Archivi tag: Ichkeria

The Ingush perspective: Francesco Benedetti interviews Mustafa Bekov (Part II)

What role did Aushev play in the restoration of the Ingush state? And how is he seen today?

Aushev is a military man and obeys orders. The first thing he did when he became president was to ban all political organizations and establish a barracks regime in the republic. He created the conditions for corruption. He divided the Ingush people into three parts: the “Ingush” Ingush, who lived on the uncontested part of the land, the “Chechen” Ingush, who were forced to leave Grozny, and the “Ossetian” Ingush, who were expelled from North Ossetia after the ethnocide by the Russian army.

He violated Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia: he gave up the ancestral territories of Ingushetia and the city of Vladikavkaz by signing the so-called “Kislovodsk Treaties”. He did this under pressure from Yeltsin, who threatened to remove him from the presidency for the next term. There is video evidence of this. I don’t remember exactly when I wrote this comment on Facebook, but it concerns Aushev.

“All those who criticize Aushev for the Kislovodsk/Nalchik agreement, for the pocket parliament, for the barracks regime, for dancing at Ossetian government meetings, for abandoning the right bank of Vladikavkaz, for corruption, for jumping off personnel, for populism …. First of all, everyone has the right to criticize, because he is not a private person, but a public person, and every public person is subject to criticism; secondly, or rather, above all, all critics are right, because they tell the TRUTH. He led the republic built by us, the ancients, not as a general, but as a sergeant. Aushev was a talented but uneducated man, and that is why he drove all serious and worthy, educated and professional Ingush out of politics and business, placing himself alongside sycophants and other amateurs.”

So Aushev “sold” legitimate Ingush claims in order to avoid a conflict with Moscow. Considering what you told me about Dudayev’s decision not to pander to Yeltsin, don’t you think Aushev’s decision was wiser than Dudayev’s? A compromise to avoid ethnocide? Or do you think it could have been done differently?

Aushev took office after the ethnocide. It is very difficult to negotiate with the imperial Kremlin. It is necessary to be politically flexible. A good example of this was the President of Tatarstan Shaimiev Mintimer Sharipovich. Aushev violated Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia in order to retain his office as president, or more precisely, to extend it for a second term. Dudayev opted for open confrontation in the hope of gaining international support. Both generals knew how to wage war.

Aushev was in Afghanistan as an infantryman and put himself in real danger. Dudayev was the commander of a squadron of strategic bombers from the “carpet bombing” era, but neither of them understood anything about politics. As Krylov’s fable says: “It’s a disaster when a cobbler starts baking cakes and a baker starts grinding boots.”

Do you therefore think that the leadership in both the case of Ingushetia and Chechnya was not the right one to achieve “separation” from Moscow? Do you think that there were better people at the time who could have handled the situation better?

Yes, certainly. For example, Salambek Naibovich Khadzhiev in Chechnya and Bembulat Bersovich Bogatyrev in Ingushetia. I knew Khadzhiyev personally. An academic, an intellectual. An experienced person who didn’t need to improve his image because he was a seasoned personality. It is the hotheads who slander him. Unlike many others, Khadzhiyev was “capable of judgment” (according to Kant), and he never followed the euphoric, apparent freedom of the Chechens and did not declare independence, but used his authority to improve the lives of his people step by step, taking more and more powers away from Moscow… until the empire weakened. Khadzhiyev would not have sacrificed the Chechen people to the Russian barbarians.

The empire has never allowed people who were not loyal to it to lead the colonies. I said at the beginning of our conversation that I consider the declaration of independence to be a tragic mistake that was a catastrophe not only for the Chechen people, but also for the entire national and liberation movement in the Caucasus.

The military should not interfere in politics: it usually ends badly. But you can’t change it, history doesn’t tolerate the subjunctive. With the right tactics towards Moscow, the people I mentioned would have achieved results slowly, without losses, gradually gaining more and more independence, distancing themselves from the Kremlin and gaining strength, coordinating their actions with other peoples in the Caucasus and taking the path of DECOLONIZATION.

Do you believe that Salambek Khadzhiyev really wanted Chechnya to be independent? And as for the need to avoid a break with Moscow: Don’t you think that, given the way things developed in the following years, Chechnya’s independence would have been impossible to achieve if Russia had overcome its period of weakness?

You and I are talking about what could have been. In principle, this is only necessary in order to understand the processes that have taken place. The past must be known for the future. That is clear. Besides, it makes no sense to compare Dudayev and Khadzhiyev. We are talking about facts here. It is a fact that the Chechens declared independence under the leadership of Dudayev! Did they achieve it? NO. This is an indisputable fact.

As it turned out later in his interview, he knew very well what would happen in the future and even predicted it. He knew that a military confrontation with Russia was unwinnable. He knew that, and yet he took the risk. Dudayev did not achieve his goal! The Chechen people suffered heavy losses and fell under the yoke of Kadyrov, who was loyal to the Kremlin.  The Russian empire was not weak in the years 1991-1998. Its economy was weak but its imperial face remained unchanged, although Yeltsin managed to fool the world into believing that Russia could be a democratic state. This will never happen.

The Russian empire will only get weaker now that it has gone to war against Ukraine. Now is the time when the colonized peoples, if they work together in harmony, can embark on the path of decolonization with the support of the Western democratic world. This includes the creation of a sovereign state. Thirty years ago, this was still impossible.

More about Khadzhiyev. After Dudayev came to power, Khadzhiyev represented the opposition and led the “collaboration government” with Moscow for a while during the war. Do you think this was the right choice for him? Wouldn’t it have been better not to lead this government?

Khadzhiyev, who knew the history of the Russian Empire well and understood that a tragic mistake had been made that would inflict great losses on the Chechen people and thwart the dream of freedom for many years, could not remain indifferent to the tragedy that was rapidly approaching his people and tried everything to prevent this catastrophe. But a man in a stately general’s uniform, who spoke in a confident and authoritarian voice about the freedom of the Chechen spirit and called for death in the fight for it, was more attractive than a thoughtful intellectual who called for a cautious confrontation with the monster that had oppressed many peoples for many years.

The calm voice and the calls of the thinking people for sensible action were easily drowned out by the general’s slogan “Freedom or death”. Intoxicated by the apparent proximity of long-awaited freedom, the crowd chose death. Khadzhiyev was not a collaborator. Like me and many other thinking Chechens, he was sure that this monster could not be defeated alone and tried to save his people from disaster.

On October 23, 1995, Khadzhiyev resigned from the government he had formed and was replaced by Zavgaev. In light of this event, do you not believe that Khadzhiyev (without judging the nobility of his soul) was more a pawn of Moscow than an asset to the Chechen people? Under his rule, the federal forces committed numerous atrocities, which Khadzhiyev apparently had to endure, and after him, power passed to the old head of the Chechen Republic, who, as far as I know, was now hated by everyone.

Khadzhiyev did not allow himself to be manipulated by anyone. He was a true Chechen for whom the terms “honor” and “human dignity” were not empty words. In September 1991, S. Khadzhiyev led the movement for democratic reforms in Chechnya-Ingushetia and on the eve of the first presidential elections of the Chechen Republic in November 1991 was considered Dudayev’s main rival, but refused to take part in the elections and subsequently work in the government formed by the Chechen National Congress (OKCHN). In 1992, he again turned down the OKCHN’s offer to become Prime Minister of the Chechen government. This was because he was against Dudayev and Yandarbiyev, who were driving the people to tragedy. Khadzhiyev tried to prevent the impending catastrophe. A few days before the Russian aggression began, he tried to end the unrest and chaos in Chechnya and lead the government. But the federal troops, as you rightly pointed out, committed atrocities. Precisely because he refused to be manipulated by Moscow, he was replaced by Zavgaev.

Zavgaev was there before Khadzhiev. The Moscow puppet was ready to carry out any order from the Kremlin. In 1991, I headed the Ingush State Theater, which I had founded, and Zavgaev wanted me to join his team, invited me to run as a deputy for the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, but in 1989, at the Second Ingush People’s Congress, I withdrew and distanced myself from political activity because I did not agree with the path I had chosen. But that’s another topic.

Doku Zavgaev: What do you think of him? Is he a man who tried to save Chechnya from war, or a weak politician who just wanted to exploit the situation for his own personal gain?

Zavgaev was an obedient lackey of Moscow. He was only interested in himself. He tried to get anyone who was popular with the people on his side. In short, he bought those who could be bought.

Back to the war. How did the Ingush deal with the Russian invasion of Chechnya? Didn’t the Ingush also declare independence after the end of the invasion in 1996 with the withdrawal of the Moscow army?

Ingushetia served as logistical support for the Chechen resistance fighters. The families of the Chechen resistance fighters were safe in Ingushetia. Wounded resistance fighters were treated in Ingushetia. Although the Republic of Ingushetia officially belonged to Russia, the Ingush strongly supported the Chechen resistance and their Chechen brothers. Individual Ingush also took part in the war against the Russian occupiers on the side of the Chechens.

What were the relations between Ingushetia and Chechnya between the end of the first and the beginning of the second war? Did the scourge of abductions also affect Ingushetia? Were there crises during this period because the borders between Ingushetia and Ichkeria could not be defined?

Despite constant provocations and attempts by the colonial authorities to divide and divide these two related peoples, all their efforts were in vain. The Chechen and Ingush people learned not to transfer the actions of politicians and the government, the lackeys of the Kremlin, to the relations between Chechens and Ingush. These attempts have continued throughout the ages, starting with the Russo-Caucasian War.

The merits of Presidents Dudayev and Aushev can be seen in the fact that they did not raise the issue of the border and postponed the resolution of these questions until better times. Chechen resistance fighters who had entered the territory of Ingushetia were arrested by the Ingushetian army and police and transferred to Chechnya with the request not to transfer the fight with the Russians to the territory of Ingushetia.

For two years, Russia has succeeded in changing the mood of the Western community from sympathy to antipathy towards the Chechens through “special operations” with hostage-taking, especially of foreign aid organizations. Who would sympathize with bandits who cut off the heads of people who wanted to help them? In the period between the first and second wars, I was often in Chechnya with German doctors. We brought wounded children to Germany to be treated free of charge. When we visited the Chechen Republic, Maskhadov, whom I knew personally, always gave us an armed escort. In a country devastated by war, there were always people who took hostages for money. Moscow provided considerable resources for this. There were no mass hostage-takings for ransom in Ingushetia.

Although the Dudayev government did not help the Ingush with either people or weapons during the ethnocide of the Ingush people in 1992, although it sent and received a delegation to North Ossetia twice and assured the Ossetian leadership of non-interference … basically betrayed the fraternal people and got them into trouble … there were no complaints or reproaches from the Ingush other than resentment. On the contrary, everyone understood that the Chechens had been provoked.

You have described the hostage crisis in Chechnya as an instrument controlled by Russia to distance Chechnya from the West. In your opinion, were the apartment explosions of 1999, which justified the second invasion of Chechnya, also organized by the Russian government?

Yes, it was an initiative of the Russian secret services to discredit the Chechens. Irena Brezna, a Swiss writer of Slovakian origin, published a memo from the Analytical Center of the Russian Federation, in which the necessity and methods of discrediting the Chechen people and their struggle for freedom were pointed out. There were direct instructions on how to proceed and that no expense should be spared.  One of the well-known facts confirming these methods is the murder of a humanitarian affairs expert from the American Soros Foundation, US citizen Fred Cuney, his translator Galina Oleynik and two employees of the Russian Committee of the Red Cross who were accompanying them. The Chechen State Security Service was held responsible for the murder.

In the interwar period, I witnessed such propaganda activities at the Russian embassy in Germany, where a video was shown of Chechens cutting off the heads of Russian mercenaries. This video certainly had a shocking effect on the German public.

Yes, of course houses in Russia were blown up by the FSB itself. There is a book by KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was murdered by Putin in London with polonium, and by historian Yuri Felshtinsky entitled “The FSB blows up Russia”.

Akhmat Kadyrov. What kind of person was he? Did the Ingush know him? What was their opinion of him and how did it change over time?

As a rule, the spiritual leaders in Russia were KGB officers. I don’t know whether Akhmat Kadyrov was one. After he became the spiritual leader of the people, he first called for the killing of Russians. He promised paradise to anyone who killed as many Russian attackers as possible. And then he sided with the Russians and became the first president of the already conquered Chechnya? Strange metamorphosis!

As far as I know, the Ingush had no time for Mufti Kadyrov. In any case, Kadyrov senior betrayed the Chechen people or, in the opinion of others, saved the Chechen people from annihilation. I don’t know. The Ingush, like all other peoples of the world, have the same attitude towards traitors.

Kadyrov senior asked for money to rebuild the destroyed city of Grozny under his control (I heard him talk about it personally on a TV program). Moscow wanted to manage the money itself… Akhmat Kadyrov became an uncomfortable figure; he was too independent. The empire doesn’t need such people, so they liquidated him and installed Kadyrov Jr. who hadn’t even finished school. Kadyrov Jr. became Putin’s loyal ‘foot soldier’, killing his enemies (Politkovskaya, Nemtsov) and terrorizing the Chechen people!

After the death of Akhmat Kadyrov, power in Chechnya passed to his son Ramzan after a brief interregnum. How did relations between Ingush and Chechens develop during his dictatorship?

The Kremlin and Kadyrov, as well as Ingush appointees such as FSB General Zyazikov and GRU General Yevkurov, have done the bidding of their masters in the Kremlin. They have tried to sow enmity between our peoples. In Chechnya, for example, information has been spread at government level that the Ingush are profiting from Chechen refugees by renting unsuitable premises for accommodation for hundreds of dollars, etc.

In 2018, on the Kremlin’s instructions, they carried out a provocation to cede Ingush territories to the Chechen Republic. It’s not just a question of land. It is about the history of the people, the graves of their ancestors and everything that is important for the self-confidence of the Ingush. Yevkurov and Kadyrov reached an agreement and drew the border between Ingush and Chechens, so that an original part of Ingushetia went to Chechnya. The protests of the Ingush were widely felt. The Kremlin had long wanted to shed blood to separate these two peoples. But the Ingush police did not allow any retaliatory measures to be taken against the demonstrators. This happened in 2018, and the leaders of this protest were sentenced to draconian punishments and are in prison. And there is no one in world public opinion who cares about this injustice.  

Of course, this provocation has not left both peoples unscathed, and relations between Chechens and Ingush have become more difficult.

But the Chechens, Ingush and other colonized peoples of the Caucasus must unite and establish their own state.

The empire does not tolerate any criticism, let alone any demands from colonized peoples.

The Empire is afraid of the unification of the colonized peoples and their national freedom movement and will therefore do everything to ensure that the peoples of the Caucasus have reason not to trust each other. Even better if they come into conflict with each other.

It is time for all the colonized peoples of the Caucasus to realize that they are not full and equal citizens of Russia. When we realize this, we will want to free ourselves from this oppression. The genetic inability to be a slave forces us to resist the position of a slave. The national liberation struggle will begin. The Chechens have tried to go it alone, have shown courage and will, have suffered heavy losses and have not reached the goal. All the peoples of the Caucasus must unite and take the path of decolonization together, because this is the path to the creation of a common independent pan-Caucasian state.

Fighting for a new “August 6”: Francesco Benedetti interviews Aset Sabdulaeva (Part II of “Ichkeria Generation”)

You told me that you moved to Canada in 2004. Where did you go to live?  Has the Canadian government helped you find accommodation and a form of livelihood?

Given the fact that our files were accepted by Canadian immigration authorities, we received the permanent residence cards right away when we landed in the Canadian airport. We landed in Halifax. Two weeks later upon our arrival, we moved to Québec because my mother knew Canadian filmmaker Helen Doyle. Helen was working on a documentary movie about my mother that was released in 2008. The name of the documentary is Birlyant, a chechen story.

When we arrived in Canada, the government gave us 4 000 cad$. But we had to pay back to the government the amount for plane tickets. We rented an apartment, and I was enrolled into a special language class, classe d’accueil.

The first time, I must admit, was very difficult. We had to start everything from zero. I didn’t have friends at school, I didn’t speak French at all. The first week of school, I had a conflict with one Russian guy, Maxim, who used to call me a “terrorist” every time he passed in the corridor during break-time. I went to complain to the director of the school. Later, my sister and my mother came – he stopped his verbal harassment. Even now, when I think about this guy, I feel awkward.

I spent 2 years in classe d’accueil, then I was transferred into regular class. It was very hard to study the French language. When I finally graduated from school and then from Cegep (French collage), I started to appreciate my years in university. I met wonderful people and wonderful professors.

Was Canadian society aware of what was happening in Chechnya? How did people you know react to your situation? Have you found people’s willingness to support you in your integration journey?

Canadian society was aware of what was happening in Chechnya. For example, in daily free journals “Metro” that were distributed every morning in the subway and in public buses to people, I often read short articles about Chechnya. However, I didn’t see any concrete steps made by Canadian society or the Canadian government to help Chechnya. Canadian society had a distant look on everything. Even now, Canadians think that their “far away” geography will protect them from any threat. They seem to lack understanding in geopolitics.

Canada has a history of immigration. It has organizations that deal with immigrants. There are government programs that grant social housing and social aid. People are generally open to immigrants, and they react to immigration as a normal process. The filmmaker, Helen, who knew my mom helped us. She and her husband helped me to get enrolled into a very good high school. I’m grateful to them. Apart from them, no one. My family dealt with everything on its own.

When did you start to feel the need to engage in politics, serving the cause of Chechen independence?

I was always on the side of Ichkeria. However, I started to actively take part in politicssince 2022, the year when Russia illegally invaded Ukraine.

The result of the war in Ukraine will change the balance of power in Eastern Europe. When Russia loses this war, it will be the end of the Russian Empire and the beginning of decolonization of captive nations. Without concrete changes in the center of the Empire, the Chechen Republic won’t be able to reestablish its democratic state because our people don’t have enough resources and capabilities for that. But our government can support Ukraine and is supporting Ukraine in all possible terms and that will help the process of disintegration of the Russian Empire. I want to contribute to the process of de-occupation of my motherland and disintegration of the Russian Empire and that is why I’m motivated to work for the government of Ichkeria.

Also, I know that the truth is on our side. The Chechen government of Ichkeria in exile is defending the legitimate right to self-determination of our people. The Chechen people already made a choice to build a sovereign country, and this choice was democratically articulated in the referendum in 1990. When the USSR made legislative reforms recognizing the right to self-determination of peoples, the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingush republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty on 27 November 1990. Our sovereignty was proclaimed in full accordance with USSR laws and with norms and principles of international law.  The statehood of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is crystally clear and undoubtedly legitimate. The legitimacy of our state was further reinforced, when the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic of Ichkeria concluded the Peace Treaty in 1997 where both parties were designated as subjects of international law. The Peace Treaty is published on the official website of the United Nations (UN).

If I had any doubt about the legitimate struggle of our people, I would step down right away. Our land is occupied, our people are being held hostage by the Russian Empire that until today keeps over 100 000 Russian soldiers on chechen soil. The way Chechen people are treated is completely unjust and unacceptable and that is why I find it  is important to defend our country, people and freedom.

What benefits do you think the deployment of ChRI armed forces alongside Ukrainian fighters can bring to the cause of independent Chechnya? And how can the Chechen diaspora in the West support their action?

The Armed Forces of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria play a key role in our resistance and they are fighting not only for Ukrainian victory and for the legitimate right to self-determination of Chechen people, but they are also fighting for the peace and security in Eastern Europe.

Russia threatens international security and is trying to destroy a sovereign Ukrainian state, Ukrainian identity, language and culture. If Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will expand its boundaries to other European countries. If Hitler was not stopped in 1945, the world would be dominated by fascism. If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, Russian chauvinism, that Djokhar Dudaev called russism, will reach other European countries. Lenin wanted to build a Soviet Empire where communism was the absolute ideal and where all captive nations were insignificant subjects all fused into a one big Russian nation. Putin wants to keep this Empire but replace communism with russism and exploit captive nations and their territories the same way as Soviets did.

The fact that Chechen armed forces are fighting alongside Ukrainian fighters sends a powerful message to the world: the Chechen resistance is still alive and Chechens defend Ukraine to help Ukrainian people to defeat the Russian Empire that is threatening international security. The Ukrainian Army is training our troops with high military technology. Ukraine is helping our army to update war skills, use advanced military technology and increase expertise. The Chechen Army is becoming more efficient. Our Army is paving the way for the de-occupation of Ichkeria.

The Armed Forces of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria consist of very brave men that love freedom. Most of the soldiers in our Armed Forces belong to my generation (born in 1990 +). They are doing the best they can to liberate our motherland, to stop the Russian Empire, to help Ukraine and establish peace and security in Eastern Europe. I truly admire them the same way I admire those who defended and liberated Grozny on 6 august 1996.

The chechen diaspora can do a lot of things to help our army. The first and very important thing is to raise awareness about our troops because most people in the West know about Kadyrovtsy, russian puppets fighting within Russian Army against Ukraine, but do not know much about the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The diaspora should be more open to speak about our army, about our state, about our national tragedy. Also, I find that it is important to give moral support to our troops that are sacrificing their lives for the better future of our nation. Lastly, financial aid is crucial because military and transportation equipment costs money and this equipment is necessary for efficient warfare.

What activities do you mainly do in Canada, in support of Chechen independence? And what are the main problems of the Chechen diaspora in the West?

My role as a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs is to connect with different people and politicians, seek their support and talk to them about Chechnya. We need diplomatic support from Western countries. On 18 October 2022, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognized that Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is a territory temporarily occupied by Russia. The main goal of our foreign policy is to find support from Western Countries and invite them to follow the example of Ukraine and recognize the occupation of the Chechen State.

The major problem of our diaspora is the lack of expression of political will. The fear of denouncing injustice, oppression and Russian occupation is  justifiable. We all have relatives in Chechnya. When Chechens express political opinions and speak against the Russian regime, the puppets of the Russian administration, kadyrovtsy, kidnap or kill relatives. Fear I think is the biggest problem. Yet, the truth is that if we want to change the status- quo of our occupied State, we must rise here, in the West.

What activities can the Chechen diaspora in the West do to influence Western society and governments, in your opinion?

The best thing that the diaspora can do is support its local Chechen leaders that are trying to get into local governments. The involvement of our local leaders into governments will help us to make hear our voices within western political establishments. For instance, soon there will be elections in Austria. We have a Chechen candidate running for a deputy office. His name is Laziz Vagaev. I’ve listened to his videos. He is highly educated person.  It is an excellent opportunity for Chechens to elect a local leader that will represent them and be capable of making hear our voice in Austrian parlement.

Last year, Chechen diaspora in Belgium had a chance to vote for a Chechen candidate. Unfortunately, our diaspora didn’t participate much in elections. Our people should support local Chechen candidates and vote for them.

Some Chechens say that one of the main risks for Chechens living abroad is Islamic radicalism, and that the government is not doing enough to distance itself from this phenomenon. Do you agree that Chechens in Europe and America are at risk of radicalization? And what is your position as a member of the government on this issue?

I disagree with this statement. Our government  is a democratic government and the rule of law is a core principle of our state.

The Russian intelligence agency (FSB) tries to drag some Chechens into radicalism, but our government is working on this problem, together with European governmental institutions. Chechens have a lot of educated and talented young people who live, work and study in Western schools, universities and companies. So I do not think that radicalization is a major problem.

It is true that we do not share the aggressive secularism of some Chechen social activists, but it does not mean that we support radicalism. Democracy gives a person the opportunity to live according to laws adopted by the majority of society. Democracy is not new to Chechen culture; it is part of our culture, and we inherited it since the 16th and 17th centuries. Chechen people lived in democracy, and we didn’t have any monarchs or social classes.  While other European nations were subjects of monarchs that had absolute power over them, Chechens lived in mountains on equal terms, with equal rights and elected the executive Council of Elders. French writer Ernest Chantre writes about this in his book “Recherches Antropologiques: Le Caucase ” (1886).

Therefore, democratic principles exist in the Chechen cultural code. But some pseudo-democrats who live today in European countries are trying to replace democracy with liberalism. Democracy is a form of government that is the basis of Chechen statehood. These individuals do not make any distinction between liberal ideology and democracy. As you know, in Europe there are a lot of political parties that build their programs/manifesto on  Christian values and ethics.

The Christian Democratic parties exist throughout the world. These parties successfully operate in Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, etc. The European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) won the elections to the European Parliament. This is normal in democracy. There is an insignificant minority of Chechen society that has not yet really understood democratic principles and is trying to impose strict secularism on the state and people. Their opinion is marginal not only for the Chechen people, but also for most European democratic countries.

How does the government act to keep the attention of the Chechen diaspora around the world on its activities?

Our government is transparent. We inform our diaspora about all the work we do through media resources such as Ichkeria News YouTube channel and the official government’s website www.thechechenpress.com. Also, we have the Council of Elders in Europe and official representation offices that keep close ties with local communities in different countries. 

And it is true that we do not force anything on anyone because we believe that to serve our state is a matter of honor, dignity and free choice.

ICHKERIA GENERATION – Francesco Benedetti interviews Aset Sabdulaeva (part 1)

Aset Sabdulaeva was born in 1991 in Grozny. Her mother is the People’s Artist of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Birlyant Ramzaeva. She composed music for many famous Chechen songs « The Knight of Honour », « The time of Heros », « Don’t leave the mountains ». Her father is poet and playwright Makkal Sabdulaev. He is the author of lyrics of most of Ramzaeva’s songs. He also wrote famous theatrical play « Rejected heroes » (Махкана совбевлла к1ентий). From 1996-2000 he worked as the 1st Deputy minister of Culture of CRI. In 2000, Sabdulaev was abducted by russian soldiers in Grozny on a checkpoint. He is considered missing.

Aset lives in Canada, where she arrived when she was 13 years old, in 2004. Aset has a BA in education and she is currently completing MA in education. Aset holds the position of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

We can say that you belong to a generation that we could define as the “Ichkeria Generation”, that is, those kids who were born close to independence, and who became adults during the period of independent Chechnya. The first question I would like to ask you is: what is the first memory you associate with “being Chechen”? Do you remember how you became aware of who you were, as a member of the Chechen nation? And what feeling did you associate with this thought?

I was raised on the songs of my mother and on the poems of my father that always praised freedom, honor, dignity, good manners, our culture, our native language, our struggle for independence, our heroes and the tragic history of our people.

 The Chechen identity was constructed in me by the art of my parents. Since my childhood, I was aware of who I am. I was three years old, in 1994, when on the Eve of the First Russo-Chechen war, huge demonstrations took place on the Liberty Square. The Chechen people were asking Russians to stop the aggression and provocations against the Chechen state. People used to invite my mother to sing for them at the demonstrations on Liberty Square and she took me with her. My people have gone through horrors and injustice, two bloody wars, genocide and isolation. Chechens defended themselves although they were abandoned by the entire world and thrown in the claws of Yeltsin and Putin. But our spirit never surrendered to Russia. The history of my people taught me that no matter how big the conqueror is, we always have to resist. Today, Chechnya is under Russian occupation and my people are living under Putin’s dictatorship, yet, we continue to resist.

Thanks for your answer, Aset, which in a way anticipates my second question.  You were just a child when Russia invaded Chechnya.  What do you remember about those terrible times?  How did you experience the years of occupation as a child?

I remember a lot of things. In 1994, Yeltsin started a full land and air attack against the Independent Chechen State. During the bombing, my mother, my sister and I used to hide in the shelter (basement of our house). My mother played Pondar (chechen accordion) very loud, so that my sister and I couldn’t hear Russian military planes and irritating sounds of missiles. My father never came to the shelter. He always stayed either upstairs or outside. 

 I remember that one day a group of Chechen warriors were walking on our street, very brave and humble men. They knocked on our door and asked for water. They seemed to be exhausted because it was the moment when Grozny was surrounded by Russians. My mother invited the entire group to our yard, prepared some food and she played our national anthem. Our warriors were smiling. But they didn’t eat anything. They just drank water and left, smiling. I will never forget these beautiful faces.

I also remember ruins. The entire city was in ruins. The doors of our house were with bullet holes. I remember our dog Borzik. It was a huge white dog. Very kind and friendly dog. Everytime it heard Russian helicopters or missiles, Borzik used to run in my sister’s room and hide under the bed. When helicopters left, we always had a hard time getting Borzik out of the room because it was too big and refused to move.

Thank you, Aset. Then the war ended with the escape of the Russians in August 1996. Do you remember those days? What did they say in your family?

When the Chechen government and Russian government signed the Khasavyurt Accord in 1996 marking the end of the first Russo-Chechen war, it was a huge celebration for our people. My parents were very happy because it meant the end of a nightmare. Our nation elected in fair and democratic elections the third President Aslan Maskhadov and we truly thought that we will finally start building our prosperous state. After the victory in the unequal struggle for freedom, Chechens gained popularity in Russian public opinion and in the world. We were perceived as heroes. However, things changed when Putin got appointed as the head of the KGB in Moscow. The entire KDG machine was directed to destroy our state, our society and our reputation. The KGB’s aim was to destroy the image of Chechen heroes.

Putin opened doors for so-called middle eastern “investors” and facilitated their arrival to Chechnya through Moscow. These emissaries from the Middle East brought a lot of money and invested it in the opposition movements that were against our government. This opposition was mainly led by Movladi Udugov and his ideological comrades from Arab countries spreading fundamentalist religious beliefs that were in complete discord with the Chechen culture and adats (customs). On the other hand, Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov, who was appointed as Chechen mufti (main imam), praised traditional Islam that was in opposition to Udugov’s “pure Islam”. These two religious individuals preached their versions of Islam on TV channels. Their destructive teachings divided Chechen society that was already in a very miserable economic situation. Both Udugov and Kadyrov were working for Russian intelligence, and they aimed to destroy our state and divide our people. They were financed by Russia. I’ve read a lot of things about these events in the book of Akhmed Zakaev, “Subjugate or Exterminate” published by Washington Press. Also, it is very important to note that these Arab emissaries, under the umbrella of Russian intelligence, were directly involved in kidnappings of civilians, international aid workers, journalists and engineers. For example, the person who kidnaped British engineers Apti Abitaev, was a KGB agent, and our government arrested them. The person who initiated “fatwa” (ruling) to behead these poor British engineers was Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary. This barbaric murder of British engineers was a triumph for Russian intelligence. It succeeded in sending the message to the world that Chechens were criminals and kidnappers. Yet, the Chechen people had nothing to do with these criminal acts. Also, on 23 July 1998, an attempt was made to assassinate our President Maskhadov by blowing up the truck close to Maskhadov’s car. Two security officers of Maskhadov were killed. Later, our government found out that the “fatwa” (ruling) to kill our legitimately and democratically elected president Maskhadov was made by the same Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary that was in very close ties with Udugov.

 Indeed, I think that the period from 1996-1999, was a very difficult time for our State. But not because our government was incompetent, as some individuals claim, but because we were in complete economic/political blockade and our enemy was unproportionally powerful and malicious. Every state at the beginning of its statehood goes through difficulties. For instance, Georgia went through political turmoil at the beginning of its existence. Unlike Georgia, Chechnya was in complete blockade with no access to any political support from the West. Therefore, Russia crushed our state in the worst manner. Zakaev makes a very good point in his book about the situation in Chechnya during that period: “Crime, the gradual impoverishment of population, corruption within the government, the economic crisis, all were due mainly, of course, to Russia’s failure to honor its obligations to restore the republic’s economic infrastructure, destroyed in a war it had unleashed. Ultimately, however, in the eyes of the public the person to blame for all our troubles and economic difficulties was President Aslan Maskhadov” (2018, p.346) Russia kept us in economic blockage, infiltrated her agents from Middle East, injected Wahhabi religious ideology that was alien to us, divided our society, discredited our government, destroyed our reputation and, later, perpetrated genocide against our people.

Aset Sabdulaeva with hes mother and her father

About the end of the first war, and the feelings you felt among your family.  Was there a particular commander among those who fought for independence who was considered a hero, or a greater hero than the others?  Did little Aset have a Chechen hero who made her proud?

I remember when my mom used to take me to a demonstration, older women sang songs “zikr” (traditional style music with lyrics) praising Djokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and Ahmed Zakaev. As a child, I didn’t have a particular admiration for a specific commander. I admired all our warriors. However, when I started to grow up and to be more conscious, I understood the real value of our heroes. I love Djokhar Dudaev because he left a legacy to our nation, I deeply respect Zelimkhan Yandarbiev because he behaved in a beautiful manner in Kremlin when Yeltsin refused to sit around the table on equal terms; Zelimkhan wrote beautiful poems in Chechen language that I enjoy reading. I appreciate Aslan Maskhadov because he was a true diplomat and is the leader that signed the Peace Treaty with the Russian Federation in May 1997. I admire Abdulhalim Sadulaev because he was a very wise leader. I truly appreciate Akhmed Zakaev because he left treasure to our nation in terms of two books that he wrote. He is the witness of all historical and political processes that occurred in Chechnya. I admire them all. They dedicated their lives, so that we can be free. In the bottom of my heart, of course, my eternal hero is my father, Makkhal. He believed in freedom and justice. He wanted to build an independent and democratic state. I became who I am, because of him.

Thinking about your father, how did you feel knowing that he was participating in building the independent state that Chechens had long desired? Were your family members proud of him, or was their fear that something bad might happen to him prevail?

I felt very happy actually. After school, I used to go to the Ministry, where my father worked as 1st Deputy Minister of Culture, and run all over it. I ran and jumped so much that sometimes the workers of the Ministry complained to my father. When he brought me home, he used to talk to me for a long time explaining how important it is to behave in a good manner.  My family members were proud of my father. I remember when he came back from work, he spent hours and hours writing articles, reports and projects. Given the fact that our Republic was in complete economic blockade and Russia didn’t pay the reparations for all the damage it had done in Chechnya, Chechen government lacked funds, and it could not pay salaries to its workers. I still have my father’s certificate where it’s written that the government owes him 18 000 rubles in salary for 6 months of work. He worked for the well-being of our country because he knew that to nourish national self-conscience in young people, it’s important to elevate the culture, teach the Chechen language in schools, promote Chechen folk music, publish Chechen literature, encourage young artists and writers to write in Chechen language and share the history of our people through poems and plays.  My father opposed all radical elements infiltrated in our society by Russian intelligence. These elements retarded the development of our state.

When the second war started in Chechnya, in 1999, the Ministry of Culture stopped functioning, so my father joined Aslan Maskhadov’s media team, and he was reporting all atrocities that were perpetrated by Russians in Chechnya. He knew that it was becoming very dangerous for him to stay there. Three days before his capture, he called my mother, who was at that time in Georgia. She asked him to leave Chechnya. He refused and said: “What is happening here is a genocide. I can’t leave.” One day before his capture, his friend Dalkhan Hojaev, a chechen historian was captured by Russians and killed. The next day, they took my father when he was crossing a Russian check- point (block-post).  My father disappeared without a trace. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya in hope to find him. One of the Russian generals told her that my father was taken to Khankala, a russian military base where russian soldiers tortured and killed chechen civilians.

Do you remember any activities organized by the Ministry for the Promotion of Culture during the interwar period?

I remember that on every 6th September, the Independence Day of Chechnya, the Ministry of Culture, under my father’s supervision, used to organize big concerts in Dinamo Stadium. He also initiated a plan to repair all our libraries and update the collection of books.   Under his supervision, our Ministry organized the competition of folk performers (singers and instrumentalists) in all villages and at the end of competition, the best folk performers were gathered in Grozny and they performed on a Gala Concert where they received special prices.

What happened after you heard of your father’s passing? Did your mother decide to take you to the West?

In 2000, my father insisted that we (my mother, my sister and me) go to Georgia. We were refugees in Georgia. In July, the same year, my father was kidnapped. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya and started searching for him everywhere, even in mass graves. At that time, it was possible to pay a bribe to Russian soldiers, they gave access to the mass grave. My mother appealed to every possible instance. Yet, she couldn’t find him. In 2002, she left Chechnya because Russians came to our house looking for her. She managed to escape through the backyard and hide in a neighbor’s house. Russians didn’t like that she was determined and eager to find out where my father was and she gathered too much attention. She had no choice but to leave Chechnya.

We stayed in Georgia until 2004. In 2004, Canada opened a program in Georgia for accepting chechen refugees through UNHCR. We applied for immigration, passed an interview and Canada accepted our file.  We left Georgia.

What do you remember about your time in Georgia? What was that life like, from the eyes of a little girl?

When we arrived in Georgia, we were afraid to say that we are Chechens because Russia spread horrible propaganda about Chechen people and the entire nation was demonized and presented on most Russian TV channels as terrorists and bandits.

The second problem was that I didn’t go to school for almost two years because of war. As a kid, in my learning process, I was getting behind the children of my age. My sister had to enroll me in school as soon as possible. At that time, we didn’t have official papers recognizing us as refugees in Georgia.  She approached one teacher in the school #44 in Tbilisi, on the mount Mtacminda, and talked to her about my case.  Gora Alexandrovna (teacher) agreed to take me in her class without any hesitation, although we didn’t have papers. The director of the school, Nana, approved my admission right away, and I was enrolled in 3d grade.  I remember Georgia as a country with very hospitable and kind people. Certainly, I remember all my teachers. They helped me so much to catch other kids. Gora Alexandrovna,Tamara Iradionovna, Nana Mas, Greta Stepanovna, Viola Mas, they were Georgian and Armenians, they taught me even during summer.

When we came to Georgia, President Shevardnadze was still in power. The country was poor and suffocating in corruption and bribery. Shervarnadze was a good friend of Putin. I remember 13 Chechens were deported to Moscow. It was an unjust decision made by Shevardnazde to deport our men. He knew that Putin is conducting an illegal war in Chechnya and that our people are suffering from this barbaric aggression. When Russians completed their mission in Chechnya, they came to Georgia in 2008 and annexed Georgian territories.

 I also remember that my sister and I participated at the demonstrations during the Rose Revolution to support Mikhail Saakashvili. I noticed that when Georgian people are fed up, they mobilize quite quickly and express their political will. As time passed, it was difficult to live in Georgia. My family couldn’t afford living there. We had to leave.

Ichkeria Generation – Francesco Benedetti interviews Surho Sugaipov

Surho Sugaipov was born and raised in Grozny. At the age of fifteen, Surho arrived in Germany after his family had to flee from Grozny during the Second Chechen War. After graduating from high school in the city of Würselen, NRW, he worked in the family business until he enrolled in university. As a student of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Cologne, he simultaneously dedicated himself to his great passion – acting. His first major role was as one of the main characters in the French film “Le grand homme” (2014) directed by Sarah Leonor.

You can learn more about his creative work in cinema in Germany and France on his Wikipedia page:

https://de.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surho_Sugaipov).

A member of the Chechen Democratic Party, one of its co-founders and spokespersons, Surho lives with his wife and three children in Cologne.

We can say that you belong to a generation that we could define as the “Ichkeria Generation”, that is, those kids who were born close to independence, and who became adults during the period of independent Chechnya. What memories do you have about the first Russian invasion of Chechnya?

I was 9 years old, and of course, I remember how my life suddenly transformed from a childhood playground into a serious, loss-filled adult life, where the main goal became to survive in the conditions of a full-scale war.

Children play in the streets of Grozny destroyed by bombing

How did you perceive your “being Chechen”?   Speaking with many older witnesses, they told me how they had to deal with a certain “induced” sense of guilt following the deportation and the legend of the “betrayal”.  You were born in a different context: did you also experience this sense of humiliation?

It started when we moved to a neighboring republic where we were registered as refugees. We, the children from the Chechen Republic, were assigned to one school. Our mother tried several times to enroll my sister and me in the city lyceum, but each time, after another inspection, we were expelled based on our nationality—I remember these moments well. By the time of the open invasion of the territory of the Chechen Republic, which had legally declared its independence based on international law, a powerful propaganda campaign had been launched throughout the Russian Federation, portraying Chechens as bandits, terrorists, and a threat to the civilized world. Chechens were blamed for all the negative consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union as an empire. Brazen false propaganda was carried out continuously 24/7.

Organized, armed groups were sent to the republic to discredit the entire population and portray us in an extremely negative light to the world. Talking to older people who became victims of the genocide of Chechens during the deportation of Chechens to Kazakhstan in 1944, under the false accusation of betrayal and collaboration of the entire population with enemy forces, the situation was similar—people were accused of collaborating with the enemy army before a single Wehrmacht soldier had set foot on the territory of the republic. The elders spoke of how they had to fight against the imposed sense of guilt for the “betrayal” of the people.

The Russians have always used the story of betrayal. They said, “The Chechens have always betrayed us.” What nonsense – an empire that is surprised why its victims do not surrender and remain beaten, but dare to resist

How did you experience the period of the first war? How did your family deal with the situation?

I mainly remember the first war through the emotions of a child, who, holding his mother’s hand, was fleeing from the war. After the first war ended, we returned to Grozny and rebuilt our house, at least to a livable condition, and started anew, from scratch, among mountains of ruins and destruction. But two years later, the second war began. Many in Chechnya understood that the war was not over even before the start of the second one, as military groups operated on the principle of “the worse, the better,” preparing the ground for the return of Russian troops by turning public opinion against Maskhadov’s government, carrying out public corporal punishments, and even executions, which worked against independence. The FSB’s plan to destabilize the situation in the republic worked precisely, giving the Russian army time to escalate its forces anew. As expected, Russia attacked with a much stronger army, seeking revenge for the humiliation they experienced from their defeat in the first war. People in the republic understood that while we were trying to heal our wounds and rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, Russia was quickly assembling a new army and preparing for a new attack.

Chechens, left to their fate, fragmented by internal conflicts artificially created by Russian special services, could not keep up with such a huge empire, with its ability to play political games, its capability to escalate the military race, and adequately prepare for the inevitable war, which was obvious to many at that time. While Russia received billions in its treasury from the sale of oil and gas to the West, Chechnya was in a state of absolute economic collapse, unable to get back on its feet without external assistance, which never came. The reasons for sacrificing us, leaving us to a senseless and brutal fate at the hands of the aggressor, in the form of the Russian Federation, will likely become the subject of many historical studies. Declaring the destruction of an ethnic group as an internal matter of Russia, the international community fed a monster that had already gone wild, threatening everyone with nuclear retribution if they interfered with its new plans. As a result, we had an absolutely impoverished, fragmented, weakened region subjected to religious pressure after the first war, left to be devoured by the predator.

Grozny Hospital, 1999

When the war ended and the Russians retreated, how did you feel? Who was your heroes?

First of all, Dzhokhar Dudayev and all the resistance fighters were our heroes.

In your head as a young Chechen, how did you visualize Aslan Maskhadov?   Was there any leader you didn’t like?

Maskhadov was also a hero. But his politics had many weak points that people did not like. Mainly, it concerned his friendliness towards the Russians. He perceived this war as a misunderstanding that arose under certain circumstances. Being an officer of the Soviet army, he did not fully realize that the imperial policy of Russia had not changed since the Caucasian War. Russia was using us at that moment; first, as a sacrificial victim to scare the international community with its military power. Second, to distract the population inside the country from the total plundering of the USSR’s wealth, seized during the collapse of the Union. Russia unilaterally separated itself from all the union republics to avoid sharing common property with them and, declaring itself the sole successor of the Union’s legacy, appropriated the common wealth. Aslan Maskhadov, instead of reaching out to the international level, establishing relations with the West and America, and securing their support, believed Russia’s promises that the war was over, that reparations would be paid, and that good neighborly relations would be established between two free states.

Another fatal mistake he made was his inability to resist radicalism, artificially introduced into the republic from the East, controlled by the Kremlin, and imposed on the Chechens through the activities of intelligence agents already operating widely in the Chechen Republic at that time.

Aslan Maskhadov

What happened after the second Russian invasion? How did you decide to reach Germany?

My father worked in the Ministry of Justice of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. After the start of the Second Chechen War, he brought us back to Nalchik, where we lived during the first war. A year later, he came for us and said that this war was more brutal, and after it, everyone who worked for their republic would be sent through filtration camps, and those who were shot immediately would be the lucky ones, envied by those who would be tortured to death in the camps. The survivors would be imprisoned, and only a few crippled people would return, while the majority would never come back. Just as he said, it happened. The situation was worse than ever. Therefore, we decided to move to Europe.

How did you personally experience arriving in Germany? Was it difficult for you to integrate with the Germans? Were there other Chechen families who helped you?

To imagine what we felt when we were settled in the dormitory, you need to at least partially understand all the persecutions we went through, the fears we experienced, and the expectations of worse scenarios that had accompanied us for years. We didn’t speak German, we couldn’t work yet, but the children were immediately sent to school. Of course, we ended up in Hauptschule at first. After a couple of years, my school teacher Fred Tribbels wrote a letter to the NRW district with a request to transfer me to HHG (Gymnasium). And that’s not all, he realized that I was struggling with physics, so he arranged for the physics teacher to tutor me additionally in this subject. We were among the first Chechens to move to Europe; there were few Chechens living in Germany, and no one who could quickly explain to us how to integrate. In any case, it wasn’t that difficult, because for any question that arose, we could contact certain institutions and always received the help and support we needed. We felt protected, it was a lifesaving support for us. Adapting to the local mentality was not difficult, it coincided with ours. The hardest part was before our arrival in Germany.

Surho Sugaipov

After you reached Germany, how were you integrated into the social system?  Were the Germans kind to you?  Were you able to attend school?

We have received a lot of support and understanding. Being a young boy, a teenager I obviously maintained good and less good relationships with my peers, but German society showed itself to be open, tolerant, available to help us. I can only say good things about how I was accepted. I just had the normal problems as a teenager, like everyone else at this age.

When did you decide to start doing political activity?  And what kind of political vision have you developed regarding Chechnya?

I think I was never apolitical because of my early acquaintance with war and the occupation of my land. In the war in Ukraine, I saw a historic moment to resume the discussion of the situation in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, to raise the topic of independence, which is once again banned from discussion in Russia.

Impunity and the killing of one-third of the republic’s population allowed the leadership of the Russian Federation to continue its imperialist expansionist policy by attacking a sovereign state recognized by the entire world – Ukraine. The international community must go back 30 years to 1994 and hold the Russian Federation criminally responsible for the genocide of the Chechen people and for all the crimes committed by Russia on the territory of the Chechen Republic to destroy the Chechen ethnicity. It must help the Chechen people de-occupy their homeland and restore statehood based on the principles of democracy and secularism, where religion should be separated from the state, where any citizen has the right to practice any religion or not practice any at all, where citizens’ rights are protected by the state, and where the people are the rightful owners of their ancestral territory.

We must return to the democratic secular state that the Chechens proclaimed to the whole world, taking advantage of the moment when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued Law No. 1409-I of April 3, 1990, “On the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Withdrawal of a Union Republic from the USSR.” In Article 3, it is stated that autonomous republics within a union republic have the right to independently decide whether to remain in the USSR or stay with the seceding union republic. The Chechen Republic, by referendum, remained in the USSR and thus became another union republic within the USSR. Consequently, when the Russian Federation declared its withdrawal from the USSR, the Chechen Republic remained within the USSR and automatically gained independence following the dissolution of the USSR on December 26, 1991.

The Chechen Republic declared its independence in July 1991, and on November 1, 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev signed his first decree on the state sovereignty of the independent democratic state. Thus, taking advantage of the political moment during the dissolution of the Soviet Union and based on international law, the Chechen Republic seceded from the Russian Federation, declaring its independence. The Russian Federation declared its independence from the union treaty significantly later than us. The Constitution of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was adopted one year earlier than the Constitution of the Russian Federation. This means that the Russian Federation attacked an independent state whose people declared their independence to the whole world, exercising their right to self-determination. None of the democratic states dared to recognize our independence, fearing the wrath of the Russian Federation. For this reason, I have become more active in recent years, but I have never been silent.

My political vision is clear. There can be nothing but a democratic, secular state, as recorded in our 1992 Constitution. This state must be de-occupied with the help of the international community.

Banner of the Chechen Democratic Party

You have found a political point of reference in the Chechen Democratic Party.  The first question regarding this: is there a line of political continuity between the Chechen Democratic Party and the Vaynakh Democratic Party, founded by Yandarbiev and the main proponent of Chechen independence in 1991?

We have nothing in common with the Vainakh Democratic Party, which has deviated towards radical ideologies, either by conviction or out of convenience, probably to seize power in Chechnya. Yandarbiyev changed his position to a radical idea; I don’t know if he really believed in it, but he completely transformed from a democrat to a radical. We do not agree with his point of view and have nothing in common with his party.

So, the Chechen Democratic Party supports an independent, democratic, secularized Chechnya, founded on the rule of law.  What political program does the party intend to follow to achieve this objective? Starting from the current situation, what steps do you think the Party should take?

We want to de-occupy our territory, demand full restitution for the moral and material damage inflicted on our people, the extradition of all war criminals and their prosecution in an international court. We also demand the removal of all radon nuclear waste sites established by the Russian Federation on the territory of our republic and the restoration of the ecological damage caused to the republic.

Our goal is also to strengthen democratic institutions in our society, primarily the protection of the rights and freedoms of the republic’s citizens, the separation of religion from the state, and the establishment of healthy international relations, both political and economic, and trade relations. We aim to join the EU as full members. Our goal also includes reconciling and uniting all segments of our fragmented society based on the Declaration of Freedom and Independence of the Chechen Republic and the Constitution of the Chechen Republic of 1992.

I am one of those Westerners who strongly supports the independence of Chechnya): why, in your opinion, should the so-called “West” be interested in supporting the independence of Chechnya? What benefit would get from this situation?

The civilized world, logically, should be interested in the multiplication and prosperity of as many democratic states as possible on the planet. We believe that Russia will soon cease to exist in its current form because it does not fit into the civilized international community of states. Wars, attacks on neighboring countries, and the seizure of foreign territories as a healthy coexistence of state entities have completely exhausted themselves. Humanity created nuclear weapons to become a deterrent from wars that take millions of human lives. The civilized world must be able to manage the world to prevent its collapse. Russia uses enslaved peoples as cannon fodder or radical terrorist organizations and groups that pose a danger to peaceful coexistence. Therefore, it is unacceptable to allow a platform or a training ground to be created on the territory of the Chechen Republic where people capable of harming peaceful creation will be trained. Our time is a time of international trade, global international environmental protection programs, and the peaceful coexistence of people as a single whole. It is time to engage in the rapprochement of religious confessions instead of inciting national or religious enmity. Our program is aimed at progress, and we, who have never known slavery or social inequality, raised on the ideals of freedom and nobility, are created precisely for peaceful purposes. This is our natural state, and we want to return to our normal human essence. We are essentially creators, farmers who accept peaceful labor as the most noble behavior of a person.

An image of barbarians, mentally deficient warriors, and desperate villains has been created of us. We will have to prove for a long time that this was never the case and cannot continue to be. If the West helps the Chechens build their own democratic, reliable state and acts as its guarantor, it will gain a reliable, experienced military and economic partner in the Caucasus, at the crossroads of Europe and Asia.

If this does not happen and the West allows the situation to unfold without intervention, there is a risk that radical elements within our population, financed by the Kremlin, will seize power. These elements can inevitably create something similar to ISIS 2.0 or a scenario reminiscent of modern Afghanistan. All this, of course, will play into the hands of the Kremlin, which has been promoting the narrative of wild, radical Chechens for decades, thereby constantly getting a green light for aggression from the West.

The most tragic thing is that we will disappear from the face of the earth as an ethnic group. For 30 years, the Russian Federation has been conducting the primitivization of our people through the occupation authorities on the territory of the republic, and this is yielding its sad fruits. According to statistics (from open sources), there are 500 schools and 1,500 mosques operating in the republic.

Symbol of the Chechen Democratic Party

Do you believe that in this sense, the activity of the Chechen battalions fighting on the front line in Ukraine, in support of the Kiev army, could be useful in convincing Europe to support the independence of Chechnya?

No, I don’t think so. I respect these people’s decision and understand their desire to fight for Ukraine and its freedom. They follow the call of vengeance that they have carried within themselves for decades. I understand their desire to take revenge for the hell that the Russians created on our land. Nevertheless, I don’t see a great future in this approach. The predominance of radical rhetoric in their behavior gives their struggle more of a “sacred” religious significance. We never fought for religion; we fought for our land and freedom. Every time the Chechens raised their banner for freedom, volunteers from the East appeared, bringing their flags and coloring our struggle for freedom with their own colors, subordinating our interests to their own. This has happened every single time. We kept making the same mistake over and over.

I don’t think civilized society needs small, fragmented Chechen battalions. Ukraine already has its own professional army. Chechen volunteers need to join the regular Ukrainian army. A state that creates private military companies (PMCs) on its territory is doomed because the privilege of legal violence belongs to the state. The West needs reasonable, reliable, and educated people with whom they can engage in dialogue and make agreements based on international law.

So, what do you think Chechens living in Europe can do to support the cause of creating an independent Chechen state? And how can they reach the Chechens in their homeland?

Engage with European governments, political and public organizations, form alliances with other diasporas, communities, and international organizations that support self-determination and human rights. We must create our own political and non-profit public associations. Chechens living in Europe should also raise their awareness about our political situation and share it from all public platforms, helping more and more compatriots become politically educated. Organize and participate in conferences, seminars, and public demonstrations to provide more information about the situation in Chechen society.

Hold cultural events, exhibitions, and festivals to preserve and promote Chechen culture and identity in the diaspora. People in Chechnya are currently hostages; they cannot do anything. They live in constant fear under state terror. People outside Chechnya must do something to help them. We must revive our society, politicize it once again, and show the path we need to take to achieve our goals. First of all, we must revive our spirituality; it has always been of great importance to us. Chechens have traditionally avoided marrying not only within close family circles but even distant ones, observing the norms prohibiting marriage between relatives up to the seventh generation, meaning that if the seventh grandfather is common, it was not possible. In Chechen society, children were considered children until the age of 15. At 15, boys were allowed to wear a belt, signifying the right to carry a weapon, and girls could emphasize their waist. A man would not enter a house if the master of the house was not at home. Ensuring the safety of a woman and accompanying her to her destination was the duty of any man. These things are important and respected to this day.

What are the main problems you are facing in the political education of Chechen society? And what have been the main successes you have achieved to date?

Our main problem is the low level of education and the high level of radicalization among a significant part of our population. There are many reasons for this, including the deliberate actions of the Kremlin, which has repeatedly used this tool, as well as the numerous severe traumas that people have experienced, often leading them to turn to religion.

I consider our great success to be the removal of the taboo on discussing political Islam. Now society is free to discuss and share opinions on topics that just a few years ago seemed almost closed and forbidden. Overall, we have made significant progress in combating political illiteracy in a short period of time. Many people support us and our views, and this number is growing every day. Many remain silent and quietly listen because they fear for themselves and their relatives. However, we receive a lot of feedback in support, which clearly indicates that people are listening and supporting us.

Surho Sugaipov

In your opinion, is the phenomenon of radicalization also involving Chechens living in the European diaspora?  Or is it a phenomenon that occurs only in Chechnya?  And what role does Kadyrov have in promoting this radical culture?

As I mentioned earlier, I believe there are two reasons for the radicalization of some Chechens. More precisely, the main reason is the Kremlin and its deliberate efforts to radicalize the youth for subsequent control and use for its purposes. The fact that they have been “successful” is a consequence of the trauma of two brutal wars, the post-war policy of severe terror, humiliation, and open attacks on honor and public humiliation, combined with the inherent naivety and trustfulness of the Chechens.

Kadyrov, in turn, started by fighting against radicals and explained his switch to the Russian side precisely for this reason. Today, Kadyrov himself has become a force that is radicalizing our society by leaps and bounds. I don’t know if this radicalization is ideological or a direct order from the Kremlin. However, I would rather assume the latter.

Just think about it: in such a small Chechen Republic, 1,400 mosques have been built. They are not building schools, kindergartens, hospitals, factories, or plants where people could work and earn a living, developing the economy. Sermons are held every day, and people are indoctrinated with the idea that they should be obedient, accept their fate, and strive for paradise, forgetting about their earthly life. This is the same old trick that has been used for thousands of years, and people still fall for it. All these newly built mosques are transmitters of propaganda. If it weren’t beneficial to them, the Kremlin wouldn’t allow a single mosque to be built.

what would you say to the European public to encourage their support for the independence of Chechnya?

If we understand that there are only two camps of countries in the world—democratic countries based on citizens’ rights to freedom and self-determination on one side, and tyrannies that usurp power and maintain it through force, violence, and total id

eological brainwashing of their population on the other side—then it will not be difficult for us to understand why it is absolutely logical for the West to help the democratic forces of Chechnya build a state that will become a reliable, strong, and dedicated ally to the entire civilized world, rather than allowing the opposite to happen. Furthermore, passively allowing the extermination and erasure of a civilized, advanced, and spiritually rich people from the face of the earth is, at the very least, inhumane. We live in a world where even cruel treatment of animals is unacceptable.

BIOGRAPHIES – Umalt Yakhubovich Dashaev  

The work on this biography is carried out in collaboration with the Instagram page “Qoman Sij”, based on information received from the former deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ilyas Musaev, verified with the sources at our disposal.

Born in Prigorodnoye (?/?/1956)

Died in Khankala (12/28/1994)

Native of the Varanda teip, he participated in the actions of the International Brigades during the Georgian – Abkhaz war, distinguishing himself for valor on numerous occasions, in particular during the Battle of Gagra (September 1992) and Sukhumi (September 1993). Wounded several times, after the war he returned to Chechnya, where he placed himself at the disposal of the nascent National Guard, operating in the Separate Battalion for Special Purposes “Borz”.

In November 1994 he participated in the operations to defend Grozny from the attack launched by Bislan Gantemirov’s forces. At the outbreak of the First Chechen War he mobilized his unit to defend Grozny, being wounded several times, until he lost an eye.

Umalt Dashaev with Khamzat Khankarov in Abkhazia

At the end of December 1994 he was sent by the Chief of Staff, Maskhadov, to defend the Khanakala airport from the federal troops who were about to occupy it. He led the Chechen contingent in the Battle of Khankala, during which, after being wounded several times, he died. According to the chronicles, he fought to his last breath against the attacking forces, earning the state award of Qoman Turpal (“Warrior of the Nation”).Riguardo la sua morte:

Eyewitnesses say that the seriously wounded Umalt Dashaev continued to lead his soldiers, urging them to conduct grenade launcher fire at Russian tanks. Umalt Dashaev was a born warrior, who did not know what fear is and was selflessly devoted to the ideas of freedom and independence of the Chechen people. From the first days of the beginning of the national liberation movement of the Chechen people, he took part in the hottest spots of the confrontation between Chechen soldiers and Russian mercenaries, destroying the enemies of the Chechen state. (Qoman Sij)

Umalt Dashaev with Shamil Basayev in Abkhazia, 1992

Freedom for Chechnya – European Recognition for the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

The failure to recognize an independent Chechnya was the West’s first concession to Russian imperialism.

Today Chechnya is occupied, and the dictator who governs it represents the denial of the values on which the European Union is founded

Correcting this error of perspective means rewinding the tape of history, to restore credibility to the Western world

SIGN THE PETITION HEREhttps://www.change.org/p/freedom-for-chechnya-european-recognition-for-the-chechen-republic-of-ichkeria

BIOGRAPHIES –Abdulkhadzhiev, Aslanbek

The work on this biography is carried out in collaboration with the Instagram page “Qoman Sij”, based on information received from the former deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ilyas Musaev, verified with the sources at our disposal.

Born in Germenchuk in 04/12/1962, Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev joined the National Guard in 1991, during the Chechen Revolution. Volunteer in Abhazhia between 1992 and 1993, he served in the International Brigades of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus, becoming Shamil Basayev’s trusted man. Appointed by the President Dudayev as Military Commander of the Shali District at the outbreak of the First Russian – Chechen war, he commanded a large detachment.

Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev, nicknamed “Big Aslanbek”

Nicknamed “Big Aslanbek” (in recognition of his comrade in arms Islanbek Ismailov, nicknamed “Little Aslanbek”) Abdulkhadzhiev was one of the main organizers of the historic raid by Chechen fighters on the Russian city of Budennovsk in June 1995, which forced the Russian authorities to agree to a temporary cessation of the war and the beginning of peace negotiations. For this military operation, among the first, he was awarded the highest state order of the CHRI Qoman Sij (Honor of the Nation), by the first President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev.

One of the main commanders in the Battle of Pervomaiskoye (January 1996) in the Operation Retribution (March 1996) and in the Operation Jihad (August 1996), after the reconquest of Grozny he was appointed military commander of he Capital as Military Commissioner. For his war merits he was appointed Brigader General and decorated with the Honor of the Nation.

Elected Deputy in the parliamentary elections of January 1997, he attempted to gain the presidency of the assembly, but was overtaken by the pro-government candidate Ruslan Alikhadzhiev. Supporter of the nazional – radical party, he promoted the “Law of lustration” with which it was intended to remove from public officies all those who had collaborated with the pro – Russian government during the war. The delays in the approval of this law were the cause of his resignation in 1998.

Preident of the state company Chechenkontrakt since June 1997, at the outbreak of the Second Russian – Chechen War he formed an unit of around 80 men, with whom he fought in the Siege of Dzhokhar (1999 – 2000). After the fall of the city in Russian’s hands, he retreated in the Argun Gorge, leading the partisan fight.

On August 26, 2002, following a denunciation by a Russian informer, the house in the city of Shali, where Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev was hiding, was surrounded by Russian occupiers and local collaborators.

Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev attends a press conference together with Shamil Basayev (center) and Aslanbek Ismailov (“Little Aslanbek”, right). June 1995

According to the reports of his death:

The senior FSB officer leading the Russian occupiers through a loudspeaker told the Chechen commander to surrender, to which there was an immediate response from a Stechkin submachine gun. In response, Russian punitive forces began firing grenade launchers and machine guns. Having used up all his ammunition, the Chechen commander began throwing grenades and lemons at the invaders. In turn, the aggressors opened fire from heavy machine guns located on armored personnel carriers. This actually predetermined the outcome of the unequal battle. Aslanbek was seriously wounded. The enemies, having learned about this, tried to take him alive.

However, the Russian punitive forces were not destined to mock the wounded Chechen commander. Aslanbek, who was losing consciousness, at the last moment managed to pull out the pin of the grenade, which exploded in his hands. The blast wave generated by the grenade explosion carried away several occupiers who were close to the Chechen commander. According to Shali residents, at least four occupiers were killed and seven wounded during the night battle in the city of Shali. This is how the life of 41-year-old Chechen general Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev heroically ended.

 

21/04/1996, La Morte di Dudaev – Estratto da “Libertà o Morte! Storia della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria”

il 21 Aprile 1996 Dhokhar Dudaev, primo Presidente della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria, fu assassinato dall’FSB. Nell’anniversario nel ventottesimo anniversario della sua morte, pubblichiamo un brano tratto dal secondo volume di “Libertà o Morte! Storia della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria” (Link)

Nell’aprile del 1996 i ceceni potevano dirsi vicini a raggiungere la vittoria: l’esercito federale era in piena crisi, ed Eltsin aveva un disperato bisogno di pace per vincere le elezioni presidenziali[1]. Le cancellerie europee, rimaste sul chi va là di fronte al “Piano di pace” presentato dal presidente russo, dopo aver inutilmente atteso l’avvio di negoziati tra le parti, erano tornate a tormentarlo con richieste pressanti di interrompere le azioni militari, lamentando la violazione della Convenzione di Ginevra e minacciando un ulteriore slittamento dell’accordo di partenariato tra Mosca e Bruxelles, che ormai languiva dalla primavera del 1994. La Commissione politica dell’Assemblea Parlamentare del Consiglio d’Europa aveva approvato un documento nel quale si diffidava la Russia a procedere alla immediata attuazione del piano di pace, o di qualsiasi altro piano specificando che qualsiasi soluzione negoziale avrebbe potuto avere successo soltanto se tutte le parti in conflitto, compreso Dudaev, vi partecipano. Il documento conteneva una condanna senza riserve delle violazioni dei diritti umani in Cecenia, commessi sia dalle truppe federali che dai combattenti ceceni. Riguardo al comportamento dei primi, la risoluzione riteneva inadeguato ed ingiustificato il massiccio ricorso alla forza da parte delle truppe di Mosca, e riconosceva che tali mezzi erano la prova tangibile del mancato rispetto da parte della Federazione Russa degli obblighi assunti col Consiglio d’Europa. Infine, proponeva la mediazione dell’OSCE in un negoziato che portasse alla ricomposizione del conflitto.  Il tempo giocava a favore di Dudaev, e presto o tardi i russi avrebbero dovuto scendere a patti con lui. Sempre che, ovviamente, non riuscissero ad ucciderlo prima.

Dzhokhar Dudaev

Fin dall’inizio delle ostilità l’FSK aveva investito ingenti risorse nel rintracciare il presidente ceceno. La prima azione per trovare ed arrestare Dudaev era stata messa in atto dal Procuratore Generale russo il 1° febbraio 1995 quando, all’indomani del fallito assalto a Grozny, la magistratura di Mosca aveva emesso un mandato d’arresto  a suo carico. Il suo caso includeva quattro capi d’accusa: tentativo di usurpare intenzionalmente il potere, sabotaggio delle attività del governo costituzionalmente eletto, incitamento pubblico ad azioni terroristiche e istigazione all’antagonismo nazionale sociale e religioso. L’FSK aveva promesso di prendere Dudaev nel giro di qualche giorno, ma non era riuscito neanche a capire dove potesse nascondersi. Alla fine di aprile era stata costituita una task force che individuasse Dudaev e lo prendesse, vivo o morto. Nel corso del 1995 i russi avevano tentato di eliminarlo quattro volte, ma il Generale non era mai caduto in trappola. L’aeronautica russa bombardava sistematicamente tutti i villaggi dove girava voce che si trovasse, senza mai riuscire a colpirlo. Il 21 aprile 1996, tuttavia, Dudaev commise un errore fatale. Il suo convoglio si trovava nei pressi del villaggio di Gekhi – Chu, diretto ad una vicina collina ben coperta dai boschi dove il Generale avrebbe dovuto intrattenere conversazioni telefoniche via satellite. Insieme a lui viaggiavano il suo assistente, Vakha Ibragimov, il Procuratore Militare Magomed Zhaniev ed il Rappresentante di Dudaev a Mosca, Chamid Kurbanov. Nel convoglio erano presenti anche sua moglie, Alla, ed un nutrito seguito di guardie. Mentre Dudaev stava parlando al telefono un aereo militare apparve dal cielo e lanciò un missile aria-terra che colpì con grande precisione l’auto sulla quale viaggiava. Da tre mesi i servizi segreti russi tentavano di triangolare la sua linea telefonica, utilizzando come riferimento un telefono dello stesso tipo che Salman Raduev aveva abbandonato a Pervomaiskoje. In altre quattro occasioni erano quasi riusciti ad individuare Dudaev, ma la repentina chiusura delle comunicazioni aveva impedito ai missili di intercettare in tempo il segnale, mancando il bersaglio. Il missile che fece centro quel fatidico 21 aprile era progettato per dirigersi verso una fonte radio, e non appena ne fu rilevata una (in quegli anni non erano molti i telefoni dotati di una simile tecnologia in Cecenia) puntò la sorgente. Per evitare questo genere di rischi Dudaev aveva stabilito che il suo assistente avrebbe dovuto cronometrare le conversazioni e, qualora queste superassero una certa durata avrebbe dovuto immediatamente chiuderle, anche contro il suo volere. Anche in questa occasione pare che Ibragimov avesse fatto scrupolosamente il suo dovere, interrompendo la conversazione dopo pochi minuti. Ma quel giorno erano previste due telefonate a distanza ravvicinata, il che permise ai servizi russi di non perdere il segnale. Inoltre il cavo dell’antenna si era rotto, costringendo Ibragimov a sistemarla direttamente sul tettino dell’auto. Per favorire l’individuazione del segnale, nelle settimane precedenti, le autorità federali avevano causato volontariamente una serie di blackout nella rete elettrica locale, spegnendo tutte le sorgenti radio e tracciando così la posizione del telefono. Il primo ad usare l’apparecchio fu Kurbanov, per leggere un comunicato. Subito dopo fu il turno di Dudaev, per una conversazione con il deputato russo Kostantin Borovoj. I due parlarono per tre o quattro minuti, poi la conversazione fu bruscamente interrotta dall’impatto del missile.

Commemorazione della morte di Dudaev sul luogo del suo omicidio, 1997

Dopo l’esplosione Alla Dudaeva, sbalzata in avanti dallo spostamento d’aria, corse al relitto fumante dell’auto, coperto di terra. Kurbanov e Zhaniev erano rimasti uccisi sul colpo mentre Ibragimov, che al momento dell’esplosione era in ginocchio davanti all’automobile, era stato sbalzato dall’esplosione ed era gravemente ferito. Dudaev giaceva poco lontano dalla macchina, coperto di terra e ferito superficialmente dalle schegge. Quando Alla prese la sua testa tra le mani, scoprì che dietro la nuca aveva una profonda ferita, che lo aveva ucciso sul colpo. Trasportato nel vicino villaggio, il suo corpo venne lavato e vestito di bianco. Alla avrebbe voluto seppellirlo in un cimitero, ma il mattino seguente l’aviazione federale bombardò tutti i cimiteri nei pressi del luogo dell’attacco, devastandoli. Così, per mantenere l’integrità del suo corpo, venne deciso di seppellirlo in un luogo nascosto, dove nessuno potesse trovarlo[2].  Una cerimonia pubblica fu comunque tenuta nel villaggio di Salazhi, alla presenza della maggior parte dei capi militari dell’esercito. Le esequie politiche del presidente furono tenute da Yandarbiev, il quale assunse ad interim i poteri di capo dello stato in qualità di Vicepresidente[3]. Parlando ai giornalisti, il braccio destro di Dudaev dichiarò: La morte del primo presidente ceceno non ha piegato il popolo, che è pronto a proseguire la sua battaglia per la libertà[4].

Morendo, Dzhokhar Dudaev lasciava un’eredità politica controversa. I suoi nemici lo avevano descritto come un dittatore attaccato al potere e responsabile delle peggiori atrocità. Dudaev fu più volte accusato di contrabbandare armi e petrolio, di alimentare attività finanziarie illegali. In molti paesi dell’Europa Orientale, come l’Estonia, fu invece considerato un eroe, al punto che gli furono dedicate strade, piazze e targhe. Nei paesi che avevano fatto parte dell’Unione Sovietica, e che avevano subito particolarmente la pervasiva presenza russa, il suo sacrificio fu pianto da molti: soprattutto in Ucraina, la notizia della sua morte fu accompagnata da manifestazioni di lutto pubblico. Perfino in Russia ci fu chi lo pianse: il 24 Aprile, tre giorni dopo la sua morte, fu fatto circolare un necrologio firmato dal Consiglio di Coordinamento del partito dell’Unione Democratica, nel quale si leggeva: Esprimiamo le nostre più sentite condoglianze al governo della Repubblica cecena di Ichkeria e al popolo ceceno in occasione della tragica morte del presidente di Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Musaevich Dudayev. Il suo nome rimarrà per sempre nella storia tra i nomi dei grandi combattenti per la liberazione nazionale dei popoli. Ricordiamo il suo dignitoso rifiuto di prendere parte alle repressioni contro il popolo estone nel 1991. Non abbiamo dubbi che la giusta lotta di liberazione nazionale del popolo ceceno non si estinguerà finché almeno un invasore calpesterà la terra di Ichkeria. Gloria all’eroe della resistenza cecena!

Per parte sua, Eltsin, che in quei giorni si trovava a Khabarovsk ed era in partenza per una visita a Pechino, commentò: Con o senza Dudaev, faremo comunque finire tutto in Cecenia con la Pace. Gli abbiamo proposto più volte di metterci al tavolo negoziale, ma lui ha voluto la guerra. Ebbene, la guerra non ci sarà più. Se l’uomo è morto, pazienza. […][5].

 Chi fu, dunque, l’uomo che tenne in pugno il destino del popolo ceceno, che lo guidò all’indipendenza e poi lo trascinò nella catastrofe? Valery Tyshkov nel suo “Chechnya: Life in a War – Torn society” scrive: “Per comprendere l’emergere dei leader nel periodo post – sovietico è necessario affrontare le seguenti domande: come è nata una nuova generazione di “leader nazionali” dalla liberalizzazione? In che modo la popolazione post – sovietica li percepiva, e perché le masse seguivano tali leader? Su questa domanda ci concentreremo più da vicino, poiché l’impatto del ruolo di leader di Dudaev nel determinare gli eventi in Cecenia non può essere sopravvalutato. Un’idea comunemente sentita nel discorso accademico e pubblico della Russia è che quando le civiltà sono in conflitto, nel corso naturale delle cose, i gruppi etnici o i popoli, di cui sono composte, assumono leader che esprimono la loro volontà collettiva di realizzare un obiettivo storicamente predestinato. In altre parole, se Dudaev non fosse salito al potere, lo avrebbe fatto qualcun altro e tutto sarebbe andato in modo simile. Come ha osservato l’ex compagno di servizio di Dudaev, A.N. Osipenko, “Non fu lui a scegliere l’idea nazionale, fu quell’idea a scegliere lui”. […] Raramente è ammesso che un leader crei, o almeno influenzi in modo significativo il cosiddetto “movimento rivoluzionario” da solo. In realtà, il quadro è molto più complicato.” Dudaev si contese la leadership della Cecenia con personaggi che per molti versi erano più avvezzi di lui alla lotta per il potere. Politici come Zavgaev e Khasbulatov, personaggi pubblici come Hadjiev, sapevano come gestire il consenso, come divincolarsi tra le pieghe della volubile opinione pubblica, possedevano ottimi agganci ed avevano accesso a grandi capitali. Eppure fu lui, e non gli altri, a dirigere il gioco fin dalla sua discesa nell’arena. Se non avesse accettato l’invito a prendere le redini del fronte nazionalista, quest’ultimo non sarebbe stato in grado di percorrere lo stesso sentiero, e probabilmente la Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria non sarebbe mai esistita. Dudaev seppe fare politica e seppe costruire un solido consenso intorno alla sua figura, seppe polarizzare le passioni di un popolo in cerca di riscatto e libertà sovrapponendo a queste due parole il suo volto[6]. A differenza di tutti gli altri, Dudaev seppe far sognare le masse. Se Zavgaev cercò di comprarsele col clientelismo, e Khasbulatov cercò di conquistarle con l’assennatezza dei suoi discorsi, Dudaev seppe far loro immaginare un futuro. E poco importa se nel pratico si dimostrasse una persona poco adatta all’amministrazione dello stato: era un leader visionario che proiettava tutto intorno a sé un’aura di eroismo, una padronanza di sé, la consapevolezza di essere il condottiero del suo popolo[7]. E questo, alla fine, era quello che la maggior parte dei ceceni si aspettava da lui. Alla sua morte egli fu oggetto di una vera e propria venerazione collettiva, e la notizia della sua dipartita fu presa da molti come falsa, tanto che il plenipotenziario di negoziati del governo, Yarikhanov, dovette fare una dichiarazione pubblica per confermarne il decesso[8], e lo stesso dovettero fare Maskhadov e Basayev, apparendo pubblicamente sul “canale presidenziale”[9]. Ciononostante molti ceceni continuarono a rifiutarsi di credere che Dudaev fosse davvero morto, incoraggiati dalle parole del genero Salman Raduev (il quale giurò sul Corano che fosse ancora vivo) nonché di altri personaggi che facevano parte della sua cerchia ristretta[10], ma anche dallo stesso scetticismo di alcuni alti ufficiali russi[11]. Inizialmente, infatti, le autorità militari russe in Cecenia negarono di aver portato a termine un’azione volta ad uccidere il presidente ceceno, anche se i giornali riportarono svariate “fughe di notizie” dal quartier generale, secondo le quali l’eliminazione di Dudaev fosse uno degli obiettivi primari dell’intelligence del Cremlino[12].

Dare un giudizio di merito su Dzhokhar Dudaev non è facile, e forse non è neanche così utile. Chi lo vide come un capo fu ispirato dalla sua figura, e nel suo nome combatté e morì. Chi lo vide come un tiranno fece di tutto per abbatterlo. Sicuramente fu un leader capace di mobilitare il popolo ceceno come nessun altro aveva mai fatto dai tempi dell’Imam Shamil. Fu un uomo coraggioso, che abbandonò la prospettiva di una lunga e rispettata vecchiaia da illustre graduato dell’esercito per combattere la sua battaglia ideale. Fu anche un abile stratega sul campo di battaglia: sfidò la Russia con un esercito di volontari e riuscì ad umiliare il prestigio di uno degli eserciti più potenti del pianeta. Per contro fu un pessimo amministratore, ed un miope negoziatore politico. La sua riluttanza a scendere a qualsiasi compromesso, se pure rese la sua figura affascinante e romantica, condusse il paese alla distruzione. La sua scelta di gettare la sua patria nel carnaio della guerra totale provocò al suo popolo immani lutti e sofferenze, il suo supporto indiretto alle azioni terroristiche lo portò a sdoganare una tattica militare odiosa, che alienò ai ceceni la simpatia del mondo occidentale.

La morte di Dudaev lasciò un vuoto incolmabile. Per quanto questi avesse da tempo organizzato la successione del potere in caso di sua dipartita, non c’era nessuno in grado di ereditare il peso politico della sua persona. Soltanto grazie a lui le numerose e composite anime dell’indipendentismo ceceno erano rimaste unite sotto la bandiera della ChRI evitando, per il momento, l’esplodere di una guerra tra bande. Il numero 2 del regime, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, era pronto a farsi carico delle sue responsabilità, ma il suo compito non era facile. L’indipendentismo aveva sempre avuto un solo eroe, e adesso questo eroe era morto. La Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria non aveva più il suo punto di riferimento e rischiava di spaccarsi in una galassia di piccoli potentati in guerra per la successione al potere. A complicare le cose giunse l’annuncio, falso, da parte del governo Zavgaev che lo stesso Yandarbiev era stato ucciso. Ci vollero alcuni giorni prima che fosse chiaro che a cadere non era stato il Vice – Presidente, ma un suo nipote, e nel frattempo i media specularono su chi avrebbe dovuto raccogliere il suo testimone, ipotizzando addirittura una guerra civile tra le forze indipendentiste[13]. Quando l’equivoco fu ufficialmente chiarito, Yandarbiev si mise all’opera, prima di tutto per ottenere la lealtà dei principali comandanti sul campo. Maskhadov, Basayev, Gelayev, Alikhadziev, Atgeriev, tutti i principali leader della resistenza riconobbero il suo primato politico, in attesa che la fine della guerra portasse ad una ridefinizione dei rapporti di potere[14]. D’altra parte la nomina di un capo era fondamentale: la morte di Dudaev, per quanto tragica, rimuoveva il principale ostacolo all’apertura di un canale diplomatico con le autorità russe. Non che fossero in molti a credere ad una soluzione negoziale della guerra: i militari russi temevano che un’altra tregua avrebbe nuovamente avvantaggiato i ceceni, permettendo loro di ricompattarsi e di lanciare una nuova ondata di attacchi. I comandanti sul campo ceceni, dal canto loro, non si aspettavano niente, considerato com’era andata fino ad allora. Il capo del governo filorusso, Zavgaev, non aveva alcuna intenzione di parteciparvi, essendo intenzionato a capitalizzare il massimo risultato politico derivante dalla morte del suo avversario. In concomitanza con la morte del generale rispolverò addirittura il Congresso del Popolo Ceceno, indicendone un’assemblea straordinaria. L’evento vide la partecipazione di 400 delegati, reclutati tra i rappresentanti delle comunità favorevoli ad un accordo con la Russia. Davanti a loro, Zavgaev chiese ed ottenne il mandato per l’organizzazione di nuove elezioni parlamentari, tramite le quali consolidare la propria posizione e disfarsi, almeno in parte, dell’ingombrante supporto derivante dalla nomina d’imperio ottenuta da Mosca nell’autunno dell’anno precedente. In quell’occasione, una voce si levò contro il “Capo della Repubblica”: quella dell’ex sindaco di Grozny (ora Vice Primo Ministro) Bislan Gantamirov. Intervenuto all’assemblea, si dichiarò insoddisfatto del lavoro di Zavgaev, sostenne che la sua figura non avrebbe facilitato il processo di pace e si dissociò dalla sua politica collaborazionista. Come vedremo, questa posizione gli sarebbe costata cara.


[1] A metà Aprile il governo russo sembrava intenzionato a riprendere i colloqui con Dudaev. Secondo quanto riferito da Kommersant il 18 Aprile 1996, Eltsin aveva dato mandato al Ministro per le Nazionalità, Mikhailov ed al Consigliere Presidenziale Emil Pain di riattivare i contatti, negoziando il ritiro delle forze federali e la normalizzazione della Cecenia. All’iniziativa, ancora informale, aveva fatto eco la dichiarazione pubblica del Ministro della Giustizia russo, Valentin Kovaljov, il quale aveva ventilato il ritiro delle accuse formali a Dudaev a seconda dell’esito dei colloqui, segno evidente che la leadership del Cremlino era disponibile ad accomodarsi pur di presentare all’opinione pubblica un piano di pace credibile. Per parte sua Dudaev aveva chiesto l’intervento quali mediatori del Presidente della Turchia, o del Re di Giordania, dando a intendere di essere disposto a raggiungere un accordo di massima con Mosca.

[2] Pochissimi sanno ancora oggi dove si trovi la sua tomba. Certamente ne fu a conoscenza il Vicepresidente, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, che dopo la sua morte assunse la carica di Presidente ad interim. In un’intervista rilasciata a Peter Grokhmalski nel Luglio del 1996 disse: Il mondo intero vede il comportamento degli aggressori russi. Niente è sacro per loro. Non vogliamo che profanino i resti di Dudaev. Un ceceno che si fa beffe del corpo del suo nemico, che tortura un prigioniero, cade in disgrazia. Per i russi, questo è motivo di orgoglio. Pertanto, oltre a me, solo poche persone conoscono il luogo di sepoltura di Dudaev.

[3] In realtà, secondo quanto riporta Ilyas Akhmadov in The Chechen Struggle, al momento della morte di Dudaev non esisteva, o non era più reperibile, un decreto legittimo che attestasse la nomina di Yandarbiev alla carica di Vicepresidente. Secondo quanto raccontato dall’autore, quindi, venne redatto un provvedimento predatato per  legittimare il passaggio dei poteri.

[4] La Repubblica, edizione del 25/04/1996.

[5] La Repubblica, edizione del 25/04/1996.

[6] Un contadino di Vedeno di 18 anni, intervistato sul suo rapporto con la figura di Dudaev, raccontò: “Quando Dudaev salì al potere ero studente di una scuola islamica. Il nostro insegnante ci disse che Dudaev era stato mandato dal cielo, che il suo vero nome era Dzhovkhar (“Perle” in ceceno) e che il suo avvento era stato predetto dall’antica tradizione. In quel momento si svolgevano molti raduni e tutti urlavano “Allah Akhbar”. Poi abbiamo iniziato a scandire “Dzhovkhar! Dzhovkhar!”. Anche il nostro insegnante, che era il Mullah della nostra scuola, venne alle manifestazioni. Quando gli ho chiesto chi fossero i nostri nemici, ha risposto “gli infedeli”. Ha anche detto che in un sogno aveva visto Dudaev scendere dal cielo su delle ali. Disse: “Con un leader del genere siamo invincibili!”. Tutto ciò di cui la gente parlava sempre più spesso era la guerra. E anch’io volevo andare in guerra.” Una ragazza cecena, ricordando il giorno della sua nomina a Presidente, riferì: WRicordo il giorno dell’investitura di Dudaev. […] Ha prestato giuramento al teatro e poi è andato al palazzo del governo in mezzo alla gente, una folla enorme. E’ stato straordinario, ho sentito che stava succedendo qualcosa di importante. Non posso dire di essermi votata a Dudaev proprio in quel momento, ma da allora qualcosa è cambiato in me. Era così bello nella sua splendida divisa da generale! Ho detto agli amici: “Andiamo a vederlo, non ci perdoneremo mai di non averlo fatto se ce lo perdiamo!”

[7] Sempre citando Tyshkov: Dudaev era il tipico carismatico “non sistemico” il cui potere risiedeva nella concezione di progetti irrealizzabili […] nell’ignorare soluzioni ai problemi pratici. Come scrive M.A. Sivertsev “Il leader carismatico che cerca una risposta alle sfide di un tempo di transizione e instabile deve affrontarlo in un orizzonte visionario: deve ripristinare i legami di lunga durata con le basi idealizzate della vita. Questa capacità (il suo carisma) di ripristinare l’esperienza sacrale conferisce al leader la legittimazione delle sue azioni. Il suo malfunzionamento e le sue insignificanti carenze nella sfera formalizzata – razionale sono perdonati e persino considerati come un’ulteriore prova di forza carismatica […].” Rivolgendosi ai miti della lotta e della vittoria, all’animosità e alla vendetta, il leader carismatico modella le percezioni dei suoi seguaci e da quel successo la sua immagine eroica personale acquisisce la necessaria stabilità. Quindi, costruisce una sottocultura chiusa che sviluppa la propria lingua, il proprio codice e le proprie pratiche, con connessioni minime verso il mondo esterno.

[8] Secondo quanto riferito da Kommersant, il 23 Aprile Yarikhanov dichiarò alla ITAR – TASS: Dudaev è stato ucciso, non c’è dubbio. Insieme a Dudaev, sono state uccise diverse persone della sua cerchia ristretta, incluso il suo assistente Vakha Ibragimov, così come il Procuratore Militare Magomed Zhaniev. In realtà Ibragimov non era morto, ma giaceva in condizioni critiche in un letto d’ospedale. Si sarebbe ripreso nel giro di qualche mese, tornando a partecipare alla vita politica della Repubblica una volta finita la guerra, tra le file dei nazionalisti radicali.

[9] Il canale televisivo presidenziale era una trasmissione prodotta da una rete di emittenti artigianali gestite dai sostenitori dell’indipendenza. Trasmetteva principalmente dai centri a Sud di Grozny, ed era in grado di rendersi visibile nella capitale ed in buona parte del Sud del paese.

[10] Interrogato sull’argomento, il segretario personale di Dudaev, Sapuddin Khasanov, dichiarò che Dudaev stava lavorando normalmente e che le voci sul suo assassinio erano totalmente infondate.

[11] Secondo quanto riporta Kommersant del 25/04/1996 il Presidente del Comitato per la Sicurezza della Duma, Viktor Iluychin, affermò di essere disposto a credere alla morte di Dudaev soltanto dopo che il suo presunto cadavere fosse stato riesumato, mentre lo stesso comandante in capo delle forze federali in Cecenia, Tikhomirov, dichiarò che le truppe di Mosca non avevano assolutamente niente a che fare con la morte di Dudaev, contraddicendo la versione ufficiale, secondo la quale il presidente ceceno sarebbe caduto vittima di un attacco missilistico. D’altra parte altri alti ufficiali dell’esercito confermavano la presenza di cacciabombardieri a Sud di Urus – Martan, intenti ad attaccare bersagli in ricerca libera come rappresaglia per i recenti attacchi ceceni alle colonne russe.

[12] Secondo quanto riportato da La Repubblica del 25/04/1996: «l’azione punitiva» è stata finalmente rivendicata da un rappresentante altolocato del ministero dell’Interno.Ci siamo vendicati per l’agguato ad una colonna di automezzi russi che ha provocato la morte di decine di soldati e ufficiali” ha detto, e “abbiamo distrutto a colpi dì missili sette sedi segrete di Dudaev di cui sapevamo l’ubicazione”. Una di quelle sedi si trovava a Ghekhi-Chu dove è stato centrato il bersaglio principale. Fonti dei servizi segreti a Groznij sono state ancora più esplicite: “Si è trattato di un quinto tentativo, stavolta riuscito, nei giro degli ultimi 2-3 mesi”.

[13] Sul Kommersant del 30/04/1996 appare un lungo articolo che specula sull’ipotesi di uno “scisma” tra Maskhadov e Basayev. In quel frangente la versione del quotidiano russo fu prontamente smentita dai protagonisti, ma il confronto tra i due si sarebbe consumato davvero, pochi anni più tardi, portando la Repubblica ad un passo dall’autodistruzione. Molto probabilmente in quel momento, nel pieno del conflitto, più che di “scisma” si poteva parlare di “concorrenza”. Riportando le parole usate da Ilyas Akhmadov in una delle nostre conversazioni: Sfiducia” è una parola troppo forte per descrivere la loro relazione in quel momento. C’era sicuramente una certa concorrenza tra loro però. Non era pubblicamente riconosciuto, solo coloro che erano nei circoli privati di Basayev e Maskhadov erano a conoscenza. Alla fine, i due hanno lavorato insieme meravigliosamente. Ci sono stati anche alcuni disaccordi sugli incaricati di Maskhadov . Maskhadov è venuto nella regione natale di Shamil e stava nominando delle persone. Ma durante la guerra c’era una legge non scritta secondo cui un comandante, quando si trovava nella sua regione d’origine, era il principale responsabile. […].Ma come ho detto, a parte poche persone, la competizione tra Shamil e Maskhadov era quasi invisibile agli occhi del pubblico. […] A quel tempo, la tensione tra Shamil e Maskhadov non era grande. Era divertente, a volte quando Shamil voleva dire qualcosa a Maskhadov me lo diceva e viceversa. […] È possibile che nel tempo la competizione abbia portato a disaccordi molto più pubblici durante le elezioni. Ma durante la guerra, sebbene avessero alcuni disaccordi, erano più personali e non divennero un problema pubblico.

[14] Tale decisione fu assunta dal consesso dei comandanti militari in una riunione straordinaria del Comitato per la Difesa dello Stato (GKO) tenutasi a Roshni – Chu subito dopo la morte del presidente ceceno, durante la quale venne avanzata anche l’ipotesi di nominare Maskhadov al posto di Yandarbiev, considerato il contesto bellico nel quale la successione avrebbe dovuto svolgersi. Maskhadov tuttavia rifiutò, invitando i convenuti a rispettare quanto previsto dalla Costituzione.

Biographies –  Aidmar Timurovich Abalaev

The work on this biography is carried out in collaboration with the Instagram page “Qoman Sij”, based on information received from the former deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ilyas Musaev, verified with the sources at our disposal

Aidmar Timurovich Abalaev, a Chechen statesman and military leader, served as the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Sharia Security Council of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Born in Nozhai Yurt in 1964, he belonged to the Chechen teip (Clan) Saysano. A descendant of Alibek-Khadzhi Aldamov, the imam of the North Caucasus and the initiator of the 1877 uprising in Chechnya and Dagestan. During the First Chechen War, he fought in his native village Nozhai-Yurt region, commanding the Mountain Rifle Unit of the Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion, and also participated in the defense of Grozny.

On January 9, 1996, on the personal instructions of Dzhokhar Dudayev, units under the command of Salman Raduev, along with other well-known Commanders: Khunkar Israpilov, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev, he took an active part in the raid in the city of Kizlyar. In 1996, he also participated in the successful military Counter-Attack operation to recapture Grozny from the Russian Terrorists. After the battle, Abalaev was awarded the highest Order of the CHRI “Qoman Sij” (Honor of the Nation) and received the rank of Brigadier General. He was a presidential candidate in the 1997 elections in the CRI and received slightly less than 1% of the votes.

At the end of 1998, he was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of the Sharia Security of the ChRI in the government of Aslan Maskhadov. After a meeting of the Military Council of the Armed Forces of the ChRI, held on April 30, 2002, under the leadership of the President of the ChRI, Aslan Maskhadov, Aidamir Abalaev, along with other Chechen commanders, was sent to one of his military bases.

On May 1, 2002, Abalaev’s unit was ambushed by fighters from Yamadayev’s terror gang for special operations together with the Russian unit of the FSB Directorate. Aidamir Abalaev, field commanders Colonel Vashev and Major Uvaisaev offered the Russian intelligence officers to surrender without a fight. The Chechen commanders responded with fire from machine guns and grenade launchers. The battle occurred near the village of Sayasan, Nozhai-Yurtovsky district (his native village). According to FSB Colonel Shubalkin, Abalaev’s corpse was identified by his relatives. He died from a bullet wound received in the left side of the chest. Military doctors tried to help him, but Abalaev, without regaining consciousness, died half an hour after being wounded on May 1, 2002.

WHERE IS CHECHNYA GOING? POLITICAL REFLECTIONS BY DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV (PART 3)

Do you know what basic conditions were constantly and ambiguously put forward by the West in almost all negotiations with state leaders of the USSR in 1989 – 1991, when it came to providing credit and charitable assistance, and this was not publicized in the Union press? Yes, the creation of that very financial oligarchy (5-10% of the population), capable of controlling up to 60% of the country’s total potential, with the guaranteed establishment of the institution of private property and protection of large-scale foreign investments and foreign property!

Then, strangely enough, the first to realize it and tried to take it into account, albeit limitedly. N.Nazarbayev, but M.Gorbachev for a long time was floundering and hesitated, grasping for various alternatives that were saving in his opinion, but miraculous, as it turned out later, until the whole feud with GKChP broke out, mainly because of irreconcilable differences of opinion among his entourage….

As long as the society reforming towards collegial privatcapitalism does not decisively overcome the transition stage of non-authoritarian state capitalism, which is dangerous because of its instability and centrifugal forces, chaos, crime, economic collapse and general ungovernability in public spheres may reach its peak, followed by monstrous armed conflicts and historically irreversible processes. The example of the collapse of the USSR, the “critical boiling points” in Russia and the CIS countries, and, thank God, only sensitive echoes in the Chechen Republic serve as impressive proof of this.

Dzhokhar Dudaev

Back then, in 1984, nothing seemed to foreshadow that such a powerful empire could collapse in such a short period of time by historical standards. And only the highest echelons of power were aware of the fact that the cumbersome and non-adaptive to the ever-increasing demands of the country’s economy management system was failing more and more catastrophically every year, its “slippages” were throwing the USSR further and further away from the advanced countries of the capitalist world in terms of economic development. The “cosmetic repairs” of the state apparatus did not save it, nor did the desperate reshuffling of personnel in it produce any results. That is why, finally, M. Gorbachev, relying on the brave and radical wing of his entourage, decided to reform the state structure. The general public is well aware of the deplorable results of the experiment for the President of the USSR. But what was M. Gorbachev’s mistake, why did he fail to skip the dangerous stage of non-authoritarian state capitalism, even introducing elements of private property and legalizing entrepreneurial activity? Were the centrifugal forces so strong, and the aspirants to the future “financial aces” were still just playing “nursery cooperatives”? Yes, probably. But this was not the only factor.

If one imagines authoritarian state capitalism in the form of the famous Ostankino TV tower, the stability of which is created by the extremely tight steel rope running through it, then the “cable of political stability” of the former USSR consisted of many strands of “unfreedoms” that created the necessary strength. In his attempt to throw the rope bridge from the “top of the Soviet system” to the “Western model”, M. Gorbachev weakened to a greater or lesser extent many of the steel strings, such as freedom of speech, press, information, expression of will, national self-expression…. and even entrepreneurial activity, while leaving the “inviolable” but coveted private property 100% tightened. And while the West was feverishly winding some ropes on its “bay of democracy”, the construction of the Soviet tower staggered and collapsed. The ropes that had already been thrown over did not help; they sagged and plunged us all into the swamp of collegial state capitalism.

The main and also fatal mistake of M. Gorbachev (if only this ERROR!?), was in the FOLLOWING loosening of the strings stretched on the “soviet fingerboard”. The example of “communist China” is clear evidence of this. They do the opposite there and apparently play the “guitar of economic reforms” quite well.

WHAT is the fate of the Russian Federation now? Will “Yeltsin’s sappers” be able to overcome the unfortunate”minefield”for the Union, or is the explosion imminent? Or maybe “Khasbulatov’s” frightened parliament will be able to pull everything back to more familiar circles? What if it all comes back to bite us in Chechnya? Nowadays, few people probably remember the December 1991 speech of Boris Yeltsin. His program speech, made on the 28th after the famous Belovezhskoe deed, although it was verified in parliamentary language and slightly diplomatically veiled for potential Russian tycoons, shone a long-awaited green light as a signal for the most active actions, as an indulgence for the ideals of private property. Behind it stood the little-known fact that the current processes in the Russian Empire (USSR, CIS and the Russian Federation proper) were financed. And it was done by target purpose “under Yeltsin”, who unlike M. Gorbachev, who was bluffing. He gave his consent to the West for the birth of the Russian Financial Oligarchy! International capital already then paid for the first stage, when a person who cannot swim is thrown into the water, seducing him with the pleasure of market relations, which can be obtained on an equal footing with others who have previously mastered swimming in the sea of capital. If he doesn’t drown at once and continues to swim, we will help him a little more, but if he goes to the bottom, we will always find another candidate. It makes no difference who will continue the line of M.Gorbachev and B.G.Yeltsin, be it L.Rutskoy or R.Khasbulatov, but they will not give up what they have, c’est la vie, but that is the logic of the powerful.


 Another, and by no means unimportant factor is the fact that Russia has significant healthy forces, high intellectual potential, desire and means to complete the radical reforms that have been initiated. That is, a complete set – Stimulus, Motive, Means and Power.

That is why, summarizing, we can say with great confidence that the young Moscow guild of capitalists, which is emerging and growing stronger day by day, coupled with a foreign armada of “associates”, together with Boris Yeltsin’s team, although rather shabby in battles, but resilient, will bring the matter to its logical conclusion.  What is in store for us? Will the mutant virus of the management tools of authoritarian state capitalism (last time in our country it had a variation under the name of “Soviet partam pa ratnoy”), which is stubbornly fighting for living space in the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, as well as in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, still give rise to incurable metastasis. After all, such a cancerous contagion inevitably dooms the representative bodies of the authorities to become a kind of “reanimated Chechen regional party committee”, taking over from its deceased predecessor the rudimentary functions of control, management and distribution in the sphere of production and consumption, and usurping the right of “the only connoisseur of the interests and problems of the people”.

MIkhail Gorbachev

So what should be our priorities? How, what forces and means should we use in the first place? These are not easy questions, but there are visible answers to them.

Let us first of all realize once and for all one simple axiom. Not a single Parliament of the world and not a single President, sitting in their palaces or residences and issuing only laws and decrees, have not fed a single nation or created commodity abundance for anyone in the history of the world. The welfare of their people is brought, usually by special initiative people (large organizers and entrepreneurs, businessmen and business scientists) who, thanks to their efforts, abilities and talent, often at their own expense and at their own risk and risk, create in society special mechanisms of social and state development, known to them alone and, at first, only understood by them, using as a creative driving force the factor of satisfying the interests of the largest and most productive part of the population. Exactly they, using the personal factor of Means, through the Motive of the attracted specialists, maximally include the factor of Interest of the Producer People, strengthening the factor of Power of the State, which in turn contributes to the next similar cycle, but already at a higher level. As a result, new jobs and guaranteed wages appear in the country, the share of “buy-and-sell” business begins to give way to creative and service business, etc. In short, it is what is called “economic recovery”, the main thing is to legally allow them to do it! And if we can’t do anything to help, it is important not to hinder it, shielding this saving layer of society from aggressive attacks of the “socialist virus” of equality without the rich and hatred of “bloodsuckers”.

That is why there is no more important task for us today than to create the most possible conditions for the intensive development of the business class, from which domestic Vainakh tycoons of financial and industrial capital will inevitably emerge, the future flagships of the Chechen ship, the guarantors of stability and prosperity of society. It is all the more urgent because, unfortunately, unlike Russia, no one will finance us. Believe me, to the great joy of the Metropolis and not without its handiwork, there are no countries in the world that at this stage would fill the empty niche of the Chechen financial oligarchy as an external friend. The vectors of geostrategic interests of Russia and those states that could actually do it are very different in their directions. The dominant Russian factor of Power and its known unpredictability leaves no one in doubt here. There is no alternative “adrenaline” for us today, and unfortunately there is no minimum necessary start-up capital. At one time we missed a very important moment when COUNCH could have made timid steps and prerequisites for the creation of oligarchic structures, but in the Parliament of the Chechen Republic we defeated the syndrome of the mental deficit acquired from the Bolsheviks. There were other missed opportunities. However, there is a deep conviction, based again on the laws and examples of social development, that the Vainakh people, having unlimited potential reserves, will be able to dispose of them rationally, that a part of the excessive willpower of the present Chechen population will necessarily transform into the missing factors and compensate for any emerging inhibitory moments on its way. And there is no other Alternative to this!

Finally, the last hot topic of discussion of the day is the legitimacy of the current form and content of the state structure of the Chechen Republic. This is a kind of self-branded tablecloth for our political cooks who are losers. Grief-experts of both the domestic and Moscow variety go to what extremes and grave extremes, looking for a speck in someone else’s eye. In order to prevent the “worm of doubt” about the legality of Chechnya from tormenting some people and to finally knock the labeled “trump card” out of the hands of others, the following clarifications are required. If we take a dialectical approach, then legal professionals know that a reference to any law of any country can always be challenged, whether on historical, legal, moral and ethical, or other aspects, due to the fact that jurisprudence is essentially eclectic, i.e. “no wisdom is simple enough”, since one can always find a counterargument to any argument if desired.

It is impossible to create any small-minded code of laws without explicit or implicit contradictions. Humanity has not yet developed a universally-identified, logically adequate and legally sterile language, like computer linguistics, free from such shortcomings. And then on the scales of the disputing parties, in principle, there will always be strong enough competent justifications in their favor, but the adoption of judicial, arbitration, socio-political or any other “legal” decision depends predominantly on the balance of forces and opinions in society, on the power and force positions of the disputing and verdict parties, finally, on the prevailing realities. This has always been the case everywhere, at any level, from the “village council” to the UN General Assembly,

Boris Eltsin

There is no doubt that Russia has not been able to “crush” us after the 1991 secession, but it is also indisputable that Chechnya has not yet won back its position in this dispute. Today we are like two tired wrestlers on the mat who, having entered the clinch, have taken a wait-and-see stance for the final victory throw. A difficult precarious balance for the country. But, remember that Unrecognized Permanent Reality tends to be legitimized sooner or later. It is only a question of time and stamina, and the effort to make it happen. Apparently, just as scientists pharmacists take a long time to reach the required prescription for a new and unexpected disease, our way of choosing the establishment and implementation of rationally effective public administration is also long. It is just that a sick person always wants to get well as soon as possible.


 Personally, I see us in collegial privatcapitalism, which, of course, has nationally distinctive features, and I am convinced that the Chechen state has not only a history, but also a real, “not banana” big future, all we need to do is to set the “good Gene Capital” free. If we don’t do it, others will do it.

In closing, I would like to remind you of one thing. Do not forget. The TRUTH is like an infinite mosaic panel consisting of innumerable pieces of “truths”. Truth is one, cognizance of all the immense depth of which, apparently, is not given to a mere mortal, to know it in its entirety is destined only to the Almighty Himself. We are destined to perceive only its separate fragments. Each individual has his own set of “truths”, from which he can make his own part of the canvas of truth. How much of it will he really display, of what components is it composed of, and what should they be? These and other similar questions, have not yet been identified in our society.But I believe in the collective Vainakh capabilities, in the Chechen Stimulus and Motive, capable of painting the necessary picture of the Truth, however small in size and large in number its components may be, because behind each of them stands our
Man with his priceless destiny

PEACE, TRANQUILITY AND PROSPERITY TO YOU ALL.