to support Mikhail Saakashvili. I noticed that when Georgian people are fed up, they mobilize quite quickly and express their political will. As time passed, it was difficult to live in Georgia. My family couldn’t afford living there. We had to leave.

Ichkeria Generation – Francesco Benedetti interviews Surho Sugaipov

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Surho Sugaipov was born and raised in Grozny. At the age of fifteen, Surho arrived in Germany after his family had to flee from Grozny during the Second Chechen War. After graduating from high school in the city of Würselen, NRW, he worked in the family business until he enrolled in university. As a student of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Cologne, he simultaneously dedicated himself to his great passion – acting. His first major role was as one of the main characters in the French film “Le grand homme” (2014) directed by Sarah Leonor.

You can learn more about his creative work in cinema in Germany and France on his Wikipedia page:

https://de.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surho_Sugaipov).

A member of the Chechen Democratic Party, one of its co-founders and spokespersons, Surho lives with his wife and three children in Cologne.

We can say that you belong to a generation that we could define as the “Ichkeria Generation”, that is, those kids who were born close to independence, and who became adults during the period of independent Chechnya. What memories do you have about the first Russian invasion of Chechnya?

I was 9 years old, and of course, I remember how my life suddenly transformed from a childhood playground into a serious, loss-filled adult life, where the main goal became to survive in the conditions of a full-scale war.

Children play in the streets of Grozny destroyed by bombing

How did you perceive your “being Chechen”?   Speaking with many older witnesses, they told me how they had to deal with a certain “induced” sense of guilt following the deportation and the legend of the “betrayal”.  You were born in a different context: did you also experience this sense of humiliation?

It started when we moved to a neighboring republic where we were registered as refugees. We, the children from the Chechen Republic, were assigned to one school. Our mother tried several times to enroll my sister and me in the city lyceum, but each time, after another inspection, we were expelled based on our nationality—I remember these moments well. By the time of the open invasion of the territory of the Chechen Republic, which had legally declared its independence based on international law, a powerful propaganda campaign had been launched throughout the Russian Federation, portraying Chechens as bandits, terrorists, and a threat to the civilized world. Chechens were blamed for all the negative consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union as an empire. Brazen false propaganda was carried out continuously 24/7.

Organized, armed groups were sent to the republic to discredit the entire population and portray us in an extremely negative light to the world. Talking to older people who became victims of the genocide of Chechens during the deportation of Chechens to Kazakhstan in 1944, under the false accusation of betrayal and collaboration of the entire population with enemy forces, the situation was similar—people were accused of collaborating with the enemy army before a single Wehrmacht soldier had set foot on the territory of the republic. The elders spoke of how they had to fight against the imposed sense of guilt for the “betrayal” of the people.

The Russians have always used the story of betrayal. They said, “The Chechens have always betrayed us.” What nonsense – an empire that is surprised why its victims do not surrender and remain beaten, but dare to resist

How did you experience the period of the first war? How did your family deal with the situation?

I mainly remember the first war through the emotions of a child, who, holding his mother’s hand, was fleeing from the war. After the first war ended, we returned to Grozny and rebuilt our house, at least to a livable condition, and started anew, from scratch, among mountains of ruins and destruction. But two years later, the second war began. Many in Chechnya understood that the war was not over even before the start of the second one, as military groups operated on the principle of “the worse, the better,” preparing the ground for the return of Russian troops by turning public opinion against Maskhadov’s government, carrying out public corporal punishments, and even executions, which worked against independence. The FSB’s plan to destabilize the situation in the republic worked precisely, giving the Russian army time to escalate its forces anew. As expected, Russia attacked with a much stronger army, seeking revenge for the humiliation they experienced from their defeat in the first war. People in the republic understood that while we were trying to heal our wounds and rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, Russia was quickly assembling a new army and preparing for a new attack.

Chechens, left to their fate, fragmented by internal conflicts artificially created by Russian special services, could not keep up with such a huge empire, with its ability to play political games, its capability to escalate the military race, and adequately prepare for the inevitable war, which was obvious to many at that time. While Russia received billions in its treasury from the sale of oil and gas to the West, Chechnya was in a state of absolute economic collapse, unable to get back on its feet without external assistance, which never came. The reasons for sacrificing us, leaving us to a senseless and brutal fate at the hands of the aggressor, in the form of the Russian Federation, will likely become the subject of many historical studies. Declaring the destruction of an ethnic group as an internal matter of Russia, the international community fed a monster that had already gone wild, threatening everyone with nuclear retribution if they interfered with its new plans. As a result, we had an absolutely impoverished, fragmented, weakened region subjected to religious pressure after the first war, left to be devoured by the predator.

Grozny Hospital, 1999

When the war ended and the Russians retreated, how did you feel? Who was your heroes?

First of all, Dzhokhar Dudayev and all the resistance fighters were our heroes.

In your head as a young Chechen, how did you visualize Aslan Maskhadov?   Was there any leader you didn’t like?

Maskhadov was also a hero. But his politics had many weak points that people did not like. Mainly, it concerned his friendliness towards the Russians. He perceived this war as a misunderstanding that arose under certain circumstances. Being an officer of the Soviet army, he did not fully realize that the imperial policy of Russia had not changed since the Caucasian War. Russia was using us at that moment; first, as a sacrificial victim to scare the international community with its military power. Second, to distract the population inside the country from the total plundering of the USSR’s wealth, seized during the collapse of the Union. Russia unilaterally separated itself from all the union republics to avoid sharing common property with them and, declaring itself the sole successor of the Union’s legacy, appropriated the common wealth. Aslan Maskhadov, instead of reaching out to the international level, establishing relations with the West and America, and securing their support, believed Russia’s promises that the war was over, that reparations would be paid, and that good neighborly relations would be established between two free states.

Another fatal mistake he made was his inability to resist radicalism, artificially introduced into the republic from the East, controlled by the Kremlin, and imposed on the Chechens through the activities of intelligence agents already operating widely in the Chechen Republic at that time.

Aslan Maskhadov

What happened after the second Russian invasion? How did you decide to reach Germany?

My father worked in the Ministry of Justice of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. After the start of the Second Chechen War, he brought us back to Nalchik, where we lived during the first war. A year later, he came for us and said that this war was more brutal, and after it, everyone who worked for their republic would be sent through filtration camps, and those who were shot immediately would be the lucky ones, envied by those who would be tortured to death in the camps. The survivors would be imprisoned, and only a few crippled people would return, while the majority would never come back. Just as he said, it happened. The situation was worse than ever. Therefore, we decided to move to Europe.

How did you personally experience arriving in Germany? Was it difficult for you to integrate with the Germans? Were there other Chechen families who helped you?

To imagine what we felt when we were settled in the dormitory, you need to at least partially understand all the persecutions we went through, the fears we experienced, and the expectations of worse scenarios that had accompanied us for years. We didn’t speak German, we couldn’t work yet, but the children were immediately sent to school. Of course, we ended up in Hauptschule at first. After a couple of years, my school teacher Fred Tribbels wrote a letter to the NRW district with a request to transfer me to HHG (Gymnasium). And that’s not all, he realized that I was struggling with physics, so he arranged for the physics teacher to tutor me additionally in this subject. We were among the first Chechens to move to Europe; there were few Chechens living in Germany, and no one who could quickly explain to us how to integrate. In any case, it wasn’t that difficult, because for any question that arose, we could contact certain institutions and always received the help and support we needed. We felt protected, it was a lifesaving support for us. Adapting to the local mentality was not difficult, it coincided with ours. The hardest part was before our arrival in Germany.

Surho Sugaipov

After you reached Germany, how were you integrated into the social system?  Were the Germans kind to you?  Were you able to attend school?

We have received a lot of support and understanding. Being a young boy, a teenager I obviously maintained good and less good relationships with my peers, but German society showed itself to be open, tolerant, available to help us. I can only say good things about how I was accepted. I just had the normal problems as a teenager, like everyone else at this age.

When did you decide to start doing political activity?  And what kind of political vision have you developed regarding Chechnya?

I think I was never apolitical because of my early acquaintance with war and the occupation of my land. In the war in Ukraine, I saw a historic moment to resume the discussion of the situation in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, to raise the topic of independence, which is once again banned from discussion in Russia.

Impunity and the killing of one-third of the republic’s population allowed the leadership of the Russian Federation to continue its imperialist expansionist policy by attacking a sovereign state recognized by the entire world – Ukraine. The international community must go back 30 years to 1994 and hold the Russian Federation criminally responsible for the genocide of the Chechen people and for all the crimes committed by Russia on the territory of the Chechen Republic to destroy the Chechen ethnicity. It must help the Chechen people de-occupy their homeland and restore statehood based on the principles of democracy and secularism, where religion should be separated from the state, where any citizen has the right to practice any religion or not practice any at all, where citizens’ rights are protected by the state, and where the people are the rightful owners of their ancestral territory.

We must return to the democratic secular state that the Chechens proclaimed to the whole world, taking advantage of the moment when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued Law No. 1409-I of April 3, 1990, “On the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Withdrawal of a Union Republic from the USSR.” In Article 3, it is stated that autonomous republics within a union republic have the right to independently decide whether to remain in the USSR or stay with the seceding union republic. The Chechen Republic, by referendum, remained in the USSR and thus became another union republic within the USSR. Consequently, when the Russian Federation declared its withdrawal from the USSR, the Chechen Republic remained within the USSR and automatically gained independence following the dissolution of the USSR on December 26, 1991.

The Chechen Republic declared its independence in July 1991, and on November 1, 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev signed his first decree on the state sovereignty of the independent democratic state. Thus, taking advantage of the political moment during the dissolution of the Soviet Union and based on international law, the Chechen Republic seceded from the Russian Federation, declaring its independence. The Russian Federation declared its independence from the union treaty significantly later than us. The Constitution of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was adopted one year earlier than the Constitution of the Russian Federation. This means that the Russian Federation attacked an independent state whose people declared their independence to the whole world, exercising their right to self-determination. None of the democratic states dared to recognize our independence, fearing the wrath of the Russian Federation. For this reason, I have become more active in recent years, but I have never been silent.

My political vision is clear. There can be nothing but a democratic, secular state, as recorded in our 1992 Constitution. This state must be de-occupied with the help of the international community.

Banner of the Chechen Democratic Party

You have found a political point of reference in the Chechen Democratic Party.  The first question regarding this: is there a line of political continuity between the Chechen Democratic Party and the Vaynakh Democratic Party, founded by Yandarbiev and the main proponent of Chechen independence in 1991?

We have nothing in common with the Vainakh Democratic Party, which has deviated towards radical ideologies, either by conviction or out of convenience, probably to seize power in Chechnya. Yandarbiyev changed his position to a radical idea; I don’t know if he really believed in it, but he completely transformed from a democrat to a radical. We do not agree with his point of view and have nothing in common with his party.

So, the Chechen Democratic Party supports an independent, democratic, secularized Chechnya, founded on the rule of law.  What political program does the party intend to follow to achieve this objective? Starting from the current situation, what steps do you think the Party should take?

We want to de-occupy our territory, demand full restitution for the moral and material damage inflicted on our people, the extradition of all war criminals and their prosecution in an international court. We also demand the removal of all radon nuclear waste sites established by the Russian Federation on the territory of our republic and the restoration of the ecological damage caused to the republic.

Our goal is also to strengthen democratic institutions in our society, primarily the protection of the rights and freedoms of the republic’s citizens, the separation of religion from the state, and the establishment of healthy international relations, both political and economic, and trade relations. We aim to join the EU as full members. Our goal also includes reconciling and uniting all segments of our fragmented society based on the Declaration of Freedom and Independence of the Chechen Republic and the Constitution of the Chechen Republic of 1992.

I am one of those Westerners who strongly supports the independence of Chechnya): why, in your opinion, should the so-called “West” be interested in supporting the independence of Chechnya? What benefit would get from this situation?

The civilized world, logically, should be interested in the multiplication and prosperity of as many democratic states as possible on the planet. We believe that Russia will soon cease to exist in its current form because it does not fit into the civilized international community of states. Wars, attacks on neighboring countries, and the seizure of foreign territories as a healthy coexistence of state entities have completely exhausted themselves. Humanity created nuclear weapons to become a deterrent from wars that take millions of human lives. The civilized world must be able to manage the world to prevent its collapse. Russia uses enslaved peoples as cannon fodder or radical terrorist organizations and groups that pose a danger to peaceful coexistence. Therefore, it is unacceptable to allow a platform or a training ground to be created on the territory of the Chechen Republic where people capable of harming peaceful creation will be trained. Our time is a time of international trade, global international environmental protection programs, and the peaceful coexistence of people as a single whole. It is time to engage in the rapprochement of religious confessions instead of inciting national or religious enmity. Our program is aimed at progress, and we, who have never known slavery or social inequality, raised on the ideals of freedom and nobility, are created precisely for peaceful purposes. This is our natural state, and we want to return to our normal human essence. We are essentially creators, farmers who accept peaceful labor as the most noble behavior of a person.

An image of barbarians, mentally deficient warriors, and desperate villains has been created of us. We will have to prove for a long time that this was never the case and cannot continue to be. If the West helps the Chechens build their own democratic, reliable state and acts as its guarantor, it will gain a reliable, experienced military and economic partner in the Caucasus, at the crossroads of Europe and Asia.

If this does not happen and the West allows the situation to unfold without intervention, there is a risk that radical elements within our population, financed by the Kremlin, will seize power. These elements can inevitably create something similar to ISIS 2.0 or a scenario reminiscent of modern Afghanistan. All this, of course, will play into the hands of the Kremlin, which has been promoting the narrative of wild, radical Chechens for decades, thereby constantly getting a green light for aggression from the West.

The most tragic thing is that we will disappear from the face of the earth as an ethnic group. For 30 years, the Russian Federation has been conducting the primitivization of our people through the occupation authorities on the territory of the republic, and this is yielding its sad fruits. According to statistics (from open sources), there are 500 schools and 1,500 mosques operating in the republic.

Symbol of the Chechen Democratic Party

Do you believe that in this sense, the activity of the Chechen battalions fighting on the front line in Ukraine, in support of the Kiev army, could be useful in convincing Europe to support the independence of Chechnya?

No, I don’t think so. I respect these people’s decision and understand their desire to fight for Ukraine and its freedom. They follow the call of vengeance that they have carried within themselves for decades. I understand their desire to take revenge for the hell that the Russians created on our land. Nevertheless, I don’t see a great future in this approach. The predominance of radical rhetoric in their behavior gives their struggle more of a “sacred” religious significance. We never fought for religion; we fought for our land and freedom. Every time the Chechens raised their banner for freedom, volunteers from the East appeared, bringing their flags and coloring our struggle for freedom with their own colors, subordinating our interests to their own. This has happened every single time. We kept making the same mistake over and over.

I don’t think civilized society needs small, fragmented Chechen battalions. Ukraine already has its own professional army. Chechen volunteers need to join the regular Ukrainian army. A state that creates private military companies (PMCs) on its territory is doomed because the privilege of legal violence belongs to the state. The West needs reasonable, reliable, and educated people with whom they can engage in dialogue and make agreements based on international law.

So, what do you think Chechens living in Europe can do to support the cause of creating an independent Chechen state? And how can they reach the Chechens in their homeland?

Engage with European governments, political and public organizations, form alliances with other diasporas, communities, and international organizations that support self-determination and human rights. We must create our own political and non-profit public associations. Chechens living in Europe should also raise their awareness about our political situation and share it from all public platforms, helping more and more compatriots become politically educated. Organize and participate in conferences, seminars, and public demonstrations to provide more information about the situation in Chechen society.

Hold cultural events, exhibitions, and festivals to preserve and promote Chechen culture and identity in the diaspora. People in Chechnya are currently hostages; they cannot do anything. They live in constant fear under state terror. People outside Chechnya must do something to help them. We must revive our society, politicize it once again, and show the path we need to take to achieve our goals. First of all, we must revive our spirituality; it has always been of great importance to us. Chechens have traditionally avoided marrying not only within close family circles but even distant ones, observing the norms prohibiting marriage between relatives up to the seventh generation, meaning that if the seventh grandfather is common, it was not possible. In Chechen society, children were considered children until the age of 15. At 15, boys were allowed to wear a belt, signifying the right to carry a weapon, and girls could emphasize their waist. A man would not enter a house if the master of the house was not at home. Ensuring the safety of a woman and accompanying her to her destination was the duty of any man. These things are important and respected to this day.

What are the main problems you are facing in the political education of Chechen society? And what have been the main successes you have achieved to date?

Our main problem is the low level of education and the high level of radicalization among a significant part of our population. There are many reasons for this, including the deliberate actions of the Kremlin, which has repeatedly used this tool, as well as the numerous severe traumas that people have experienced, often leading them to turn to religion.

I consider our great success to be the removal of the taboo on discussing political Islam. Now society is free to discuss and share opinions on topics that just a few years ago seemed almost closed and forbidden. Overall, we have made significant progress in combating political illiteracy in a short period of time. Many people support us and our views, and this number is growing every day. Many remain silent and quietly listen because they fear for themselves and their relatives. However, we receive a lot of feedback in support, which clearly indicates that people are listening and supporting us.

Surho Sugaipov

In your opinion, is the phenomenon of radicalization also involving Chechens living in the European diaspora?  Or is it a phenomenon that occurs only in Chechnya?  And what role does Kadyrov have in promoting this radical culture?

As I mentioned earlier, I believe there are two reasons for the radicalization of some Chechens. More precisely, the main reason is the Kremlin and its deliberate efforts to radicalize the youth for subsequent control and use for its purposes. The fact that they have been “successful” is a consequence of the trauma of two brutal wars, the post-war policy of severe terror, humiliation, and open attacks on honor and public humiliation, combined with the inherent naivety and trustfulness of the Chechens.

Kadyrov, in turn, started by fighting against radicals and explained his switch to the Russian side precisely for this reason. Today, Kadyrov himself has become a force that is radicalizing our society by leaps and bounds. I don’t know if this radicalization is ideological or a direct order from the Kremlin. However, I would rather assume the latter.

Just think about it: in such a small Chechen Republic, 1,400 mosques have been built. They are not building schools, kindergartens, hospitals, factories, or plants where people could work and earn a living, developing the economy. Sermons are held every day, and people are indoctrinated with the idea that they should be obedient, accept their fate, and strive for paradise, forgetting about their earthly life. This is the same old trick that has been used for thousands of years, and people still fall for it. All these newly built mosques are transmitters of propaganda. If it weren’t beneficial to them, the Kremlin wouldn’t allow a single mosque to be built.

what would you say to the European public to encourage their support for the independence of Chechnya?

If we understand that there are only two camps of countries in the world—democratic countries based on citizens’ rights to freedom and self-determination on one side, and tyrannies that usurp power and maintain it through force, violence, and total id

eological brainwashing of their population on the other side—then it will not be difficult for us to understand why it is absolutely logical for the West to help the democratic forces of Chechnya build a state that will become a reliable, strong, and dedicated ally to the entire civilized world, rather than allowing the opposite to happen. Furthermore, passively allowing the extermination and erasure of a civilized, advanced, and spiritually rich people from the face of the earth is, at the very least, inhumane. We live in a world where even cruel treatment of animals is unacceptable.

BIOGRAPHIES – Umalt Yakhubovich Dashaev  

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The work on this biography is carried out in collaboration with the Instagram page “Qoman Sij”, based on information received from the former deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ilyas Musaev, verified with the sources at our disposal.

Born in Prigorodnoye (?/?/1956)

Died in Khankala (12/28/1994)

Native of the Varanda teip, he participated in the actions of the International Brigades during the Georgian – Abkhaz war, distinguishing himself for valor on numerous occasions, in particular during the Battle of Gagra (September 1992) and Sukhumi (September 1993). Wounded several times, after the war he returned to Chechnya, where he placed himself at the disposal of the nascent National Guard, operating in the Separate Battalion for Special Purposes “Borz”.

In November 1994 he participated in the operations to defend Grozny from the attack launched by Bislan Gantemirov’s forces. At the outbreak of the First Chechen War he mobilized his unit to defend Grozny, being wounded several times, until he lost an eye.

Umalt Dashaev with Khamzat Khankarov in Abkhazia

At the end of December 1994 he was sent by the Chief of Staff, Maskhadov, to defend the Khanakala airport from the federal troops who were about to occupy it. He led the Chechen contingent in the Battle of Khankala, during which, after being wounded several times, he died. According to the chronicles, he fought to his last breath against the attacking forces, earning the state award of Qoman Turpal (“Warrior of the Nation”).Riguardo la sua morte:

Eyewitnesses say that the seriously wounded Umalt Dashaev continued to lead his soldiers, urging them to conduct grenade launcher fire at Russian tanks. Umalt Dashaev was a born warrior, who did not know what fear is and was selflessly devoted to the ideas of freedom and independence of the Chechen people. From the first days of the beginning of the national liberation movement of the Chechen people, he took part in the hottest spots of the confrontation between Chechen soldiers and Russian mercenaries, destroying the enemies of the Chechen state. (Qoman Sij)

Umalt Dashaev with Shamil Basayev in Abkhazia, 1992

Freedom for Chechnya – European Recognition for the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

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The failure to recognize an independent Chechnya was the West’s first concession to Russian imperialism.

Today Chechnya is occupied, and the dictator who governs it represents the denial of the values on which the European Union is founded

Correcting this error of perspective means rewinding the tape of history, to restore credibility to the Western world

SIGN THE PETITION HERE – https://www.change.org/p/freedom-for-chechnya-european-recognition-for-the-chechen-republic-of-ichkeria

BIOGRAPHIES –Abdulkhadzhiev, Aslanbek

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The work on this biography is carried out in collaboration with the Instagram page “Qoman Sij”, based on information received from the former deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ilyas Musaev, verified with the sources at our disposal.

Born in Germenchuk in 04/12/1962, Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev joined the National Guard in 1991, during the Chechen Revolution. Volunteer in Abhazhia between 1992 and 1993, he served in the International Brigades of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus, becoming Shamil Basayev’s trusted man. Appointed by the President Dudayev as Military Commander of the Shali District at the outbreak of the First Russian – Chechen war, he commanded a large detachment.

Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev, nicknamed “Big Aslanbek”

Nicknamed “Big Aslanbek” (in recognition of his comrade in arms Islanbek Ismailov, nicknamed “Little Aslanbek”) Abdulkhadzhiev was one of the main organizers of the historic raid by Chechen fighters on the Russian city of Budennovsk in June 1995, which forced the Russian authorities to agree to a temporary cessation of the war and the beginning of peace negotiations. For this military operation, among the first, he was awarded the highest state order of the CHRI Qoman Sij (Honor of the Nation), by the first President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev.

One of the main commanders in the Battle of Pervomaiskoye (January 1996) in the Operation Retribution (March 1996) and in the Operation Jihad (August 1996), after the reconquest of Grozny he was appointed military commander of he Capital as Military Commissioner. For his war merits he was appointed Brigader General and decorated with the Honor of the Nation.

Elected Deputy in the parliamentary elections of January 1997, he attempted to gain the presidency of the assembly, but was overtaken by the pro-government candidate Ruslan Alikhadzhiev. Supporter of the nazional – radical party, he promoted the “Law of lustration” with which it was intended to remove from public officies all those who had collaborated with the pro – Russian government during the war. The delays in the approval of this law were the cause of his resignation in 1998.

Preident of the state company Chechenkontrakt since June 1997, at the outbreak of the Second Russian – Chechen War he formed an unit of around 80 men, with whom he fought in the Siege of Dzhokhar (1999 – 2000). After the fall of the city in Russian’s hands, he retreated in the Argun Gorge, leading the partisan fight.

On August 26, 2002, following a denunciation by a Russian informer, the house in the city of Shali, where Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev was hiding, was surrounded by Russian occupiers and local collaborators.

Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev attends a press conference together with Shamil Basayev (center) and Aslanbek Ismailov (“Little Aslanbek”, right). June 1995

According to the reports of his death:

The senior FSB officer leading the Russian occupiers through a loudspeaker told the Chechen commander to surrender, to which there was an immediate response from a Stechkin submachine gun. In response, Russian punitive forces began firing grenade launchers and machine guns. Having used up all his ammunition, the Chechen commander began throwing grenades and lemons at the invaders. In turn, the aggressors opened fire from heavy machine guns located on armored personnel carriers. This actually predetermined the outcome of the unequal battle. Aslanbek was seriously wounded. The enemies, having learned about this, tried to take him alive.

However, the Russian punitive forces were not destined to mock the wounded Chechen commander. Aslanbek, who was losing consciousness, at the last moment managed to pull out the pin of the grenade, which exploded in his hands. The blast wave generated by the grenade explosion carried away several occupiers who were close to the Chechen commander. According to Shali residents, at least four occupiers were killed and seven wounded during the night battle in the city of Shali. This is how the life of 41-year-old Chechen general Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev heroically ended.

 

21/04/1996, La Morte di Dudaev – Estratto da “Libertà o Morte! Storia della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria”

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il 21 Aprile 1996 Dhokhar Dudaev, primo Presidente della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria, fu assassinato dall’FSB. Nell’anniversario nel ventottesimo anniversario della sua morte, pubblichiamo un brano tratto dal secondo volume di “Libertà o Morte! Storia della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria” (Link)

Nell’aprile del 1996 i ceceni potevano dirsi vicini a raggiungere la vittoria: l’esercito federale era in piena crisi, ed Eltsin aveva un disperato bisogno di pace per vincere le elezioni presidenziali[1]. Le cancellerie europee, rimaste sul chi va là di fronte al “Piano di pace” presentato dal presidente russo, dopo aver inutilmente atteso l’avvio di negoziati tra le parti, erano tornate a tormentarlo con richieste pressanti di interrompere le azioni militari, lamentando la violazione della Convenzione di Ginevra e minacciando un ulteriore slittamento dell’accordo di partenariato tra Mosca e Bruxelles, che ormai languiva dalla primavera del 1994. La Commissione politica dell’Assemblea Parlamentare del Consiglio d’Europa aveva approvato un documento nel quale si diffidava la Russia a procedere alla immediata attuazione del piano di pace, o di qualsiasi altro piano specificando che qualsiasi soluzione negoziale avrebbe potuto avere successo soltanto se tutte le parti in conflitto, compreso Dudaev, vi partecipano. Il documento conteneva una condanna senza riserve delle violazioni dei diritti umani in Cecenia, commessi sia dalle truppe federali che dai combattenti ceceni. Riguardo al comportamento dei primi, la risoluzione riteneva inadeguato ed ingiustificato il massiccio ricorso alla forza da parte delle truppe di Mosca, e riconosceva che tali mezzi erano la prova tangibile del mancato rispetto da parte della Federazione Russa degli obblighi assunti col Consiglio d’Europa. Infine, proponeva la mediazione dell’OSCE in un negoziato che portasse alla ricomposizione del conflitto.  Il tempo giocava a favore di Dudaev, e presto o tardi i russi avrebbero dovuto scendere a patti con lui. Sempre che, ovviamente, non riuscissero ad ucciderlo prima.

Dzhokhar Dudaev

Fin dall’inizio delle ostilità l’FSK aveva investito ingenti risorse nel rintracciare il presidente ceceno. La prima azione per trovare ed arrestare Dudaev era stata messa in atto dal Procuratore Generale russo il 1° febbraio 1995 quando, all’indomani del fallito assalto a Grozny, la magistratura di Mosca aveva emesso un mandato d’arresto  a suo carico. Il suo caso includeva quattro capi d’accusa: tentativo di usurpare intenzionalmente il potere, sabotaggio delle attività del governo costituzionalmente eletto, incitamento pubblico ad azioni terroristiche e istigazione all’antagonismo nazionale sociale e religioso. L’FSK aveva promesso di prendere Dudaev nel giro di qualche giorno, ma non era riuscito neanche a capire dove potesse nascondersi. Alla fine di aprile era stata costituita una task force che individuasse Dudaev e lo prendesse, vivo o morto. Nel corso del 1995 i russi avevano tentato di eliminarlo quattro volte, ma il Generale non era mai caduto in trappola. L’aeronautica russa bombardava sistematicamente tutti i villaggi dove girava voce che si trovasse, senza mai riuscire a colpirlo. Il 21 aprile 1996, tuttavia, Dudaev commise un errore fatale. Il suo convoglio si trovava nei pressi del villaggio di Gekhi – Chu, diretto ad una vicina collina ben coperta dai boschi dove il Generale avrebbe dovuto intrattenere conversazioni telefoniche via satellite. Insieme a lui viaggiavano il suo assistente, Vakha Ibragimov, il Procuratore Militare Magomed Zhaniev ed il Rappresentante di Dudaev a Mosca, Chamid Kurbanov. Nel convoglio erano presenti anche sua moglie, Alla, ed un nutrito seguito di guardie. Mentre Dudaev stava parlando al telefono un aereo militare apparve dal cielo e lanciò un missile aria-terra che colpì con grande precisione l’auto sulla quale viaggiava. Da tre mesi i servizi segreti russi tentavano di triangolare la sua linea telefonica, utilizzando come riferimento un telefono dello stesso tipo che Salman Raduev aveva abbandonato a Pervomaiskoje. In altre quattro occasioni erano quasi riusciti ad individuare Dudaev, ma la repentina chiusura delle comunicazioni aveva impedito ai missili di intercettare in tempo il segnale, mancando il bersaglio. Il missile che fece centro quel fatidico 21 aprile era progettato per dirigersi verso una fonte radio, e non appena ne fu rilevata una (in quegli anni non erano molti i telefoni dotati di una simile tecnologia in Cecenia) puntò la sorgente. Per evitare questo genere di rischi Dudaev aveva stabilito che il suo assistente avrebbe dovuto cronometrare le conversazioni e, qualora queste superassero una certa durata avrebbe dovuto immediatamente chiuderle, anche contro il suo volere. Anche in questa occasione pare che Ibragimov avesse fatto scrupolosamente il suo dovere, interrompendo la conversazione dopo pochi minuti. Ma quel giorno erano previste due telefonate a distanza ravvicinata, il che permise ai servizi russi di non perdere il segnale. Inoltre il cavo dell’antenna si era rotto, costringendo Ibragimov a sistemarla direttamente sul tettino dell’auto. Per favorire l’individuazione del segnale, nelle settimane precedenti, le autorità federali avevano causato volontariamente una serie di blackout nella rete elettrica locale, spegnendo tutte le sorgenti radio e tracciando così la posizione del telefono. Il primo ad usare l’apparecchio fu Kurbanov, per leggere un comunicato. Subito dopo fu il turno di Dudaev, per una conversazione con il deputato russo Kostantin Borovoj. I due parlarono per tre o quattro minuti, poi la conversazione fu bruscamente interrotta dall’impatto del missile.

Commemorazione della morte di Dudaev sul luogo del suo omicidio, 1997

Dopo l’esplosione Alla Dudaeva, sbalzata in avanti dallo spostamento d’aria, corse al relitto fumante dell’auto, coperto di terra. Kurbanov e Zhaniev erano rimasti uccisi sul colpo mentre Ibragimov, che al momento dell’esplosione era in ginocchio davanti all’automobile, era stato sbalzato dall’esplosione ed era gravemente ferito. Dudaev giaceva poco lontano dalla macchina, coperto di terra e ferito superficialmente dalle schegge. Quando Alla prese la sua testa tra le mani, scoprì che dietro la nuca aveva una profonda ferita, che lo aveva ucciso sul colpo. Trasportato nel vicino villaggio, il suo corpo venne lavato e vestito di bianco. Alla avrebbe voluto seppellirlo in un cimitero, ma il mattino seguente l’aviazione federale bombardò tutti i cimiteri nei pressi del luogo dell’attacco, devastandoli. Così, per mantenere l’integrità del suo corpo, venne deciso di seppellirlo in un luogo nascosto, dove nessuno potesse trovarlo[2].  Una cerimonia pubblica fu comunque tenuta nel villaggio di Salazhi, alla presenza della maggior parte dei capi militari dell’esercito. Le esequie politiche del presidente furono tenute da Yandarbiev, il quale assunse ad interim i poteri di capo dello stato in qualità di Vicepresidente[3]. Parlando ai giornalisti, il braccio destro di Dudaev dichiarò: La morte del primo presidente ceceno non ha piegato il popolo, che è pronto a proseguire la sua battaglia per la libertà[4].

Morendo, Dzhokhar Dudaev lasciava un’eredità politica controversa. I suoi nemici lo avevano descritto come un dittatore attaccato al potere e responsabile delle peggiori atrocità. Dudaev fu più volte accusato di contrabbandare armi e petrolio, di alimentare attività finanziarie illegali. In molti paesi dell’Europa Orientale, come l’Estonia, fu invece considerato un eroe, al punto che gli furono dedicate strade, piazze e targhe. Nei paesi che avevano fatto parte dell’Unione Sovietica, e che avevano subito particolarmente la pervasiva presenza russa, il suo sacrificio fu pianto da molti: soprattutto in Ucraina, la notizia della sua morte fu accompagnata da manifestazioni di lutto pubblico. Perfino in Russia ci fu chi lo pianse: il 24 Aprile, tre giorni dopo la sua morte, fu fatto circolare un necrologio firmato dal Consiglio di Coordinamento del partito dell’Unione Democratica, nel quale si leggeva: Esprimiamo le nostre più sentite condoglianze al governo della Repubblica cecena di Ichkeria e al popolo ceceno in occasione della tragica morte del presidente di Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Musaevich Dudayev. Il suo nome rimarrà per sempre nella storia tra i nomi dei grandi combattenti per la liberazione nazionale dei popoli. Ricordiamo il suo dignitoso rifiuto di prendere parte alle repressioni contro il popolo estone nel 1991. Non abbiamo dubbi che la giusta lotta di liberazione nazionale del popolo ceceno non si estinguerà finché almeno un invasore calpesterà la terra di Ichkeria. Gloria all’eroe della resistenza cecena!

Per parte sua, Eltsin, che in quei giorni si trovava a Khabarovsk ed era in partenza per una visita a Pechino, commentò: Con o senza Dudaev, faremo comunque finire tutto in Cecenia con la Pace. Gli abbiamo proposto più volte di metterci al tavolo negoziale, ma lui ha voluto la guerra. Ebbene, la guerra non ci sarà più. Se l’uomo è morto, pazienza. […][5].

 Chi fu, dunque, l’uomo che tenne in pugno il destino del popolo ceceno, che lo guidò all’indipendenza e poi lo trascinò nella catastrofe? Valery Tyshkov nel suo “Chechnya: Life in a War – Torn society” scrive: “Per comprendere l’emergere dei leader nel periodo post – sovietico è necessario affrontare le seguenti domande: come è nata una nuova generazione di “leader nazionali” dalla liberalizzazione? In che modo la popolazione post – sovietica li percepiva, e perché le masse seguivano tali leader? Su questa domanda ci concentreremo più da vicino, poiché l’impatto del ruolo di leader di Dudaev nel determinare gli eventi in Cecenia non può essere sopravvalutato. Un’idea comunemente sentita nel discorso accademico e pubblico della Russia è che quando le civiltà sono in conflitto, nel corso naturale delle cose, i gruppi etnici o i popoli, di cui sono composte, assumono leader che esprimono la loro volontà collettiva di realizzare un obiettivo storicamente predestinato. In altre parole, se Dudaev non fosse salito al potere, lo avrebbe fatto qualcun altro e tutto sarebbe andato in modo simile. Come ha osservato l’ex compagno di servizio di Dudaev, A.N. Osipenko, “Non fu lui a scegliere l’idea nazionale, fu quell’idea a scegliere lui”. […] Raramente è ammesso che un leader crei, o almeno influenzi in modo significativo il cosiddetto “movimento rivoluzionario” da solo. In realtà, il quadro è molto più complicato.” Dudaev si contese la leadership della Cecenia con personaggi che per molti versi erano più avvezzi di lui alla lotta per il potere. Politici come Zavgaev e Khasbulatov, personaggi pubblici come Hadjiev, sapevano come gestire il consenso, come divincolarsi tra le pieghe della volubile opinione pubblica, possedevano ottimi agganci ed avevano accesso a grandi capitali. Eppure fu lui, e non gli altri, a dirigere il gioco fin dalla sua discesa nell’arena. Se non avesse accettato l’invito a prendere le redini del fronte nazionalista, quest’ultimo non sarebbe stato in grado di percorrere lo stesso sentiero, e probabilmente la Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria non sarebbe mai esistita. Dudaev seppe fare politica e seppe costruire un solido consenso intorno alla sua figura, seppe polarizzare le passioni di un popolo in cerca di riscatto e libertà sovrapponendo a queste due parole il suo volto[6]. A differenza di tutti gli altri, Dudaev seppe far sognare le masse. Se Zavgaev cercò di comprarsele col clientelismo, e Khasbulatov cercò di conquistarle con l’assennatezza dei suoi discorsi, Dudaev seppe far loro immaginare un futuro. E poco importa se nel pratico si dimostrasse una persona poco adatta all’amministrazione dello stato: era un leader visionario che proiettava tutto intorno a sé un’aura di eroismo, una padronanza di sé, la consapevolezza di essere il condottiero del suo popolo[7]. E questo, alla fine, era quello che la maggior parte dei ceceni si aspettava da lui. Alla sua morte egli fu oggetto di una vera e propria venerazione collettiva, e la notizia della sua dipartita fu presa da molti come falsa, tanto che il plenipotenziario di negoziati del governo, Yarikhanov, dovette fare una dichiarazione pubblica per confermarne il decesso[8], e lo stesso dovettero fare Maskhadov e Basayev, apparendo pubblicamente sul “canale presidenziale”[9]. Ciononostante molti ceceni continuarono a rifiutarsi di credere che Dudaev fosse davvero morto, incoraggiati dalle parole del genero Salman Raduev (il quale giurò sul Corano che fosse ancora vivo) nonché di altri personaggi che facevano parte della sua cerchia ristretta[10], ma anche dallo stesso scetticismo di alcuni alti ufficiali russi[11]. Inizialmente, infatti, le autorità militari russe in Cecenia negarono di aver portato a termine un’azione volta ad uccidere il presidente ceceno, anche se i giornali riportarono svariate “fughe di notizie” dal quartier generale, secondo le quali l’eliminazione di Dudaev fosse uno degli obiettivi primari dell’intelligence del Cremlino[12].

Dare un giudizio di merito su Dzhokhar Dudaev non è facile, e forse non è neanche così utile. Chi lo vide come un capo fu ispirato dalla sua figura, e nel suo nome combatté e morì. Chi lo vide come un tiranno fece di tutto per abbatterlo. Sicuramente fu un leader capace di mobilitare il popolo ceceno come nessun altro aveva mai fatto dai tempi dell’Imam Shamil. Fu un uomo coraggioso, che abbandonò la prospettiva di una lunga e rispettata vecchiaia da illustre graduato dell’esercito per combattere la sua battaglia ideale. Fu anche un abile stratega sul campo di battaglia: sfidò la Russia con un esercito di volontari e riuscì ad umiliare il prestigio di uno degli eserciti più potenti del pianeta. Per contro fu un pessimo amministratore, ed un miope negoziatore politico. La sua riluttanza a scendere a qualsiasi compromesso, se pure rese la sua figura affascinante e romantica, condusse il paese alla distruzione. La sua scelta di gettare la sua patria nel carnaio della guerra totale provocò al suo popolo immani lutti e sofferenze, il suo supporto indiretto alle azioni terroristiche lo portò a sdoganare una tattica militare odiosa, che alienò ai ceceni la simpatia del mondo occidentale.

La morte di Dudaev lasciò un vuoto incolmabile. Per quanto questi avesse da tempo organizzato la successione del potere in caso di sua dipartita, non c’era nessuno in grado di ereditare il peso politico della sua persona. Soltanto grazie a lui le numerose e composite anime dell’indipendentismo ceceno erano rimaste unite sotto la bandiera della ChRI evitando, per il momento, l’esplodere di una guerra tra bande. Il numero 2 del regime, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, era pronto a farsi carico delle sue responsabilità, ma il suo compito non era facile. L’indipendentismo aveva sempre avuto un solo eroe, e adesso questo eroe era morto. La Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria non aveva più il suo punto di riferimento e rischiava di spaccarsi in una galassia di piccoli potentati in guerra per la successione al potere. A complicare le cose giunse l’annuncio, falso, da parte del governo Zavgaev che lo stesso Yandarbiev era stato ucciso. Ci vollero alcuni giorni prima che fosse chiaro che a cadere non era stato il Vice – Presidente, ma un suo nipote, e nel frattempo i media specularono su chi avrebbe dovuto raccogliere il suo testimone, ipotizzando addirittura una guerra civile tra le forze indipendentiste[13]. Quando l’equivoco fu ufficialmente chiarito, Yandarbiev si mise all’opera, prima di tutto per ottenere la lealtà dei principali comandanti sul campo. Maskhadov, Basayev, Gelayev, Alikhadziev, Atgeriev, tutti i principali leader della resistenza riconobbero il suo primato politico, in attesa che la fine della guerra portasse ad una ridefinizione dei rapporti di potere[14]. D’altra parte la nomina di un capo era fondamentale: la morte di Dudaev, per quanto tragica, rimuoveva il principale ostacolo all’apertura di un canale diplomatico con le autorità russe. Non che fossero in molti a credere ad una soluzione negoziale della guerra: i militari russi temevano che un’altra tregua avrebbe nuovamente avvantaggiato i ceceni, permettendo loro di ricompattarsi e di lanciare una nuova ondata di attacchi. I comandanti sul campo ceceni, dal canto loro, non si aspettavano niente, considerato com’era andata fino ad allora. Il capo del governo filorusso, Zavgaev, non aveva alcuna intenzione di parteciparvi, essendo intenzionato a capitalizzare il massimo risultato politico derivante dalla morte del suo avversario. In concomitanza con la morte del generale rispolverò addirittura il Congresso del Popolo Ceceno, indicendone un’assemblea straordinaria. L’evento vide la partecipazione di 400 delegati, reclutati tra i rappresentanti delle comunità favorevoli ad un accordo con la Russia. Davanti a loro, Zavgaev chiese ed ottenne il mandato per l’organizzazione di nuove elezioni parlamentari, tramite le quali consolidare la propria posizione e disfarsi, almeno in parte, dell’ingombrante supporto derivante dalla nomina d’imperio ottenuta da Mosca nell’autunno dell’anno precedente. In quell’occasione, una voce si levò contro il “Capo della Repubblica”: quella dell’ex sindaco di Grozny (ora Vice Primo Ministro) Bislan Gantamirov. Intervenuto all’assemblea, si dichiarò insoddisfatto del lavoro di Zavgaev, sostenne che la sua figura non avrebbe facilitato il processo di pace e si dissociò dalla sua politica collaborazionista. Come vedremo, questa posizione gli sarebbe costata cara.

[1] A metà Aprile il governo russo sembrava intenzionato a riprendere i colloqui con Dudaev. Secondo quanto riferito da Kommersant il 18 Aprile 1996, Eltsin aveva dato mandato al Ministro per le Nazionalità, Mikhailov ed al Consigliere Presidenziale Emil Pain di riattivare i contatti, negoziando il ritiro delle forze federali e la normalizzazione della Cecenia. All’iniziativa, ancora informale, aveva fatto eco la dichiarazione pubblica del Ministro della Giustizia russo, Valentin Kovaljov, il quale aveva ventilato il ritiro delle accuse formali a Dudaev a seconda dell’esito dei colloqui, segno evidente che la leadership del Cremlino era disponibile ad accomodarsi pur di presentare all’opinione pubblica un piano di pace credibile. Per parte sua Dudaev aveva chiesto l’intervento quali mediatori del Presidente della Turchia, o del Re di Giordania, dando a intendere di essere disposto a raggiungere un accordo di massima con Mosca.

[2] Pochissimi sanno ancora oggi dove si trovi la sua tomba. Certamente ne fu a conoscenza il Vicepresidente, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, che dopo la sua morte assunse la carica di Presidente ad interim. In un’intervista rilasciata a Peter Grokhmalski nel Luglio del 1996 disse: Il mondo intero vede il comportamento degli aggressori russi. Niente è sacro per loro. Non vogliamo che profanino i resti di Dudaev. Un ceceno che si fa beffe del corpo del suo nemico, che tortura un prigioniero, cade in disgrazia. Per i russi, questo è motivo di orgoglio. Pertanto, oltre a me, solo poche persone conoscono il luogo di sepoltura di Dudaev.

[3] In realtà, secondo quanto riporta Ilyas Akhmadov in The Chechen Struggle, al momento della morte di Dudaev non esisteva, o non era più reperibile, un decreto legittimo che attestasse la nomina di Yandarbiev alla carica di Vicepresidente. Secondo quanto raccontato dall’autore, quindi, venne redatto un provvedimento predatato per  legittimare il passaggio dei poteri.

[4] La Repubblica, edizione del 25/04/1996.

[5] La Repubblica, edizione del 25/04/1996.

[6] Un contadino di Vedeno di 18 anni, intervistato sul suo rapporto con la figura di Dudaev, raccontò: “Quando Dudaev salì al potere ero studente di una scuola islamica. Il nostro insegnante ci disse che Dudaev era stato mandato dal cielo, che il suo vero nome era Dzhovkhar (“Perle” in ceceno) e che il suo avvento era stato predetto dall’antica tradizione. In quel momento si svolgevano molti raduni e tutti urlavano “Allah Akhbar”. Poi abbiamo iniziato a scandire “Dzhovkhar! Dzhovkhar!”. Anche il nostro insegnante, che era il Mullah della nostra scuola, venne alle manifestazioni. Quando gli ho chiesto chi fossero i nostri nemici, ha risposto “gli infedeli”. Ha anche detto che in un sogno aveva visto Dudaev scendere dal cielo su delle ali. Disse: “Con un leader del genere siamo invincibili!”. Tutto ciò di cui la gente parlava sempre più spesso era la guerra. E anch’io volevo andare in guerra.” Una ragazza cecena, ricordando il giorno della sua nomina a Presidente, riferì: WRicordo il giorno dell’investitura di Dudaev. […] Ha prestato giuramento al teatro e poi è andato al palazzo del governo in mezzo alla gente, una folla enorme. E’ stato straordinario, ho sentito che stava succedendo qualcosa di importante. Non posso dire di essermi votata a Dudaev proprio in quel momento, ma da allora qualcosa è cambiato in me. Era così bello nella sua splendida divisa da generale! Ho detto agli amici: “Andiamo a vederlo, non ci perdoneremo mai di non averlo fatto se ce lo perdiamo!”

[7] Sempre citando Tyshkov: Dudaev era il tipico carismatico “non sistemico” il cui potere risiedeva nella concezione di progetti irrealizzabili […] nell’ignorare soluzioni ai problemi pratici. Come scrive M.A. Sivertsev “Il leader carismatico che cerca una risposta alle sfide di un tempo di transizione e instabile deve affrontarlo in un orizzonte visionario: deve ripristinare i legami di lunga durata con le basi idealizzate della vita. Questa capacità (il suo carisma) di ripristinare l’esperienza sacrale conferisce al leader la legittimazione delle sue azioni. Il suo malfunzionamento e le sue insignificanti carenze nella sfera formalizzata – razionale sono perdonati e persino considerati come un’ulteriore prova di forza carismatica […].” Rivolgendosi ai miti della lotta e della vittoria, all’animosità e alla vendetta, il leader carismatico modella le percezioni dei suoi seguaci e da quel successo la sua immagine eroica personale acquisisce la necessaria stabilità. Quindi, costruisce una sottocultura chiusa che sviluppa la propria lingua, il proprio codice e le proprie pratiche, con connessioni minime verso il mondo esterno.

[8] Secondo quanto riferito da Kommersant, il 23 Aprile Yarikhanov dichiarò alla ITAR – TASS: Dudaev è stato ucciso, non c’è dubbio. Insieme a Dudaev, sono state uccise diverse persone della sua cerchia ristretta, incluso il suo assistente Vakha Ibragimov, così come il Procuratore Militare Magomed Zhaniev. In realtà Ibragimov non era morto, ma giaceva in condizioni critiche in un letto d’ospedale. Si sarebbe ripreso nel giro di qualche mese, tornando a partecipare alla vita politica della Repubblica una volta finita la guerra, tra le file dei nazionalisti radicali.

[9] Il canale televisivo presidenziale era una trasmissione prodotta da una rete di emittenti artigianali gestite dai sostenitori dell’indipendenza. Trasmetteva principalmente dai centri a Sud di Grozny, ed era in grado di rendersi visibile nella capitale ed in buona parte del Sud del paese.

[10] Interrogato sull’argomento, il segretario personale di Dudaev, Sapuddin Khasanov, dichiarò che Dudaev stava lavorando normalmente e che le voci sul suo assassinio erano totalmente infondate.

[11] Secondo quanto riporta Kommersant del 25/04/1996 il Presidente del Comitato per la Sicurezza della Duma, Viktor Iluychin, affermò di essere disposto a credere alla morte di Dudaev soltanto dopo che il suo presunto cadavere fosse stato riesumato, mentre lo stesso comandante in capo delle forze federali in Cecenia, Tikhomirov, dichiarò che le truppe di Mosca non avevano assolutamente niente a che fare con la morte di Dudaev, contraddicendo la versione ufficiale, secondo la quale il presidente ceceno sarebbe caduto vittima di un attacco missilistico. D’altra parte altri alti ufficiali dell’esercito confermavano la presenza di cacciabombardieri a Sud di Urus – Martan, intenti ad attaccare bersagli in ricerca libera come rappresaglia per i recenti attacchi ceceni alle colonne russe.

[12] Secondo quanto riportato da La Repubblica del 25/04/1996: «l’azione punitiva» è stata finalmente rivendicata da un rappresentante altolocato del ministero dell’Interno. “Ci siamo vendicati per l’agguato ad una colonna di automezzi russi che ha provocato la morte di decine di soldati e ufficiali” ha detto, e “abbiamo distrutto a colpi dì missili sette sedi segrete di Dudaev di cui sapevamo l’ubicazione”. Una di quelle sedi si trovava a Ghekhi-Chu dove è stato centrato il bersaglio principale. Fonti dei servizi segreti a Groznij sono state ancora più esplicite: “Si è trattato di un quinto tentativo, stavolta riuscito, nei giro degli ultimi 2-3 mesi”.

[13] Sul Kommersant del 30/04/1996 appare un lungo articolo che specula sull’ipotesi di uno “scisma” tra Maskhadov e Basayev. In quel frangente la versione del quotidiano russo fu prontamente smentita dai protagonisti, ma il confronto tra i due si sarebbe consumato davvero, pochi anni più tardi, portando la Repubblica ad un passo dall’autodistruzione. Molto probabilmente in quel momento, nel pieno del conflitto, più che di “scisma” si poteva parlare di “concorrenza”. Riportando le parole usate da Ilyas Akhmadov in una delle nostre conversazioni: “Sfiducia” è una parola troppo forte per descrivere la loro relazione in quel momento. C’era sicuramente una certa concorrenza tra loro però. Non era pubblicamente riconosciuto, solo coloro che erano nei circoli privati di Basayev e Maskhadov erano a conoscenza. Alla fine, i due hanno lavorato insieme meravigliosamente. Ci sono stati anche alcuni disaccordi sugli incaricati di Maskhadov . Maskhadov è venuto nella regione natale di Shamil e stava nominando delle persone. Ma durante la guerra c’era una legge non scritta secondo cui un comandante, quando si trovava nella sua regione d’origine, era il principale responsabile. […].Ma come ho detto, a parte poche persone, la competizione tra Shamil e Maskhadov era quasi invisibile agli occhi del pubblico. […] A quel tempo, la tensione tra Shamil e Maskhadov non era grande. Era divertente, a volte quando Shamil voleva dire qualcosa a Maskhadov me lo diceva e viceversa. […] È possibile che nel tempo la competizione abbia portato a disaccordi molto più pubblici durante le elezioni. Ma durante la guerra, sebbene avessero alcuni disaccordi, erano più personali e non divennero un problema pubblico.

[14] Tale decisione fu assunta dal consesso dei comandanti militari in una riunione straordinaria del Comitato per la Difesa dello Stato (GKO) tenutasi a Roshni – Chu subito dopo la morte del presidente ceceno, durante la quale venne avanzata anche l’ipotesi di nominare Maskhadov al posto di Yandarbiev, considerato il contesto bellico nel quale la successione avrebbe dovuto svolgersi. Maskhadov tuttavia rifiutò, invitando i convenuti a rispettare quanto previsto dalla Costituzione.

Biographies –  Aidmar Timurovich Abalaev

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The work on this biography is carried out in collaboration with the Instagram page “Qoman Sij”, based on information received from the former deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ilyas Musaev, verified with the sources at our disposal

Aidmar Timurovich Abalaev, a Chechen statesman and military leader, served as the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Sharia Security Council of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Born in Nozhai Yurt in 1964, he belonged to the Chechen teip (Clan) Saysano. A descendant of Alibek-Khadzhi Aldamov, the imam of the North Caucasus and the initiator of the 1877 uprising in Chechnya and Dagestan. During the First Chechen War, he fought in his native village Nozhai-Yurt region, commanding the Mountain Rifle Unit of the Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion, and also participated in the defense of Grozny.

On January 9, 1996, on the personal instructions of Dzhokhar Dudayev, units under the command of Salman Raduev, along with other well-known Commanders: Khunkar Israpilov, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev, he took an active part in the raid in the city of Kizlyar. In 1996, he also participated in the successful military Counter-Attack operation to recapture Grozny from the Russian Terrorists. After the battle, Abalaev was awarded the highest Order of the CHRI “Qoman Sij” (Honor of the Nation) and received the rank of Brigadier General. He was a presidential candidate in the 1997 elections in the CRI and received slightly less than 1% of the votes.

At the end of 1998, he was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of the Sharia Security of the ChRI in the government of Aslan Maskhadov. After a meeting of the Military Council of the Armed Forces of the ChRI, held on April 30, 2002, under the leadership of the President of the ChRI, Aslan Maskhadov, Aidamir Abalaev, along with other Chechen commanders, was sent to one of his military bases.

On May 1, 2002, Abalaev’s unit was ambushed by fighters from Yamadayev’s terror gang for special operations together with the Russian unit of the FSB Directorate. Aidamir Abalaev, field commanders Colonel Vashev and Major Uvaisaev offered the Russian intelligence officers to surrender without a fight. The Chechen commanders responded with fire from machine guns and grenade launchers. The battle occurred near the village of Sayasan, Nozhai-Yurtovsky district (his native village). According to FSB Colonel Shubalkin, Abalaev’s corpse was identified by his relatives. He died from a bullet wound received in the left side of the chest. Military doctors tried to help him, but Abalaev, without regaining consciousness, died half an hour after being wounded on May 1, 2002.

WHERE IS CHECHNYA GOING? POLITICAL REFLECTIONS BY DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV (PART 3)

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Do you know what basic conditions were constantly and ambiguously put forward by the West in almost all negotiations with state leaders of the USSR in 1989 – 1991, when it came to providing credit and charitable assistance, and this was not publicized in the Union press? Yes, the creation of that very financial oligarchy (5-10% of the population), capable of controlling up to 60% of the country’s total potential, with the guaranteed establishment of the institution of private property and protection of large-scale foreign investments and foreign property!

Then, strangely enough, the first to realize it and tried to take it into account, albeit limitedly. N.Nazarbayev, but M.Gorbachev for a long time was floundering and hesitated, grasping for various alternatives that were saving in his opinion, but miraculous, as it turned out later, until the whole feud with GKChP broke out, mainly because of irreconcilable differences of opinion among his entourage….

As long as the society reforming towards collegial privatcapitalism does not decisively overcome the transition stage of non-authoritarian state capitalism, which is dangerous because of its instability and centrifugal forces, chaos, crime, economic collapse and general ungovernability in public spheres may reach its peak, followed by monstrous armed conflicts and historically irreversible processes. The example of the collapse of the USSR, the “critical boiling points” in Russia and the CIS countries, and, thank God, only sensitive echoes in the Chechen Republic serve as impressive proof of this.

Dzhokhar Dudaev

Back then, in 1984, nothing seemed to foreshadow that such a powerful empire could collapse in such a short period of time by historical standards. And only the highest echelons of power were aware of the fact that the cumbersome and non-adaptive to the ever-increasing demands of the country’s economy management system was failing more and more catastrophically every year, its “slippages” were throwing the USSR further and further away from the advanced countries of the capitalist world in terms of economic development. The “cosmetic repairs” of the state apparatus did not save it, nor did the desperate reshuffling of personnel in it produce any results. That is why, finally, M. Gorbachev, relying on the brave and radical wing of his entourage, decided to reform the state structure. The general public is well aware of the deplorable results of the experiment for the President of the USSR. But what was M. Gorbachev’s mistake, why did he fail to skip the dangerous stage of non-authoritarian state capitalism, even introducing elements of private property and legalizing entrepreneurial activity? Were the centrifugal forces so strong, and the aspirants to the future “financial aces” were still just playing “nursery cooperatives”? Yes, probably. But this was not the only factor.

If one imagines authoritarian state capitalism in the form of the famous Ostankino TV tower, the stability of which is created by the extremely tight steel rope running through it, then the “cable of political stability” of the former USSR consisted of many strands of “unfreedoms” that created the necessary strength. In his attempt to throw the rope bridge from the “top of the Soviet system” to the “Western model”, M. Gorbachev weakened to a greater or lesser extent many of the steel strings, such as freedom of speech, press, information, expression of will, national self-expression…. and even entrepreneurial activity, while leaving the “inviolable” but coveted private property 100% tightened. And while the West was feverishly winding some ropes on its “bay of democracy”, the construction of the Soviet tower staggered and collapsed. The ropes that had already been thrown over did not help; they sagged and plunged us all into the swamp of collegial state capitalism.

The main and also fatal mistake of M. Gorbachev (if only this ERROR!?), was in the FOLLOWING loosening of the strings stretched on the “soviet fingerboard”. The example of “communist China” is clear evidence of this. They do the opposite there and apparently play the “guitar of economic reforms” quite well.

WHAT is the fate of the Russian Federation now? Will “Yeltsin’s sappers” be able to overcome the unfortunate”minefield”for the Union, or is the explosion imminent? Or maybe “Khasbulatov’s” frightened parliament will be able to pull everything back to more familiar circles? What if it all comes back to bite us in Chechnya? Nowadays, few people probably remember the December 1991 speech of Boris Yeltsin. His program speech, made on the 28th after the famous Belovezhskoe deed, although it was verified in parliamentary language and slightly diplomatically veiled for potential Russian tycoons, shone a long-awaited green light as a signal for the most active actions, as an indulgence for the ideals of private property. Behind it stood the little-known fact that the current processes in the Russian Empire (USSR, CIS and the Russian Federation proper) were financed. And it was done by target purpose “under Yeltsin”, who unlike M. Gorbachev, who was bluffing. He gave his consent to the West for the birth of the Russian Financial Oligarchy! International capital already then paid for the first stage, when a person who cannot swim is thrown into the water, seducing him with the pleasure of market relations, which can be obtained on an equal footing with others who have previously mastered swimming in the sea of capital. If he doesn’t drown at once and continues to swim, we will help him a little more, but if he goes to the bottom, we will always find another candidate. It makes no difference who will continue the line of M.Gorbachev and B.G.Yeltsin, be it L.Rutskoy or R.Khasbulatov, but they will not give up what they have, c’est la vie, but that is the logic of the powerful.


 Another, and by no means unimportant factor is the fact that Russia has significant healthy forces, high intellectual potential, desire and means to complete the radical reforms that have been initiated. That is, a complete set – Stimulus, Motive, Means and Power.

That is why, summarizing, we can say with great confidence that the young Moscow guild of capitalists, which is emerging and growing stronger day by day, coupled with a foreign armada of “associates”, together with Boris Yeltsin’s team, although rather shabby in battles, but resilient, will bring the matter to its logical conclusion.  What is in store for us? Will the mutant virus of the management tools of authoritarian state capitalism (last time in our country it had a variation under the name of “Soviet partam pa ratnoy”), which is stubbornly fighting for living space in the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, as well as in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, still give rise to incurable metastasis. After all, such a cancerous contagion inevitably dooms the representative bodies of the authorities to become a kind of “reanimated Chechen regional party committee”, taking over from its deceased predecessor the rudimentary functions of control, management and distribution in the sphere of production and consumption, and usurping the right of “the only connoisseur of the interests and problems of the people”.

MIkhail Gorbachev

So what should be our priorities? How, what forces and means should we use in the first place? These are not easy questions, but there are visible answers to them.

Let us first of all realize once and for all one simple axiom. Not a single Parliament of the world and not a single President, sitting in their palaces or residences and issuing only laws and decrees, have not fed a single nation or created commodity abundance for anyone in the history of the world. The welfare of their people is brought, usually by special initiative people (large organizers and entrepreneurs, businessmen and business scientists) who, thanks to their efforts, abilities and talent, often at their own expense and at their own risk and risk, create in society special mechanisms of social and state development, known to them alone and, at first, only understood by them, using as a creative driving force the factor of satisfying the interests of the largest and most productive part of the population. Exactly they, using the personal factor of Means, through the Motive of the attracted specialists, maximally include the factor of Interest of the Producer People, strengthening the factor of Power of the State, which in turn contributes to the next similar cycle, but already at a higher level. As a result, new jobs and guaranteed wages appear in the country, the share of “buy-and-sell” business begins to give way to creative and service business, etc. In short, it is what is called “economic recovery”, the main thing is to legally allow them to do it! And if we can’t do anything to help, it is important not to hinder it, shielding this saving layer of society from aggressive attacks of the “socialist virus” of equality without the rich and hatred of “bloodsuckers”.

That is why there is no more important task for us today than to create the most possible conditions for the intensive development of the business class, from which domestic Vainakh tycoons of financial and industrial capital will inevitably emerge, the future flagships of the Chechen ship, the guarantors of stability and prosperity of society. It is all the more urgent because, unfortunately, unlike Russia, no one will finance us. Believe me, to the great joy of the Metropolis and not without its handiwork, there are no countries in the world that at this stage would fill the empty niche of the Chechen financial oligarchy as an external friend. The vectors of geostrategic interests of Russia and those states that could actually do it are very different in their directions. The dominant Russian factor of Power and its known unpredictability leaves no one in doubt here. There is no alternative “adrenaline” for us today, and unfortunately there is no minimum necessary start-up capital. At one time we missed a very important moment when COUNCH could have made timid steps and prerequisites for the creation of oligarchic structures, but in the Parliament of the Chechen Republic we defeated the syndrome of the mental deficit acquired from the Bolsheviks. There were other missed opportunities. However, there is a deep conviction, based again on the laws and examples of social development, that the Vainakh people, having unlimited potential reserves, will be able to dispose of them rationally, that a part of the excessive willpower of the present Chechen population will necessarily transform into the missing factors and compensate for any emerging inhibitory moments on its way. And there is no other Alternative to this!

Finally, the last hot topic of discussion of the day is the legitimacy of the current form and content of the state structure of the Chechen Republic. This is a kind of self-branded tablecloth for our political cooks who are losers. Grief-experts of both the domestic and Moscow variety go to what extremes and grave extremes, looking for a speck in someone else’s eye. In order to prevent the “worm of doubt” about the legality of Chechnya from tormenting some people and to finally knock the labeled “trump card” out of the hands of others, the following clarifications are required. If we take a dialectical approach, then legal professionals know that a reference to any law of any country can always be challenged, whether on historical, legal, moral and ethical, or other aspects, due to the fact that jurisprudence is essentially eclectic, i.e. “no wisdom is simple enough”, since one can always find a counterargument to any argument if desired.

It is impossible to create any small-minded code of laws without explicit or implicit contradictions. Humanity has not yet developed a universally-identified, logically adequate and legally sterile language, like computer linguistics, free from such shortcomings. And then on the scales of the disputing parties, in principle, there will always be strong enough competent justifications in their favor, but the adoption of judicial, arbitration, socio-political or any other “legal” decision depends predominantly on the balance of forces and opinions in society, on the power and force positions of the disputing and verdict parties, finally, on the prevailing realities. This has always been the case everywhere, at any level, from the “village council” to the UN General Assembly,

Boris Eltsin

There is no doubt that Russia has not been able to “crush” us after the 1991 secession, but it is also indisputable that Chechnya has not yet won back its position in this dispute. Today we are like two tired wrestlers on the mat who, having entered the clinch, have taken a wait-and-see stance for the final victory throw. A difficult precarious balance for the country. But, remember that Unrecognized Permanent Reality tends to be legitimized sooner or later. It is only a question of time and stamina, and the effort to make it happen. Apparently, just as scientists pharmacists take a long time to reach the required prescription for a new and unexpected disease, our way of choosing the establishment and implementation of rationally effective public administration is also long. It is just that a sick person always wants to get well as soon as possible.


 Personally, I see us in collegial privatcapitalism, which, of course, has nationally distinctive features, and I am convinced that the Chechen state has not only a history, but also a real, “not banana” big future, all we need to do is to set the “good Gene Capital” free. If we don’t do it, others will do it.

In closing, I would like to remind you of one thing. Do not forget. The TRUTH is like an infinite mosaic panel consisting of innumerable pieces of “truths”. Truth is one, cognizance of all the immense depth of which, apparently, is not given to a mere mortal, to know it in its entirety is destined only to the Almighty Himself. We are destined to perceive only its separate fragments. Each individual has his own set of “truths”, from which he can make his own part of the canvas of truth. How much of it will he really display, of what components is it composed of, and what should they be? These and other similar questions, have not yet been identified in our society.But I believe in the collective Vainakh capabilities, in the Chechen Stimulus and Motive, capable of painting the necessary picture of the Truth, however small in size and large in number its components may be, because behind each of them stands our
Man with his priceless destiny

PEACE, TRANQUILITY AND PROSPERITY TO YOU ALL.

Where is Chechnya going? Political reflections by Dzhokhar Dudayev (part 2)

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That is why the archaic for modern foreign political science linguistics terminology “good, honest, decent, fair”, etc. as applied to our new power structures does not have even approximately unambiguously identified semantic content, because a million people will give exactly a million different interpretations to it. For some reason, for example, when speaking about the performing skills of a musician, we use quite natural and characteristic definitions such as “talented” or “skillful”, but not at all “virtuous” or “crystal honest”. This, as they say, is from a different opera.

Why is it that in politics everything is put upside down and professionalism is advanced to the “good guy”? Any specialist is very jealous of dilettantish talks about the subtleties of his profession. In politics, strangely enough, everything is allowed.

If we give in to the verbal exercises and tempting enticements of the rather proliferated “elementary educated” and use as state-building material such abstracted criteria thrown by Satan himself, we will probably not build anything good…ANY community of people at all times is differentiated, and the real basis of its division is the multiplicity of human aspirations, principles of behavior, potentialities and influential moments. Integrating by one or another criteria into groups and categories, they constitute those real natural forces and movements in society. In this connection, it is probably worth recalling that the formation and development of the state, which is also true for any individual, is based on these four characteristic driving factors, conventionally named: STIMULUS, MOTIVE, POWER AND FACILITIES.

STIMULUS is usually understood as a value reflecting the vector sum of its components, such as all kinds of Interests, Desires, Feelings, etc. MOTIVE is a potential value integrating Intellect, Knowledge, Experience, Know-How, etc. Another vector value is POWER, which integrates Power and Strength. And finally, FACILITIES is another potential value, the components of which are Money, Resources, Funds, etc. Predominantly operating with such concepts, which are “political bricks, mortar, armature and concrete”, and not with dilettantish abstract ones – “honesty, decency” or even “competence”, will always help any statesman and not only him to get a sufficiently objective dialectically verified analytical picture of any socio-political processes, to have the basis that does not allow making inexcusable and irreparable mistakes of political nature. The tools used for dismantling and destruction, as a rule, are unsuitable for construction and creation. That is why all appeals to “reason, brotherhood, understanding, unity, consensus…” etc. are useless. Only those who will be able to satisfy the Stimulus of the people, using the Means through the Motive of specialists, will be able to increase the Power of the state.
 Further. Many people thought, and are still strongly convinced of it, that it is worth to adopt the external attributes of the so-called civilized democracies, i.e. to elect a Parliament, a President and a Constitutional Court, delegating there the “best” representatives of the people, and all problems are solved. This is a monstrous misconception, and in conditions of collegial state capitalism, which today is certainly not only the Chechen Republic, but also Russia, these institutions turn out to be nothing more than the well-known “Hottabych’s telephone!” Absolutely identical to the prototype in all externally visible parameters and banally completely empty inside, without the electronic and mechanical stuffing that makes the apparatus work. We think, i.e. “call”, that we govern, while the people live under the influence of their objective social laws of evolutionary development.

Photo of a voucher (privatization check, 1992) with an indication of the place where the monogram of the artist Igor Krylkov is located on the banknote (letters I and K in an oval).

Parliaments, Senates, Congresses, as a rule, are only a symbol of POWER in the hands of the explicit (authoritarianism) or implicit (non-authoritarianism) MASTER and, at best, serve as a laboratory practice for practicing the legislature set by the Master or giving legitimate form to his wishes.

As for the Presidential Structures, Cabinets or Councils of Ministers, other possible state bodies of executive power, they, as a rule, fulfill the function of these Wishes. Naturally, any form of state governance is characterized by a greater or lesser divergence in the directions of vectors of interests of the Master and the People. Except that in authoritarian state capitalism the change of the direction of the latter in its direction is performed by the Master mainly at the expense of the Power component of the Power factor, and in collegial private capitalism through the predominant use of the components of the Means factor. Unfortunately, and this is probably characteristic of most citizens of the former USSR, we are still in the deep captivity of nostalgic illusions about that executive power, which was exercised thanks to years of clearly defined totalitarian system, which had a wide range of appropriate tools: from fiscal bodies for suppression of dissent to institutions for “ideological straightening of brains”, from the stick to the carrot. Even the most ardent Western “anti-Sovietists” recognized at the time that totalitarianism ensured greater efficiency, discipline, and order. This is achieved, of course, at the expense of such characteristically dominant in authoritarian state capitalism worst components of the Stimulus, such as fear, fear, a sense of hopelessness, powerlessness, etc. Another question, of course, is what we have come to as a result of all this….

Let’s imagine hypothetically that the notorious Power overnight completely and completely passes into one hands: either the President, or the Parliament, or someone else. And let us be ruled by the ideal in each case, either presidential X. or the many-faced parliamentary Y, or nameless Z. What does this mean in practice? And that in this case all the national wealth, all the country’s resources and all its economic potential “falls under the monopoly of X. Y-a, or Z. That is, they will manage and distribute what they personally do not really own, but the owner – the people have very ephemeral economic rights! Together with the entire ministerial team, the governing echelon of the government can hardly constitute even one tenth of a percent of the population. But the psychology of behavior and programmed attitude of any manager – non-private co-owner, especially in the conditions of decline in economic production and deterioration of living standards of the poor part of the population, consists in instinctive efforts to keep the place under the sun by justifying the motives of their activities, referring to the difficulties of objective and subjective plan, as well as criticism of various formal and informal objects that create allegedly insurmountable problems. Remember N. Ryzhkov, V. Pavlov or T. Gaidar. V.Chernomyrdin is bound to follow this path.

Boris Eltsin

Naturally, and it is inherent in human nature, that the dissatisfied and offended, “who know better how the country should be run and what the people need”, necessarily starting with derogatory criticism, can move on to much more serious and active actions to “restore justice”. What is the response for the ruling elite? To tighten the screws? But this is a return to totalitarianism, from which they fled and have not yet had time to catch their breath. Make personnel reshuffles? Nothing will change significantly. Then the System itself must be replaced! But, as it seems, we changed it by dismantling the “unified party-parameter room” and creating a modernized one with “separate warheads”. This is where another stumbling block turned out to be. Having flown out at first in one “anti-imperial missile”, we ended up like those “swan, crayfish and pike”, with our spatially differently oriented vectors of Stimulus and Power, different baggage of Motive and Means.

Yes, sometimes power is divisible. And its rank gradation is possible both vertically and horizontally. But on a national scale, it always has pyramidal differentiation, strengthening from the base to the top. And two or even three pyramids in a country is a competition of authoritarian authorities. Reasonable peace or peaceful compromise in such unnatural conditions is nonsense. Artificial attempts of horizontal separation of powers, i.e. to make several Masters at the same time, is an objective doom for “family-economic” strife, which will continue until the unstable balance will not take its more natural stable state, peculiar only under one definite Master, until the divided pyramids will finally merge into one. Many people mistakenly see the antagonism of “divided powers” as a personal factor. Then imagine, for example, that we swapped places with the Chairman of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic. In half a year, if not sooner, having mastered and gotten up to speed, having been in a “different skin”, each of us will defend new positions, noticing a grain of sand in someone else’s eye and not seeing a log in our own. And there is nothing surprising or tragic in this, it is simply the natural nature of a person to defend the interests of a certain (“his”) group and category of people or, if you like, a part of society. I am sure that the same metamorphosis would have happened if B. Yeltsin and R. Khasbulatov had been swapped.

Former Soviet Parliament Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, seen here second-left in 1993

What then is the reason for stability in the collegial private capitalist camp? Is their “collective economy” quiet and smooth and God’s grace? Not at all. And here interests and motives may differ greatly, and various storms and tsunamis may occur. But in the world, where “the dominance of private property” rules, the communicative language of business invariably develops a mutually acceptable solution, which, having passed through “their” structures of power, is always implemented, as it is refined by the filter of economic expediency and the state Guarantor of Private capital. The only way of civilized solution to any conflict, which has been worked out for centuries, is to make it more profitable for the disputing parties to stop the conflict than to continue it. We have yet to master such methods.

Thus, implying a change of the System, in fact we have changed only its external Form, its Attributes. The System itself remained inviolable – state-capitalist! To finally dispel the last illusions about its viability, let us consider the question: “Will such a competitive government be able to effectively realize its management mission in the period of transition to market relations, so that the sheep would be safe and the wolves would be fed? What, in general, is its potential future, if neither M. Gorbachev and the Union Parliament, nor B. Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, nor other CIS republics have been able to do so so far – one does not need to go far for examples….

Where is Chechnya going? Political reflections by Dzhokhar Dudayev (part 1)

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On April 29, 1993, the newspaper “Ichkeria” published a long article by Dzhokhar Dudayev, in which the President of the Chechen Republic framed the political context in which the Republic found itself, and proposed a long and detailed reflection on the direction that the new state of the Chechens he could have taken. We are publishing the first part today, translated into English.

On the question of the state-political structure of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Front page of the newspaper “Ichkeria”

The reason for writing this article was my sincere conviction of the need for an urgent, comprehensively balanced and thorough conversation about our long overdue and pressing issues.
Almost a year and a half has already passed since the proclamation of the independent Chechen Republic. What seemed a few years ago to be a centuries-old pipe dream for the Chechen people is today, in spite of everything, an objective reality. We have not only freed ourselves from imperial dictate, but also proclaimed the task of building a new social formation on the model of developed capitalist countries, calling it “secular civilized”. Of course, it seemed to many people before that everything was much easier, it was enough to remove odious figures, to break or dismantle some things, to give up something and everything else would go on as usual, we could not afford any problems. Moreover, we had almost no doubts about WHAT exactly we wanted to build and HOW exactly we wanted to live in it. It seemed to us, and even now we are strongly convinced of it, that we should only adopt the external attributes of civilized democracies, i.e. elect a Parliament, a President and a Constitutional Court, implementing the so-called “separation of powers”, delegating the best representatives of the people to these structures, and all the issues will be solved by themselves. But the future, as it turns out, always makes its unexpected adjustments.

The “revolutionary” euphoria gradually passes, unfamiliar and ear-slashing word combinations become commonplace and familiar, and  every day’s life puts before us all new problems and questions, and each time more and more complicated. And with time we become wiser. Even a cursory retrospective look at the recent “our beginning” allows us to rethink many things in a new way, highlighting the blunders and mistakes. Add to this the fact that the chronic failure to solve some of the main problems of economic nature for our society in this transitional period often gives rise to nihilistic moods, feelings of dissatisfaction and pessimism, sometimes turning into defeatist or even aggressive rejection of everything that has been done. But there is nothing tragic in this, believe me, nor is there any reason for panic. This is the dialectic of the natural course of complex reformist transformations. It is said that a man rejoices twice – when he “buys” and then when he “sells”. We have already experienced the first, and we have obviously come close to the second. But it has become difficult to revise what we have acquired, what we can still use, and what it is time to consign to the dustbin of history.

The statue of Lenin torn down in the square of the same name in Grozny, renamed “Sheikh Mansur Square”

However, in the modern era of information and political boils and maximum conditions for the politicization of society, it is indeed extremely difficult to understand objectively the intense events taking place around us and to give them an unambiguous analytical assessment. Even the Chechen “political elite” is not ready for this. The absence of effective methodological tools in its “portfolio baggage” has not only put us all in an erroneous dead-end position, but has also failed to outline a sufficiently effective way out of the crisis.
 Today we can name several myths and basic misconceptions that have had a devastating effect on the process of the formation of the Chechen state and which can be conditionally characterized as follows:

1) uncertainty of the state-legal status of the Czech Republic;
2) false premise of “separation of powers”;
3) myth of “good leaders”;
4) choice of the form of economic development

The most fierce disputes and discussions that hamper our progressive course are connected with the ambiguous assessment of the socio-political and socio-economic formation that is now called the Chechen Republic. Today there is no shortage of all sorts of definitions and attempts to characterize all the diseases of our state, no shortage of “authoritative diagnoses” and plenty of “alternative-free prescriptions”. That is why a logically adequate interpretation of the investigative processes surrounding the current stage of the Vainakh people’s historical development is becoming very relevant. In my opinion, only the anatomy of the disintegration processes of the Russian Empire’s transformation, on the one hand, and the influence of the laws of evolutionary development of human society, on the other hand, can provide such a tomographic picture of a profound understanding of the problems of the formation of a sovereign Chechen state.

According to Western scientific standards, modern history knows two types of state structure: authoritarian and collegial. The former is usually understood as a regime of unity of power, when a PERSON (chief, leader, etc.) rules. The second is understood when the country is ruled collegially by representatives of different forces of society. Each of these forms of state structure can have, pronounced variations, state-capitalism and private capitalism. That is, there are four main modifications:

  1. authoritarian state capitalism:
    2) collegiate private capitalism;
    3) authoritarian private capitalism;
    4) collegiate state

We would like to warn, first, that often used definitions such as: totalitarianism, dictatorship, democracy, etc. should be used very carefully, because, often and especially in the context of the issue under consideration, they do not really reflect either the essence or the content of the state structure, which will be explained below. And, secondly, although this classification does not claim to be true in the first instance, it is a simple and reliable pilot map among the reefs of “Noev’s” political science terminology. As is known, the former USSR of the “pre-Gorbachev period” was one of the classic examples of the authoritarian state capitalism regime with all the necessary attributes of pyramidal comprehensive and all-encompassing power and executive discipline. This was a necessary and sufficient basis for the adopted centralized scheme of management of the national economy of the country. A vivid example of the opposite and antagonistic state system is the collegial private capitalism of the USA. At the same time, the predominant characteristic of the private capitalist system lies in its inherent ability to self-regulation, which is inherent within it and inherent only to it, and which is tuned to the level of the highest social efficiency and economic expediency, penetrating the state structure in the opposite direction – from the micro to the macro level.

The flag of the Soviet Union, an example of “State Authoritarian Capitalism” cited by Dudayev

It is clear that they have more differences than similarities. And this is quite common knowledge. But the main fact is that in the first case, the role of the owner of the country is played by a specific person (general secretary, president, chairman…), and in the second case – by the FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY. It is the true, though not explicitly expressed, real “master of the situation” in the capitalist world, and not the president, senate or congress, as many sincerely delude themselves. Presidents come and go, but the financial oligarchy remains. This field should be known and always remembered! In the capitalist world, the parliamentary and presidential institutions, which today are fashionably but dilettantishly nodded to in various arguments, are nothing more than an officious facade of the “powers that be”: financial tycoons, military-industrial magnates, royal dynasties, and sometimes even the mafia. If THEY do not wish it, no ideal law issued by the parliament or presidential decree will have a life. If the “officios” step out of the conditioned framework and break the taboos, it ends his career politically or even physically. The assassination of John F. Kennedy is a vivid example of this. If a political crisis breaks out in a developed capitalist country, for example, Italy or South Korea, and the government is urgently changed, you can be absolutely sure that in the “quiet family circle” of the financial oligarchy there is an outwardly unremarkable, but very significant for this country new balance of power and balance of interests of spheres of influence.

Flag of the United States of America, example of a “collegiate private capitalism” cited by Dudayev

The third, very few, group of countries of authoritarian private capitalism includes, for example, the Sultanate of Brunei and some “banana kingdoms”. Being an inherently unstable entity, this form is characterized by frequent regime changes and patrimonial coups d’état. However, if international capital enters such a country under the influence of its interests, achieving the necessary level of balance of internal forces through financial and forceful support of one of the parties, then the authoritarian private capitalism is provided with a long “life”.

Finally, the fourth, also unstable (due to the uncertainty of a single master) form of state structure, which is usually a transitional stage either from collegial private capitalism to authoritarian state capitalism (1917 in Russia), or vice versa (current processes in the “socialist” countries). It is clear that in this classification, which, although conditional, is very effective and illustrative, the Chechen Republic is not in the first formation, from which it fled under the flag of anti-imperialist sentiments, but it is clearly not in the second one, to which it is not clear how long we have to run. We are also far from the third “dignitary” camp by nature. Well, the last thing left is collegial state capitalism! That’s where our forced landing is and the stove from which we are obliged to dance. Another pernicious factor for the Chechen state is the unanimity that the absolute majority of people believe that it is necessary and sufficient for the republic to have “good leadership and a good parliament”, which could supposedly improve the life of the people. At the same time, practically everyone has his or her own version of “good” candidates for leadership positions.

The dangerous consequences of such and other similar, outwardly very attractive and seemingly only true, approaches lie in the methodological incompetence that has struck our society. Unfortunately, we very often, one could say, often lump everything into one pile and do not make special distinctions between concepts, terms, phraseology. Expressing ourselves with the same words, we perceive their different contents.