Taymaz Taysumovich Abubakarov was born on April 16, 1948 in Kazakhstan, where his family had been deported alongside the entire Chechen nation under Stalin’s 1944 mass deportations. After the rehabilitation of the Chechen people, his family returned to Chechnya, where he grew up in Grozny.
He initially worked as a mechanic at Grozny’s TETs-2 thermal power plant before pursuing higher education in economics at Moscow State University (MGU). He completed his studies with distinction and later earned the academic degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences. Upon returning to Grozny, Abubakarov embarked on an academic career at the Chechen-Ingush State University, rising to the post of First Vice-Rector. His research specialized in the economic and demographic dynamics of the North Caucasus, earning him respect as a regional development expert.
Entry into Politics and Early Career
During the period of perestroika, Abubakarov became involved in the Chechen national movement. As early as 1985, he was an active member of the organizations “Dosh” and “Nokhchicho”, which advocated Chechen sovereignty. He briefly served in the economic administration under Doku Zavgaev during the final phase of the Soviet administration in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic.
After General Dzhokhar Dudaev led the Chechen Republic to declare independence in 1991, Abubakarov was appointed Minister of Economy and Finance on October 27, 1991. His appointment was part of Dudaev’s strategy to balance revolutionary legitimacy with the need for capable technocratic leadership.
Doku Zavgaev
Economic Policies and Challenges
As minister, Abubakarov faced the enormous challenge of establishing an independent economic system in a collapsing post-Soviet environment. He proposed a mixed economy model: allowing private ownership while maintaining state control over key strategic sectors. This approach aimed to stabilize Ichkeria’s fragile economy and shield it from Russia’s impending blockade.
However, tensions soon emerged between Abubakarov and Dudaev, particularly over economic control. Dudaev maintained tight personal oversight over sectors such as oil exports. Abubakarov also opposed Dudaev’s attempts to launch a national currency (The “Nahar”), which were instead handled by Central Bank Governor Usman Imaev. In his memoirs (The Dudaev Regime: Truth and Lies, available HERE), Abubakarov describes the severe economic crisis gripping the republic in 1992-1993, including hyperinflation, speculative black-market pricing, and the collapse of state revenues. Attempts by Dudaev to subsidize basic food items proved unsustainable, aggravating the fiscal strain.
The Chechen national currency project, the Nahar
Involvement in Pre-War Diplomacy (1994)
In December 1994, with tensions escalating towards open war, Dudaev appointed Abubakarov to lead Ichkeria’s delegation in negotiations with Russian representatives in Vladikavkaz. Despite his position as Finance Minister rather than Foreign Minister, Abubakarov was chosen based on Dudaev’s personal trust and pragmatism. The Chechen delegation offered major concessions, including dismantling irregular armed formations, provided Russia agreed to withdraw its military forces first. Meanwhile, Moscow supported both negotiations and an escalating military buildup, leading Abubakarov to accuse Russia of duplicity.
The talks were further complicated by the presence of a second, pro-Moscow Chechen delegation representing the so-called “Provisional Council.” Figures like Bektimar Baskhanov and Bislan Gantamirov appeared at the negotiations, highlighting Moscow’s attempt to foster an alternative Chechen leadership.
On December 14, 1994, as head of the Chechen Working Commission, Abubakarov signed an official statement reaffirming Chechnya’s position: disarmament would proceed only after full Russian troop withdrawal. Nevertheless, the negotiations collapsed, and Russia launched its full-scale invasion on December 11, 1994. Shortly thereafter, Abubakarov was replaced in the negotiation team by Prosecutor General Usman Imaev.
The Council of Ministers of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (formerly “Sovmin”)
Corruption Allegations and Dismissal
As the war unfolded, accusations of corruption began to surround Abubakarov:
Prominent Chechen politician Musa Temishev accused him of massive misappropriation of state resources, calling him “one of Ichkeria’s most notorious looters.”
Russian journalist Yuri Shchekochikhin reported on a 1993 contract in which Abubakarov authorized the purchase of five metric tons of pure gold from Yakutia for 2.78 billion rubles, raising serious suspicions regarding the transaction’s legitimacy.
Abubakarov increasingly centralized control over export licenses, oil contracts, credit allocation, and financial institutions.
In 1995, President Dudaev dismissed Abubakarov on charges of financial misconduct. Following his removal, Abubakarov relocated to Moscow, where he lived in quiet exile, completely withdrawing from public life.
Memoirs and Historical Testimony
In 1998, Abubakarov published his memoirs, The Dudaev Regime: Truth and Lies, offering valuable firsthand insights into Ichkeria’s early governance, internal conflicts, and economic policies. The book serves both as a crucial historical source and as his personal defense against corruption allegations.
Later Life and Current Status
Following his exile, Abubakarov disappeared from the public scene. According to public real estate records, since 1998 he has owned an apartment in Moscow. As of 2024, no official records of his death exist. He is presumed alive at age 77. He has not participated in political, media, or social activities since the late 1990s.
Extensive searches in Russian archives, media, and historical forums confirm that no verified photographs of Abubakarov are publicly available. His image remains absent from media databases, official archives, and the Ichkeria.net Name Index.
Final Remarks
Taymaz Abubakarov’s personal journey exemplifies the turbulent fate of many Ichkerian leaders. From academia to state-building under extreme conditions, from internal power struggles to exile, his career reflects the complex realities of Ichkeria’s struggle for independence. Decades later, his role remains significant for historians analyzing the republic’s internal political dynamics and its economic challenges in the face of overwhelming adversity.
The following is a preview of the second volume of “Freedom or Death!” just released in English. The passage deals with Russian and Chechen preparations in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war.
Zero Hour
In 1994, Russian-backed forces in Chechnya opposing Dzhokhar Dudayev led the failed November Assault, and it was a moment of realization for everyone.[1] President Yeltsin now clearly understood he needed to do more than covertly support groups inside Chechnya. He had to officially intervene to prevent the small, historically rebellious mountain republic from seceding. The Chechen opposition’s Provisional Council itself desperately appealed to him to send troops against the Dudayevites.[2] Meanwhile, General Dudayev was hopeful for peace negotiations but took seriously the threat of Russia fully invading.
For Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, victory was not an achievable objective but a ripening fact. A “small victorious war” promised to raise the administration’s ratings against the increasing popularity of nationalist parties.[3] They ignored, or pretended to ignore, the deplorable state of their military and underestimated their enemy’s determination. Meanwhile the Chechens were preparing to resist the invasion.[4] Dudayev entrusted command of the regular forces to Colonel Aslan Maskhadov,[5] who inherited ragtag units rather than an army from his former colleague Viskhan Shakhabov.[6] Throughout 1994, he attempted to structure it partly according to army reforms enacted in 1992 and based on pre-existing forces, which were comprised of veterans from wars in Afghanistan and Abkhazia. Some units were combat-ready by the beginning of December. Among such forces was the Presidential Guard commanded by Abu Arsanukaev, and its Spetnatz unit under Apti Takhaev. Next was Shamil Basayev’s Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion, which was composed mostly of veterans of Abkhazia. Then came Ruslan Gelayev’s Special Borz (“Wolf”) Regiment, which included a battalion led by Umalt Dashayev. Adding also the Shali Armored Regiment and other minor units, there was a nucleus of 1,500 troops joined by 1,000 men from the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Service (police officials, riot police and state intelligence services). Maskhadov added some volunteer territorial militia battalions, such as the so-called “Islamic Regiment” under Islam Halimov and the Naursk Battalion[7] with Major Apti Batalov.[8] Thanks to their contribution and the many other bands of volunteers who rushed to Grozny’s defense, Chechen Headquarters relied on 5,000 men at the start of Russia’s invasion. Several more formations followed Dudayev’s general mobilization proclamation on 4 December.[9] The Chechens understood however, that regardless of how they prepared they could only temporarily hold the enemy at the gates. Chechnya lacked the numbers, arms, and organization to take on enemy armored brigades directly.[10] Russia had even preemptively destroyed the modest air force on 1 December.
Russia’s initial approach to the invasion reflected its narrow aim to eliminate the leadership rather than destroy Chechnya. The average Russian solider, struggling to pin it on a map, cared even less about Chechnya. The government narrowed its invasion partly to avoid a humanitarian crisis since the wary West was watching with a hand on the money tap keeping Russia afloat.
Whatever way the Russians intended to attack, the Chechens were preparing to fight and die all the same. Their plan was “to last.” They wanted to resist as long as possible and hopefully expose the Kremlin to domestic public opinion, which was still struggling with trauma from the Soviet-Afghan War. Equally important was the opinion of the West, whose conditional loans kept Russia’s economy from sinking.[11] The Chechens organized their defense in three phases. They planned to first trap the Russians inside Grozny, a “concrete forest,” and ensnarl their overwhelming armor. To entice the Russians, the Chechens yielded the defensive line to the north to create the illusion they had abandoned the capital. This line along a strip of hills running north of Grozny on the so-called Terek Ridge hinged to the west by the villages Dolinskyand Pervomaisk. It ended in the east at the height of the village Petropavlovskaya on the left bank of the Sunzha. After crossing the line and penetrating the capital, the Russians would encounter Chechnya’s best forces eagerly waiting to recreate the success they had against the anti-Dudayevites back in 26 November. This was ideally going to force Yeltsin to negotiate with Dudayev, but with far more realistic expectations, the Chechens planned to retreat south to the main centers of Achkhoy-Martan, Shatoy, Vedeno, and Nozhay Yurt.
Maskhadov divided the territory into six military districts called “Fronts” and entrusted them to his best men.[12] The loyal former police captain Vakha Arsanov held the Terek Ridge Line. Ruslan Gelayev was charged with the South-Western Front, a quadrilateral defined by the villages Assinovskaya, Novy-Sharoy, Achkhoy-Martan, and Bamut. Dudayev’s twenty-eight-year-old son-in-law Salman Raduyevcommanded the North-Eastern Front centering on the city Gudermes. CommanderRuslan Alikhadziyev[13]of the newly appointed Shali Armored Regimentled the southern front, with its main centers being Shatoyand Shali. Turpal Atgeriyev, a twenty-six-year-old veteran of the Abkhaz War and one of Raduyev’s most trusted men led the South-Eastern Front, centering on Nozhay Yurt. Finally, Shamil Basayev held Grozny. Unfortunately, the government lacked a comprehensive plan to protect the population,[14] and the situation was especially dire in Grozny. Unlike their Chechen neighbors there, the many ethnic Russian residents did not have relatives and friends in the countryside to flee to.
The Russian Headquarters was busily gathering nineteen thousand fresh conscripts from the most diverse branches. Collectively baptized the “Joint Group of the United Forces,”[15] it also included five thousand soldiers from the Interior Ministry to comb the rear for enemies. The army was divided into the West, East, and North groups.[16] West Group started off from Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia to penetrate in three columns, taking up a position at the height of Novy-Sharoy behind the Chechen Terek RidgeLine. From Klizyar, Dagestan, East Group was to reach Tolstoy-Yurt along the Terek River. Finally, North Group in Mozdok, North Ossetia would cross the pro-Russian occupied plains of northern Chechnya to link up with East Group north of Grozny. With one hundred kilometers to the objectives, the operation had a schedule of a couple days. The high command of the Russian military prepared to issue an ultimatum to the leadership and offer amnesty to Chechen troops who surrendered.[17] Afterwards, artillery would clear the way for tanks to finally crush the rest of Dudayev’s “little rebellion”.
However, the commander of the Russian operation Colonel General Eduard Vorobyov refused to lead the plan,[18] dismissing it as “madness”and a dishonor to send the military against citizens Russian considered its own.[19] Grachev promptly dismissed and investigated him, and instead tapped the unquestioning General Anatoly Kvashnin. Vorobyov’s forced resignation quickly led to the replacement of the Military Command of the Caucasus, further disrupting the chain of command which, on the eve of the invasion, was completely “purged.”
There were also important fringes of Parliament, including in the majority, opposed to military intervention. Yegor Gaidar, one of Yeltsin’s closest allies and chairman of the pro-government Democratic Choice of Russia Party,[20] spoke out and brought others from his faction with him.[21] Galina Starovoytova from the Democratic Russia Party was also opposed. Many moderates remained ambivalent though: the newly established center-left Yabloko Party saw heated internal debate between skeptics and those that supported the invasion “in principle” if not in execution.[22] On the right, nationalist movements beat the war drums, particularly Vadim Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party. Opponents argued that using the military was unconstitutional without the government declaring a state of emergency and imposing martial law. According to Article 102 of the Constitution, the president had to consult Parliament to issue the provision, which would likely have been rejected. Supporters of military action, on the other hand, pointed to Articles 80 and 86 as support for Yeltsin’s right to lead the military and his duty to “safeguard the sovereignty” and “integrity of the state.”[23] A public debate could perhaps have steered tanks away from the Caucasus, especially as concerned newspapers all over the world began to cover the matter.[24] But the die was cast, and Yelstin was moving his pieces towards Chechnya.
[1] For more on the November Assault and the events preceding the outbreak of the First Russo-Chechen War, see Volume I of this work.
[2] In a conversation with the author, Ilyas Akhmadov recalled a telegram from the Provisional Council explicitly requesting Yeltsin to intervene. It was signed by Umar Avturkhanov and arrived in Moscow in the first days of December 1994.
[3] One analysis of the beginning of Yeltsin’s political shift: “With the controversial decision to use force to stop the secession of a small ‘province’ of his empire, Yeltsin himself also crossed a political ‘Rubicon,’ from which it will be difficult to go back: that of the alliance with the democratic forces that had supported him from the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 to the bloody battle against the rebel parliament in ’93. . . . After the victory of nationalists and communists in the legislative elections of December ’93, Yeltsin assumed new positions in foreign policy and in the management of economic reforms, thus trying to pander to the opposition, regain popular consent, and maintain power at the next electoral appointments, the legislative ones in a year, the presidential elections in a year and a half.” (Enrico Franceschini, “A Peace Party in Moscow,” La Repubblica, December 19, 1994).
[4] Chechen Foreign Minister Shamsouddin Youssef responded to news of Russia’s likely invasion by demanding Russia to recognize Chechnya’s independence. Otherwise, the Chechens would “fight, and bring war in the Russian Federation.” On the same day, Aslan Maskhadov added that Moscow risked fighting a “new Afghanistan.” First Name Last Name, “Title,” La Repubblica, May 12, 1994.
[5]Aslan Alievich Maskhadov, introduced in Volume I of this work, was born in Shakai, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, and returned to Chechnya with his family in 1957. He enrolled at the Artillery School of Tbilisi in 1972, then perfected himself at the High School of Kalinin Artillery in Leningrad. After his service in Hungary, he transferred to Vilnius and witnessed the Lithuanian independence uprisings. After resigning in 1992, he returned to Chechnya again and entered Dudayev’s service. In November 1993, he replaced Viskhan Sakhabov as chief of the general staff, first on an interim basis, then permanently beginning in March 1994. For a comprehensive biography written by his son Anzor, see Frihetskjemperen: Min far, Tsjetsjenias president.
[6] As Musa Temishev shared in a conversation with the author, Viskhan Shakhabov (extensively discussed in Volume I of this work) could not organize the nascent Chechen armed forces as a result of frictions with President Dudayev that arose between 1992 and 1993. Their disagreements on the methods of acquisition and use of Soviet arsenals paralyzed the Ministry of Defense, which was never officially established, leading to Shakhabov’s resignation.
[7] To be precise, Aslan Maskhadov christened the unit “Naursk Battalion” only in January 1995, during a live television broadcast on the presidential channel. The nom de guerre was a eulogy to Batalov’s units who had fought during the siege of Grozny. According to the commander, the regiment was still a “people’s militia”until the Battle for Grozny: “There were no cadres, there were no officers, there were only groups of people from different villages, commanded by people elected by them, totally on a voluntary basis. People came and went, and no one could order anything from them.”To read more about Apti Batalov and the Naursk Battalion, see the series of articles The General of Naur: Memoirs of Apti Batalov at www.ichkeria.net.
[8] Apti Batalov Aldamovich, born in Kyrgyzstan on October 19, 1956, returned to Chechnya and graduated from the Petroleum Institute of Grozny as a civil engineer. After entering the police force, he served as part of the Ishcherskaya Militia in the Naursk district, becoming its commander on June 20 1994. According to our conversations, until early August he served under District Military Commander Duta Muzaev, Dudayev’s son-in-law. After Muzaev’s return to Gronzy, Batalov became of head of the military administration of the Naursk and Nadterechny districts on September 16, 1994. He was tasked with organizing their defense against raids by the pro-Russia armed opposition.
[9] On 4 December, President Dudayev proclaimed a total mobilization of reservists. All male citizens between the ages of 15 and 60 were summoned, too many to realistically arm and train for the regular forces. Most were sent back to their villages of origin with the task of setting up self-defense militias using light weapons or resorting to hunting weapons.
Regarding the composition and nature of these militias, Ilyas Akhmadov recalled in a conversation with the author in 2022: “During the war there were many local volunteer groups consisting of five or six people, sometimes related to each other. It was very important to find a band that you knew. If you were with someone from your village, street, block, or family, you had a 90% guarantee that they wouldn’t leave your body if killed or injured. If they didn’t know you, they didn’t want you. This was mutually understandable to all: If something happened they would not be able to find the relatives, and for us it was very important to be returned to our families.”
[10] To learn more about the ChRI Air Force and its eventual destruction by Russia, see the in-depth study Green Wolf Stars: the ChRI Air Force on the website www.ichkria.netand consult Volume I of this work.
[11] United States Congress opened debates on 11 December 1994, on financially leveraging Russia to discourage war. Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberan asked for aid to be reevaluated. Their colleague Alfonse D’Amato, argued on 3 January, that this could “send the wrong signal,”although he felt it necessary to express US displeasure at the civilian losses caused by the invasion.
[12] To view the Chechen defense plan, see thematic map A.
[13] Ruslan Alikhadzhiev was born in 1961 in Shali. After completing his military service with the rank of Sergeant, he returned to Chechnya in 1992. He took command of the Shali Armored Regiment in the autumn of 1994, replacing Isa Dalkhaev. At the outbreak of hostilities he organized the recruitment of militia in the Shali district (the “Shali Regiment”).
[14] Anatol Lieven’s first-hand account: “A government plan to feed the population and evacuate the children if the Russians started a siege? I don’t know of any such thing, but if President Dudayev said so, of course it is true,” an official told me in early December 1994, sitting in his deserted office in the municipal offices of the central district of Grozny, . . . “Anyway, it doesn’t matter. We Chechens are such strong people, we will be able to feed ourselves no matter what happens. Is it my responsibility? What do you mean by this? I’m here in my office, right? Don’t you think I will fight to the death to defend my country?” With that he let out a gasp, blowing a breath of vodka in our direction, and with wet fingers lifted a piece of greyish meat from a glass jar on his knees, and fed it to his cat.” Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 34.
[15] The unpreparedness of the federal forces was well known to the military commands, and to the Minister of Defense himself. A few days before the start of the military campaign, Grachev read a top secret directive (No. D-0010) which described “unpreparedness for action of fighting.” Stazys Knezys and Romana Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).
The assessment report drawn up by the office of the North Caucasus Military Region was similar: “Most of the officers are not only unfamiliar with the required combat readiness requirements set out in the control documents, but also do not know how to recognize their personal duties, or what they should do in times of peace or war. Watch officers and units, in most formations inspected, are poorly trained to take practical actions in response to combat commands. The instructions and other control documents are prepared in gross violation of the requirements of the General Staff.” Knezys and Sedlickas, War in Chechnya.
[16] To view the Russian invasion plan, see thematic map B.
[17] The Duma approved a resolution to this effect 13 December 1994.
[18] Grachev’s plan was entirely based on the assumption that a massive deployment of forces would disperse the separatists: “Grachev’s plan and timetable reflect expectations of limited resistance. Little intelligence used and bad planning were to blame… The planning also ignored the experience of loyalist Chechen forces [i.e. thread . Russians] who had attempted to storm Grozny in August , October and November 1994. If that experience had been studied, the Russian command would have been aware of the dangers that faced tank columns in Grozny.”Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001) 11-12.
[19] As Eduard Vorobjev said in an interview with journalist Vitaly Moiseev: “I was shocked by the situation, the units that arrived were completely unprepared, the commanders did not know their subordinates, many of the fighters did not have the necessary professional skills. I turned to the Chief of the General Staff: ‘If you think that a change of command will change the situation for the better, then you are wrong. It’s not about the commander, it’s about the adventurous approach. . . . Approaching me, the Minister of Defense said ‘I am disappointed in you, Colonel General, and I think you should submit your letter of resignation.’ I replied ‘I have it.’… It was not easy for me, a person who served in the armed forces for 38 years, who constantly answered ‘Yes!’ I was faced with a choice: to make a deal with my conscience and deal with completely unprepared people, to conduct an operation not planned by me, or to leave the armed forces, which meant the end of my military career.… It seems to me that Grachev underestimated the moral and psychological state of the Chechens, which had reached fanaticism. The operation was designed to intimidate: they thought that Dudayev would get scared when he saw hundreds of units and thousands of soldiers, and surrender to the victor’s mercy. Indeed, the Chechen side clearly knew where our troops were, what they were doing—information was spreading in all directions.”
[20] To the press Gaidar declared: “I appeal to Yeltsin not to allow a military escalation in Chechnya. The intervention was a tragic mistake. Taking Grozny will cost huge human losses. It will worsen the internal political situation in Russia, it will be a blow to the integrity of the nation, to our democratic achievements, to everything we have achieved in recent years.” Franceschini, “A Peace Party in Moscow.”
[21] Deputy of Democratic Choice Dimitrij Golkogonov’s response to “Why are you against the invasion?”: “Because my party, Choice of Russia, led by the ex-Prime Minister Gajdar, is against violence, against the use of force to solve political problems. In Chechnya there is a leader, Dudayev, who does not want to lose power, thanks to whom he has enriched himself and his friends with the trade of oil. Independence has nothing to do with it. But to attack Dudayev is to make a criminal a popular hero. . . . A negotiation had to be opened. If Yeltsin had invited the Chechens to Moscow, they would have come running.” Enrico Franceschini, “‘Yeltsin Made Wrong Move in Invading But Remains Leader of Russia,’” La Repubblica, December 15, 1994.
[22] Vladimir Lukin, former ambassador to the United States and prominent member of Yabloko, in his January 24, 1995 speech in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote: “The executive branch has shown itself and society that it can act independently, regardless of and in spite of political pressures . . . In an ideal world, the preposterous and dangerous idea that the military should not be used for internal conflicts should be driven out of the heads of our armed forces. . . . Using the army inside the country in extreme situations, when threats to the state appear, is the norm in democratic states. Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
[23] For careful study of this topic see Stuart Goldman and Jim Nichol, Russian Conflict in Chechnya and Implications for the United States (DC: Congressional Research Service, 1995).See also Victoria A. Malko, The Chechen Wars: Responses in Russia and the United States(Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015).
[24] An example from an Italian newspaper: “In the end, like a mountain annoyed by a daredevil mouse, Yeltsin ordered the direct intervention of his troops. Moscow claims that Chechnya is part of Russia, therefore it is its right to occupy it to restore order. For the moment, Western public opinion seems aligned with this position, considering yesterday’s events as an “internal matter” for Russia: for which there are no international complaints, unlike what happened with the invasion of Afghanistan. But if we look at the substance of the Russian military expedition in Chechnya, some resemblance to the Soviet invasion fifteen years ago emerges. . . . The fact remains that Yeltsin does not hesitate to use tanks when he sees that other means (negotiation, economic pressure, support for the local opposition) do not produce results. The propensity to resolve political crises militarily, as a year ago in the tug of war with the rebel Parliament, is a hallmark of his presidency. The future will tell whether Russia needed a “strongman” to become a civilized and democratic nation”. Enrico Franceschini,“Moscow Fears the Kabul Syndrome,” La Repubblica, December 12, 1994.
What role did Aushev play in the restoration of the Ingush state? And how is he seen today?
Aushev is a military man and obeys orders. The first thing he did when he became president was to ban all political organizations and establish a barracks regime in the republic. He created the conditions for corruption. He divided the Ingush people into three parts: the “Ingush” Ingush, who lived on the uncontested part of the land, the “Chechen” Ingush, who were forced to leave Grozny, and the “Ossetian” Ingush, who were expelled from North Ossetia after the ethnocide by the Russian army.
He violated Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia: he gave up the ancestral territories of Ingushetia and the city of Vladikavkaz by signing the so-called “Kislovodsk Treaties”. He did this under pressure from Yeltsin, who threatened to remove him from the presidency for the next term. There is video evidence of this. I don’t remember exactly when I wrote this comment on Facebook, but it concerns Aushev.
“All those who criticize Aushev for the Kislovodsk/Nalchik agreement, for the pocket parliament, for the barracks regime, for dancing at Ossetian government meetings, for abandoning the right bank of Vladikavkaz, for corruption, for jumping off personnel, for populism …. First of all, everyone has the right to criticize, because he is not a private person, but a public person, and every public person is subject to criticism; secondly, or rather, above all, all critics are right, because they tell the TRUTH. He led the republic built by us, the ancients, not as a general, but as a sergeant. Aushev was a talented but uneducated man, and that is why he drove all serious and worthy, educated and professional Ingush out of politics and business, placing himself alongside sycophants and other amateurs.”
Ruslan Aushev
So Aushev “sold” legitimate Ingush claims in order to avoid a conflict with Moscow. Considering what you told me about Dudayev’s decision not to pander to Yeltsin, don’t you think Aushev’s decision was wiser than Dudayev’s? A compromise to avoid ethnocide? Or do you think it could have been done differently?
Aushev took office after the ethnocide. It is very difficult to negotiate with the imperial Kremlin. It is necessary to be politically flexible. A good example of this was the President of Tatarstan Shaimiev Mintimer Sharipovich. Aushev violated Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia in order to retain his office as president, or more precisely, to extend it for a second term. Dudayev opted for open confrontation in the hope of gaining international support. Both generals knew how to wage war.
Aushev was in Afghanistan as an infantryman and put himself in real danger. Dudayev was the commander of a squadron of strategic bombers from the “carpet bombing” era, but neither of them understood anything about politics. As Krylov’s fable says: “It’s a disaster when a cobbler starts baking cakes and a baker starts grinding boots.”
Do you therefore think that the leadership in both the case of Ingushetia and Chechnya was not the right one to achieve “separation” from Moscow? Do you think that there were better people at the time who could have handled the situation better?
Yes, certainly. For example, Salambek Naibovich Khadzhiev in Chechnya and Bembulat Bersovich Bogatyrev in Ingushetia. I knew Khadzhiyev personally. An academic, an intellectual. An experienced person who didn’t need to improve his image because he was a seasoned personality. It is the hotheads who slander him. Unlike many others, Khadzhiyev was “capable of judgment” (according to Kant), and he never followed the euphoric, apparent freedom of the Chechens and did not declare independence, but used his authority to improve the lives of his people step by step, taking more and more powers away from Moscow… until the empire weakened. Khadzhiyev would not have sacrificed the Chechen people to the Russian barbarians.
The empire has never allowed people who were not loyal to it to lead the colonies. I said at the beginning of our conversation that I consider the declaration of independence to be a tragic mistake that was a catastrophe not only for the Chechen people, but also for the entire national and liberation movement in the Caucasus.
The military should not interfere in politics: it usually ends badly. But you can’t change it, history doesn’t tolerate the subjunctive. With the right tactics towards Moscow, the people I mentioned would have achieved results slowly, without losses, gradually gaining more and more independence, distancing themselves from the Kremlin and gaining strength, coordinating their actions with other peoples in the Caucasus and taking the path of DECOLONIZATION.
Do you believe that Salambek Khadzhiyev really wanted Chechnya to be independent? And as for the need to avoid a break with Moscow: Don’t you think that, given the way things developed in the following years, Chechnya’s independence would have been impossible to achieve if Russia had overcome its period of weakness?
You and I are talking about what could have been. In principle, this is only necessary in order to understand the processes that have taken place. The past must be known for the future. That is clear. Besides, it makes no sense to compare Dudayev and Khadzhiyev. We are talking about facts here. It is a fact that the Chechens declared independence under the leadership of Dudayev! Did they achieve it? NO. This is an indisputable fact.
As it turned out later in his interview, he knew very well what would happen in the future and even predicted it. He knew that a military confrontation with Russia was unwinnable. He knew that, and yet he took the risk. Dudayev did not achieve his goal! The Chechen people suffered heavy losses and fell under the yoke of Kadyrov, who was loyal to the Kremlin. The Russian empire was not weak in the years 1991-1998. Its economy was weak but its imperial face remained unchanged, although Yeltsin managed to fool the world into believing that Russia could be a democratic state. This will never happen.
The Russian empire will only get weaker now that it has gone to war against Ukraine. Now is the time when the colonized peoples, if they work together in harmony, can embark on the path of decolonization with the support of the Western democratic world. This includes the creation of a sovereign state. Thirty years ago, this was still impossible.
Salambek Khadzhiyev
More about Khadzhiyev. After Dudayev came to power, Khadzhiyev represented the opposition and led the “collaboration government” with Moscow for a while during the war. Do you think this was the right choice for him? Wouldn’t it have been better not to lead this government?
Khadzhiyev, who knew the history of the Russian Empire well and understood that a tragic mistake had been made that would inflict great losses on the Chechen people and thwart the dream of freedom for many years, could not remain indifferent to the tragedy that was rapidly approaching his people and tried everything to prevent this catastrophe. But a man in a stately general’s uniform, who spoke in a confident and authoritarian voice about the freedom of the Chechen spirit and called for death in the fight for it, was more attractive than a thoughtful intellectual who called for a cautious confrontation with the monster that had oppressed many peoples for many years.
The calm voice and the calls of the thinking people for sensible action were easily drowned out by the general’s slogan “Freedom or death”. Intoxicated by the apparent proximity of long-awaited freedom, the crowd chose death. Khadzhiyev was not a collaborator. Like me and many other thinking Chechens, he was sure that this monster could not be defeated alone and tried to save his people from disaster.
On October 23, 1995, Khadzhiyev resigned from the government he had formed and was replaced by Zavgaev. In light of this event, do you not believe that Khadzhiyev (without judging the nobility of his soul) was more a pawn of Moscow than an asset to the Chechen people? Under his rule, the federal forces committed numerous atrocities, which Khadzhiyev apparently had to endure, and after him, power passed to the old head of the Chechen Republic, who, as far as I know, was now hated by everyone.
Khadzhiyev did not allow himself to be manipulated by anyone. He was a true Chechen for whom the terms “honor” and “human dignity” were not empty words. In September 1991, S. Khadzhiyev led the movement for democratic reforms in Chechnya-Ingushetia and on the eve of the first presidential elections of the Chechen Republic in November 1991 was considered Dudayev’s main rival, but refused to take part in the elections and subsequently work in the government formed by the Chechen National Congress (OKCHN). In 1992, he again turned down the OKCHN’s offer to become Prime Minister of the Chechen government. This was because he was against Dudayev and Yandarbiyev, who were driving the people to tragedy. Khadzhiyev tried to prevent the impending catastrophe. A few days before the Russian aggression began, he tried to end the unrest and chaos in Chechnya and lead the government. But the federal troops, as you rightly pointed out, committed atrocities. Precisely because he refused to be manipulated by Moscow, he was replaced by Zavgaev.
Zavgaev was there before Khadzhiev. The Moscow puppet was ready to carry out any order from the Kremlin. In 1991, I headed the Ingush State Theater, which I had founded, and Zavgaev wanted me to join his team, invited me to run as a deputy for the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, but in 1989, at the Second Ingush People’s Congress, I withdrew and distanced myself from political activity because I did not agree with the path I had chosen. But that’s another topic.
Doku Zavgaev
Doku Zavgaev: What do you think of him? Is he a man who tried to save Chechnya from war, or a weak politician who just wanted to exploit the situation for his own personal gain?
Zavgaev was an obedient lackey of Moscow. He was only interested in himself. He tried to get anyone who was popular with the people on his side. In short, he bought those who could be bought.
Back to the war. How did the Ingush deal with the Russian invasion of Chechnya? Didn’t the Ingush also declare independence after the end of the invasion in 1996 with the withdrawal of the Moscow army?
Ingushetia served as logistical support for the Chechen resistance fighters. The families of the Chechen resistance fighters were safe in Ingushetia. Wounded resistance fighters were treated in Ingushetia. Although the Republic of Ingushetia officially belonged to Russia, the Ingush strongly supported the Chechen resistance and their Chechen brothers. Individual Ingush also took part in the war against the Russian occupiers on the side of the Chechens.
What were the relations between Ingushetia and Chechnya between the end of the first and the beginning of the second war? Did the scourge of abductions also affect Ingushetia? Were there crises during this period because the borders between Ingushetia and Ichkeria could not be defined?
Despite constant provocations and attempts by the colonial authorities to divide and divide these two related peoples, all their efforts were in vain. The Chechen and Ingush people learned not to transfer the actions of politicians and the government, the lackeys of the Kremlin, to the relations between Chechens and Ingush. These attempts have continued throughout the ages, starting with the Russo-Caucasian War.
The merits of Presidents Dudayev and Aushev can be seen in the fact that they did not raise the issue of the border and postponed the resolution of these questions until better times. Chechen resistance fighters who had entered the territory of Ingushetia were arrested by the Ingushetian army and police and transferred to Chechnya with the request not to transfer the fight with the Russians to the territory of Ingushetia.
For two years, Russia has succeeded in changing the mood of the Western community from sympathy to antipathy towards the Chechens through “special operations” with hostage-taking, especially of foreign aid organizations. Who would sympathize with bandits who cut off the heads of people who wanted to help them? In the period between the first and second wars, I was often in Chechnya with German doctors. We brought wounded children to Germany to be treated free of charge. When we visited the Chechen Republic, Maskhadov, whom I knew personally, always gave us an armed escort. In a country devastated by war, there were always people who took hostages for money. Moscow provided considerable resources for this. There were no mass hostage-takings for ransom in Ingushetia.
Although the Dudayev government did not help the Ingush with either people or weapons during the ethnocide of the Ingush people in 1992, although it sent and received a delegation to North Ossetia twice and assured the Ossetian leadership of non-interference … basically betrayed the fraternal people and got them into trouble … there were no complaints or reproaches from the Ingush other than resentment. On the contrary, everyone understood that the Chechens had been provoked.
Dzhokhar Dudaev
You have described the hostage crisis in Chechnya as an instrument controlled by Russia to distance Chechnya from the West. In your opinion, were the apartment explosions of 1999, which justified the second invasion of Chechnya, also organized by the Russian government?
Yes, it was an initiative of the Russian secret services to discredit the Chechens. Irena Brezna, a Swiss writer of Slovakian origin, published a memo from the Analytical Center of the Russian Federation, in which the necessity and methods of discrediting the Chechen people and their struggle for freedom were pointed out. There were direct instructions on how to proceed and that no expense should be spared. One of the well-known facts confirming these methods is the murder of a humanitarian affairs expert from the American Soros Foundation, US citizen Fred Cuney, his translator Galina Oleynik and two employees of the Russian Committee of the Red Cross who were accompanying them. The Chechen State Security Service was held responsible for the murder.
In the interwar period, I witnessed such propaganda activities at the Russian embassy in Germany, where a video was shown of Chechens cutting off the heads of Russian mercenaries. This video certainly had a shocking effect on the German public.
Yes, of course houses in Russia were blown up by the FSB itself. There is a book by KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was murdered by Putin in London with polonium, and by historian Yuri Felshtinsky entitled “The FSB blows up Russia”.
Akhmat Kadyrov. What kind of person was he? Did the Ingush know him? What was their opinion of him and how did it change over time?
As a rule, the spiritual leaders in Russia were KGB officers. I don’t know whether Akhmat Kadyrov was one. After he became the spiritual leader of the people, he first called for the killing of Russians. He promised paradise to anyone who killed as many Russian attackers as possible. And then he sided with the Russians and became the first president of the already conquered Chechnya? Strange metamorphosis!
As far as I know, the Ingush had no time for Mufti Kadyrov. In any case, Kadyrov senior betrayed the Chechen people or, in the opinion of others, saved the Chechen people from annihilation. I don’t know. The Ingush, like all other peoples of the world, have the same attitude towards traitors.
Kadyrov senior asked for money to rebuild the destroyed city of Grozny under his control (I heard him talk about it personally on a TV program). Moscow wanted to manage the money itself… Akhmat Kadyrov became an uncomfortable figure; he was too independent. The empire doesn’t need such people, so they liquidated him and installed Kadyrov Jr. who hadn’t even finished school. Kadyrov Jr. became Putin’s loyal ‘foot soldier’, killing his enemies (Politkovskaya, Nemtsov) and terrorizing the Chechen people!
Akhmat Kadyrov with Vladimir Putin
After the death of Akhmat Kadyrov, power in Chechnya passed to his son Ramzan after a brief interregnum. How did relations between Ingush and Chechens develop during his dictatorship?
The Kremlin and Kadyrov, as well as Ingush appointees such as FSB General Zyazikov and GRU General Yevkurov, have done the bidding of their masters in the Kremlin. They have tried to sow enmity between our peoples. In Chechnya, for example, information has been spread at government level that the Ingush are profiting from Chechen refugees by renting unsuitable premises for accommodation for hundreds of dollars, etc.
In 2018, on the Kremlin’s instructions, they carried out a provocation to cede Ingush territories to the Chechen Republic. It’s not just a question of land. It is about the history of the people, the graves of their ancestors and everything that is important for the self-confidence of the Ingush. Yevkurov and Kadyrov reached an agreement and drew the border between Ingush and Chechens, so that an original part of Ingushetia went to Chechnya. The protests of the Ingush were widely felt. The Kremlin had long wanted to shed blood to separate these two peoples. But the Ingush police did not allow any retaliatory measures to be taken against the demonstrators. This happened in 2018, and the leaders of this protest were sentenced to draconian punishments and are in prison. And there is no one in world public opinion who cares about this injustice.
Of course, this provocation has not left both peoples unscathed, and relations between Chechens and Ingush have become more difficult.
But the Chechens, Ingush and other colonized peoples of the Caucasus must unite and establish their own state.
The empire does not tolerate any criticism, let alone any demands from colonized peoples.
The Empire is afraid of the unification of the colonized peoples and their national freedom movement and will therefore do everything to ensure that the peoples of the Caucasus have reason not to trust each other. Even better if they come into conflict with each other.
It is time for all the colonized peoples of the Caucasus to realize that they are not full and equal citizens of Russia. When we realize this, we will want to free ourselves from this oppression. The genetic inability to be a slave forces us to resist the position of a slave. The national liberation struggle will begin. The Chechens have tried to go it alone, have shown courage and will, have suffered heavy losses and have not reached the goal. All the peoples of the Caucasus must unite and take the path of decolonization together, because this is the path to the creation of a common independent pan-Caucasian state.
In view of the upcoming publication of the second volume of “Freedom or Death! History of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” we are publishing the maps in English, which will be available to readers via the QR code printed in the book.
Aset Sabdulaeva was born in 1991 in Grozny. Her mother is the People’s Artist of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Birlyant Ramzaeva. She composed music for many famous Chechen songs « The Knight of Honour », « The time of Heros », « Don’t leave the mountains ». Her father is poet and playwright Makkal Sabdulaev. He is the author of lyrics of most of Ramzaeva’s songs. He also wrote famous theatrical play « Rejected heroes » (Махкана совбевлла к1ентий). From 1996-2000 he worked as the 1st Deputy minister of Culture of CRI. In 2000, Sabdulaev was abducted by russian soldiers in Grozny on a checkpoint. He is considered missing.
Aset lives in Canada, where she arrived when she was 13 years old, in 2004. Aset has a BA in education and she is currently completing MA in education. Aset holds the position of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
We can say that you belong to a generation that we could define as the “Ichkeria Generation”, that is, those kids who were born close to independence, and who became adults during the period of independent Chechnya. The first question I would like to ask you is: what is the first memory you associate with “being Chechen”? Do you remember how you became aware of who you were, as a member of the Chechen nation? And what feeling did you associate with this thought?
I was raised on the songs of my mother and on the poems of my father that always praised freedom, honor, dignity, good manners, our culture, our native language, our struggle for independence, our heroes and the tragic history of our people.
The Chechen identity was constructed in me by the art of my parents. Since my childhood, I was aware of who I am. I was three years old, in 1994, when on the Eve of the First Russo-Chechen war, huge demonstrations took place on the Liberty Square. The Chechen people were asking Russians to stop the aggression and provocations against the Chechen state. People used to invite my mother to sing for them at the demonstrations on Liberty Square and she took me with her. My people have gone through horrors and injustice, two bloody wars, genocide and isolation. Chechens defended themselves although they were abandoned by the entire world and thrown in the claws of Yeltsin and Putin. But our spirit never surrendered to Russia. The history of my people taught me that no matter how big the conqueror is, we always have to resist. Today, Chechnya is under Russian occupation and my people are living under Putin’s dictatorship, yet, we continue to resist.
Thanks for your answer, Aset, which in a way anticipates my second question. You were just a child when Russia invaded Chechnya. What do you remember about those terrible times? How did you experience the years of occupation as a child?
I remember a lot of things. In 1994, Yeltsin started a full land and air attack against the Independent Chechen State. During the bombing, my mother, my sister and I used to hide in the shelter (basement of our house). My mother played Pondar (chechen accordion) very loud, so that my sister and I couldn’t hear Russian military planes and irritating sounds of missiles. My father never came to the shelter. He always stayed either upstairs or outside.
I remember that one day a group of Chechen warriors were walking on our street, very brave and humble men. They knocked on our door and asked for water. They seemed to be exhausted because it was the moment when Grozny was surrounded by Russians. My mother invited the entire group to our yard, prepared some food and she played our national anthem. Our warriors were smiling. But they didn’t eat anything. They just drank water and left, smiling. I will never forget these beautiful faces.
I also remember ruins. The entire city was in ruins. The doors of our house were with bullet holes. I remember our dog Borzik. It was a huge white dog. Very kind and friendly dog. Everytime it heard Russian helicopters or missiles, Borzik used to run in my sister’s room and hide under the bed. When helicopters left, we always had a hard time getting Borzik out of the room because it was too big and refused to move.
Thank you, Aset. Then the war ended with the escape of the Russians in August 1996. Do you remember those days? What did they say in your family?
When the Chechen government and Russian government signed the Khasavyurt Accord in 1996 marking the end of the first Russo-Chechen war, it was a huge celebration for our people. My parents were very happy because it meant the end of a nightmare. Our nation elected in fair and democratic elections the third President Aslan Maskhadov and we truly thought that we will finally start building our prosperous state. After the victory in the unequal struggle for freedom, Chechens gained popularity in Russian public opinion and in the world. We were perceived as heroes. However, things changed when Putin got appointed as the head of the KGB in Moscow. The entire KDG machine was directed to destroy our state, our society and our reputation. The KGB’s aim was to destroy the image of Chechen heroes.
Putin opened doors for so-called middle eastern “investors” and facilitated their arrival to Chechnya through Moscow. These emissaries from the Middle East brought a lot of money and invested it in the opposition movements that were against our government. This opposition was mainly led by Movladi Udugov and his ideological comrades from Arab countries spreading fundamentalist religious beliefs that were in complete discord with the Chechen culture and adats (customs). On the other hand, Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov, who was appointed as Chechen mufti (main imam), praised traditional Islam that was in opposition to Udugov’s “pure Islam”. These two religious individuals preached their versions of Islam on TV channels. Their destructive teachings divided Chechen society that was already in a very miserable economic situation. Both Udugov and Kadyrov were working for Russian intelligence, and they aimed to destroy our state and divide our people. They were financed by Russia. I’ve read a lot of things about these events in the book of Akhmed Zakaev, “Subjugate or Exterminate” published by Washington Press. Also, it is very important to note that these Arab emissaries, under the umbrella of Russian intelligence, were directly involved in kidnappings of civilians, international aid workers, journalists and engineers. For example, the person who kidnaped British engineers Apti Abitaev, was a KGB agent, and our government arrested them. The person who initiated “fatwa” (ruling) to behead these poor British engineers was Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary. This barbaric murder of British engineers was a triumph for Russian intelligence. It succeeded in sending the message to the world that Chechens were criminals and kidnappers. Yet, the Chechen people had nothing to do with these criminal acts. Also, on 23 July 1998, an attempt was made to assassinate our President Maskhadov by blowing up the truck close to Maskhadov’s car. Two security officers of Maskhadov were killed. Later, our government found out that the “fatwa” (ruling) to kill our legitimately and democratically elected president Maskhadov was made by the same Abu Djunid, an Arab emissary that was in very close ties with Udugov.
Indeed, I think that the period from 1996-1999, was a very difficult time for our State. But not because our government was incompetent, as some individuals claim, but because we were in complete economic/political blockade and our enemy was unproportionally powerful and malicious. Every state at the beginning of its statehood goes through difficulties. For instance, Georgia went through political turmoil at the beginning of its existence. Unlike Georgia, Chechnya was in complete blockade with no access to any political support from the West. Therefore, Russia crushed our state in the worst manner. Zakaev makes a very good point in his book about the situation in Chechnya during that period: “Crime, the gradual impoverishment of population, corruption within the government, the economic crisis, all were due mainly, of course, to Russia’s failure to honor its obligations to restore the republic’s economic infrastructure, destroyed in a war it had unleashed. Ultimately, however, in the eyes of the public the person to blame for all our troubles and economic difficulties was President Aslan Maskhadov” (2018, p.346) Russia kept us in economic blockage, infiltrated her agents from Middle East, injected Wahhabi religious ideology that was alien to us, divided our society, discredited our government, destroyed our reputation and, later, perpetrated genocide against our people.
Aset Sabdulaeva with hes mother and her father
About the end of the first war, and the feelings you felt among your family. Was there a particular commander among those who fought for independence who was considered a hero, or a greater hero than the others? Did little Aset have a Chechen hero who made her proud?
I remember when my mom used to take me to a demonstration, older women sang songs “zikr” (traditional style music with lyrics) praising Djokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and Ahmed Zakaev. As a child, I didn’t have a particular admiration for a specific commander. I admired all our warriors. However, when I started to grow up and to be more conscious, I understood the real value of our heroes. I love Djokhar Dudaev because he left a legacy to our nation, I deeply respect Zelimkhan Yandarbiev because he behaved in a beautiful manner in Kremlin when Yeltsin refused to sit around the table on equal terms; Zelimkhan wrote beautiful poems in Chechen language that I enjoy reading. I appreciate Aslan Maskhadov because he was a true diplomat and is the leader that signed the Peace Treaty with the Russian Federation in May 1997. I admire Abdulhalim Sadulaev because he was a very wise leader. I truly appreciate Akhmed Zakaev because he left treasure to our nation in terms of two books that he wrote. He is the witness of all historical and political processes that occurred in Chechnya. I admire them all. They dedicated their lives, so that we can be free. In the bottom of my heart, of course, my eternal hero is my father, Makkhal. He believed in freedom and justice. He wanted to build an independent and democratic state. I became who I am, because of him.
Thinking about your father, how did you feel knowing that he was participating in building the independent state that Chechens had long desired? Were your family members proud of him, or was their fear that something bad might happen to him prevail?
I felt very happy actually. After school, I used to go to the Ministry, where my father worked as 1st Deputy Minister of Culture, and run all over it. I ran and jumped so much that sometimes the workers of the Ministry complained to my father. When he brought me home, he used to talk to me for a long time explaining how important it is to behave in a good manner. My family members were proud of my father. I remember when he came back from work, he spent hours and hours writing articles, reports and projects. Given the fact that our Republic was in complete economic blockade and Russia didn’t pay the reparations for all the damage it had done in Chechnya, Chechen government lacked funds, and it could not pay salaries to its workers. I still have my father’s certificate where it’s written that the government owes him 18 000 rubles in salary for 6 months of work. He worked for the well-being of our country because he knew that to nourish national self-conscience in young people, it’s important to elevate the culture, teach the Chechen language in schools, promote Chechen folk music, publish Chechen literature, encourage young artists and writers to write in Chechen language and share the history of our people through poems and plays. My father opposed all radical elements infiltrated in our society by Russian intelligence. These elements retarded the development of our state.
When the second war started in Chechnya, in 1999, the Ministry of Culture stopped functioning, so my father joined Aslan Maskhadov’s media team, and he was reporting all atrocities that were perpetrated by Russians in Chechnya. He knew that it was becoming very dangerous for him to stay there. Three days before his capture, he called my mother, who was at that time in Georgia. She asked him to leave Chechnya. He refused and said: “What is happening here is a genocide. I can’t leave.” One day before his capture, his friend Dalkhan Hojaev, a chechen historian was captured by Russians and killed. The next day, they took my father when he was crossing a Russian check- point (block-post). My father disappeared without a trace. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya in hope to find him. One of the Russian generals told her that my father was taken to Khankala, a russian military base where russian soldiers tortured and killed chechen civilians.
Makkal Sabdulaev (centre) with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev (center – left) and Akhmed Zakayev (Right)
Do you remember any activities organized by the Ministry for the Promotion of Culture during the interwar period?
I remember that on every 6th September, the Independence Day of Chechnya, the Ministry of Culture, under my father’s supervision, used to organize big concerts in Dinamo Stadium. He also initiated a plan to repair all our libraries and update the collection of books. Under his supervision, our Ministry organized the competition of folk performers (singers and instrumentalists) in all villages and at the end of competition, the best folk performers were gathered in Grozny and they performed on a Gala Concert where they received special prices.
What happened after you heard of your father’s passing? Did your mother decide to take you to the West?
In 2000, my father insisted that we (my mother, my sister and me) go to Georgia. We were refugees in Georgia. In July, the same year, my father was kidnapped. When my mother learned that my father was captured, she returned to Chechnya and started searching for him everywhere, even in mass graves. At that time, it was possible to pay a bribe to Russian soldiers, they gave access to the mass grave. My mother appealed to every possible instance. Yet, she couldn’t find him. In 2002, she left Chechnya because Russians came to our house looking for her. She managed to escape through the backyard and hide in a neighbor’s house. Russians didn’t like that she was determined and eager to find out where my father was and she gathered too much attention. She had no choice but to leave Chechnya.
We stayed in Georgia until 2004. In 2004, Canada opened a program in Georgia for accepting chechen refugees through UNHCR. We applied for immigration, passed an interview and Canada accepted our file. We left Georgia.
Aset Sabdulaeva ad the Jamestown Foundation
What do you remember about your time in Georgia? What was that life like, from the eyes of a little girl?
When we arrived in Georgia, we were afraid to say that we are Chechens because Russia spread horrible propaganda about Chechen people and the entire nation was demonized and presented on most Russian TV channels as terrorists and bandits.
The second problem was that I didn’t go to school for almost two years because of war. As a kid, in my learning process, I was getting behind the children of my age. My sister had to enroll me in school as soon as possible. At that time, we didn’t have official papers recognizing us as refugees in Georgia. She approached one teacher in the school #44 in Tbilisi, on the mount Mtacminda, and talked to her about my case. Gora Alexandrovna (teacher) agreed to take me in her class without any hesitation, although we didn’t have papers. The director of the school, Nana, approved my admission right away, and I was enrolled in 3d grade. I remember Georgia as a country with very hospitable and kind people. Certainly, I remember all my teachers. They helped me so much to catch other kids. Gora Alexandrovna,Tamara Iradionovna, Nana Mas, Greta Stepanovna, Viola Mas, they were Georgian and Armenians, they taught me even during summer.
When we came to Georgia, President Shevardnadze was still in power. The country was poor and suffocating in corruption and bribery. Shervarnadze was a good friend of Putin. I remember 13 Chechens were deported to Moscow. It was an unjust decision made by Shevardnazde to deport our men. He knew that Putin is conducting an illegal war in Chechnya and that our people are suffering from this barbaric aggression. When Russians completed their mission in Chechnya, they came to Georgia in 2008 and annexed Georgian territories.
I also remember that my sister and I participated at the demonstrations during the Rose Revolution to support Mikhail Saakashvili. I noticed that when Georgian people are fed up, they mobilize quite quickly and express their political will. As time passed, it was difficult to live in Georgia. My family couldn’t afford living there. We had to leave.
Mustafa Bekov (artistic name: Mac Bekov) is an Ingush theater and film director, founder of the National Theatre of Ingushetia, Caucasian politician at the end of the 20th century, plenipotentiary representative of Ingushetia in the UNPO (unrepresetitive nationals and people organization) in The Hague from 1993.
As the son of parents who were deported to Kazakhstan in 1944, he was born in exile and had to live with the awareness of being considered an enemy since childhood. “Even before I could read and write, I was aware of the conflict surrounding my identity. Without really knowing why, I was clearly told that I was considered a criminal”. At the age of eleven, Mac received his first lessons in theater and life from the famous director Arsenij Ridal, initially a student and later assistant of Max Reinhard. Ridal introduced him to the methods of Stanislavski, Meyerhold, Vakhtangov and Michael Chekhov and helped him to develop a passion for art. Mac lived for several years in what was then Leningrad, “where Pushkin lived and Dostoyevsky swam”, and studied acting and directing at the Academy for Film, Theater and Music, as well as theater studies, psychology, philosophy and theater business. His professors were Irina Meyerhold (daughter of the famous W. Meyerhold) and Mar Vladimirovich Sulimov.
After many successful years as an in-house director, senior director and artistic director of theaters throughout the former Soviet Union, the National Theater in Grozny offered him the opportunity to bring his ideas to the stage. In this way, he brought his observations on human existence and political realities to a wide audience in artistic form. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, his artistic work was marginalized and Mac moved to Germany. In more than 40 years as a director and lecturer, he has created more than 50 plays and trained numerous actors and directors. His repertoire includes Shakespeare and Chekhov, Schiller and Gorky, Brecht and Lorca, Tennesse Williams and Mrozek, as well as many other authors. Mac has directed plays, tragedies, comedies, musicals and rock operas in many major theaters.
Ingush and Chechens lived together for a long time, they were deported together and consider themselves “brother peoples”. Why do you think they decided to separate in 1991? Do you think it was the right decision more than 30 years later?
This is not entirely true. Chechens and Ingush have always lived side by side, not together. In 1934, the regions of Chechnya and Ingushetia were united, and in 1936 the Soviet Socialist Republic was given the name “Chechen-Ingush Autonomy”. Prior to this, in 1928, the city of Vladikavkaz and later the areas adjacent to the city, the cradle of the Ingush people, were taken away from the Ingush. Previously Vladikavkaz was a fortress on Ingush soil during the Russo-Caucasian War. On November 1, 1991, President Dzhokhar Dudayev issued his first decree, the Decree on the Statehood of the Chechen Republic. On September 4, 1991, at a session of the Chechen parliament chaired and attended by President Dzhokhar Dudayev, elected at the Chechen People’s Congress, and party leader Selimkhan Yandarbiyev, I asked the Chechens not to declare their independence. I warned that the Russian political elite was not ready to give freedom to the colonized peoples and that this would already cause a great tragedy. I also said that the Russians consider us to be one people, although we are two fraternal peoples. The Chechens’ declaration of sovereignty would not help Ingush to restore statehood and achieve the return of the land by parliamentary means. The euphoria of the seemingly tangible long-awaited freedom drowned out my words. Then the decision was made.
Map showing territories claimed by the Ingush in 1992
After 33 years, I still believe that the Chechens’ decision was wrong. I still think it was right that the Ingush did not go the way of the Chechens. The Chechens declared their independence 33 years ago. This hasty and ill-considered decision cost them dearly. Did they achieve independence? No. Instead of independence, there were destroyed cities, three hundred thousand dead, forty-two thousand of them children. Destroyed farms and factories, a large number of refugees. Chechen refugees scattered all over the world. Those who stayed ended up under the oppression of Putin’s servant Kadyrov. But that’s not all: new generations have grown up, plagued by Putin’s ideology. Dudaev said that 70% would die, but 30% would be free. Where is the freedom? Thirtythree years have passed and the goal has become even more distant. The Ingush have regained their statehood, albeit only a pseudo-statehood. On June 4, 1992, the Republic of Ingushetia was founded as part of the Russian Federation. If the Ingush had joined the Chechens in 1991, they would no longer exist today. At that time, the population was less than 200,000 people.
In his own words, Dudayev was a bad general and a bad politician: “A good general does not go into a battle that he knows he will lose, and the Soviet general Dudayev knew exactly what the military capabilities of the Russians were. A good politician protects his people from rash decisions. All colonized peoples of the Caucasus should embark on the path of decolonization together. Going it alone is doomed to failure.
In your opinion, the independence of the peoples of the Caucasus from Russia can only be achieved if they all rise up at the same time. Don’t you think this possibility is utopian and don’t you believe that the Russian government is setting the people against each other to prevent this?
Each empire pursues the same policy with the peoples of the territories and resources it has conquered. It assimilates the peoples and plays them off against each other. This is confirmed by the famous saying “Devide er impera”. The Russian empire is no exception. But unlike other empires, the Russians claim that they did not come to conquer, but to liberate. And they suggest to the peoples that they have joined Russia voluntarily. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire after the February and October Revolutions, a mountain republic was founded in the North Caucasus from 1917 onwards, which existed until 1918/19. It had already taken place, so it was not a utopian idea. With the war against Ukraine, the Russian Empire is well on the way to dissolving itself. It is important that the Caucasian peoples overcome the obstacles created by the empire and reach an agreement.
In my opinion, even the Prime Minister of the Chechen government-in-exile, Zakaev, has understood this and is now talking about the confederation of the Caucasian peoples. With Gamsakhurdia, we issued the motto “The Caucasus is our common home” back in 1986. The path to the liberation of the Caucasus could therefore be that of a general uprising under one banner.
Akhmed Zakayev, Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, promoter of the project for the reconstitution of the Republic of the North Caucasus.
The restoration of a single republic in the North Caucasus was already theorized in the early 1990s. Dudayev himself was working on the establishment of a “Caucasian house”, if my sources are correct. Why do you think this project was not realized?
As I have already mentioned, the slogan “Caucasus – our common home” entered the political lexicon even before Dudayev, in 1986. The initiator was the dissident Gamsakhurdia. But the idea and the feeling for the need for unity among the colonized peoples of the Caucasus came from Visangirei Dzhabagiev. Deputy of the Tsarist State Duma, politician of the early 20th century. Considering the fact that the Caucasus was home to various peoples with common but also differentiated characteristics, Dzhabagiev recognized the need for a community and therefore emphasized: “Caucasianism is our nationality”.
Why did it not come about? The mass consciousness of the peoples of the Caucasus, clouded by communist ideology, was not yet ready for unity. In addition, Chechen politicians loudly emphasized the leading role of the Chechen people. This had a negative effect on the other peoples. Nobody wanted another Chechen “big brother” in place of the Russian one have a “big brother”. The empire also actively resisted this idea. And then came the war.
Recently, Akhmed Zakayev, together with other representatives of Caucasian communities, launched the project to establish a republic in the North Caucasus. What do you think of this project?
In principle, I support the initiative to create a pan-Caucasian state. As I said before, this is the only way to get rid of the Russian Empire and at the same time ensure that our peoples preserve their identity. I know Ahmed personally from my time in the theater. Ahmed was a gifted actor. He went through a difficult school of losses and, in my opinion, became a serious politician. The fact that he sent his son to defend Ukraine instills great respect and shows the seriousness of his convictions.
I believe that this project deserves support and has a future. I don’t know the details of the project, but I think Ahmed knows that the free peoples of the Caucasus do not tolerate inequality. Therefore, it is important what form of statehood is envisaged in this project. Whether a nation is large or small, everyone should feel free and have equal rights. The peoples of the Caucasus will not accept the establishment of a caliphate, an imamate and other forms of despotism.
At the end of the 1980s, the idea of founding a Chechen-Ingush federation was born in the intellectual part of Grozny’s population. Unfortunately, it was quickly buried again. As already mentioned, the idea of integrating the Ingush ethnic group into the Chechen ethnic group gained the upper hand, and so Zelimkhan Yanderbiev, a passionate Ingushophobe, became chairman of the VDR (Vainakh Democratic Party) and headed for independence. The Ingush realized that this was a deadly path for the Ingush (in those years there were no more than 200,000 Ingush), and I think that the Ingush did not agree to a war with the Russian Empire out of a self-preservation instinct. Time has shown that the Ingush acted wisely.
Isa Kodzoev
One of the most interesting personalities on the Ingush side is Isa Kodzoev. He was a dissident of Soviet power before the collapse of the USSR. The population was initially very positive towards him, but then favored a “moderate” current, which then negotiated the establishment of a federal republic with Moscow. Do you remember Kodzoev? Are there any other personalities (apart from Aushev, who we will talk about later) who you think deserve attention?
Of course I remember Isa Kodzoev and I knew him very, very well. He was not a “dissident” in the classical sense of the word. He was sentenced to four years in prison for his text “Diary of Kazakhstan”, in which he revealed the truth about the lives of the deported people. He returned from exile and settled in the village of Kantyshevo under KGB surveillance, where he taught in a local school. He was the chairman of the organization we had founded in 1986/87, the socio-political movement “Niisho”. I was one of its founders. Its aim was to restore Ingush statehood, to return the Ingush ancestral lands, to create conditions for the development of the national language, culture and art.
What did you think of the Ossetians? Did you regard them as members of the Caucasian community or as foreign bodies?
Before the 1917 revolution, relations between Ossetians and Ingush were not exactly fraternal, but they were not openly hostile either. There were many inter-ethnic marriages. And entire clans with mixed surnames were formed. After the revolution, relations became hostile. No Caucasian people considers the Ossetians to be members of the Caucasian community; the Ossetian elites themselves have tried to do so. The Ossetians are not natives of the Caucasus, but foreign tribes of modern Iran.
Muslim Ingush civilians stand among the wreckage of their destroyed home in predominantly Christian North Ossetia during the East Prigorodny Conflict, 1992. (Photo by Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images)
But don’t you think that the Ossetians should somehow be included in the hypothesis of a general uprising in the Caucasus? Or are they not included in the “Caucasian House” project?
If we rely on historical experience, there is little hope that the Ossetians will join the other Caucasian peoples. Rather, they will side with whoever has a stronger position. They helped the 9th and 11th Bolshevik armies to bloodily drown Georgia, which declared its independence, in 1921. I don’t think we can rely on the Ossetians. Most likely, the Ossetians will wait and see and then join the victors. In 1921 and 2008 in Georgia and in 1992 in Ingushetia, they made a very negative impression. The wounds that the Ossetians inflicted on the Georgians and Ingush in those years have not yet healed. That is a problem. But I think it can be solved.
We come to the war between Ossetians and Ingush.The reason for this war, if I have understood correctly, was the Prigorodny district. But what led to the outbreak of tensions between the two peoples? Who fanned the flames of war and why?
The USSR, heir to the Russian Empire, made sure that the peoples of the occupied territories were included in the conflicts. In our case, it expelled the Ingush from and ceded the land to the Ossetians, along with the city that was the capital of both autonomies. Under the conditions of land scarcity, this was reason enough for hostilities between Ossetians and Ingush. After the deportation of the Ingush, the remaining territories were ceded to the Ossetians, part of the mountainous regions to the Georgians and part to the Dagestani. After the repatriation, both the Dagestani and the Georgians voluntarily returned their lands to the Ingush, along with their houses and even equipment; the Georgians also left some of their pets behind. The Ossetians, on the other hand, prevented the Ingush from returning to their former homes. Even when the owner of the house returned and wanted to buy his own house, he was forbidden to do so by the leadership of the republic.
For many years, the Ingush returned to their homeland by hook or by crook. At the beginning of the 1990s, 70,000 Ingush lived in these areas. The Ossetian authorities organized various provocations and suppressed the Ingush at all possible levels. They were accused of all sins. They contributed in every possible way to increasing hatred and intolerance between the peoples. The Ingush living in the city of Vladikavkaz and the Prigorodny district were discriminated against by the Ossetian authorities in all areas of life. This escalation of hatred between Ossetians and Ingush was systematic and was carried out by the leadership of North Ossetia with the approval of Moscow. All appeals to the Kremlin remained unanswered or were not in the interests of the Ingush people. In January 1973, a peaceful demonstration of thousands of Ingush took place in Grozny. The Ingush expressed their distrust of the local authorities and demanded to be heard by Moscow. I was a young man of 21 at the time, took part in this demonstration and witnessed how and what happened there. I mention this because the participants in the demonstration were later persecuted for alleged anti-Soviet activities. The Chechen residents of Grozny supported the demonstrating Ingush en masse. The doors of Chechen apartments and houses were open for the demonstrators to warm up, for prayers and there was hot food for everyone. Temperatures in January are above -25 °C.
I personally experienced the intolerance and prejudice of the Ossetian authorities towards the Ingush people. In 1980, after I had received my diploma, I was sent to the Russian State Theater in Vladikavkaz. I was not allowed to direct a single play. The North Ossetian party headquarters obstructed me and forced me to leave Vladikavkaz. They couldn’t allow an Ingush to work as a director in the theater. From their point of view, the Ingush were an inferior race.
As is known, the Ingush people achieved the restoration of their statehood through parliamentary work, and on June 4, 1992, the Republic of Ingushetia was established as part of the Russian Federation. As a result of the parliamentary work of our deputies, with the support of the population The Law of the Russian Federation “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions” of October 18, 1991 N 1761-1 was also adopted. The Ossetian authorities were aware that the path to territorial rehabilitation was not far off. Moreover, Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia (The return of territories illegally expropriated from Ingushetia by political means and the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Ingushetia is the most important task of the state) left no doubt that the Ingushetian people would fight for the return of the annexed territories.
il 21 Aprile 1996 Dhokhar Dudaev, primo Presidente della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria, fu assassinato dall’FSB. Nell’anniversario nel ventottesimo anniversario della sua morte, pubblichiamo un brano tratto dal secondo volume di “Libertà o Morte! Storia della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria” (Link)
Nell’aprile del 1996 i ceceni potevano dirsi vicini a raggiungere la vittoria: l’esercito federale era in piena crisi, ed Eltsin aveva un disperato bisogno di pace per vincere le elezioni presidenziali[1]. Le cancellerie europee, rimaste sul chi va là di fronte al “Piano di pace” presentato dal presidente russo, dopo aver inutilmente atteso l’avvio di negoziati tra le parti, erano tornate a tormentarlo con richieste pressanti di interrompere le azioni militari, lamentando la violazione della Convenzione di Ginevra e minacciando un ulteriore slittamento dell’accordo di partenariato tra Mosca e Bruxelles, che ormai languiva dalla primavera del 1994. La Commissione politica dell’Assemblea Parlamentare del Consiglio d’Europa aveva approvato un documento nel quale si diffidava la Russia a procedere alla immediata attuazione del piano di pace, o di qualsiasi altro piano specificando che qualsiasi soluzione negoziale avrebbe potuto avere successo soltanto se tutte le parti in conflitto, compreso Dudaev, vi partecipano. Il documento conteneva una condanna senza riserve delle violazioni dei diritti umani in Cecenia, commessi sia dalle truppe federali che dai combattenti ceceni. Riguardo al comportamento dei primi, la risoluzione riteneva inadeguato ed ingiustificato il massiccio ricorso alla forza da parte delle truppe di Mosca, e riconosceva che tali mezzi erano la prova tangibile del mancato rispetto da parte della Federazione Russa degli obblighi assunti col Consiglio d’Europa. Infine, proponeva la mediazione dell’OSCE in un negoziato che portasse alla ricomposizione del conflitto. Il tempo giocava a favore di Dudaev, e presto o tardi i russi avrebbero dovuto scendere a patti con lui. Sempre che, ovviamente, non riuscissero ad ucciderlo prima.
Dzhokhar Dudaev
Fin dall’inizio delle ostilità l’FSK aveva investito ingenti risorse nel rintracciare il presidente ceceno. La prima azione per trovare ed arrestare Dudaev era stata messa in atto dal Procuratore Generale russo il 1° febbraio 1995 quando, all’indomani del fallito assalto a Grozny, la magistratura di Mosca aveva emesso un mandato d’arresto a suo carico. Il suo caso includeva quattro capi d’accusa: tentativo di usurpare intenzionalmente il potere, sabotaggio delle attività del governo costituzionalmente eletto, incitamento pubblico ad azioni terroristiche e istigazione all’antagonismo nazionale sociale e religioso. L’FSK aveva promesso di prendere Dudaev nel giro di qualche giorno, ma non era riuscito neanche a capire dove potesse nascondersi. Alla fine di aprile era stata costituita una task force che individuasse Dudaev e lo prendesse, vivo o morto. Nel corso del 1995 i russi avevano tentato di eliminarlo quattro volte, ma il Generale non era mai caduto in trappola. L’aeronautica russa bombardava sistematicamente tutti i villaggi dove girava voce che si trovasse, senza mai riuscire a colpirlo. Il 21 aprile 1996, tuttavia, Dudaev commise un errore fatale. Il suo convoglio si trovava nei pressi del villaggio di Gekhi – Chu, diretto ad una vicina collina ben coperta dai boschi dove il Generale avrebbe dovuto intrattenere conversazioni telefoniche via satellite. Insieme a lui viaggiavano il suo assistente, Vakha Ibragimov, il Procuratore Militare Magomed Zhaniev ed il Rappresentante di Dudaev a Mosca, Chamid Kurbanov. Nel convoglio erano presenti anche sua moglie, Alla, ed un nutrito seguito di guardie. Mentre Dudaev stava parlando al telefono un aereo militare apparve dal cielo e lanciò un missile aria-terra che colpì con grande precisione l’auto sulla quale viaggiava. Da tre mesi i servizi segreti russi tentavano di triangolare la sua linea telefonica, utilizzando come riferimento un telefono dello stesso tipo che Salman Raduev aveva abbandonato a Pervomaiskoje. In altre quattro occasioni erano quasi riusciti ad individuare Dudaev, ma la repentina chiusura delle comunicazioni aveva impedito ai missili di intercettare in tempo il segnale, mancando il bersaglio. Il missile che fece centro quel fatidico 21 aprile era progettato per dirigersi verso una fonte radio, e non appena ne fu rilevata una (in quegli anni non erano molti i telefoni dotati di una simile tecnologia in Cecenia) puntò la sorgente. Per evitare questo genere di rischi Dudaev aveva stabilito che il suo assistente avrebbe dovuto cronometrare le conversazioni e, qualora queste superassero una certa durata avrebbe dovuto immediatamente chiuderle, anche contro il suo volere. Anche in questa occasione pare che Ibragimov avesse fatto scrupolosamente il suo dovere, interrompendo la conversazione dopo pochi minuti. Ma quel giorno erano previste due telefonate a distanza ravvicinata, il che permise ai servizi russi di non perdere il segnale. Inoltre il cavo dell’antenna si era rotto, costringendo Ibragimov a sistemarla direttamente sul tettino dell’auto. Per favorire l’individuazione del segnale, nelle settimane precedenti, le autorità federali avevano causato volontariamente una serie di blackout nella rete elettrica locale, spegnendo tutte le sorgenti radio e tracciando così la posizione del telefono. Il primo ad usare l’apparecchio fu Kurbanov, per leggere un comunicato. Subito dopo fu il turno di Dudaev, per una conversazione con il deputato russo Kostantin Borovoj. I due parlarono per tre o quattro minuti, poi la conversazione fu bruscamente interrotta dall’impatto del missile.
Commemorazione della morte di Dudaev sul luogo del suo omicidio, 1997
Dopo l’esplosione Alla Dudaeva, sbalzata in avanti dallo spostamento d’aria, corse al relitto fumante dell’auto, coperto di terra. Kurbanov e Zhaniev erano rimasti uccisi sul colpo mentre Ibragimov, che al momento dell’esplosione era in ginocchio davanti all’automobile, era stato sbalzato dall’esplosione ed era gravemente ferito. Dudaev giaceva poco lontano dalla macchina, coperto di terra e ferito superficialmente dalle schegge. Quando Alla prese la sua testa tra le mani, scoprì che dietro la nuca aveva una profonda ferita, che lo aveva ucciso sul colpo. Trasportato nel vicino villaggio, il suo corpo venne lavato e vestito di bianco. Alla avrebbe voluto seppellirlo in un cimitero, ma il mattino seguente l’aviazione federale bombardò tutti i cimiteri nei pressi del luogo dell’attacco, devastandoli. Così, per mantenere l’integrità del suo corpo, venne deciso di seppellirlo in un luogo nascosto, dove nessuno potesse trovarlo[2]. Una cerimonia pubblica fu comunque tenuta nel villaggio di Salazhi, alla presenza della maggior parte dei capi militari dell’esercito. Le esequie politiche del presidente furono tenute da Yandarbiev, il quale assunse ad interim i poteri di capo dello stato in qualità di Vicepresidente[3]. Parlando ai giornalisti, il braccio destro di Dudaev dichiarò: La morte del primo presidente ceceno non ha piegato il popolo, che è pronto a proseguire la sua battaglia per la libertà[4].
Morendo, Dzhokhar Dudaev lasciava un’eredità politica controversa. I suoi nemici lo avevano descritto come un dittatore attaccato al potere e responsabile delle peggiori atrocità. Dudaev fu più volte accusato di contrabbandare armi e petrolio, di alimentare attività finanziarie illegali. In molti paesi dell’Europa Orientale, come l’Estonia, fu invece considerato un eroe, al punto che gli furono dedicate strade, piazze e targhe. Nei paesi che avevano fatto parte dell’Unione Sovietica, e che avevano subito particolarmente la pervasiva presenza russa, il suo sacrificio fu pianto da molti: soprattutto in Ucraina, la notizia della sua morte fu accompagnata da manifestazioni di lutto pubblico. Perfino in Russia ci fu chi lo pianse: il 24 Aprile, tre giorni dopo la sua morte, fu fatto circolare un necrologio firmato dal Consiglio di Coordinamento del partito dell’Unione Democratica, nel quale si leggeva: Esprimiamo le nostre più sentite condoglianze al governo della Repubblica cecena di Ichkeria e al popolo ceceno in occasione della tragica morte del presidente di Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Musaevich Dudayev. Il suo nome rimarrà per sempre nella storia tra i nomi dei grandi combattenti per la liberazione nazionale dei popoli. Ricordiamo il suo dignitoso rifiuto di prendere parte alle repressioni contro il popolo estone nel 1991. Non abbiamo dubbi che la giusta lotta di liberazione nazionale del popolo ceceno non si estinguerà finché almeno un invasore calpesterà la terra di Ichkeria. Gloria all’eroe della resistenza cecena!
Per parte sua, Eltsin, che in quei giorni si trovava a Khabarovsk ed era in partenza per una visita a Pechino, commentò: Con o senza Dudaev, faremo comunque finire tutto in Cecenia con la Pace. Gli abbiamo proposto più volte di metterci al tavolo negoziale, ma lui ha voluto la guerra. Ebbene, la guerra non ci sarà più. Se l’uomo è morto, pazienza. […][5].
Chi fu, dunque, l’uomo che tenne in pugno il destino del popolo ceceno, che lo guidò all’indipendenza e poi lo trascinò nella catastrofe? Valery Tyshkov nel suo “Chechnya: Life in a War – Torn society” scrive: “Per comprendere l’emergere dei leader nel periodo post – sovietico è necessario affrontare le seguenti domande: come è nata una nuova generazione di “leader nazionali” dalla liberalizzazione? In che modo la popolazione post – sovietica li percepiva, e perché le masse seguivano tali leader? Su questa domanda ci concentreremo più da vicino, poiché l’impatto del ruolo di leader di Dudaev nel determinare gli eventi in Cecenia non può essere sopravvalutato. Un’idea comunemente sentita nel discorso accademico e pubblico della Russia è che quando le civiltà sono in conflitto, nel corso naturale delle cose, i gruppi etnici o i popoli, di cui sono composte, assumono leader che esprimono la loro volontà collettiva di realizzare un obiettivo storicamente predestinato. In altre parole, se Dudaev non fosse salito al potere, lo avrebbe fatto qualcun altro e tutto sarebbe andato in modo simile. Come ha osservato l’ex compagno di servizio di Dudaev, A.N. Osipenko, “Non fu lui a scegliere l’idea nazionale, fu quell’idea a scegliere lui”. […] Raramente è ammesso che un leader crei, o almeno influenzi in modo significativo il cosiddetto “movimento rivoluzionario” da solo. In realtà, il quadro è molto più complicato.” Dudaev si contese la leadership della Cecenia con personaggi che per molti versi erano più avvezzi di lui alla lotta per il potere. Politici come Zavgaev e Khasbulatov, personaggi pubblici come Hadjiev, sapevano come gestire il consenso, come divincolarsi tra le pieghe della volubile opinione pubblica, possedevano ottimi agganci ed avevano accesso a grandi capitali. Eppure fu lui, e non gli altri, a dirigere il gioco fin dalla sua discesa nell’arena. Se non avesse accettato l’invito a prendere le redini del fronte nazionalista, quest’ultimo non sarebbe stato in grado di percorrere lo stesso sentiero, e probabilmente la Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria non sarebbe mai esistita. Dudaev seppe fare politica e seppe costruire un solido consenso intorno alla sua figura, seppe polarizzare le passioni di un popolo in cerca di riscatto e libertà sovrapponendo a queste due parole il suo volto[6]. A differenza di tutti gli altri, Dudaev seppe far sognare le masse. Se Zavgaev cercò di comprarsele col clientelismo, e Khasbulatov cercò di conquistarle con l’assennatezza dei suoi discorsi, Dudaev seppe far loro immaginare un futuro. E poco importa se nel pratico si dimostrasse una persona poco adatta all’amministrazione dello stato: era un leader visionario che proiettava tutto intorno a sé un’aura di eroismo, una padronanza di sé, la consapevolezza di essere il condottiero del suo popolo[7]. E questo, alla fine, era quello che la maggior parte dei ceceni si aspettava da lui. Alla sua morte egli fu oggetto di una vera e propria venerazione collettiva, e la notizia della sua dipartita fu presa da molti come falsa, tanto che il plenipotenziario di negoziati del governo, Yarikhanov, dovette fare una dichiarazione pubblica per confermarne il decesso[8], e lo stesso dovettero fare Maskhadov e Basayev, apparendo pubblicamente sul “canale presidenziale”[9]. Ciononostante molti ceceni continuarono a rifiutarsi di credere che Dudaev fosse davvero morto, incoraggiati dalle parole del genero Salman Raduev (il quale giurò sul Corano che fosse ancora vivo) nonché di altri personaggi che facevano parte della sua cerchia ristretta[10], ma anche dallo stesso scetticismo di alcuni alti ufficiali russi[11]. Inizialmente, infatti, le autorità militari russe in Cecenia negarono di aver portato a termine un’azione volta ad uccidere il presidente ceceno, anche se i giornali riportarono svariate “fughe di notizie” dal quartier generale, secondo le quali l’eliminazione di Dudaev fosse uno degli obiettivi primari dell’intelligence del Cremlino[12].
Dare un giudizio di merito su Dzhokhar Dudaev non è facile, e forse non è neanche così utile. Chi lo vide come un capo fu ispirato dalla sua figura, e nel suo nome combatté e morì. Chi lo vide come un tiranno fece di tutto per abbatterlo. Sicuramente fu un leader capace di mobilitare il popolo ceceno come nessun altro aveva mai fatto dai tempi dell’Imam Shamil. Fu un uomo coraggioso, che abbandonò la prospettiva di una lunga e rispettata vecchiaia da illustre graduato dell’esercito per combattere la sua battaglia ideale. Fu anche un abile stratega sul campo di battaglia: sfidò la Russia con un esercito di volontari e riuscì ad umiliare il prestigio di uno degli eserciti più potenti del pianeta. Per contro fu un pessimo amministratore, ed un miope negoziatore politico. La sua riluttanza a scendere a qualsiasi compromesso, se pure rese la sua figura affascinante e romantica, condusse il paese alla distruzione. La sua scelta di gettare la sua patria nel carnaio della guerra totale provocò al suo popolo immani lutti e sofferenze, il suo supporto indiretto alle azioni terroristiche lo portò a sdoganare una tattica militare odiosa, che alienò ai ceceni la simpatia del mondo occidentale.
La morte di Dudaev lasciò un vuoto incolmabile. Per quanto questi avesse da tempo organizzato la successione del potere in caso di sua dipartita, non c’era nessuno in grado di ereditare il peso politico della sua persona. Soltanto grazie a lui le numerose e composite anime dell’indipendentismo ceceno erano rimaste unite sotto la bandiera della ChRI evitando, per il momento, l’esplodere di una guerra tra bande. Il numero 2 del regime, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, era pronto a farsi carico delle sue responsabilità, ma il suo compito non era facile. L’indipendentismo aveva sempre avuto un solo eroe, e adesso questo eroe era morto. La Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria non aveva più il suo punto di riferimento e rischiava di spaccarsi in una galassia di piccoli potentati in guerra per la successione al potere. A complicare le cose giunse l’annuncio, falso, da parte del governo Zavgaev che lo stesso Yandarbiev era stato ucciso. Ci vollero alcuni giorni prima che fosse chiaro che a cadere non era stato il Vice – Presidente, ma un suo nipote, e nel frattempo i media specularono su chi avrebbe dovuto raccogliere il suo testimone, ipotizzando addirittura una guerra civile tra le forze indipendentiste[13]. Quando l’equivoco fu ufficialmente chiarito, Yandarbiev si mise all’opera, prima di tutto per ottenere la lealtà dei principali comandanti sul campo. Maskhadov, Basayev, Gelayev, Alikhadziev, Atgeriev, tutti i principali leader della resistenza riconobbero il suo primato politico, in attesa che la fine della guerra portasse ad una ridefinizione dei rapporti di potere[14]. D’altra parte la nomina di un capo era fondamentale: la morte di Dudaev, per quanto tragica, rimuoveva il principale ostacolo all’apertura di un canale diplomatico con le autorità russe. Non che fossero in molti a credere ad una soluzione negoziale della guerra: i militari russi temevano che un’altra tregua avrebbe nuovamente avvantaggiato i ceceni, permettendo loro di ricompattarsi e di lanciare una nuova ondata di attacchi. I comandanti sul campo ceceni, dal canto loro, non si aspettavano niente, considerato com’era andata fino ad allora. Il capo del governo filorusso, Zavgaev, non aveva alcuna intenzione di parteciparvi, essendo intenzionato a capitalizzare il massimo risultato politico derivante dalla morte del suo avversario. In concomitanza con la morte del generale rispolverò addirittura il Congresso del Popolo Ceceno, indicendone un’assemblea straordinaria. L’evento vide la partecipazione di 400 delegati, reclutati tra i rappresentanti delle comunità favorevoli ad un accordo con la Russia. Davanti a loro, Zavgaev chiese ed ottenne il mandato per l’organizzazione di nuove elezioni parlamentari, tramite le quali consolidare la propria posizione e disfarsi, almeno in parte, dell’ingombrante supporto derivante dalla nomina d’imperio ottenuta da Mosca nell’autunno dell’anno precedente. In quell’occasione, una voce si levò contro il “Capo della Repubblica”: quella dell’ex sindaco di Grozny (ora Vice Primo Ministro) Bislan Gantamirov. Intervenuto all’assemblea, si dichiarò insoddisfatto del lavoro di Zavgaev, sostenne che la sua figura non avrebbe facilitato il processo di pace e si dissociò dalla sua politica collaborazionista. Come vedremo, questa posizione gli sarebbe costata cara.
[1] A metà Aprile il governo russo sembrava intenzionato a riprendere i colloqui con Dudaev. Secondo quanto riferito da Kommersant il 18 Aprile 1996, Eltsin aveva dato mandato al Ministro per le Nazionalità, Mikhailov ed al Consigliere Presidenziale Emil Pain di riattivare i contatti, negoziando il ritiro delle forze federali e la normalizzazione della Cecenia. All’iniziativa, ancora informale, aveva fatto eco la dichiarazione pubblica del Ministro della Giustizia russo, Valentin Kovaljov, il quale aveva ventilato il ritiro delle accuse formali a Dudaev a seconda dell’esito dei colloqui, segno evidente che la leadership del Cremlino era disponibile ad accomodarsi pur di presentare all’opinione pubblica un piano di pace credibile. Per parte sua Dudaev aveva chiesto l’intervento quali mediatori del Presidente della Turchia, o del Re di Giordania, dando a intendere di essere disposto a raggiungere un accordo di massima con Mosca.
[2] Pochissimi sanno ancora oggi dove si trovi la sua tomba. Certamente ne fu a conoscenza il Vicepresidente, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, che dopo la sua morte assunse la carica di Presidente ad interim. In un’intervista rilasciata a Peter Grokhmalski nel Luglio del 1996 disse: Il mondo intero vede il comportamento degli aggressori russi. Niente è sacro per loro. Non vogliamo che profanino i resti di Dudaev. Un ceceno che si fa beffe del corpo del suo nemico, che tortura un prigioniero, cade in disgrazia. Per i russi, questo è motivo di orgoglio. Pertanto, oltre a me, solo poche persone conoscono il luogo di sepoltura di Dudaev.
[3] In realtà, secondo quanto riporta Ilyas Akhmadov in The Chechen Struggle, al momento della morte di Dudaev non esisteva, o non era più reperibile, un decreto legittimo che attestasse la nomina di Yandarbiev alla carica di Vicepresidente. Secondo quanto raccontato dall’autore, quindi, venne redatto un provvedimento predatato per legittimare il passaggio dei poteri.
[6] Un contadino di Vedeno di 18 anni, intervistato sul suo rapporto con la figura di Dudaev, raccontò: “Quando Dudaev salì al potere ero studente di una scuola islamica. Il nostro insegnante ci disse che Dudaev era stato mandato dal cielo, che il suo vero nome era Dzhovkhar (“Perle” in ceceno) e che il suo avvento era stato predetto dall’antica tradizione. In quel momento si svolgevano molti raduni e tutti urlavano “Allah Akhbar”. Poi abbiamo iniziato a scandire “Dzhovkhar! Dzhovkhar!”. Anche il nostro insegnante, che era il Mullah della nostra scuola, venne alle manifestazioni. Quando gli ho chiesto chi fossero i nostri nemici, ha risposto “gli infedeli”. Ha anche detto che in un sogno aveva visto Dudaev scendere dal cielo su delle ali. Disse: “Con un leader del genere siamo invincibili!”. Tutto ciò di cui la gente parlava sempre più spesso era la guerra. E anch’io volevo andare in guerra.” Una ragazza cecena, ricordando il giorno della sua nomina a Presidente, riferì: WRicordo il giorno dell’investitura di Dudaev. […] Ha prestato giuramento al teatro e poi è andato al palazzo del governo in mezzo alla gente, una folla enorme. E’ stato straordinario, ho sentito che stava succedendo qualcosa di importante. Non posso dire di essermi votata a Dudaev proprio in quel momento, ma da allora qualcosa è cambiato in me. Era così bello nella sua splendida divisa da generale! Ho detto agli amici: “Andiamo a vederlo, non ci perdoneremo mai di non averlo fatto se ce lo perdiamo!”
[7] Sempre citando Tyshkov: Dudaev era il tipico carismatico “non sistemico” il cui potere risiedeva nella concezione di progetti irrealizzabili […] nell’ignorare soluzioni ai problemi pratici. Come scrive M.A. Sivertsev “Il leader carismatico che cerca una risposta alle sfide di un tempo di transizione e instabile deve affrontarlo in un orizzonte visionario: deve ripristinare i legami di lunga durata con le basi idealizzate della vita. Questa capacità (il suo carisma) di ripristinare l’esperienza sacrale conferisce al leader la legittimazione delle sue azioni. Il suo malfunzionamento e le sue insignificanti carenze nella sfera formalizzata – razionale sono perdonati e persino considerati come un’ulteriore prova di forza carismatica […].” Rivolgendosi ai miti della lotta e della vittoria, all’animosità e alla vendetta, il leader carismatico modella le percezioni dei suoi seguaci e da quel successo la sua immagine eroica personale acquisisce la necessaria stabilità. Quindi, costruisce una sottocultura chiusa che sviluppa la propria lingua, il proprio codice e le proprie pratiche, con connessioni minime verso il mondo esterno.
[8] Secondo quanto riferito da Kommersant, il 23 Aprile Yarikhanov dichiarò alla ITAR – TASS: Dudaev è stato ucciso, non c’è dubbio. Insieme a Dudaev, sono state uccise diverse persone della sua cerchia ristretta, incluso il suo assistente Vakha Ibragimov, così come il Procuratore Militare Magomed Zhaniev. In realtà Ibragimov non era morto, ma giaceva in condizioni critiche in un letto d’ospedale. Si sarebbe ripreso nel giro di qualche mese, tornando a partecipare alla vita politica della Repubblica una volta finita la guerra, tra le file dei nazionalisti radicali.
[9] Il canale televisivo presidenziale era una trasmissione prodotta da una rete di emittenti artigianali gestite dai sostenitori dell’indipendenza. Trasmetteva principalmente dai centri a Sud di Grozny, ed era in grado di rendersi visibile nella capitale ed in buona parte del Sud del paese.
[10] Interrogato sull’argomento, il segretario personale di Dudaev, Sapuddin Khasanov, dichiarò che Dudaev stava lavorando normalmente e che le voci sul suo assassinio erano totalmente infondate.
[11] Secondo quanto riporta Kommersant del 25/04/1996 il Presidente del Comitato per la Sicurezza della Duma, Viktor Iluychin, affermò di essere disposto a credere alla morte di Dudaev soltanto dopo che il suo presunto cadavere fosse stato riesumato, mentre lo stesso comandante in capo delle forze federali in Cecenia, Tikhomirov, dichiarò che le truppe di Mosca non avevano assolutamente niente a che fare con la morte di Dudaev, contraddicendo la versione ufficiale, secondo la quale il presidente ceceno sarebbe caduto vittima di un attacco missilistico. D’altra parte altri alti ufficiali dell’esercito confermavano la presenza di cacciabombardieri a Sud di Urus – Martan, intenti ad attaccare bersagli in ricerca libera come rappresaglia per i recenti attacchi ceceni alle colonne russe.
[12]Secondo quanto riportato da La Repubblica del 25/04/1996: «l’azione punitiva» è stata finalmente rivendicata da un rappresentante altolocato del ministero dell’Interno. “Ci siamo vendicati per l’agguato ad una colonna di automezzi russi che ha provocato la morte di decine di soldati e ufficiali”ha detto, e “abbiamo distrutto a colpi dì missili sette sedi segrete di Dudaev di cui sapevamo l’ubicazione”. Una di quelle sedi si trovava a Ghekhi-Chu dove è stato centrato il bersaglio principale. Fonti dei servizi segreti a Groznij sono state ancora più esplicite: “Si è trattato di un quinto tentativo, stavolta riuscito, nei giro degli ultimi 2-3 mesi”.
[13] Sul Kommersant del 30/04/1996 appare un lungo articolo che specula sull’ipotesi di uno “scisma” tra Maskhadov e Basayev. In quel frangente la versione del quotidiano russo fu prontamente smentita dai protagonisti, ma il confronto tra i due si sarebbe consumato davvero, pochi anni più tardi, portando la Repubblica ad un passo dall’autodistruzione. Molto probabilmente in quel momento, nel pieno del conflitto, più che di “scisma” si poteva parlare di “concorrenza”. Riportando le parole usate da Ilyas Akhmadov in una delle nostre conversazioni: “Sfiducia” è una parola troppo forte per descrivere la loro relazione in quel momento. C’era sicuramente una certa concorrenza tra loro però. Non era pubblicamente riconosciuto, solo coloro che erano nei circoli privati di Basayev e Maskhadov erano a conoscenza. Alla fine, i due hanno lavorato insieme meravigliosamente. Ci sono stati anche alcuni disaccordi sugli incaricati di Maskhadov . Maskhadov è venuto nella regione natale di Shamil e stava nominando delle persone. Ma durante la guerra c’era una legge non scritta secondo cui un comandante, quando si trovava nella sua regione d’origine, era il principale responsabile. […].Ma come ho detto, a parte poche persone, la competizione tra Shamil e Maskhadov era quasi invisibile agli occhi del pubblico. […] A quel tempo, la tensione tra Shamil e Maskhadov non era grande. Era divertente, a volte quando Shamil voleva dire qualcosa a Maskhadov me lo diceva e viceversa. […] È possibile che nel tempo la competizione abbia portato a disaccordi molto più pubblici durante le elezioni. Ma durante la guerra, sebbene avessero alcuni disaccordi, erano più personali e non divennero un problema pubblico.
[14] Tale decisione fu assunta dal consesso dei comandanti militari in una riunione straordinaria del Comitato per la Difesa dello Stato (GKO) tenutasi a Roshni – Chu subito dopo la morte del presidente ceceno, durante la quale venne avanzata anche l’ipotesi di nominare Maskhadov al posto di Yandarbiev, considerato il contesto bellico nel quale la successione avrebbe dovuto svolgersi. Maskhadov tuttavia rifiutò, invitando i convenuti a rispettare quanto previsto dalla Costituzione.
Do you know what basic conditions were constantly and ambiguously put forward by the West in almost all negotiations with state leaders of the USSR in 1989 – 1991, when it came to providing credit and charitable assistance, and this was not publicized in the Union press? Yes, the creation of that very financial oligarchy (5-10% of the population), capable of controlling up to 60% of the country’s total potential, with the guaranteed establishment of the institution of private property and protection of large-scale foreign investments and foreign property!
Then, strangely enough, the first to realize it and tried to take it into account, albeit limitedly. N.Nazarbayev, but M.Gorbachev for a long time was floundering and hesitated, grasping for various alternatives that were saving in his opinion, but miraculous, as it turned out later, until the whole feud with GKChP broke out, mainly because of irreconcilable differences of opinion among his entourage….
As long as the society reforming towards collegial privatcapitalism does not decisively overcome the transition stage of non-authoritarian state capitalism, which is dangerous because of its instability and centrifugal forces, chaos, crime, economic collapse and general ungovernability in public spheres may reach its peak, followed by monstrous armed conflicts and historically irreversible processes. The example of the collapse of the USSR, the “critical boiling points” in Russia and the CIS countries, and, thank God, only sensitive echoes in the Chechen Republic serve as impressive proof of this.
Dzhokhar Dudaev
Back then, in 1984, nothing seemed to foreshadow that such a powerful empire could collapse in such a short period of time by historical standards. And only the highest echelons of power were aware of the fact that the cumbersome and non-adaptive to the ever-increasing demands of the country’s economy management system was failing more and more catastrophically every year, its “slippages” were throwing the USSR further and further away from the advanced countries of the capitalist world in terms of economic development. The “cosmetic repairs” of the state apparatus did not save it, nor did the desperate reshuffling of personnel in it produce any results. That is why, finally, M. Gorbachev, relying on the brave and radical wing of his entourage, decided to reform the state structure. The general public is well aware of the deplorable results of the experiment for the President of the USSR. But what was M. Gorbachev’s mistake, why did he fail to skip the dangerous stage of non-authoritarian state capitalism, even introducing elements of private property and legalizing entrepreneurial activity? Were the centrifugal forces so strong, and the aspirants to the future “financial aces” were still just playing “nursery cooperatives”? Yes, probably. But this was not the only factor.
If one imagines authoritarian state capitalism in the form of the famous Ostankino TV tower, the stability of which is created by the extremely tight steel rope running through it, then the “cable of political stability” of the former USSR consisted of many strands of “unfreedoms” that created the necessary strength. In his attempt to throw the rope bridge from the “top of the Soviet system” to the “Western model”, M. Gorbachev weakened to a greater or lesser extent many of the steel strings, such as freedom of speech, press, information, expression of will, national self-expression…. and even entrepreneurial activity, while leaving the “inviolable” but coveted private property 100% tightened. And while the West was feverishly winding some ropes on its “bay of democracy”, the construction of the Soviet tower staggered and collapsed. The ropes that had already been thrown over did not help; they sagged and plunged us all into the swamp of collegial state capitalism.
The main and also fatal mistake of M. Gorbachev (if only this ERROR!?), was in the FOLLOWING loosening of the strings stretched on the “soviet fingerboard”. The example of “communist China” is clear evidence of this. They do the opposite there and apparently play the “guitar of economic reforms” quite well.
WHAT is the fate of the Russian Federation now? Will “Yeltsin’s sappers” be able to overcome the unfortunate”minefield”for the Union, or is the explosion imminent? Or maybe “Khasbulatov’s” frightened parliament will be able to pull everything back to more familiar circles? What if it all comes back to bite us in Chechnya? Nowadays, few people probably remember the December 1991 speech of Boris Yeltsin. His program speech, made on the 28th after the famous Belovezhskoe deed, although it was verified in parliamentary language and slightly diplomatically veiled for potential Russian tycoons, shone a long-awaited green light as a signal for the most active actions, as an indulgence for the ideals of private property. Behind it stood the little-known fact that the current processes in the Russian Empire (USSR, CIS and the Russian Federation proper) were financed. And it was done by target purpose “under Yeltsin”, who unlike M. Gorbachev, who was bluffing. He gave his consent to the West for the birth of the Russian Financial Oligarchy! International capital already then paid for the first stage, when a person who cannot swim is thrown into the water, seducing him with the pleasure of market relations, which can be obtained on an equal footing with others who have previously mastered swimming in the sea of capital. If he doesn’t drown at once and continues to swim, we will help him a little more, but if he goes to the bottom, we will always find another candidate. It makes no difference who will continue the line of M.Gorbachev and B.G.Yeltsin, be it L.Rutskoy or R.Khasbulatov, but they will not give up what they have, c’est la vie, but that is the logic of the powerful.
Another, and by no means unimportant factor is the fact that Russia has significant healthy forces, high intellectual potential, desire and means to complete the radical reforms that have been initiated. That is, a complete set – Stimulus, Motive, Means and Power.
That is why, summarizing, we can say with great confidence that the young Moscow guild of capitalists, which is emerging and growing stronger day by day, coupled with a foreign armada of “associates”, together with Boris Yeltsin’s team, although rather shabby in battles, but resilient, will bring the matter to its logical conclusion. What is in store for us? Will the mutant virus of the management tools of authoritarian state capitalism (last time in our country it had a variation under the name of “Soviet partam pa ratnoy”), which is stubbornly fighting for living space in the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, as well as in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, still give rise to incurable metastasis. After all, such a cancerous contagion inevitably dooms the representative bodies of the authorities to become a kind of “reanimated Chechen regional party committee”, taking over from its deceased predecessor the rudimentary functions of control, management and distribution in the sphere of production and consumption, and usurping the right of “the only connoisseur of the interests and problems of the people”.
MIkhail Gorbachev
So what should be our priorities? How, what forces and means should we use in the first place? These are not easy questions, but there are visible answers to them.
Let us first of all realize once and for all one simple axiom. Not a single Parliament of the world and not a single President, sitting in their palaces or residences and issuing only laws and decrees, have not fed a single nation or created commodity abundance for anyone in the history of the world. The welfare of their people is brought, usually by special initiative people (large organizers and entrepreneurs, businessmen and business scientists) who, thanks to their efforts, abilities and talent, often at their own expense and at their own risk and risk, create in society special mechanisms of social and state development, known to them alone and, at first, only understood by them, using as a creative driving force the factor of satisfying the interests of the largest and most productive part of the population. Exactly they, using the personal factor of Means, through the Motive of the attracted specialists, maximally include the factor of Interest of the Producer People, strengthening the factor of Power of the State, which in turn contributes to the next similar cycle, but already at a higher level. As a result, new jobs and guaranteed wages appear in the country, the share of “buy-and-sell” business begins to give way to creative and service business, etc. In short, it is what is called “economic recovery”, the main thing is to legally allow them to do it! And if we can’t do anything to help, it is important not to hinder it, shielding this saving layer of society from aggressive attacks of the “socialist virus” of equality without the rich and hatred of “bloodsuckers”.
That is why there is no more important task for us today than to create the most possible conditions for the intensive development of the business class, from which domestic Vainakh tycoons of financial and industrial capital will inevitably emerge, the future flagships of the Chechen ship, the guarantors of stability and prosperity of society. It is all the more urgent because, unfortunately, unlike Russia, no one will finance us. Believe me, to the great joy of the Metropolis and not without its handiwork, there are no countries in the world that at this stage would fill the empty niche of the Chechen financial oligarchy as an external friend. The vectors of geostrategic interests of Russia and those states that could actually do it are very different in their directions. The dominant Russian factor of Power and its known unpredictability leaves no one in doubt here. There is no alternative “adrenaline” for us today, and unfortunately there is no minimum necessary start-up capital. At one time we missed a very important moment when COUNCH could have made timid steps and prerequisites for the creation of oligarchic structures, but in the Parliament of the Chechen Republic we defeated the syndrome of the mental deficit acquired from the Bolsheviks. There were other missed opportunities. However, there is a deep conviction, based again on the laws and examples of social development, that the Vainakh people, having unlimited potential reserves, will be able to dispose of them rationally, that a part of the excessive willpower of the present Chechen population will necessarily transform into the missing factors and compensate for any emerging inhibitory moments on its way. And there is no other Alternative to this!
Finally, the last hot topic of discussion of the day is the legitimacy of the current form and content of the state structure of the Chechen Republic. This is a kind of self-branded tablecloth for our political cooks who are losers. Grief-experts of both the domestic and Moscow variety go to what extremes and grave extremes, looking for a speck in someone else’s eye. In order to prevent the “worm of doubt” about the legality of Chechnya from tormenting some people and to finally knock the labeled “trump card” out of the hands of others, the following clarifications are required. If we take a dialectical approach, then legal professionals know that a reference to any law of any country can always be challenged, whether on historical, legal, moral and ethical, or other aspects, due to the fact that jurisprudence is essentially eclectic, i.e. “no wisdom is simple enough”, since one can always find a counterargument to any argument if desired.
It is impossible to create any small-minded code of laws without explicit or implicit contradictions. Humanity has not yet developed a universally-identified, logically adequate and legally sterile language, like computer linguistics, free from such shortcomings. And then on the scales of the disputing parties, in principle, there will always be strong enough competent justifications in their favor, but the adoption of judicial, arbitration, socio-political or any other “legal” decision depends predominantly on the balance of forces and opinions in society, on the power and force positions of the disputing and verdict parties, finally, on the prevailing realities. This has always been the case everywhere, at any level, from the “village council” to the UN General Assembly,
Boris Eltsin
There is no doubt that Russia has not been able to “crush” us after the 1991 secession, but it is also indisputable that Chechnya has not yet won back its position in this dispute. Today we are like two tired wrestlers on the mat who, having entered the clinch, have taken a wait-and-see stance for the final victory throw. A difficult precarious balance for the country. But, remember that Unrecognized Permanent Reality tends to be legitimized sooner or later. It is only a question of time and stamina, and the effort to make it happen. Apparently, just as scientists pharmacists take a long time to reach the required prescription for a new and unexpected disease, our way of choosing the establishment and implementation of rationally effective public administration is also long. It is just that a sick person always wants to get well as soon as possible.
Personally, I see us in collegial privatcapitalism, which, of course, has nationally distinctive features, and I am convinced that the Chechen state has not only a history, but also a real, “not banana” big future, all we need to do is to set the “good Gene Capital” free. If we don’t do it, others will do it.
In closing, I would like to remind you of one thing. Do not forget. The TRUTH is like an infinite mosaic panel consisting of innumerable pieces of “truths”. Truth is one, cognizance of all the immense depth of which, apparently, is not given to a mere mortal, to know it in its entirety is destined only to the Almighty Himself. We are destined to perceive only its separate fragments. Each individual has his own set of “truths”, from which he can make his own part of the canvas of truth. How much of it will he really display, of what components is it composed of, and what should they be? These and other similar questions, have not yet been identified in our society.But I believe in the collective Vainakh capabilities, in the Chechen Stimulus and Motive, capable of painting the necessary picture of the Truth, however small in size and large in number its components may be, because behind each of them stands our Man with his priceless destiny
That is why the archaic for modern foreign political science linguistics terminology “good, honest, decent, fair”, etc. as applied to our new power structures does not have even approximately unambiguously identified semantic content, because a million people will give exactly a million different interpretations to it. For some reason, for example, when speaking about the performing skills of a musician, we use quite natural and characteristic definitions such as “talented” or “skillful”, but not at all “virtuous” or “crystal honest”. This, as they say, is from a different opera.
Why is it that in politics everything is put upside down and professionalism is advanced to the “good guy”? Any specialist is very jealous of dilettantish talks about the subtleties of his profession. In politics, strangely enough, everything is allowed.
If we give in to the verbal exercises and tempting enticements of the rather proliferated “elementary educated” and use as state-building material such abstracted criteria thrown by Satan himself, we will probably not build anything good…ANY community of people at all times is differentiated, and the real basis of its division is the multiplicity of human aspirations, principles of behavior, potentialities and influential moments. Integrating by one or another criteria into groups and categories, they constitute those real natural forces and movements in society. In this connection, it is probably worth recalling that the formation and development of the state, which is also true for any individual, is based on these four characteristic driving factors, conventionally named: STIMULUS, MOTIVE, POWER AND FACILITIES.
STIMULUS is usually understood as a value reflecting the vector sum of its components, such as all kinds of Interests, Desires, Feelings, etc. MOTIVE is a potential value integrating Intellect, Knowledge, Experience, Know-How, etc. Another vector value is POWER, which integrates Power and Strength. And finally, FACILITIES is another potential value, the components of which are Money, Resources, Funds, etc. Predominantly operating with such concepts, which are “political bricks, mortar, armature and concrete”, and not with dilettantish abstract ones – “honesty, decency” or even “competence”, will always help any statesman and not only him to get a sufficiently objective dialectically verified analytical picture of any socio-political processes, to have the basis that does not allow making inexcusable and irreparable mistakes of political nature. The tools used for dismantling and destruction, as a rule, are unsuitable for construction and creation. That is why all appeals to “reason, brotherhood, understanding, unity, consensus…” etc. are useless. Only those who will be able to satisfy the Stimulus of the people, using the Means through the Motive of specialists, will be able to increase the Power of the state. Further. Many people thought, and are still strongly convinced of it, that it is worth to adopt the external attributes of the so-called civilized democracies, i.e. to elect a Parliament, a President and a Constitutional Court, delegating there the “best” representatives of the people, and all problems are solved. This is a monstrous misconception, and in conditions of collegial state capitalism, which today is certainly not only the Chechen Republic, but also Russia, these institutions turn out to be nothing more than the well-known “Hottabych’s telephone!” Absolutely identical to the prototype in all externally visible parameters and banally completely empty inside, without the electronic and mechanical stuffing that makes the apparatus work. We think, i.e. “call”, that we govern, while the people live under the influence of their objective social laws of evolutionary development.
Photo of a voucher (privatization check, 1992) with an indication of the place where the monogram of the artist Igor Krylkov is located on the banknote (letters I and K in an oval).
Parliaments, Senates, Congresses, as a rule, are only a symbol of POWER in the hands of the explicit (authoritarianism) or implicit (non-authoritarianism) MASTER and, at best, serve as a laboratory practice for practicing the legislature set by the Master or giving legitimate form to his wishes.
As for the Presidential Structures, Cabinets or Councils of Ministers, other possible state bodies of executive power, they, as a rule, fulfill the function of these Wishes. Naturally, any form of state governance is characterized by a greater or lesser divergence in the directions of vectors of interests of the Master and the People. Except that in authoritarian state capitalism the change of the direction of the latter in its direction is performed by the Master mainly at the expense of the Power component of the Power factor, and in collegial private capitalism through the predominant use of the components of the Means factor. Unfortunately, and this is probably characteristic of most citizens of the former USSR, we are still in the deep captivity of nostalgic illusions about that executive power, which was exercised thanks to years of clearly defined totalitarian system, which had a wide range of appropriate tools: from fiscal bodies for suppression of dissent to institutions for “ideological straightening of brains”, from the stick to the carrot. Even the most ardent Western “anti-Sovietists” recognized at the time that totalitarianism ensured greater efficiency, discipline, and order. This is achieved, of course, at the expense of such characteristically dominant in authoritarian state capitalism worst components of the Stimulus, such as fear, fear, a sense of hopelessness, powerlessness, etc. Another question, of course, is what we have come to as a result of all this….
Let’s imagine hypothetically that the notorious Power overnight completely and completely passes into one hands: either the President, or the Parliament, or someone else. And let us be ruled by the ideal in each case, either presidential X. or the many-faced parliamentary Y, or nameless Z. What does this mean in practice? And that in this case all the national wealth, all the country’s resources and all its economic potential “falls under the monopoly of X. Y-a, or Z. That is, they will manage and distribute what they personally do not really own, but the owner – the people have very ephemeral economic rights! Together with the entire ministerial team, the governing echelon of the government can hardly constitute even one tenth of a percent of the population. But the psychology of behavior and programmed attitude of any manager – non-private co-owner, especially in the conditions of decline in economic production and deterioration of living standards of the poor part of the population, consists in instinctive efforts to keep the place under the sun by justifying the motives of their activities, referring to the difficulties of objective and subjective plan, as well as criticism of various formal and informal objects that create allegedly insurmountable problems. Remember N. Ryzhkov, V. Pavlov or T. Gaidar. V.Chernomyrdin is bound to follow this path.
Boris Eltsin
Naturally, and it is inherent in human nature, that the dissatisfied and offended, “who know better how the country should be run and what the people need”, necessarily starting with derogatory criticism, can move on to much more serious and active actions to “restore justice”. What is the response for the ruling elite? To tighten the screws? But this is a return to totalitarianism, from which they fled and have not yet had time to catch their breath. Make personnel reshuffles? Nothing will change significantly. Then the System itself must be replaced! But, as it seems, we changed it by dismantling the “unified party-parameter room” and creating a modernized one with “separate warheads”. This is where another stumbling block turned out to be. Having flown out at first in one “anti-imperial missile”, we ended up like those “swan, crayfish and pike”, with our spatially differently oriented vectors of Stimulus and Power, different baggage of Motive and Means.
Yes, sometimes power is divisible. And its rank gradation is possible both vertically and horizontally. But on a national scale, it always has pyramidal differentiation, strengthening from the base to the top. And two or even three pyramids in a country is a competition of authoritarian authorities. Reasonable peace or peaceful compromise in such unnatural conditions is nonsense. Artificial attempts of horizontal separation of powers, i.e. to make several Masters at the same time, is an objective doom for “family-economic” strife, which will continue until the unstable balance will not take its more natural stable state, peculiar only under one definite Master, until the divided pyramids will finally merge into one. Many people mistakenly see the antagonism of “divided powers” as a personal factor. Then imagine, for example, that we swapped places with the Chairman of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic. In half a year, if not sooner, having mastered and gotten up to speed, having been in a “different skin”, each of us will defend new positions, noticing a grain of sand in someone else’s eye and not seeing a log in our own. And there is nothing surprising or tragic in this, it is simply the natural nature of a person to defend the interests of a certain (“his”) group and category of people or, if you like, a part of society. I am sure that the same metamorphosis would have happened if B. Yeltsin and R. Khasbulatov had been swapped.
Former Soviet Parliament Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, seen here second-left in 1993
What then is the reason for stability in the collegial private capitalist camp? Is their “collective economy” quiet and smooth and God’s grace? Not at all. And here interests and motives may differ greatly, and various storms and tsunamis may occur. But in the world, where “the dominance of private property” rules, the communicative language of business invariably develops a mutually acceptable solution, which, having passed through “their” structures of power, is always implemented, as it is refined by the filter of economic expediency and the state Guarantor of Private capital. The only way of civilized solution to any conflict, which has been worked out for centuries, is to make it more profitable for the disputing parties to stop the conflict than to continue it. We have yet to master such methods.
Thus, implying a change of the System, in fact we have changed only its external Form, its Attributes. The System itself remained inviolable – state-capitalist! To finally dispel the last illusions about its viability, let us consider the question: “Will such a competitive government be able to effectively realize its management mission in the period of transition to market relations, so that the sheep would be safe and the wolves would be fed? What, in general, is its potential future, if neither M. Gorbachev and the Union Parliament, nor B. Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, nor other CIS republics have been able to do so so far – one does not need to go far for examples….
On April 29, 1993, the newspaper “Ichkeria” published a long article by Dzhokhar Dudayev, in which the President of the Chechen Republic framed the political context in which the Republic found itself, and proposed a long and detailed reflection on the direction that the new state of the Chechens he could have taken. We are publishing the first part today, translated into English.
On the question of the state-political structure of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
Front page of the newspaper “Ichkeria”
The reason for writing this article was my sincere conviction of the need for an urgent, comprehensively balanced and thorough conversation about our long overdue and pressing issues. Almost a year and a half has already passed since the proclamation of the independent Chechen Republic. What seemed a few years ago to be a centuries-old pipe dream for the Chechen people is today, in spite of everything, an objective reality. We have not only freed ourselves from imperial dictate, but also proclaimed the task of building a new social formation on the model of developed capitalist countries, calling it “secular civilized”. Of course, it seemed to many people before that everything was much easier, it was enough to remove odious figures, to break or dismantle some things, to give up something and everything else would go on as usual, we could not afford any problems. Moreover, we had almost no doubts about WHAT exactly we wanted to build and HOW exactly we wanted to live in it. It seemed to us, and even now we are strongly convinced of it, that we should only adopt the external attributes of civilized democracies, i.e. elect a Parliament, a President and a Constitutional Court, implementing the so-called “separation of powers”, delegating the best representatives of the people to these structures, and all the issues will be solved by themselves. But the future, as it turns out, always makes its unexpected adjustments.
The “revolutionary” euphoria gradually passes, unfamiliar and ear-slashing word combinations become commonplace and familiar, and every day’s life puts before us all new problems and questions, and each time more and more complicated. And with time we become wiser. Even a cursory retrospective look at the recent “our beginning” allows us to rethink many things in a new way, highlighting the blunders and mistakes. Add to this the fact that the chronic failure to solve some of the main problems of economic nature for our society in this transitional period often gives rise to nihilistic moods, feelings of dissatisfaction and pessimism, sometimes turning into defeatist or even aggressive rejection of everything that has been done. But there is nothing tragic in this, believe me, nor is there any reason for panic. This is the dialectic of the natural course of complex reformist transformations. It is said that a man rejoices twice – when he “buys” and then when he “sells”. We have already experienced the first, and we have obviously come close to the second. But it has become difficult to revise what we have acquired, what we can still use, and what it is time to consign to the dustbin of history.
The statue of Lenin torn down in the square of the same name in Grozny, renamed “Sheikh Mansur Square”
However, in the modern era of information and political boils and maximum conditions for the politicization of society, it is indeed extremely difficult to understand objectively the intense events taking place around us and to give them an unambiguous analytical assessment. Even the Chechen “political elite” is not ready for this. The absence of effective methodological tools in its “portfolio baggage” has not only put us all in an erroneous dead-end position, but has also failed to outline a sufficiently effective way out of the crisis. Today we can name several myths and basic misconceptions that have had a devastating effect on the process of the formation of the Chechen state and which can be conditionally characterized as follows:
1) uncertainty of the state-legal status of the Czech Republic; 2) false premise of “separation of powers”; 3) myth of “good leaders”; 4) choice of the form of economic development
The most fierce disputes and discussions that hamper our progressive course are connected with the ambiguous assessment of the socio-political and socio-economic formation that is now called the Chechen Republic. Today there is no shortage of all sorts of definitions and attempts to characterize all the diseases of our state, no shortage of “authoritative diagnoses” and plenty of “alternative-free prescriptions”. That is why a logically adequate interpretation of the investigative processes surrounding the current stage of the Vainakh people’s historical development is becoming very relevant. In my opinion, only the anatomy of the disintegration processes of the Russian Empire’s transformation, on the one hand, and the influence of the laws of evolutionary development of human society, on the other hand, can provide such a tomographic picture of a profound understanding of the problems of the formation of a sovereign Chechen state.
According to Western scientific standards, modern history knows two types of state structure: authoritarian and collegial. The former is usually understood as a regime of unity of power, when a PERSON (chief, leader, etc.) rules. The second is understood when the country is ruled collegially by representatives of different forces of society. Each of these forms of state structure can have, pronounced variations, state-capitalism and private capitalism. That is, there are four main modifications:
authoritarian state capitalism: 2) collegiate private capitalism; 3) authoritarian private capitalism; 4) collegiate state
We would like to warn, first, that often used definitions such as: totalitarianism, dictatorship, democracy, etc. should be used very carefully, because, often and especially in the context of the issue under consideration, they do not really reflect either the essence or the content of the state structure, which will be explained below. And, secondly, although this classification does not claim to be true in the first instance, it is a simple and reliable pilot map among the reefs of “Noev’s” political science terminology. As is known, the former USSR of the “pre-Gorbachev period” was one of the classic examples of the authoritarian state capitalism regime with all the necessary attributes of pyramidal comprehensive and all-encompassing power and executive discipline. This was a necessary and sufficient basis for the adopted centralized scheme of management of the national economy of the country. A vivid example of the opposite and antagonistic state system is the collegial private capitalism of the USA. At the same time, the predominant characteristic of the private capitalist system lies in its inherent ability to self-regulation, which is inherent within it and inherent only to it, and which is tuned to the level of the highest social efficiency and economic expediency, penetrating the state structure in the opposite direction – from the micro to the macro level.
The flag of the Soviet Union, an example of “State Authoritarian Capitalism” cited by Dudayev
It is clear that they have more differences than similarities. And this is quite common knowledge. But the main fact is that in the first case, the role of the owner of the country is played by a specific person (general secretary, president, chairman…), and in the second case – by the FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY. It is the true, though not explicitly expressed, real “master of the situation” in the capitalist world, and not the president, senate or congress, as many sincerely delude themselves. Presidents come and go, but the financial oligarchy remains. This field should be known and always remembered! In the capitalist world, the parliamentary and presidential institutions, which today are fashionably but dilettantishly nodded to in various arguments, are nothing more than an officious facade of the “powers that be”: financial tycoons, military-industrial magnates, royal dynasties, and sometimes even the mafia. If THEY do not wish it, no ideal law issued by the parliament or presidential decree will have a life. If the “officios” step out of the conditioned framework and break the taboos, it ends his career politically or even physically. The assassination of John F. Kennedy is a vivid example of this. If a political crisis breaks out in a developed capitalist country, for example, Italy or South Korea, and the government is urgently changed, you can be absolutely sure that in the “quiet family circle” of the financial oligarchy there is an outwardly unremarkable, but very significant for this country new balance of power and balance of interests of spheres of influence.
Flag of the United States of America, example of a “collegiate private capitalism” cited by Dudayev
The third, very few, group of countries of authoritarian private capitalism includes, for example, the Sultanate of Brunei and some “banana kingdoms”. Being an inherently unstable entity, this form is characterized by frequent regime changes and patrimonial coups d’état. However, if international capital enters such a country under the influence of its interests, achieving the necessary level of balance of internal forces through financial and forceful support of one of the parties, then the authoritarian private capitalism is provided with a long “life”.
Finally, the fourth, also unstable (due to the uncertainty of a single master) form of state structure, which is usually a transitional stage either from collegial private capitalism to authoritarian state capitalism (1917 in Russia), or vice versa (current processes in the “socialist” countries). It is clear that in this classification, which, although conditional, is very effective and illustrative, the Chechen Republic is not in the first formation, from which it fled under the flag of anti-imperialist sentiments, but it is clearly not in the second one, to which it is not clear how long we have to run. We are also far from the third “dignitary” camp by nature. Well, the last thing left is collegial state capitalism! That’s where our forced landing is and the stove from which we are obliged to dance. Another pernicious factor for the Chechen state is the unanimity that the absolute majority of people believe that it is necessary and sufficient for the republic to have “good leadership and a good parliament”, which could supposedly improve the life of the people. At the same time, practically everyone has his or her own version of “good” candidates for leadership positions.
The dangerous consequences of such and other similar, outwardly very attractive and seemingly only true, approaches lie in the methodological incompetence that has struck our society. Unfortunately, we very often, one could say, often lump everything into one pile and do not make special distinctions between concepts, terms, phraseology. Expressing ourselves with the same words, we perceive their different contents.
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