A career officer in the Soviet Navy, Alkhazur Abuev (also transliterated as Olkhazur Abuev) was born in the Chechen-Ingush Socialist Republic in the first half of the 1950s.
In 1972, he graduated from the M. V. Frunze Higher Naval Academy in Leningrad, a prestigious Soviet Navy academy, obtaining the rank of Captain First Rank (капитан первого ранга). He served in the Black Sea Fleet and later in the Caspian Flotilla, where he held technical and staff positions.
He left his military career in the early 1990s, during the collapse of the USSR, and returned to Chechnya, apparently in March 1992, where he was immediately appointed by President Dzhokhar Dudaev to the organizational chart of the nascent Chechen national army, obtaining the position of deputy head of the Operational Directorate of the Armed Forces General Staff and, from June 1993, head of the same directorate. At the outbreak of the First Russian-Chechen War, however, Abuev did not take up arms but left the country.
Maskhadov’s Army
Upon his return to his homeland, he was called back by President Aslan Maskhadov to help reorganize the regular army, which, according to the plans of the new head of state, was to be called the National Guard and consist of eight specialized regiments. Maskhadov appointed Abuev Chief of Staff immediately after his election as President. According to Timur Muzaev’s reconstruction, on March 13, 1997, Maskhadov established the National Guard, and on May 15, 1997, Abuev signed the general reorganization of the army, abolishing the previous front commands and centralizing the chain of command.
The Chechen National Guard in 1997
The measures taken by the new Chief of Staff had their own abstract logic and were in line with the President’s desire to professionalize the army, but they did not take into account the important changes that had affected the armed forces during the war. Dudaev’s death had accentuated the tendency of units to rally around their field commanders, and Abuev appeared to be ‘disconnected’ from the natural hierarchies that were forming. The new General Staff’s claim to establish a professional system in an army that resembled more an advanced popular militia than a classic armed force clashed with the convictions (and interests) of many field commanders, who preferred to consider their units in ‘permanent mobilization’, both because they were convinced that war with Russia would soon resume and because they wanted to maintain the privileges and impunity that some of them had acquired.
The friction between Abuev, who was pushing for the demobilization of the armed units, and the main brigade generals, who wanted to avoid it, led to an institutional crisis that, in October 1998, resulted in Abuev’s resignation. He was replaced by Maskhadov with the “veteran” Abubakar Bantaev.
Retirement and final years
At the outbreak of the Second Chechen War (1999), Abuev retired to Baku, Azerbaijan, where he lived for almost ten years. On April 23, 2008, according to Kommersant and RBC News, he voluntarily surrendered to the Russian federal authorities, claiming that he had not participated in armed activities since 1999. The authorities confirmed that, despite having served as Chief of Staff in 1997-1998, he was not involved in war crimes. Akhmed Zakayev commented on his surrender as follows: “I don’t understand why he had to surrender. He could have returned home without announcing it, and there would have been no charges against him.” This position was confirmed by one of Abuev’s relatives, who commented: “In Chechnya, only the laziest or the illiterate are unaware that Olkhazar never fought against the federal forces […] Olkhazar was a naval officer and only arrived in Chechnya after the end of the first war, leaving before the start of the second military campaign. Why turn him into a militant commander?”
After a brief interrogation, he was released and not prosecuted.
Press sources indicated that he still lives in Chechnya under discreet surveillance, maintaining a low profile and staying out of public life.
The Chechen National Guard in 1999
Profile and assessment
Alkhazur Abuev was one of the most atypical figures in the Ichkerian military elite: a Soviet-trained technician, uninterested in religious or revolutionary rhetoric, focused on rebuilding a modern state military structure. He was the main architect of the attempt to transition from a guerrilla army to a regular force, which was thwarted by the fragmentation of the armed forces in 1998 and then by the second Russian invasion of Chechnya. His story—from his career in the USSR Navy to his command of the Ichkerian forces, to his retirement in Baku and surrender in 2008—reflects the trajectory of a generation of Chechen officers who sought to reconcile military professionalism and national identity, only to be crushed between the two logics.
Russian ambition is vulnerable in what has always been the Empire’s soft underbelly: the North Caucasus. A conference in Kyiv sets a framework for opposition to Moscow’s imperialist legacy.
The following article was written by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Inal Sharip, and published in the Kyiv Post at the following link:
The Kyiv conference “The North Caucasus as Europe’s Security Frontier” was timed to the third anniversary of Verkhovna Rada Resolution No. 2672-IX on the temporary occupation of the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI). Its core conclusion is that Europe’s stability is inseparable from the fate of the peoples of the North Caucasus; therefore, the “Caucasus track” must move from declarations to a managed policy with institutional tools and clearly defined addressees.
The lineup underscored the political weight and attention to the topic. Participants included Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk and First Deputy Speaker Oleksandr Korniyenko; Ukraine’s third President Viktor Yushchenko; Mykhailo Podolyak, advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine; Prime Minister of the ChRI Akhmed Zakayev; MEP Rasa Jukneviciene (former Lithuanian Minister of Defense, Vice-Chair of the EPP Group in the European Parliament); former Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga; as well as members of the Ukrainian parliament and international experts. Such a roster widens the frame from a national to a pan-European and transatlantic level, signaling that the North Caucasus is entering the security mainstream.
Prime Minister of ChRI Akhmed Zakayev with the third President of the Republic of Ukraine, Viktor Andrijovych Yushchenko
The normative direction of the discussion was set by the adopted Kyiv Declaration.
First, it fixes a strategic lens: the North Caucasus is a critical link in pan-European security; the threats are transnational (hybrid aggression, repression, deportations, disinformation) and require coordinated international responses. This turn implies abandoning the “all-Russia prism” in favor of viewing the North Caucasus as a distinct macro-region with its own elites and trajectory.
Second, the declaration sets an operational framework – a four-track roadmap, which makes the conversation reproducible within EU/NATO policy and at national levels:
Legal (universal jurisdiction, documentation of crimes, support for applications to international courts);
Sanctions (expansion of personal and sectoral measures for repression, mobilization, deportations, and cultural erasure);
Humanitarian (protection of refugees and political prisoners, access to medical and psychological care, preservation of language and culture);
Communications (countering disinformation, supporting independent media and expert analysis).
Third, much attention was dedicated to the Ukrainian pillar. Participants called on the Verkhovna Rada to take steps enabling “Ichkerian entities” to function within Ukraine’s legal field: recognize ChRI citizenship; provide for representation of ChRI citizens in third countries pending international recognition; grant the State Committee for the De-Occupation of the ChRI official status as an organ of national-liberation struggle; and launch a regular parliamentary dialogue. They also propose energizing cross-party caucuses and supporting draft law No. 11402 on engagement with national movements of the Russian Federation’s colonized peoples. Taken together, this moves moral-political declarations toward legally operable mechanisms.
ChRI Prime Minister Akhmed Zakayev with the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk
External addressees are divided into two groups. The first – the European Parliament, PACE/NATO PA, and national parliaments – are urged to strengthen the parliamentary dimension of de-occupation policy, initiate public hearings and evidence-gathering missions, establish systematic dialogue with national-liberation movements, and expand sanctions lists, including accountability for the use of North Caucasus natives in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The second – governments and institutions of the EU/UK/Canada/US – are encouraged to integrate North Caucasus issues into strategic reviews and deterrence plans, and to support human rights, cultural heritage, and the languages of the Caucasus peoples.
A key infrastructural outcome was the decision to build an expert network and a public monitoring panel, Caucasus Watch – a tool that links human-rights reporting, sanctions tracking, and analysis, thereby reducing information asymmetries for policymakers and regulators. A dedicated grant track is envisioned for researchers working on law, security, and culture in the North Caucasus.
The tone of the discussion was well captured by remarks from Laura Lindermann of the United States (Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and Director of Programs at the Central Asia – Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council). She noted Russia’s “strategic retrenchment” from the South Caucasus, the shift in the mediation architecture, and the vulnerability of three pillars of control in the North – hyper-securitization, budget transfers, and personal patronage networks (including the “Kadyrov model”). The weakening of these pillars increases the risks of local conflicts and terrorism, as well as the play of external actors; hence integrating the “Caucasus track” into the core of Euro-Atlantic strategies is a matter of prevention, not reaction.
From here flows the practical logic of the Kyiv Declaration: institutionalizing subjecthood, standardizing sanctions-legal work, producing verifiable data, and advancing parliamentary diplomacy. The expected outputs fall into three baskets:
Legal (building out universal-jurisdiction cases and treaty-based procedures);
Political (consolidating inter-parliamentary formats, including channels to movements and diasporas);
Informational (reducing reliance on fragmentary testimony through a single data window (Caucasus Watch)).
The risks are evident: sanctions fatigue and bureaucratization; limited access to sources and witness security; competing external agendas. However, the very shift to an operational framework with clear addressees and instruments is already significant. The political will of parliaments and the cohesion of expert networks will be the key variables – both for implementing the Ukrainian pillar (including decisions on ChRI citizenship and the State Committee’s status) and for embedding the “Caucasus track” in EU/NATO strategies.
Kyiv has offered new arguments as well as a policy infrastructure, from legislation to enforcement. The trajectory ahead will be measured not by the volume of statements but by the speed of institutional steps and the quality of interagency coordination.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
The text of the Declaration signed in Kyiv is available in English, Russian and Ukrainian at this link
Born on November 8, 1956, in Kazakhstan to a family of deportees belonging to the Teip Thadakhara tribe originally from the village of Khatuni, Supyan Minkailovich Abdullaev was just a child when, after Khrushchev’s “Pardon,” he moved to Chechnya with his parents. His family was one of many that, during the Ardakhar, had been deported by Stalin to Kazakhstan, officially as “punishment” for not fighting the Nazi invasion of the USSR with sufficient rigor, but in reality to consolidate the colonization of the Caucasus by ethnic Russians.
Exile first, then social ghettoization after their return, had produced a strong sense of disorientation in the younger Chechen generation: for a people accustomed to living in the same land for millennia, organized into clans deeply rooted in specific territories, deportation to Central Asia and the chaotic return to their homeland thirteen years later, unable to rebuild the ancient social mosaic based on the “family-territory” relationship meant the loss of every “cardinal point of identity.” In this context, the only cultural pillar remaining to the Chechens was Islam, which until the deportation had taken root in a very ‘light’ form, often syncretic with ancient cultural values, but which now represented the only foothold for Chechens to recognize themselves in a USSR that was predominantly Orthodox and Russian-speaking.
Supyan grew up cultivating traditional Chechen customs, soon became very skilled in fighting, and studied the Koran. After graduating in 1972, he earned a degree from the Chechen-Ingush State University and found work as a physical education teacher in schools in the Vedeno district, the “ancestral land” of the Chechen nation.
From madrasas to the Islamic Battalion
With the advent of Glasnost and the easing of censorship, Abdullaev was able to devote himself openly to religious propaganda, teaching in local madrasas, acquiring contacts throughout the Eastern Caucasus, and eventually participating in the creation of the Islamic Revival Party, the first explicitly confessional political movement in the Soviet Union. His social activism took the form of participation in the activities of the Ar-Risalya Islamic center in Grozny, where he began teaching Islamic doctrine and law, achieving the honorary title of Ustaz (Teacher). He eventually became director of the center and, in this capacity, supported the Chechen Revolution, the proclamation of independence, and the rise of Dzhokhar Dudaev to the presidency of the republic. He differed from most other teachers, who struggled to express themselves in Russian, in his almost complete lack of accent and a style of speech that would have been the envy of a university professor. He had a long red beard that reached down to his waist (hence the nickname “Supjan the Red”).
Supyan ran the Islamic center until 1994, when the Russian army entered Chechnya with the aim of reconquering the small republic. On November 26, 1994, a contingent of anti-Dudaev militiamen, mercenaries, and undercover Russian soldiers attempted to overthrow Dudaev by attacking Grozny. Abdulaev enlisted in a village militia and took part in the fighting that saw the attackers destroyed and put to flight. The group of volunteers to which Supyan belonged engaged the attackers at the Press House. According to some, it was in that battle that people first began to talk about the “Islamic Battalion.” Supyan’s bravery during the battle earned him the position of deputy commander of the battalion, a unit that would fight with honor throughout the First Chechen War (for more information, read “Freedom or Death! History of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” available HERE).
Supyan took part in Operation Jihad, the action with which the independence fighters recaptured the capital, putting the Russian army in check and forcing Moscow to withdraw from Chechnya. During the battle, he commanded several assault groups against the FSB headquarters, the “Government Palace,” the Dinamo Stadium, and other sensitive targets. For his role, he was apparently appointed ‘Brigadier General’ (a mainly honorary title, which would become rather inflated in the following years).
Islam and War
Maskhadov’s rise to power, democratically elected by the overwhelming majority of Chechens in 1997, saw Supyan align himself with the so-called “Radicals,” whose main exponent was Shamil Basayev. In the distribution of posts, seeking to please the radicals, Maskhadov appointed him Deputy Minister of Sharia for State Security, with the task of working on the ideological and religious training of officials. With the proclamation of full Sharia law (1999), Supyan’s role (recognized as one of the leading exponents of radical Islam in Chechnya alongside Movladi Ugudov) in the training of state officials grew significantly, as the Chechen legal system had no background in religious law. Thus, the few scholars available became ‘experts’ in Islamic law, even though they often lacked even a basic knowledge of the subject.
In any case, the formation of the ‘Islamised’ Chechen ruling class was soon brought to an end when Russia invaded Chechnya again at the end of 1999. Abdullaev quickly became a key figure, not only because he reconstituted his unit (renamed the ‘Jundullah’ Brigade) at the outbreak of the war, but also because, as a radical figure not only in politics but also in religion, he had access to the richest sources of foreign funding, coming from Wahhabi Islamic associations, which were happy to finance the jihad while ignoring any interest on the part of the moderate political and religious current of the Chechen government, of which Maskhadov was the expression.
During the Second Russian-Chechen War, Abdullaev first commanded the Jundullah Brigade as second-in-command, then as commander, earning himself a place in the political-military council of the Chechen resistance[1], the Majilis-Al-Shura (successor to the Committee for the Defense of the State at the head of the Republic). After taking command of the Eastern Front of the war theater (2003) centered in the territories of Vedeno and Shali (where he was wounded several times in combat[2]), on July 5, 2004, he was appointed Minister of Finance of the war government, with the aim of raising the necessary funds to continue operations and distribute them to units in the field. His work was appreciated, if it is true that Maskhadov’s successor, Sadulayev, confirmed him in his position. Among the fighters, Supyan gained the goodwill of his comrades, earning the respect of all. Despite his advanced age compared to the other commanders, he actively participated in operations and war councils, and was known for his austere religious discipline, moral authority, and charisma among the fighters.
The Emirate
On March 3, 2007, he was appointed Vice President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by Dokka Umarov, a position he held until the founding of the Emirate of the Caucasus on October 7, 2007. He joined the new formation, formally abandoning the state structures of the ChRI, and took on the role of “Naib” (political successor) to the former President, now “Emir,” Umarov. When, in June 2009, unconfirmed information emerged about the alleged death of Doku Umarov, Akhmed Zakayev expressed the opinion that his closest associate, Supyan Abdullayev, would most likely become his successor. Within the Caucasus Emirate, Supyan Abdullaev maintained a leading role as Dokka Umarov’s deputy, being the de facto number two in the movement. For this reason, the Russian authorities tried in every way to capture or kill him, even arresting his son, Masud, then 22, who was deported from Egypt to Russia. Nevertheless, Supyan did not give in to blackmail and did not surrender.
He was considered the most influential of the Salafi ideologues and acted as a liaison between the various Wilayat (provinces) of the new Emirate. As an educator, he oversaw the religious and ideological training of new militants in mountain training camps. He carried out this task until March 28, 2011, when, during a raid by Russian special forces in the village of Verkhny Alkun, in the Sunzha district, the Russians hunted him down and killed him. The operation was aimed at preventing a meeting between Umarov and his staff. According to some, Umarov managed to escape, while Abdullaev was killed in a heavy air strike, following which he and several others
[1] His radio call signs were “Red Supyan” and “Chitok.”
[2] In January 2006, information appeared about Abdullaev’s elimination following a special operation in the district of Shali in Chechnya. This information was later denied, as it was his youngest nephew, field commander Adam Abdullaev, who was killed. Two other field commanders were killed along with him.
There are very little information about him in the press, and we were unable to find a personal photo of him. All we know about him is that he was born in 1954, that he graduated from Voronezh State University with a degree in law, and that, according to our sources, he is still alive.
Before Chechnya’s independence, Abdulkharimov worked as a law enforcement officer in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. During the period between 1991 and 1994, he had the opportunity to establish himself in the oil business, acquiring skills and contacts that earned him the government’s interest.
It is not known what his political position was with respect to the issue of Chechen independence, and whether or not he participated (and if so in what form) in the defense of the country during the First Russo-Chechen War. It is known, however, that after the withdrawal of Russian troops from the country, he moved closer to government positions, beginning a notable political rise.
Institutional roles
Presidential Advisor for Oil Production (since 1996): After the end of the First Chechen War and the election of Aslan Maskhadov, Abdulkharimov was appointed Presidential Advisor for Oil Production, taking on a key role in managing the country’s energy resources.
Minister of Oil Production and Energy (03/07/1998 – 10/10/1998): During this short period, he headed the ministry responsible for energy policies, in a context of reconstruction and political instability.
First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers with responsibility for oil production (since 10/10/1998): Subsequently, he was promoted to First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, maintaining responsibility for oil production.
Director of the State Enterprise “ChechenTEK” (since September 1998): He took over the management of ChechenTEK, the state enterprise responsible for the management of the oil sector, at a time when Chechnya was trying to consolidate its economy.
Member of the collaborationist government
After the conquest of Chechnya by the Russian army and the installation of the collaborationist government of Ramzan Kadyrov, Abdulkharimov was appointed Minister of Industry and Energy, by nomination of Kadyrov himself, replacing Amadi Temishev.
Temishev had repeatedly criticized the policy of “plunder” carried out by the Russian state oil company, Rosneft, complaining about the systematic violation of the contractual agreements signed in 2002 between the company and the collaborationist government, at the time led by Akhmat Kadyrov, Ramzan’s father, the disinterest of the Russian administration in the economic and environmental fate of the Republic, and the lack of investment in the restoration of Chechen industrial infrastructure. His last public interview, dated October 11, 2006, was an explicit indictment of Moscow. It is not surprising, therefore, that in April 2007 Ramzan Kadyrov (newly elected President of the Chechen Republic by decree of Vladimir Putin) decided to remove him from government, replacing him with a figure supposedly less cumbersome and more “available” towards the Russian imperial center.
On 16 April, a few hundred meters from the village Yarish-Mardy in the Argun Gorge, the Russians suffered one of their worst setbacks. At 2:20 p.m., after a several hours’ march from Khankala Military Base, an armored column of thirty fighting vehicles,[1] four oil trucks, and numerous supply trucks, hit a bottleneck between the villages Chishki and Zony. The area was the only along the route without a permanently-manned Russian checkpoint and, due to the differences in height between the road and hills, without radio coverage too. Waiting there instead were Chechen units led by an obscure young commander of Arab origin. He had arrived in Chechnya in mid-1995 leading a small group of foreign fighters. Now with 80-160 men, his name was Samir Saleh Abdullah but went by Ibn Al Khattab.[2]
The ambushers jammed the radios of the passing unsuspecting Russians before detonating a powerful anti-tank mine, stranding the forward vehicle. The hills began spewing down on the column, now stretched for almost a kilometer and a half, destroying the leading and trailing vehicles, and a few minutes later killing the commander and deputy commander, Major Terzovets and Captain Vyatkin. Most of the infantry and vehicles were destroyed eventually too. A nearby platoon of Russian soldiers set off to investigate the explosions. Hearing the nearby explosions, a platoon of Russian soldiers set off to investigate but came under heavy fire too and took up defensive positions. The command hurriedly organized a task force with battle tanks and heavy machine guns to relieve their trapped comrades. Simultaneously, a second relief column supported by combat helicopters was racing to the south. The two rescue teams made contact with the Chechens around five o’clock and fled to the woods an hour later. They had arrived at the ambush site to the smell of a hundred of their dead comrades burning. Of the initial 30 vehicles 21 were destroyed, and of the 200 men only 13 were unharmed. The Chechens lost twenty at most.[3] This was a defeat which blew up the tottering diplomatic bridge unilaterally constructed by Yeltsin. The day after the ambush, the Russian president backtracked, vowing not to “deal with the gangsters.” Meanwhile, Yarish-Mardy projected a hitherto unknown name, Al Khattab, onto the fresco of freedom fighters. With the advent of the internet, he had prudently brought a troupe of cameramen to record for a propaganda film, resulting in global clicks and new sympathizers for the Chechens. For the first time, footage out of Chechnya showed not helpless victims of Russian bombardment or desperate fighters, but a formidable fighting force winning true battles against Russia. The video of the Yarish-Mardy ambush evidently reached Parliament in Moscow: deputies requested an immediate report from Grachev and ordered the creation of a parliamentary commission of inquiry. As a result, formal accusations were brought against commanders of the devastated unit, but also the unified command of forces in Chechnya, for authorizing the column’s mission without properly assessing risks, even Grachev could not escape an accusation. Tough lessons went unheeded though, with another ambush on a Russian column destroying 15 combat vehicles and an unknown number of men on 5 May.
Khattab, whose fame would continue to grow with such attacks, needs to be put into context. He was a follower of Salafism, a radical current of Islam of which some fringes, called Wahhabism, openly preached global Jihad while supporting terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Born in Arar, Saudi Arabia in 1969, he grew up passionate about Islam’s great figures, developing a radical vision of religious commitment that had led him to join, at seventeen years old, the Afghan Mujahedeen’s war against the Soviet Union. Earning the nom de guerre inspired by Caliph Omar Ibn Al- Khattab, he bore a permanent mark of that war after carelessly handling explosives and almost losing his entire right hand. According to his memoirs, between 1993 and 1995 he served in Tajikistan alongside the Islamic opposition and then moved to Bosnia.[4] More than just a strong fighter, he was an astute strategist and diplomat, skillfully commanding media to build a network of financiers. Cameramen captured the successes of his Jihad to show to the fringes of the Islamic world. Khattab was the first and certainly the main non-native commander to attract news in Chechnya.[5] After entering under the guise of a Jordanian journalist with his crew, he connected with Faith Al-Sistani, the commander of an Islamic battalion who led him to Dudaev.[6] With the president’s approval he settled down with some of his followers in an old Soviet Young Pioneer camp near Serzhen-Yurt.[7] Here Khattab set up a training course using his experience on previous battlefields: guerrilla warfare, explosives, and ambushes, focusing on how to transform a band of militiamen into a deadly combat force.[8] Though, what set his and other Chechen units apart was a strict adherence to the dictates of Islam. The war planted the seeds of Islamic formations by increasingly radicalizing the rural population.[9] According to Khattab, his “Jamaat’s (literally “community”, as was customary to call Islamist guerrilla military cells) first action was an ambush near Kharachoy, feeding a Russian column through the meat grinder. The initial success attracted new blood for the Yarish-Mardy ambush already described. Inflicting this second debacle on the Russians, Khattab won respect as a field commander and a seat on the Defense Council, the executive body through which Dudaev directed his armed forces. His invitation to the Defense Council marked the beginning of the so-called “Islamization of the resistance.” Until then, nationalism had been the common denominator across Chechen military groups.
Khattab
Two overwhelming factors encouraged the gradual Islamization of the Chechen resistance: the population’s suffering and the successes of field commanders associated with Islamic radicalism. In 1996, the sectarian view of the war for independence was in its infancy but growing fast. It is unsurprising that, with most of the population displaced, ravaged by poverty, and grieving over lost loved ones, people turned to extremism. Yandarbiev’s and Ugudov’s rhetoric fed the public with a holy war of independence against “Russian infidels.” The rule of law having died, Islam was a a simple and easily understandable replacement for a nation unaccustomed to the law of war. Next, political isolation incentivized supporting Jihad as desperate tool for gaining financial support from numerous religious networks across the Arab world. In exchange, these backers demanded the Chechens fight not for simply national aspirations but divine above all.
[1]According to The War in Chechnya, the column carried 199 men, mostly contract soldiers.
[2]According to what Khattab himself later reported, his contingent did not exceed 50 people. The Polish journalist Miroslav Kuleba, who entered the independence guerrilla, declared in his book The Empire on its knees the figure of 43 men, including Khattab.
[3]As reported by Ibn Al Khattab in his book of memoirs, the Shahid (“martyrs”) were 9, and 21 were wounded. On the Russian side, Chechen losses were never ascertained with certainty. The only certain data were the bodies of 7 militants from the Shatoy District, identified on the battle site in the following days.
[4]Most of Khattab’s autobiographical notes are contained in a book of memoirs, Memories of Amir Khattab , some extracts of which can be found on www.ichkeria.net in the Insights- Memoirs section.
[5]About his choice to participate in the war in Chechnya, Khattab says: “While we were preparing for the next year, the events in Chechnya began. I watched TV: the fight against the Russians was led by the communist general Dzhokhar Dudayev, or so we imagined. We thought it was a conflict between communists, we didn’t see Islamic prospects in Chechnya. One day I went back to the rear to nurse my wounded right arm. There a Chechen Mujahideen came to me and offered to take me to Chechnya for a week or two. We looked at the map of Chechnya. It was a small republic of 16,000 square kilometers. It was even hard to find on the map. I thought its population was a thousand […].”
[6]Regarding this meeting, Khattab recalls: I met Dudayev during a visit to Sheikh Fathi. […] Dzhokhar began to ask questions. […] He asked: “Why don’t they come to help us in your area?” I replied, “The truth is that the reasons for the war are not clear, and people don’t know what we are fighting for.” He told me: “Brother […] this is an Islamic land. Isn’t that enough for you?” […] I sat down next to them (Dudayev and Al – Sistani, ed.) and asked Dudayev the first question: “What is the purpose of your battle? Do you fight for Islam?” He replied: “Every son of Chechnya and the Caucasus, oppressed for decades, dreams that one day Islam will return not only to his homeland, but to the whole Caucasus. And I am one of these children.[…].”
[7]We have already mentioned this field in the paragraph concerning the Battle of Serzhen- Yurt.
[8]Regarding the establishment of the Serzhen Yurt camp, Khattab recalls: […] I remember that at the first meeting there were more than 80 mujahideen who have now become Emirs. I remember what I told them (and Fathi translated): “If any of you want to be Emir, then he must offer his fighting program and we will obey him.” Nobody said anything. In those days the battle was approaching the mountains. So I told them, “I’m not telling you that I have knowledge. I only have combat experience in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Maybe it’s time to get to work. I have a program staggered into three phases: preparation, arming and operations. If we are not ahead of you in battle you can shoot us. We will be in front of you after the course. After arming, we will start implementing the combat program. We will always go ahead of you, I and the brothers who are with me.”
[9]Again we quote Khattab’s recollections, contained in his memoir: The fighting soon approached our area. The young people argued whether it was a Jihad, the Sufi mullahs declared that it was not, that it was a showdown between Dzhokhar Dudayev and the Communists, and the hypocrites added fuel to the fire […]. The puppets of the Russians (the anti-Dudayevite opposition, ed.) said that this was a problem between them and Dudayev, and that we shouldn’t have intervened. […] I didn’t really know the situation because I hadn’t studied it. I had a video camera and started filming people, asking them what they were fighting for. That’s how I met Shamil Basayev. Some people thought I was a reporter. I have seen sincere people and, I swear by Allah, I cried when I asked an old woman, “How long will you bear these hardships?” and she replied: “We want to get rid of the Russians.” I asked her “What are you fighting for?” and she replied: “We want to live as Muslims and we don’t want to live with Russians.” So I asked her. “What can you give to the Mujahideen?” And she: “I have only this jacket on.” I cried: if this old woman can help by having only this, why do we allow ourselves to be afraid and doubtful? From that day I decided with my brothers to start preparing people for battle, as a first step.
Born in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Efim Sandler is a veteran of the Israeli Defence Force Armoured Corps and is currently living in the USA. An enthusiastic historian since his youth, he developed a deep interest in the armoured warfare of the Arab–Israeli Wars and conflicts in the former USSR, and has been collecting related information for decades. He is the co-author of the Lebanese Civil War series, and after posting several articles about the Chechen Wars he wrote Battle for Grozny: Prelude and the Way to the City, 1994. Next January the second volume of his work, Battle for Grozny: The First Chechen War and the Battle of 31 December 1994-january 1995 will be avaiable.
Your work on the First Russian-Chechen War, released in 2023, is the first in a series of essays whose next volume will be released in January next year
Yes, originally there was a plan for 2-3 volumes but it looks there will be at least 4 or even 5. The publishing house is not able to release the next one till spring 2025. Thus it is not really connected to when my books ready but to the availability of publisher resources.
Efim Sandler
Why did you decide to take such an in-depth interest in the First Russian – Chechen War?
It is kind of personal. I left Soviet Union in 1989 when I was 15 and by 1994 I was already in IDF. I cannot say we were following the war but the New Year assault on Grozny was pretty much discussed. We were shown the pictures of destroyed Russian tanks and killed Russian soldiers. Of cause there was not much details but the feeling was pretty bad. I felt bad for the whole situation in general, political stupidity and carelessness, poor condition of Russian army and the destruction that was coming upon Chechens. I had absolutely no doubt that Russia would grinder Chechnya despite the losses. At the top nobody ever cared about the losses. I visited Moscow in early 1995 and there were talks about the war was all about money and power. Some people blamed Yeltsin, others blamed Dudaev. There was no real censoring and you could see all the chaos of Grozny on various TV channels. I remember watching the footage of burning Russian armor and was thinking – how lucky I am for not being there! Many years later, when I started to develop my interest in military history one of my major directions were modern wars of USSR/Russia and the two big ones fell right into it: Afghanistan and Chechnya.
Did you find difficulties in the preliminary research work?
Obviously. There were several problems. At first there were not many sources and those available basically were telling the same story. It looked “fishy” as it was basically supporting the formal version that I did not believe. It took me a while to arrange a decent collection of sources including books, periodicals, videos and internet resources. Secondly there was barely any mention of particular units besides the ill-famed 131st and 81st. Majority of the sources gave very high level picture of the events. I had to approach this issue like assembling a puzzle. The phenomena of so-called ‘joint units’ added complexity as, for example, on veteran forums sometimes people were using their original units and not the ones they were assigned to.Chechen side was mostly covered by Russian version that was copied from one source to another. Especially pre-war period. I found a lot of stuff in Chechen History group on FB and later in your book. I also had to go over video footage from western news channels like AP and Reuters.I used veteran memories as well though many of them were kind of misleading. This is pretty obvious as people do not memorize everything in order but fetch some most vivid pieces. Some of the accounts I was able to cross-check, some I treated as ‘probable’. I also used a lot of my personal experience and logic to decide if the account is valid for the research.
What were your main sources?
This is a hard question as I do not have any major source for the whole period. For example to work on the Russian advance from 11 till 31 December I used the blog of Konstantin Yuk (botter) for the general structure then added information from several other sources like the books I am Kaliber 10, Win or Disappear, Life and Death of a General, Moloch of Grozny, Tanks in Grozny, Fangs of the Lone Wolf, First Chechen War, Soldier of Fortune and Bratishka magazines, and others. The videos also did some good job especially the news feeds as I was able to identify military units by the markings on the vehicles.
As a former – soldier and an expert in military history, what aspect, in your opinion, is particularly interesting in this war?
First of all I do not consider myself ‘an expert’ but an enthusiast of military history. I know a thing or two and I’ve developed my own method to make a research and tell the story in a way that is not as boring as pure academic history papers. Besides personal factors that I mentioned above, I think that the Battle for Grozny was the first and only massive urban clash of such a scale since WWII. It was asymmetric engagement where the advantage of firepower was minimized by mobility, experience and training. It is also interesting to see how Russian forces got themselves adapted to the very unfamiliar type of war and managed to take over the city. At last this war is barely explored and this makes it even more interesting – probably this is the major reason for me personally.
What experience, from the military side, do you think the First Russian-Chechen War brought?
Talking about military side we need to accept the fact that not all Russian units were devastated as common narrative tells us. There were many that fought well and got themselves adapted very quickly. I am talking not only about Lev Rokhlin and his troops. The major issue was at the top. As I tried to show it in my first book the whole management of preparations was a failure. This was the reason that I spent so much on describing the issues in details. I called it ‘a show of absurd’. Personally I was so horrified by learning the actual picture that I could not simply pass by. Thus my most important message – each operation should be carefully prepared from the top to the bottom.
Having studied this topic in depth, do you think that the Russian army has effectively learned from that experience, considering the operational fields in which it has competed in the following years, especially in Ukraine?
I don’t really know the operational details of the battles in Ukraine but we can look at the Second Chechen war (1999-2000) for example. I do believe that Russians learned something and tried to apply to certain extent. In general the Russian military remained on the low level of training and equipment while the higher command remained disconnected from the situation on the ground with some exceptions. Speaking about later conflicts like 5-Day (2008) it looked like there was some improvement in level of training but there still were issues with coordination.
One of the certainly most interesting aspects of this war is the fact that its asymmetrical nature has overwhelmingly benefited the militarily less strong faction, going so far as to force the Russian invasion army to retreat, recognizing a factual victory for the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. How do you, as an expert, interpret this unexpected Chechen victory against the Russians?
Well, I believe there are two answers – simple and not very obvious. As I mentioned above Russians had upper hand in firepower but it was minimized by mobility, experience and training of Chechen units. What is not obvious is the fact that Russians were totally unprepared for fighting while the whole operation was taken as ‘show of force’ by the higher command with the exception of Group North-East commander, Lev Rokhlin. In large Chechens managed to repel Russian assault on the night of 31 Dec – 1 Jan due to neglectance and carelessness of top Russian commanders. There is no sense to compare types of firearms or other equipment. The tank is a tank and it can fire and kill. The problem is when the tank crew is unprepared and unit commander has no idea where he is and who is from the right and who is from the left – this is a problem. Squeezing dozens of armored vehicles into the small railway station area – this is a problem. Having not enough troops to perform proper sweeping and organize defensive perimeter – this is a problem. This will sound strange but I will say like this: Chechens did not win the New Year night, Russians lost it by giving them the lead. I hope I will be able to prove it in my coming book.
Regarding your next volume, what could you tell us to make the reader curious to read it? What could he find “unpublished”, compared to the superficial narrative that often fills the internet about this topic?
First of all let’s agree that there are only a few comprehensive publications available to western audience. All of them give a relatively decent overview of the events that led to the war (mostly from Chechen side) but poorly describe military activities. Sometimes the authors fill the gap with their own fantasies making the story look spicy. My job is to present the events in a most realistic way. Describing military actions I will go as deep as I can down to single unit level – battalion, company, platoon or even a team. I am combining various types of sources like publications, books, forum discussions, documentaries, personal memories, blogs, raw footage, news channels. Of cause majority of such sources are Russian and less of Chechen. Your books give good insight on the Chechen side.
Did you have the opportunity to interview war veterans, or eyewitnesses of these events? If yes, what impression did you get from their words?
As I mentioned above, I mostly used published accounts. I tried to interview a couple of times but it did not go well. Too many emotions. Can not blame them.
Have you had any difficulties talking to veterans? Do you remember a conversation that particularly impressed you?
Most of the veterans that I tried to contact declined after learning that I am living in USA. Several conversations I had were not very impressive and gave almost no additional details while switching to emotions. After Russia launched its intervention into Ukraine I lost all my contacts in Russia.
Two years later, do you feel that the public still retains a strong interest in this topic?
You means since the release of first book? I think the War in Ukraine invoked additional interest in everything connected to modern Russia. I cannot estimate to what extent though. Just to mention that general interest in Chechen wars was very low and this is the reason there so few serious publications about it. Need to mention that in early mid 1990s there were several major events that completely overshadowed what was going in Chechnya. Gulf War, collapse of Soviet Union, rearrangement of Eastern Europe just to name few. There were also numerous local conflicts like Balkans, Somalia, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Transnistria, Abkhazia, NKAO, etc. Thus for western observer 1st Chechen War was just one of them. Talking about Russians – they are trying to forget it due to their reasons.
Trying to bring the First Russian-Chechen War into the present day: do you think there are any similarities, or points of contact, between the invasion of Chechnya in 1994 and that Of Ukraine in 2022?
To my personal knowledge of the events in Ukraine (and I definitely can’t consider myself an expert there), the situation is pretty much different. Starting from the point that Ukraine is an independent country, and not a part of Russia trying to separate itself. Russians prepared the invasion and it looked they started to work on it well in advance. Russian military at least at first showed pretty much organization, equipment and training. Similar to Chechnya Ukrainian local population showed their dedication to resist invading troops and in my opinion that was the major factor that caused Russian advance to stall. In Chechnya Russians managed to suppress such resistance with numbers and firepower have almost no issues with supplies. In Ukraine this did not work. Western weapons also played some role in Ukraine while Chechens relied mostly on what they inherited from Russian units located in Chechnya prior to 1992. Of cause this is only a couple of examples but I tend not to compare these two wars. On the other hand the conflict in Donbass (2014-15) can be compared to Chechen War.
The following is a preview of the second volume of “Freedom or Death!” just released in English. The passage deals with Russian and Chechen preparations in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war.
Zero Hour
In 1994, Russian-backed forces in Chechnya opposing Dzhokhar Dudayev led the failed November Assault, and it was a moment of realization for everyone.[1] President Yeltsin now clearly understood he needed to do more than covertly support groups inside Chechnya. He had to officially intervene to prevent the small, historically rebellious mountain republic from seceding. The Chechen opposition’s Provisional Council itself desperately appealed to him to send troops against the Dudayevites.[2] Meanwhile, General Dudayev was hopeful for peace negotiations but took seriously the threat of Russia fully invading.
For Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, victory was not an achievable objective but a ripening fact. A “small victorious war” promised to raise the administration’s ratings against the increasing popularity of nationalist parties.[3] They ignored, or pretended to ignore, the deplorable state of their military and underestimated their enemy’s determination. Meanwhile the Chechens were preparing to resist the invasion.[4] Dudayev entrusted command of the regular forces to Colonel Aslan Maskhadov,[5] who inherited ragtag units rather than an army from his former colleague Viskhan Shakhabov.[6] Throughout 1994, he attempted to structure it partly according to army reforms enacted in 1992 and based on pre-existing forces, which were comprised of veterans from wars in Afghanistan and Abkhazia. Some units were combat-ready by the beginning of December. Among such forces was the Presidential Guard commanded by Abu Arsanukaev, and its Spetnatz unit under Apti Takhaev. Next was Shamil Basayev’s Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion, which was composed mostly of veterans of Abkhazia. Then came Ruslan Gelayev’s Special Borz (“Wolf”) Regiment, which included a battalion led by Umalt Dashayev. Adding also the Shali Armored Regiment and other minor units, there was a nucleus of 1,500 troops joined by 1,000 men from the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Service (police officials, riot police and state intelligence services). Maskhadov added some volunteer territorial militia battalions, such as the so-called “Islamic Regiment” under Islam Halimov and the Naursk Battalion[7] with Major Apti Batalov.[8] Thanks to their contribution and the many other bands of volunteers who rushed to Grozny’s defense, Chechen Headquarters relied on 5,000 men at the start of Russia’s invasion. Several more formations followed Dudayev’s general mobilization proclamation on 4 December.[9] The Chechens understood however, that regardless of how they prepared they could only temporarily hold the enemy at the gates. Chechnya lacked the numbers, arms, and organization to take on enemy armored brigades directly.[10] Russia had even preemptively destroyed the modest air force on 1 December.
Russia’s initial approach to the invasion reflected its narrow aim to eliminate the leadership rather than destroy Chechnya. The average Russian solider, struggling to pin it on a map, cared even less about Chechnya. The government narrowed its invasion partly to avoid a humanitarian crisis since the wary West was watching with a hand on the money tap keeping Russia afloat.
Whatever way the Russians intended to attack, the Chechens were preparing to fight and die all the same. Their plan was “to last.” They wanted to resist as long as possible and hopefully expose the Kremlin to domestic public opinion, which was still struggling with trauma from the Soviet-Afghan War. Equally important was the opinion of the West, whose conditional loans kept Russia’s economy from sinking.[11] The Chechens organized their defense in three phases. They planned to first trap the Russians inside Grozny, a “concrete forest,” and ensnarl their overwhelming armor. To entice the Russians, the Chechens yielded the defensive line to the north to create the illusion they had abandoned the capital. This line along a strip of hills running north of Grozny on the so-called Terek Ridge hinged to the west by the villages Dolinskyand Pervomaisk. It ended in the east at the height of the village Petropavlovskaya on the left bank of the Sunzha. After crossing the line and penetrating the capital, the Russians would encounter Chechnya’s best forces eagerly waiting to recreate the success they had against the anti-Dudayevites back in 26 November. This was ideally going to force Yeltsin to negotiate with Dudayev, but with far more realistic expectations, the Chechens planned to retreat south to the main centers of Achkhoy-Martan, Shatoy, Vedeno, and Nozhay Yurt.
Maskhadov divided the territory into six military districts called “Fronts” and entrusted them to his best men.[12] The loyal former police captain Vakha Arsanov held the Terek Ridge Line. Ruslan Gelayev was charged with the South-Western Front, a quadrilateral defined by the villages Assinovskaya, Novy-Sharoy, Achkhoy-Martan, and Bamut. Dudayev’s twenty-eight-year-old son-in-law Salman Raduyevcommanded the North-Eastern Front centering on the city Gudermes. CommanderRuslan Alikhadziyev[13]of the newly appointed Shali Armored Regimentled the southern front, with its main centers being Shatoyand Shali. Turpal Atgeriyev, a twenty-six-year-old veteran of the Abkhaz War and one of Raduyev’s most trusted men led the South-Eastern Front, centering on Nozhay Yurt. Finally, Shamil Basayev held Grozny. Unfortunately, the government lacked a comprehensive plan to protect the population,[14] and the situation was especially dire in Grozny. Unlike their Chechen neighbors there, the many ethnic Russian residents did not have relatives and friends in the countryside to flee to.
The Russian Headquarters was busily gathering nineteen thousand fresh conscripts from the most diverse branches. Collectively baptized the “Joint Group of the United Forces,”[15] it also included five thousand soldiers from the Interior Ministry to comb the rear for enemies. The army was divided into the West, East, and North groups.[16] West Group started off from Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia to penetrate in three columns, taking up a position at the height of Novy-Sharoy behind the Chechen Terek RidgeLine. From Klizyar, Dagestan, East Group was to reach Tolstoy-Yurt along the Terek River. Finally, North Group in Mozdok, North Ossetia would cross the pro-Russian occupied plains of northern Chechnya to link up with East Group north of Grozny. With one hundred kilometers to the objectives, the operation had a schedule of a couple days. The high command of the Russian military prepared to issue an ultimatum to the leadership and offer amnesty to Chechen troops who surrendered.[17] Afterwards, artillery would clear the way for tanks to finally crush the rest of Dudayev’s “little rebellion”.
However, the commander of the Russian operation Colonel General Eduard Vorobyov refused to lead the plan,[18] dismissing it as “madness”and a dishonor to send the military against citizens Russian considered its own.[19] Grachev promptly dismissed and investigated him, and instead tapped the unquestioning General Anatoly Kvashnin. Vorobyov’s forced resignation quickly led to the replacement of the Military Command of the Caucasus, further disrupting the chain of command which, on the eve of the invasion, was completely “purged.”
There were also important fringes of Parliament, including in the majority, opposed to military intervention. Yegor Gaidar, one of Yeltsin’s closest allies and chairman of the pro-government Democratic Choice of Russia Party,[20] spoke out and brought others from his faction with him.[21] Galina Starovoytova from the Democratic Russia Party was also opposed. Many moderates remained ambivalent though: the newly established center-left Yabloko Party saw heated internal debate between skeptics and those that supported the invasion “in principle” if not in execution.[22] On the right, nationalist movements beat the war drums, particularly Vadim Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party. Opponents argued that using the military was unconstitutional without the government declaring a state of emergency and imposing martial law. According to Article 102 of the Constitution, the president had to consult Parliament to issue the provision, which would likely have been rejected. Supporters of military action, on the other hand, pointed to Articles 80 and 86 as support for Yeltsin’s right to lead the military and his duty to “safeguard the sovereignty” and “integrity of the state.”[23] A public debate could perhaps have steered tanks away from the Caucasus, especially as concerned newspapers all over the world began to cover the matter.[24] But the die was cast, and Yelstin was moving his pieces towards Chechnya.
[1] For more on the November Assault and the events preceding the outbreak of the First Russo-Chechen War, see Volume I of this work.
[2] In a conversation with the author, Ilyas Akhmadov recalled a telegram from the Provisional Council explicitly requesting Yeltsin to intervene. It was signed by Umar Avturkhanov and arrived in Moscow in the first days of December 1994.
[3] One analysis of the beginning of Yeltsin’s political shift: “With the controversial decision to use force to stop the secession of a small ‘province’ of his empire, Yeltsin himself also crossed a political ‘Rubicon,’ from which it will be difficult to go back: that of the alliance with the democratic forces that had supported him from the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 to the bloody battle against the rebel parliament in ’93. . . . After the victory of nationalists and communists in the legislative elections of December ’93, Yeltsin assumed new positions in foreign policy and in the management of economic reforms, thus trying to pander to the opposition, regain popular consent, and maintain power at the next electoral appointments, the legislative ones in a year, the presidential elections in a year and a half.” (Enrico Franceschini, “A Peace Party in Moscow,” La Repubblica, December 19, 1994).
[4] Chechen Foreign Minister Shamsouddin Youssef responded to news of Russia’s likely invasion by demanding Russia to recognize Chechnya’s independence. Otherwise, the Chechens would “fight, and bring war in the Russian Federation.” On the same day, Aslan Maskhadov added that Moscow risked fighting a “new Afghanistan.” First Name Last Name, “Title,” La Repubblica, May 12, 1994.
[5]Aslan Alievich Maskhadov, introduced in Volume I of this work, was born in Shakai, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, and returned to Chechnya with his family in 1957. He enrolled at the Artillery School of Tbilisi in 1972, then perfected himself at the High School of Kalinin Artillery in Leningrad. After his service in Hungary, he transferred to Vilnius and witnessed the Lithuanian independence uprisings. After resigning in 1992, he returned to Chechnya again and entered Dudayev’s service. In November 1993, he replaced Viskhan Sakhabov as chief of the general staff, first on an interim basis, then permanently beginning in March 1994. For a comprehensive biography written by his son Anzor, see Frihetskjemperen: Min far, Tsjetsjenias president.
[6] As Musa Temishev shared in a conversation with the author, Viskhan Shakhabov (extensively discussed in Volume I of this work) could not organize the nascent Chechen armed forces as a result of frictions with President Dudayev that arose between 1992 and 1993. Their disagreements on the methods of acquisition and use of Soviet arsenals paralyzed the Ministry of Defense, which was never officially established, leading to Shakhabov’s resignation.
[7] To be precise, Aslan Maskhadov christened the unit “Naursk Battalion” only in January 1995, during a live television broadcast on the presidential channel. The nom de guerre was a eulogy to Batalov’s units who had fought during the siege of Grozny. According to the commander, the regiment was still a “people’s militia”until the Battle for Grozny: “There were no cadres, there were no officers, there were only groups of people from different villages, commanded by people elected by them, totally on a voluntary basis. People came and went, and no one could order anything from them.”To read more about Apti Batalov and the Naursk Battalion, see the series of articles The General of Naur: Memoirs of Apti Batalov at www.ichkeria.net.
[8] Apti Batalov Aldamovich, born in Kyrgyzstan on October 19, 1956, returned to Chechnya and graduated from the Petroleum Institute of Grozny as a civil engineer. After entering the police force, he served as part of the Ishcherskaya Militia in the Naursk district, becoming its commander on June 20 1994. According to our conversations, until early August he served under District Military Commander Duta Muzaev, Dudayev’s son-in-law. After Muzaev’s return to Gronzy, Batalov became of head of the military administration of the Naursk and Nadterechny districts on September 16, 1994. He was tasked with organizing their defense against raids by the pro-Russia armed opposition.
[9] On 4 December, President Dudayev proclaimed a total mobilization of reservists. All male citizens between the ages of 15 and 60 were summoned, too many to realistically arm and train for the regular forces. Most were sent back to their villages of origin with the task of setting up self-defense militias using light weapons or resorting to hunting weapons.
Regarding the composition and nature of these militias, Ilyas Akhmadov recalled in a conversation with the author in 2022: “During the war there were many local volunteer groups consisting of five or six people, sometimes related to each other. It was very important to find a band that you knew. If you were with someone from your village, street, block, or family, you had a 90% guarantee that they wouldn’t leave your body if killed or injured. If they didn’t know you, they didn’t want you. This was mutually understandable to all: If something happened they would not be able to find the relatives, and for us it was very important to be returned to our families.”
[10] To learn more about the ChRI Air Force and its eventual destruction by Russia, see the in-depth study Green Wolf Stars: the ChRI Air Force on the website www.ichkria.netand consult Volume I of this work.
[11] United States Congress opened debates on 11 December 1994, on financially leveraging Russia to discourage war. Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberan asked for aid to be reevaluated. Their colleague Alfonse D’Amato, argued on 3 January, that this could “send the wrong signal,”although he felt it necessary to express US displeasure at the civilian losses caused by the invasion.
[12] To view the Chechen defense plan, see thematic map A.
[13] Ruslan Alikhadzhiev was born in 1961 in Shali. After completing his military service with the rank of Sergeant, he returned to Chechnya in 1992. He took command of the Shali Armored Regiment in the autumn of 1994, replacing Isa Dalkhaev. At the outbreak of hostilities he organized the recruitment of militia in the Shali district (the “Shali Regiment”).
[14] Anatol Lieven’s first-hand account: “A government plan to feed the population and evacuate the children if the Russians started a siege? I don’t know of any such thing, but if President Dudayev said so, of course it is true,” an official told me in early December 1994, sitting in his deserted office in the municipal offices of the central district of Grozny, . . . “Anyway, it doesn’t matter. We Chechens are such strong people, we will be able to feed ourselves no matter what happens. Is it my responsibility? What do you mean by this? I’m here in my office, right? Don’t you think I will fight to the death to defend my country?” With that he let out a gasp, blowing a breath of vodka in our direction, and with wet fingers lifted a piece of greyish meat from a glass jar on his knees, and fed it to his cat.” Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 34.
[15] The unpreparedness of the federal forces was well known to the military commands, and to the Minister of Defense himself. A few days before the start of the military campaign, Grachev read a top secret directive (No. D-0010) which described “unpreparedness for action of fighting.” Stazys Knezys and Romana Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).
The assessment report drawn up by the office of the North Caucasus Military Region was similar: “Most of the officers are not only unfamiliar with the required combat readiness requirements set out in the control documents, but also do not know how to recognize their personal duties, or what they should do in times of peace or war. Watch officers and units, in most formations inspected, are poorly trained to take practical actions in response to combat commands. The instructions and other control documents are prepared in gross violation of the requirements of the General Staff.” Knezys and Sedlickas, War in Chechnya.
[16] To view the Russian invasion plan, see thematic map B.
[17] The Duma approved a resolution to this effect 13 December 1994.
[18] Grachev’s plan was entirely based on the assumption that a massive deployment of forces would disperse the separatists: “Grachev’s plan and timetable reflect expectations of limited resistance. Little intelligence used and bad planning were to blame… The planning also ignored the experience of loyalist Chechen forces [i.e. thread . Russians] who had attempted to storm Grozny in August , October and November 1994. If that experience had been studied, the Russian command would have been aware of the dangers that faced tank columns in Grozny.”Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001) 11-12.
[19] As Eduard Vorobjev said in an interview with journalist Vitaly Moiseev: “I was shocked by the situation, the units that arrived were completely unprepared, the commanders did not know their subordinates, many of the fighters did not have the necessary professional skills. I turned to the Chief of the General Staff: ‘If you think that a change of command will change the situation for the better, then you are wrong. It’s not about the commander, it’s about the adventurous approach. . . . Approaching me, the Minister of Defense said ‘I am disappointed in you, Colonel General, and I think you should submit your letter of resignation.’ I replied ‘I have it.’… It was not easy for me, a person who served in the armed forces for 38 years, who constantly answered ‘Yes!’ I was faced with a choice: to make a deal with my conscience and deal with completely unprepared people, to conduct an operation not planned by me, or to leave the armed forces, which meant the end of my military career.… It seems to me that Grachev underestimated the moral and psychological state of the Chechens, which had reached fanaticism. The operation was designed to intimidate: they thought that Dudayev would get scared when he saw hundreds of units and thousands of soldiers, and surrender to the victor’s mercy. Indeed, the Chechen side clearly knew where our troops were, what they were doing—information was spreading in all directions.”
[20] To the press Gaidar declared: “I appeal to Yeltsin not to allow a military escalation in Chechnya. The intervention was a tragic mistake. Taking Grozny will cost huge human losses. It will worsen the internal political situation in Russia, it will be a blow to the integrity of the nation, to our democratic achievements, to everything we have achieved in recent years.” Franceschini, “A Peace Party in Moscow.”
[21] Deputy of Democratic Choice Dimitrij Golkogonov’s response to “Why are you against the invasion?”: “Because my party, Choice of Russia, led by the ex-Prime Minister Gajdar, is against violence, against the use of force to solve political problems. In Chechnya there is a leader, Dudayev, who does not want to lose power, thanks to whom he has enriched himself and his friends with the trade of oil. Independence has nothing to do with it. But to attack Dudayev is to make a criminal a popular hero. . . . A negotiation had to be opened. If Yeltsin had invited the Chechens to Moscow, they would have come running.” Enrico Franceschini, “‘Yeltsin Made Wrong Move in Invading But Remains Leader of Russia,’” La Repubblica, December 15, 1994.
[22] Vladimir Lukin, former ambassador to the United States and prominent member of Yabloko, in his January 24, 1995 speech in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote: “The executive branch has shown itself and society that it can act independently, regardless of and in spite of political pressures . . . In an ideal world, the preposterous and dangerous idea that the military should not be used for internal conflicts should be driven out of the heads of our armed forces. . . . Using the army inside the country in extreme situations, when threats to the state appear, is the norm in democratic states. Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
[23] For careful study of this topic see Stuart Goldman and Jim Nichol, Russian Conflict in Chechnya and Implications for the United States (DC: Congressional Research Service, 1995).See also Victoria A. Malko, The Chechen Wars: Responses in Russia and the United States(Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015).
[24] An example from an Italian newspaper: “In the end, like a mountain annoyed by a daredevil mouse, Yeltsin ordered the direct intervention of his troops. Moscow claims that Chechnya is part of Russia, therefore it is its right to occupy it to restore order. For the moment, Western public opinion seems aligned with this position, considering yesterday’s events as an “internal matter” for Russia: for which there are no international complaints, unlike what happened with the invasion of Afghanistan. But if we look at the substance of the Russian military expedition in Chechnya, some resemblance to the Soviet invasion fifteen years ago emerges. . . . The fact remains that Yeltsin does not hesitate to use tanks when he sees that other means (negotiation, economic pressure, support for the local opposition) do not produce results. The propensity to resolve political crises militarily, as a year ago in the tug of war with the rebel Parliament, is a hallmark of his presidency. The future will tell whether Russia needed a “strongman” to become a civilized and democratic nation”. Enrico Franceschini,“Moscow Fears the Kabul Syndrome,” La Repubblica, December 12, 1994.
Let’s go back to 1999. When Russia invaded Chechnya for the second time, where were you? Were you still studying?
At that time I was working in Moscow, at the Central Documentary Film Studio. I was making documentaries. When the war started, I returned to Chechnya to make a film about the war. It was my most dangerous experience, because the aggression was in full swing, they were ready to destroy the entire Chechen people. When Russian troops saw journalists, human rights activists or documentary filmmakers, they hated them and put up all sorts of obstacles, because they were telling the whole world about the atrocities that the Russians were committing in Chechnya. And when the Russian military found out that I was a Chechen, they were ready to shoot me. Several times I was a millimeter away from death. After finishing work on the film, the film was selected at a film festival in North Carolina (USA). In 2000, I left for the USA, where my film received high reviews in the professional community. After that, I began negotiations with American producers about working on a documentary series about the centuries-long struggle of the Chechen people for independence: from Sheikh Mansur to the present day.
nail Sharip collects the Award for the International Festival of Independent Cinema of Naples
What was the American public’s involvement with what was happening in Chechnya?
Ordinary people knew little about Chechnya. They heard something about the war, but knew nothing specific. Journalists and human rights activists knew well. Most Americans are not interested in what is happening outside the United States. According to statistics, only a few percent of voters care about the presidential candidate’s pre-election position on U.S. foreign policy.
In the rhetoric of the current regime of Ramzan Kadyrov I have often heard references to the fact that the independence that was regained then cost the Chechens so much, that even talking about it today is to be considered synonymous with “extremism”. In your opinion, how much did all this weigh in strengthening the Chechens’ support for Kadyrov?
The question of how the values associated with independence and loss influence the support for Ramzan Kadyrov’s regime in Chechnya leads us to deeper reflections on human ideals and motivations. The phrase indicating that independence “cost” the Chechen people too much and that preserving this memory has become synonymous with “extremism” touches upon complex issues of identity and self-awareness. For peoples who have endured wars and trauma, collective ideals are often intertwined with historical memory, built on suffering and struggle. For many Chechens, the memory of war and independence is not merely a historical fact but a part of their identity that legitimizes their sense of community and belonging. However, this perception can become a tool of power when fear and loss are employed to validate authority.
This raises a philosophical question: Do individuals truly hold higher ideals for which they are willing to sacrifice everything, including their lives? In the past, values such as honor, dignity, and justice served as catalysts for revolutions and social changes. In the 18th and 19th centuries, such ideals inspired people to make selfless acts. Yet in the modern world, filled with logic of consumerism and individualism, these ideals may appear indifferent. Nonetheless, those ideals have not disappeared; rather, they have transformed. When facing crises or difficulties, individuals unconsciously seek not only justifications for their actions but also profound values that could support them in those moments. For some, this may be family; for others, freedom; and for some, belonging to their nation and its history. However, under an authoritarian regime like Kadyrov’s, such searches are permeated by fear. The ability to openly defend ideals born from suffering can lead to repression, making individuals more inclined towards conformity.
Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Russian province of Chechnya gestures speaking in Chechnya’s regional capital of Grozny, Russia, Tuesday, March 29, 2022. (AP Photo)
Thus, Kadyrov’s support can be viewed as a product of psychological defense, built before external threats. This does not always indicate ideological support for the ruler; rather, it is a strategic adaptation driven by the desire for survival. Society needs to protect itself from challenges, and at times, supporting an established authority becomes a means of preserving identity and collective memory. Therefore, while the era of high ideals may give way to more pragmatic considerations, the very idea of self-sacrifice and the search for meaning in life remains an inseparable part of human existence. Ultimately, the answer to the question of what drives a person regarding higher ideals largely depends on personal choice, background, and existing context. In this sense, support for Kadyrov is not merely support for a regime, but a complex and multifaceted process where fear, memory, and the search for identity converge.
A splendid reflection, which brings us to another question: can all those who collaborate with Kadyrov be considered “traitors”?
Thank you for your question. This is indeed a very complex issue that touches upon moral and ethical considerations regarding collaboration with a regime. Historical experience shows that different contexts and eras have led to various responses to such situations. During World War II, for example, those who collaborated with the occupiers were often executed immediately. In contrast, in the Baltic countries—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—after over 50 years of occupation, there were no mass executions in 1991. This was largely because a new generation had grown up without knowing life outside the Soviet Union, highlighting how sensitive the topic of survival under occupation is.
Your reflections on who exactly can be considered a “Kadyrovite” are indeed critical. It is essential to emphasize that we cannot label ordinary people, who are forced to survive in difficult conditions and have no connection to the crimes committed by Kadyrov’s gang, as “Kadyrovites.” On the contrary, they are victims of this regime, subjected to the abuses of Kadyrov and his associates. In my view, those who have committed crimes should primarily be held accountable. It is especially important to bring religious leaders who justify Kadyrov’s actions to justice, as their influence on the minds and souls of people can be far more destructive than that of the perpetrators themselves. This is a multifaceted issue, and addressing it requires careful consideration of numerous factors.
In your answer you specifically mentioned “religious leaders”. How are Islamic clergy supporting Kadyrov’s regime?
In various countries, the relationship between the state and the clergy can vary: they either work closely together or, as in the case of Russia, the state uses religious institutions to advance its interests. In Russia, government agencies deploy their agents into the religious sphere, helping them build careers within spiritual organizations. These state representatives are legitimized in religious circles, while the clergy, in turn, serves the interests of the state. This practice is widespread globally, although there may be exceptions. The first official Muslim organization in Russia was established by the decree of Catherine the Great in 1788. The position of the Mufti, the head of Russian Muslims, was created, and the candidate had to be approved by the emperor after being elected by the Muslim community. In the decree, it was explicitly stated that this organization was established in the interest of the Russian state. Since then, little has changed: just as the state controlled the religious life of its citizens in the past, it continues to do so today.
Before the 1917 revolution, Russian intelligence services infiltrated their agents into religious institutions, and after the revolution, the Soviet government created its own educational institutions—Orthodox seminaries and Islamic madrasas—where future preachers, often intelligence officers, were trained. It was impossible to receive a religious education in the Soviet Union without KGB approval. Those who believe Russia has lost its grip in this area are mistaken. In fact, Russia has expanded its influence: for example, graduates of the Islamic faculty at the University of Damascus in Syria are under the control of Russian intelligence, particularly the GRU. It’s no secret that the GRU has a base in Syria, and it’s no surprise that several dozen graduates of this university work within Ramzan Kadyrov’s circle, justifying his actions both in Chechnya and in Ukraine from a religious perspective. Undoubtedly, this situation needs to change, and the Islamic world is in dire need of reforms. However, those who benefit from the current state of affairs will fiercely defend it. A striking example is the case of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was forced to flee due to threats to his life for his political views. He was brutally murdered and dismembered at the Saudi consulate in Turkey when he came to obtain a new passport. His last tweet was deeply symbolic: “The Islamic world is in great need of democratic reforms.”
The central Mosque of Grozny
So, if the Islamic clergy is all, more or less, infiltrated or managed by the secret services, does this mean that Islam cannot be a unifying force in the movement for the independence of the North Caucasus? And if so, what force, in your opinion, can be a unifying element?
There’s no need to invent a new unifying idea for the peoples of the North Caucasus in their struggle for independence. That idea has long existed and remains clear. Just as 100 years ago, when the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus, the Mountain Republic, was created, today the peoples of the North Caucasus simply want to live freely on their own land, in accordance with their traditions and culture. It is the national liberation movement of different peoples that unites them in this struggle, just as it did a century ago. This deeply rooted desire for self-determination and the preservation of their identity continues to be the strongest unifying force. The fight for freedom and sovereignty has always been the common thread binding the diverse peoples of the region. The historical past of the struggle against occupation, repression, and genocide by the Russian Empire is indeed a key unifying factor for the peoples of the Caucasus. This past is connected to numerous tragic events and struggles for survival, creating a common platform for the recognition of themselves as oppressed peoples.
Common Experience of Oppression: All the peoples of the Caucasus have faced similar confrontations with imperial power, fostering a sense of solidarity. Memories of brutal repression, genocide, and occupation deepen the understanding of a shared fate and suffering.
Identity and Memory: Preserving the historical memory of the struggle against colonial oppression strengthens the identity of each people. In this context, shared history becomes the foundation for recognizing their rights and striving for freedom.
Culture and Language: Common cultural elements, folklore, and language also serve as connecting links. These aspects often bring a sense of unity to the fight for justice and independence.Historical memory serves as motivation for consolidating efforts to protect rights and freedoms.
Thus, the shared historical experience of fighting against oppression becomes a solid basis for forming a united front among the peoples of the Caucasus, allowing them to focus on common goals without sacrificing the interests of one people to the detriment of another.
Every project for the birth of a new state needs its own intrinsic “usefulness” for those governments that, from the outside, should give it legitimacy with their recognition. In this sense, what “usefulness” do you see for a Confederation of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus?
The answer to the question about the purpose of establishing a government in exile for the Confederation of the North Caucasus starts with recognizing the limitations of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. It is a small territory that cannot play a significant role in shaping global geopolitics. In today’s world, if you are not part of a larger force shaping the future geopolitical landscape, it is nearly impossible to change existing borders in a way that would grant independence to the Chechen people. The Chechen Republic lacks access to the Black Sea and does not occupy any strategically important transport corridors, which is why our struggle for independence did not fall within the interests of major geopolitical players. However, our struggle has been subject to political manipulation. For example, Saudi Arabia tried to leverage the Chechen issue for its own interests, offering Putin a deal to resolve the Chechen independence question in exchange for Russian withdrawal from Syria. This demonstrates how external powers can exploit national movements for their own agendas.
But when we talk about the creation of the Confederation of the North Caucasus, the geopolitical calculus changes dramatically. Such a state becomes highly attractive because it addresses several key geopolitical problems that have emerged during the war in Ukraine. If the Confederation of the North Caucasus is formed, Russia would lose access to the Black Sea, which directly aligns with Ukraine’s interests. Without its naval base in the Black Sea, Russia would no longer pose a constant maritime threat to Ukraine. Europe and the U.S. are also interested in this outcome, as they do not wish to see the total collapse of Russia, which could lead to China’s expansion into the Far East and further strengthen its influence. The West is also concerned about the potential chaos that could arise from Russia’s breakup, especially given that Russia is the largest country in the world, covering more than 10% of the world’s land area. Furthermore, there is fear over Russia’s nuclear facilities and, most critically, the risk that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of third-party states or terrorist organizations.
The creation of the Confederation of the North Caucasus would address several of these challenges at once. By losing access to the Black Sea, Russia would be reduced from a global power to a regional one, which is something the entire world is interested in. A regional Russia would be forced to focus on containing China and managing its nuclear arsenal. Without nuclear weapons, Russia would not be able to effectively counter China’s influence. Additionally, Ukraine would no longer face the threat of Russia’s naval base in the Black Sea, and Turkey would emerge as the dominant power in the region. In this way, the establishment of the Confederation of the North Caucasus aligns with the interests of multiple countries, including the U.S., Europe, Ukraine, and Turkey, all of whom share a vested interest in transforming Russia from a global to a regional power. This shift is crucial for maintaining stability and ensuring a balanced global order.
Could a confederation of the North Caucasus also be an opportunity for Russia?
The separation of the North Caucasus from Russia can indeed be seen as an opportunity for a new Russia. This scenario could facilitate the necessary transformation of the country towards a democratic state, which is urgently needed. Moreover, the separation of the Caucasus could increase the rating of those Russian politicians who manage to implement such a course. Given the growing anti-Caucasian sentiments in society, the separation of the region might be perceived as a populist step, allowing them to garner support among a segment of Russian citizens dissatisfied with the current situation.
Couldn’t an independent Caucasus easily become a client state of Türkiye?
Turkey is certainly an important player in the region with whom we will establish partnership relations, but at this stage other NATO countries are also helping us in the implementation of this project. Naturally, in the future we hope to become part of NATO, and with the partners who will help in the implementation of this project, we will have allied relations.
Inal Sharip is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ichkeria. Born in 1971, he is a chess champion, a film director and producer, and between the first and second Chechen wars he was Deputy Minister of Culture and head of the Film Department.
Being born in 1971, You had the opportunity to observe the evolution of the situation in Chechnya from the independence until the outbreak of the war in 1994. What was the climate in the country in those years? And what impression did you have of Dudaev’s government?
I lived in Grozny until I graduated from university in 1993. Then I went to Moscow to take my first steps in the cinema. I remember Grozny as an ordinary post-Soviet city no different from other cities in the former USSR or Eastern Europe. As in other cities of the post-Soviet space there was an economic difficult situation. But Dzhokhar Dudayev began to stimulate medium and small businesses and abolished taxes and duties on imported goods. Direct flights were also established from Grozny to cities in the United Arab Emirates and other cities in eastern countries from where the goods were transported. Thanks to this Grozny became in a short time the trade center of the North Caucasus.
When the war started, I was in Moscow, taking my first steps in documentary filmmaking. Many things fade from memory, but what I remember well is the anxiety of realizing that terrible events were coming. Many of my feelings were portrayed in one of my first movies, “My Grozny City”. The piercing pain of what was done to my hometown, which remained only in my memory.
Inal Sharip, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ichkeria
How did you spend the two years of war? And what did you do after?
At the first opportunity I came to Grozny. I established a secret connection with Akhmed Zakayev. (I met Akhmed Zakayev when I was writing music for the theater, in 1992. We were introduced by our mutual friend, Hussein Guzuev, a theater director. Before the war, Dzhokhar Dudayev appointed him director of television and he was one of the first to be killed at the beginning of the First Chechen War. Akhmed was then a theater artist and became at first chairman of the Chechen Union of Theater Workers. A few months before the war started, Dzhokhar Dudayev appointed Zakayev Minister of Culture. When the war started, Akhmed led the people’s militia.) And he coordinated his activities while in Moscow and Grozny. After the first war, Akhmed returned to work as Minister of Culture and invited me to be Deputy Minister.
Akhmed appointed me head of the Department of Cinematography of the Chechen Republic with the rank of Deputy Minister of Culture. I worked there for about a year. Maskhadov then created a commission on education, science and culture (a prototype of the UNESCO commission) to work on accession and cooperation with UNESCO, and to search for and return cultural property from museums that the Russians had illegally exported to Russia in violation of all international conventions. I was appointed head of this commission. Before leaving Chechnya, I was in charge of this commission.
I was the only member of the commission. It was I who initiated the creation of this commission, because we had to enter international organizations, and UNESCO was an organization we could enter, although without the right to vote in this organization at the first stage. In addition, the Russians have taken many museum exhibits out of Chechnya. Including paintings, a collection of 17th-18th century edged weapons, etc. It was necessary to track them down and return them. The international UNESCO conventions that regulate this kind of situation were an ideal tool, given that Russia had ratified all UNESCO conventions. Maskhadov wrote a decree creating this commission and appointing me to head it. Other than that, I received nothing, no funding, no office, nothing. Few among the military at that time understood the significance of this organization. At that time, everything was focused on the military aspect. That’s why I couldn’t hire people. I could work without a salary, other people could not.
Akhmed Zakayev in 1996
Speaking of the period between 1996 and 1999, what was your impression of the situation? In your opinion, was the Maskhadov government doing a good job? What was the general opinion of the people, in your opinion?
This is one of the most difficult periods in the history of modern Chechnya. Of course, Maskhadov’s government was not ideal, but we must understand the situation it found itself in. Russia was secretly preparing for a second war. It was actively recruiting agents from among the supporters of independence. It was deliberately corrupting Chechen officials. Russian special services were in direct contact with independent commanders of military units, persuading them to commit criminal acts. Russian agents in the Middle East, who specialize in working in the Islamic world, were redirected to Chechnya to split Chechen society along religious lines. In the conditions of post-war devastation and economic crisis, Russia managed to split Chechen society. Of course, at that time few people understood what was really happening. I also did not understand and did not like many things, so in 1998 I left Chechnya and returned to film production.
Now that we have collected information, we see how many FSB agents have infiltrated Chechen society, and we can draw conclusions. Suffice it to say that the Chief Mufti of Chechnya Kadyrov was an FSB agent, but no one talked about it at the time, and the leaders of Chechnya trusted him. In addition, it should be noted that few in Maskhadov’s government understood how world politics actually worked, both in the West and in the East, since there was no international experience. There was no information, no Internet. There was great trust in the Muslim world, based on the myth of the Muslim Brotherhood, but there was no understanding that the governments and intelligence services of most Muslim countries were using religion for their own political and geopolitical interests. Perhaps historians will analyze this period of Chechen history more deeply in the future, but today we can say for sure that Maskhadov was under great pressure from all sides, primarily with the goal of splitting Chechen society.
Boris Eltsin and Vladimir Putin
In 1999, Russia invaded Chechnya for the second time. Shortly before, Vladimir Putin had appeared on the political scene. Do you remember how public opinion experienced his rise to power?
At that time, Russians were tired of crime, corruption and disorder. It seems that discrimination against democracy was deliberate and directed by someone. Of course, what happened in Russia in the nineties has nothing to do with democracy, but it was presented to the people as democratic processes. That is why the people began to miss a strong authoritarian leader, like Stalin, Andropov and others who were leaders of the USSR. A situation was created when the people wanted to get their master back, who would determine their fate for them. In exchange, the new master had to restore order and feed the people. That is why the explosions of apartment buildings, Putin’s harsh rhetoric, all this is part of the scenario of creating a new authoritarian leader of Russia. It should be noted, I say this as a director, that Putin was not the best candidate for this role. He does not have natural charisma. But the circumstances developed in such a way that he was chosen as a collective decision of several influential groups in the Kremlin.
Putin, at the beginning of his career, was a compromise figure for different Kremlin clans. Every Russian billionaire or oligarch has a KGB-FSB general as his head of security. The KGB-FSB nominated three presidential candidates: Primakov, Stepashin, Putin. All of them were from the KGB and all of them were presidential candidates. The least known person, who did not have his own team and was considered harmless for different clans, was Putin, and he was elected. In 25 years, he created his clan, dealt with other clans and now he is the undisputed master in the Kremlin. The problem is that over these 25 years, Russian propaganda has been cultivating Great Russian chauvinism in the people. Chauvinism is constantly present in the Russian people, so cultivating Great Russian chauvinism in the people was not difficult. Putin has created for himself a Putin electorate, which was created for the greatness of Russia, the successor of the tsarist empire, the Soviet empire. Therefore, having removed one tsar, the people will in any case want another tsar and demand revenge for the defeat in Ukraine. Quite recently, Putin said in an interview that the collapse of the USSR is a great geopolitical tragedy. He said this because this is the mood of the people and he expressed the opinion of the Russian people. Therefore, the matter is much more complicated than in one person.
Yes, for a period of time for several years the war may stop, but then preparations for a military revenge in Ukraine will begin. Russians will never forgive the defeat in Ukraine. Just as they could not forgive the defeat from Chechnya in 1996. When they signed a peace treaty with Chechnya, at the same moment they began to prepare for the Second Chechen War. The same will happen in Ukraine. Russia must lose and transform into another democratic state. For example, the leader of the Russian opposition Navalny, who was killed in prison, did not recognize Crimea as Ukrainian. Because in the future he planned to participate in the presidential election campaign, and he must be guided by the opinion of the people. And 90 percent of the population of Russia considers Crimea to be Russia.
So, if I understand correctly, power in Russia is organized as an alliance of clans, and the President is the one who “moderates” the relations between clans. And in this system the FSB is a “clanized” apparatus or is it in competition with these clans?
This was the case before the war in Ukraine. Each major clan had its own people in the FSB leadership. But there was also an FSB clan that included both former and current FSB officers. All this was done with Putin’s approval. Putin was interested in creating a situation where different clans opposed him, and he was at the center of this structure and was an arbiter. In this way, he ensures his own security, and the clans were interested in Putin. But the war in Ukraine changed the balance of power in Russia. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow had a particular impact on these changes. Today, the FSB controls almost everything in Russia. With Shoigu’s departure from the Ministry of Defense, the FSB began a purge of generals and thus the FSB took control of the army. The only person the FSB cannot defeat yet is Kadyrov. Putin supports Kadyrov so that at least someone inside Russia would oppose the FSB. But I assume that the FSB will achieve its goal, and sooner or later the FSB will defeat Kadyrov.
Ramzan Kadyrov hugs Vladimir Putin
Why, in your opinion, does it (the FSB) not control Kadyrov?
Because Putin is interested in this. Putin knows what the KGB and the FSB are, and he knows that they can play their game at any moment. Putin and his clan have stolen hundreds of billions of dollars. Some “patriotic” generals may not like this, and they may try to stage a coup. Therefore, he is trying to minimize the risks. To do this, he must separate the different clans and do everything so that they do not unite. There are Chechen generals in the FSB who have always served Russia and whom the FSB would like to put in charge of Chechnya. But the FSB is not succeeding, because Putin has placed his bet on Kadyrov, whom he allows to commit any crimes, which helps strengthen him. The FSB was counting on the fact that Ramzan Kadyrov and his father are temporary workers, whom they are temporarily using to transfer the Chechen people’s struggle for independence from Russia into a civil war between Chechens. Kadyrov is not a career FSB employee, he is pursuing his own independent policy in the republic, which the FSB does not like.
In this regard, clashes between the FSB and Kadyrov’s men are constantly taking place in Russia, in which Putin has to act as an arbitrator. But so far there has not been a single situation where Putin has infringed on Kadyrov’s interests. The FSB expects that Putin will have to hand over Kadyrov sooner or later. But there is no doubt that Putin will have to choose between the FSB and Kadyrov. The FSB is getting stronger because of the war in Ukraine and is a state-forming institution, so I have no doubt that they will defeat Kadyrov in the future.
What role did Aushev play in the restoration of the Ingush state? And how is he seen today?
Aushev is a military man and obeys orders. The first thing he did when he became president was to ban all political organizations and establish a barracks regime in the republic. He created the conditions for corruption. He divided the Ingush people into three parts: the “Ingush” Ingush, who lived on the uncontested part of the land, the “Chechen” Ingush, who were forced to leave Grozny, and the “Ossetian” Ingush, who were expelled from North Ossetia after the ethnocide by the Russian army.
He violated Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia: he gave up the ancestral territories of Ingushetia and the city of Vladikavkaz by signing the so-called “Kislovodsk Treaties”. He did this under pressure from Yeltsin, who threatened to remove him from the presidency for the next term. There is video evidence of this. I don’t remember exactly when I wrote this comment on Facebook, but it concerns Aushev.
“All those who criticize Aushev for the Kislovodsk/Nalchik agreement, for the pocket parliament, for the barracks regime, for dancing at Ossetian government meetings, for abandoning the right bank of Vladikavkaz, for corruption, for jumping off personnel, for populism …. First of all, everyone has the right to criticize, because he is not a private person, but a public person, and every public person is subject to criticism; secondly, or rather, above all, all critics are right, because they tell the TRUTH. He led the republic built by us, the ancients, not as a general, but as a sergeant. Aushev was a talented but uneducated man, and that is why he drove all serious and worthy, educated and professional Ingush out of politics and business, placing himself alongside sycophants and other amateurs.”
Ruslan Aushev
So Aushev “sold” legitimate Ingush claims in order to avoid a conflict with Moscow. Considering what you told me about Dudayev’s decision not to pander to Yeltsin, don’t you think Aushev’s decision was wiser than Dudayev’s? A compromise to avoid ethnocide? Or do you think it could have been done differently?
Aushev took office after the ethnocide. It is very difficult to negotiate with the imperial Kremlin. It is necessary to be politically flexible. A good example of this was the President of Tatarstan Shaimiev Mintimer Sharipovich. Aushev violated Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia in order to retain his office as president, or more precisely, to extend it for a second term. Dudayev opted for open confrontation in the hope of gaining international support. Both generals knew how to wage war.
Aushev was in Afghanistan as an infantryman and put himself in real danger. Dudayev was the commander of a squadron of strategic bombers from the “carpet bombing” era, but neither of them understood anything about politics. As Krylov’s fable says: “It’s a disaster when a cobbler starts baking cakes and a baker starts grinding boots.”
Do you therefore think that the leadership in both the case of Ingushetia and Chechnya was not the right one to achieve “separation” from Moscow? Do you think that there were better people at the time who could have handled the situation better?
Yes, certainly. For example, Salambek Naibovich Khadzhiev in Chechnya and Bembulat Bersovich Bogatyrev in Ingushetia. I knew Khadzhiyev personally. An academic, an intellectual. An experienced person who didn’t need to improve his image because he was a seasoned personality. It is the hotheads who slander him. Unlike many others, Khadzhiyev was “capable of judgment” (according to Kant), and he never followed the euphoric, apparent freedom of the Chechens and did not declare independence, but used his authority to improve the lives of his people step by step, taking more and more powers away from Moscow… until the empire weakened. Khadzhiyev would not have sacrificed the Chechen people to the Russian barbarians.
The empire has never allowed people who were not loyal to it to lead the colonies. I said at the beginning of our conversation that I consider the declaration of independence to be a tragic mistake that was a catastrophe not only for the Chechen people, but also for the entire national and liberation movement in the Caucasus.
The military should not interfere in politics: it usually ends badly. But you can’t change it, history doesn’t tolerate the subjunctive. With the right tactics towards Moscow, the people I mentioned would have achieved results slowly, without losses, gradually gaining more and more independence, distancing themselves from the Kremlin and gaining strength, coordinating their actions with other peoples in the Caucasus and taking the path of DECOLONIZATION.
Do you believe that Salambek Khadzhiyev really wanted Chechnya to be independent? And as for the need to avoid a break with Moscow: Don’t you think that, given the way things developed in the following years, Chechnya’s independence would have been impossible to achieve if Russia had overcome its period of weakness?
You and I are talking about what could have been. In principle, this is only necessary in order to understand the processes that have taken place. The past must be known for the future. That is clear. Besides, it makes no sense to compare Dudayev and Khadzhiyev. We are talking about facts here. It is a fact that the Chechens declared independence under the leadership of Dudayev! Did they achieve it? NO. This is an indisputable fact.
As it turned out later in his interview, he knew very well what would happen in the future and even predicted it. He knew that a military confrontation with Russia was unwinnable. He knew that, and yet he took the risk. Dudayev did not achieve his goal! The Chechen people suffered heavy losses and fell under the yoke of Kadyrov, who was loyal to the Kremlin. The Russian empire was not weak in the years 1991-1998. Its economy was weak but its imperial face remained unchanged, although Yeltsin managed to fool the world into believing that Russia could be a democratic state. This will never happen.
The Russian empire will only get weaker now that it has gone to war against Ukraine. Now is the time when the colonized peoples, if they work together in harmony, can embark on the path of decolonization with the support of the Western democratic world. This includes the creation of a sovereign state. Thirty years ago, this was still impossible.
Salambek Khadzhiyev
More about Khadzhiyev. After Dudayev came to power, Khadzhiyev represented the opposition and led the “collaboration government” with Moscow for a while during the war. Do you think this was the right choice for him? Wouldn’t it have been better not to lead this government?
Khadzhiyev, who knew the history of the Russian Empire well and understood that a tragic mistake had been made that would inflict great losses on the Chechen people and thwart the dream of freedom for many years, could not remain indifferent to the tragedy that was rapidly approaching his people and tried everything to prevent this catastrophe. But a man in a stately general’s uniform, who spoke in a confident and authoritarian voice about the freedom of the Chechen spirit and called for death in the fight for it, was more attractive than a thoughtful intellectual who called for a cautious confrontation with the monster that had oppressed many peoples for many years.
The calm voice and the calls of the thinking people for sensible action were easily drowned out by the general’s slogan “Freedom or death”. Intoxicated by the apparent proximity of long-awaited freedom, the crowd chose death. Khadzhiyev was not a collaborator. Like me and many other thinking Chechens, he was sure that this monster could not be defeated alone and tried to save his people from disaster.
On October 23, 1995, Khadzhiyev resigned from the government he had formed and was replaced by Zavgaev. In light of this event, do you not believe that Khadzhiyev (without judging the nobility of his soul) was more a pawn of Moscow than an asset to the Chechen people? Under his rule, the federal forces committed numerous atrocities, which Khadzhiyev apparently had to endure, and after him, power passed to the old head of the Chechen Republic, who, as far as I know, was now hated by everyone.
Khadzhiyev did not allow himself to be manipulated by anyone. He was a true Chechen for whom the terms “honor” and “human dignity” were not empty words. In September 1991, S. Khadzhiyev led the movement for democratic reforms in Chechnya-Ingushetia and on the eve of the first presidential elections of the Chechen Republic in November 1991 was considered Dudayev’s main rival, but refused to take part in the elections and subsequently work in the government formed by the Chechen National Congress (OKCHN). In 1992, he again turned down the OKCHN’s offer to become Prime Minister of the Chechen government. This was because he was against Dudayev and Yandarbiyev, who were driving the people to tragedy. Khadzhiyev tried to prevent the impending catastrophe. A few days before the Russian aggression began, he tried to end the unrest and chaos in Chechnya and lead the government. But the federal troops, as you rightly pointed out, committed atrocities. Precisely because he refused to be manipulated by Moscow, he was replaced by Zavgaev.
Zavgaev was there before Khadzhiev. The Moscow puppet was ready to carry out any order from the Kremlin. In 1991, I headed the Ingush State Theater, which I had founded, and Zavgaev wanted me to join his team, invited me to run as a deputy for the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, but in 1989, at the Second Ingush People’s Congress, I withdrew and distanced myself from political activity because I did not agree with the path I had chosen. But that’s another topic.
Doku Zavgaev
Doku Zavgaev: What do you think of him? Is he a man who tried to save Chechnya from war, or a weak politician who just wanted to exploit the situation for his own personal gain?
Zavgaev was an obedient lackey of Moscow. He was only interested in himself. He tried to get anyone who was popular with the people on his side. In short, he bought those who could be bought.
Back to the war. How did the Ingush deal with the Russian invasion of Chechnya? Didn’t the Ingush also declare independence after the end of the invasion in 1996 with the withdrawal of the Moscow army?
Ingushetia served as logistical support for the Chechen resistance fighters. The families of the Chechen resistance fighters were safe in Ingushetia. Wounded resistance fighters were treated in Ingushetia. Although the Republic of Ingushetia officially belonged to Russia, the Ingush strongly supported the Chechen resistance and their Chechen brothers. Individual Ingush also took part in the war against the Russian occupiers on the side of the Chechens.
What were the relations between Ingushetia and Chechnya between the end of the first and the beginning of the second war? Did the scourge of abductions also affect Ingushetia? Were there crises during this period because the borders between Ingushetia and Ichkeria could not be defined?
Despite constant provocations and attempts by the colonial authorities to divide and divide these two related peoples, all their efforts were in vain. The Chechen and Ingush people learned not to transfer the actions of politicians and the government, the lackeys of the Kremlin, to the relations between Chechens and Ingush. These attempts have continued throughout the ages, starting with the Russo-Caucasian War.
The merits of Presidents Dudayev and Aushev can be seen in the fact that they did not raise the issue of the border and postponed the resolution of these questions until better times. Chechen resistance fighters who had entered the territory of Ingushetia were arrested by the Ingushetian army and police and transferred to Chechnya with the request not to transfer the fight with the Russians to the territory of Ingushetia.
For two years, Russia has succeeded in changing the mood of the Western community from sympathy to antipathy towards the Chechens through “special operations” with hostage-taking, especially of foreign aid organizations. Who would sympathize with bandits who cut off the heads of people who wanted to help them? In the period between the first and second wars, I was often in Chechnya with German doctors. We brought wounded children to Germany to be treated free of charge. When we visited the Chechen Republic, Maskhadov, whom I knew personally, always gave us an armed escort. In a country devastated by war, there were always people who took hostages for money. Moscow provided considerable resources for this. There were no mass hostage-takings for ransom in Ingushetia.
Although the Dudayev government did not help the Ingush with either people or weapons during the ethnocide of the Ingush people in 1992, although it sent and received a delegation to North Ossetia twice and assured the Ossetian leadership of non-interference … basically betrayed the fraternal people and got them into trouble … there were no complaints or reproaches from the Ingush other than resentment. On the contrary, everyone understood that the Chechens had been provoked.
Dzhokhar Dudaev
You have described the hostage crisis in Chechnya as an instrument controlled by Russia to distance Chechnya from the West. In your opinion, were the apartment explosions of 1999, which justified the second invasion of Chechnya, also organized by the Russian government?
Yes, it was an initiative of the Russian secret services to discredit the Chechens. Irena Brezna, a Swiss writer of Slovakian origin, published a memo from the Analytical Center of the Russian Federation, in which the necessity and methods of discrediting the Chechen people and their struggle for freedom were pointed out. There were direct instructions on how to proceed and that no expense should be spared. One of the well-known facts confirming these methods is the murder of a humanitarian affairs expert from the American Soros Foundation, US citizen Fred Cuney, his translator Galina Oleynik and two employees of the Russian Committee of the Red Cross who were accompanying them. The Chechen State Security Service was held responsible for the murder.
In the interwar period, I witnessed such propaganda activities at the Russian embassy in Germany, where a video was shown of Chechens cutting off the heads of Russian mercenaries. This video certainly had a shocking effect on the German public.
Yes, of course houses in Russia were blown up by the FSB itself. There is a book by KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was murdered by Putin in London with polonium, and by historian Yuri Felshtinsky entitled “The FSB blows up Russia”.
Akhmat Kadyrov. What kind of person was he? Did the Ingush know him? What was their opinion of him and how did it change over time?
As a rule, the spiritual leaders in Russia were KGB officers. I don’t know whether Akhmat Kadyrov was one. After he became the spiritual leader of the people, he first called for the killing of Russians. He promised paradise to anyone who killed as many Russian attackers as possible. And then he sided with the Russians and became the first president of the already conquered Chechnya? Strange metamorphosis!
As far as I know, the Ingush had no time for Mufti Kadyrov. In any case, Kadyrov senior betrayed the Chechen people or, in the opinion of others, saved the Chechen people from annihilation. I don’t know. The Ingush, like all other peoples of the world, have the same attitude towards traitors.
Kadyrov senior asked for money to rebuild the destroyed city of Grozny under his control (I heard him talk about it personally on a TV program). Moscow wanted to manage the money itself… Akhmat Kadyrov became an uncomfortable figure; he was too independent. The empire doesn’t need such people, so they liquidated him and installed Kadyrov Jr. who hadn’t even finished school. Kadyrov Jr. became Putin’s loyal ‘foot soldier’, killing his enemies (Politkovskaya, Nemtsov) and terrorizing the Chechen people!
Akhmat Kadyrov with Vladimir Putin
After the death of Akhmat Kadyrov, power in Chechnya passed to his son Ramzan after a brief interregnum. How did relations between Ingush and Chechens develop during his dictatorship?
The Kremlin and Kadyrov, as well as Ingush appointees such as FSB General Zyazikov and GRU General Yevkurov, have done the bidding of their masters in the Kremlin. They have tried to sow enmity between our peoples. In Chechnya, for example, information has been spread at government level that the Ingush are profiting from Chechen refugees by renting unsuitable premises for accommodation for hundreds of dollars, etc.
In 2018, on the Kremlin’s instructions, they carried out a provocation to cede Ingush territories to the Chechen Republic. It’s not just a question of land. It is about the history of the people, the graves of their ancestors and everything that is important for the self-confidence of the Ingush. Yevkurov and Kadyrov reached an agreement and drew the border between Ingush and Chechens, so that an original part of Ingushetia went to Chechnya. The protests of the Ingush were widely felt. The Kremlin had long wanted to shed blood to separate these two peoples. But the Ingush police did not allow any retaliatory measures to be taken against the demonstrators. This happened in 2018, and the leaders of this protest were sentenced to draconian punishments and are in prison. And there is no one in world public opinion who cares about this injustice.
Of course, this provocation has not left both peoples unscathed, and relations between Chechens and Ingush have become more difficult.
But the Chechens, Ingush and other colonized peoples of the Caucasus must unite and establish their own state.
The empire does not tolerate any criticism, let alone any demands from colonized peoples.
The Empire is afraid of the unification of the colonized peoples and their national freedom movement and will therefore do everything to ensure that the peoples of the Caucasus have reason not to trust each other. Even better if they come into conflict with each other.
It is time for all the colonized peoples of the Caucasus to realize that they are not full and equal citizens of Russia. When we realize this, we will want to free ourselves from this oppression. The genetic inability to be a slave forces us to resist the position of a slave. The national liberation struggle will begin. The Chechens have tried to go it alone, have shown courage and will, have suffered heavy losses and have not reached the goal. All the peoples of the Caucasus must unite and take the path of decolonization together, because this is the path to the creation of a common independent pan-Caucasian state.
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